Hegel's Discovery of the Philosophy of Spirit

Autonomy, Alienation, and the Ethical Life: The Jena Lectures 1802-1806

P. Ifergan

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781137302137
• Topic: Filosofía
• Subtopic: Historia y teoría filosóficas

This exploration of Hegel's critique of the individualistic ethos of modernity and the genesis of his alternative vision traces the conceptual schemes Hegel experimented with to show how he settled on the concepts of 'ethical life' (Sittlichkeit) and Spirit as the means for overcoming subjectivity and domination.

1

What Motivated Hegel’s Philosophical Project?

1 Introduction

Every first-year philosophy student soon learns the schematic version of the history of modern philosophy, which she can use to characterize the figures deemed to have played a role in shaping modern philosophy. According to the schema, the rationalists and the empiricists constitute two distinct camps separated by an unbridgeable conceptual chasm. This chasm remained impassable until Kant, who succeeded in putting an end to the seemingly intractable conflict with his grand synthesis, which united the two opposed conceptual frameworks. The last significant protagonist in this long-running battle, prior to the emergence of the Kantian solution, was Hume. For a while, it seemed that Hume’s skepticism had managed to settle the dispute between the rationalists and empiricists in favor of the latter. But the schema presents the Humean solution as a pyrrhic victory, inasmuch as the empiricist epistemology – the putative victor – necessarily undermines the validity of philosophical reasoning. Kant’s synthesis, however, carries out the crucial mission of bridging the chasm between rationalism and empiricism. At the same time, it also accomplishes something perhaps even more important: it provides an appropriate answer to Hume’s skepticism. This answer, in addition to its crucial contribution in making possible objective knowledge – a pre-condition for the sciences – also serves to re-assert the validity, in principle, of philosophical reasoning.

So powerful has the schematic version of the history of modern philosophy been that over the years, it has become an integral part of the philosophical tradition’s self-understanding. It serves us as a conceptual and historical framework within which, or in relation to which, we identify schools of thought and philosophical positions. Its primary advantages are its simplicity, and the fact that it tells a convincing story, that is, it presents a convincing account of intellectual history. The narrative is appealing chiefly because its general structure is that of antagonism and a heroic struggle which culminates in a resolution, like a story with a happy ending: the antagonism is overcome, and the struggle ends.

The absence of a similar such tale of struggle in the annals of post-Kantian philosophy in general, and of the formative period between Kant and Hegel in particular, is striking. This conspicuous lacuna does not merely put the history of post-Kantian thought at a pedagogic disadvantage, which in any event might not be viewed as a problem for philosophy per se. Its significance lies principally in its impact on the prospects for describing and understanding the questions facing philosophy in the wake of the Kantian achievement. The absence of a clear and accepted historical schema is, as I noted, particularly conspicuous with respect to German Idealism as it underwent a transition from Kant to Hegel via Fichte and Schelling.¹ Any attempt to describe this transition quickly leads to a dead end, or to what can be characterized as an impasse between the claim that there is a basic continuity between Kant’s philosophy and Hegel’s, and the claim that there is no such continuity.

On the continuity thesis, there was a continuous philosophical process that began with Kant and was completed by Hegel. This thesis, put forward in great detail early in the twentieth century in Richard Kroner’s From Kant to Hegel, continues to find advocates among interpreters of Hegel even today. Prominent exponents include, in Germany, Klaus Düsing and Hans Friedrich Fulda, and in the English-speaking world, Robert Pippin, Allen Wood, and Terry Pinkard.² A possible motivation for the persistence of the continuity thesis may lie in the explanatory power of the schematic account of the history of modern philosophy up to Kant. On the schematic account, Kant resolved the fundamental dichotomy of modern philosophy, hence any continuation of the philosophical endeavor after Kant must constitute either a conceptual modification of the Kantian solution, or alternatively, correct its flaws and fill in its lacunae. There is simply no other possibility. This neo-Kantian outlook is responsible, to a great extent, for two very different readings of German Idealism’s philosophical project. The first reading is apologetic. On this reading, the only way to justify the philosophical stance espoused by German Idealism is to construe its premises as fully identical to those of the Kantian project. The other interpretive reading is critical, seeking to undermine the philosophical project of German Idealism by claiming that the whole project rests on a complete misunderstanding of the premises of the Kantian position. On this line of thinking, the fact that some proponents of German Idealism take themselves to be continuing Kant’s work is but an idle boast, a delusion. This may also be one of the reasons for the persistent tendency to dismiss or belittle German Idealism on the grounds that it rests on a misunderstanding of Kantian philosophy.

Juxtaposed to the continuity thesis is the discontinuity thesis, the thesis that during the transition from Kant to Hegel, philosophy underwent a major rupture. Hegel’s philosophical project is taken to represent the culmination of this rupture. On this account, Hegel constitutes the consummation of the process of severance, not only from Kant’s philosophical project, but also from that of modern philosophy in general, beginning with Descartes. The most radical characterization of this transition presents it as a fundamental transformation of the philosophical enterprise, which ceases to be the reflection of consciousness on itself – the philosophy of subjectivity – and is re-framed as conceptual activity aimed at understanding the cultural and historical context that determines the human condition, and the possibility of changing it. Given the fundamental shift posited by the discontinuity thesis, the schematic picture of modern philosophy up to Kant is – from the perspective of the discontinuity theorists – inappropriate as a description of Hegel and post-Hegelian philosophy, since the problem that philosophy must now confront is very different from that addressed by Kant, inasmuch as its basic objective has undergone a crucial change.³

The unsuitability of the schematic version of the history of philosophy from Descartes to Kant as a description of the problematics of the transition from Kant to Hegel creates, as I said, a dichotomy between accounts that posit continuity and those that posit discontinuity. This raises a question the importance of which is not merely historical, but primarily philosophical: is it possible to resolve the controversy and determine, once and for all, whether the transition from Kant to Hegel is characterized by philosophical continuity or discontinuity?⁴ There seem to be at least two possible routes by which one might seek an answer to this question.

On the one hand, it would seem to be possible, prima facie, to carry out a conceptual analysis of the philosophical problems with which Kant grappled, and to decide whether these are, ultimately, the same problems that occupied Hegel. Answering this question in the affirmative will also provide an unequivocal answer to the continuity–discontinuity controversy. This is the route taken by most interpreters of Hegel up to the present.⁵

The second path to an answer is more complex. It involves surveying the motivations underlying post-Kantian philosophical thought, seeking to determine their interconnections and tease out their conceptual ties to the fundamental problems addressed by Kantian philosophy. The controversy between champions of continuity and champions of rupture is perceived as an integral aspect of the transition from Kant to Hegel, since this transition – like every radical transition from one era to another – entails tension between continuity and discontinuity. The difficulty for those seeking to describe such a transition is always to explain how a new era emerges from the zeitgeist of the previous era without having to forgo its claim to originality. Yet originality insists on the possibility that the new ideas are continuous with those of the preceding era. For only by accepting the premises of the continuity–discontinuity controversy is it possible to speak of, or characterize as significant, a change in a historical or philosophical position. That is, the analysis of affinities between philosophical theories is based on the assumption that historical time, or to put it more accurately, time in general, is continuous and not discrete.

In my view, the second route provides a better account of the course taken by philosophical inquiry in the transition from Kant to Hegel, a process that resulted in a radical change in the core philosophical questions, and hence this is the route I will take.⁶ In other words, I will not seek to examine Hegel’s relationship to Kant in terms of conceptual issues devoid of any specific historical context, but rather, I will examine it in terms of the problems that actually motivated and gave rise to the work of the German Idealists.⁷ I will seek to show how these motivations determined the manner in which these thinkers understood Kant’s philosophical project. This understanding in turn determined the framework for their own philosophical project. Analysis of these motivations will enable us to further clarify the continuity–discontinuity controversy, as it will equip us with a clearer understanding of the sense in which the Kantian project is a necessary condition for later developments. Precisely because it is a necessary condition, only a radical departure from it, and not attempts to complete it or rectify its shortcomings, allowed for creation of the philosophical alternative put forward by German Idealism, especially its Hegelian version. The radical change to which analysis of the Idealists’ motivations points is, in essence, substantive and not formal: it addresses the fundamental questions of what philosophy tries to describe, and what it seeks to accomplish. Yet change of this type also necessitates the creation of a philosophical method that provides the tools with which to describe new philosophical challenges.

The radical change to which analysis of the Idealists’ motivations leads can also be characterized as follows: philosophy is no longer perceived as a-historical, but as emerging from the historical context in which it is created. In effect, by reflecting this historical era, it captures the quintessence of the era and its malaise, or in other words, it provides a diagnosis, as it were, of the era. Yet paradoxically, at the same time it serves as a means of overcoming the maladies it uncovers.

This assumption that philosophy is not a-historical but emerges from the historical era in which it is created entails a new relationship to Kant’s philosophy, which is not construed as purely theoretical, but rather as the quintessential expression of the Kantian era. At the same time, Kantianism is criticized for its inability to offer a satisfactory solution to the era’s central problems, which it articulates so faithfully. The assumption thus clarifies how analysis of the Idealists’ philosophical motivations – their desire to understand their historical era as well as their desire to overcome its major problems – enables us to grasp the post-Kantian thinkers’ ambivalent relationship to Kant.

The crucial change in the meaning of philosophical reflection was not, of course, effected by a specific act. There was no cohesive ideological movement that put forth a manifesto explicitly articulating its relationship to Kant and spelling out an alternative to the Kantian approach. Rather, it arose from the gradual coalescence of a unique intellectual and historico-political constellation. This process, the final outcome of which is epitomized by Hegel’s assertion that there is a relationship between historical reality and philosophical reflection, can nonetheless be characterized in many different ways depending on which figures are taken as its heroes. We might endorse a description in which thinkers such as Solomon Maimon, Karl Reinhold, Friedrich Jacobi, and Fichte are the protagonists. If we choose this course, our discussion will undoubtedly focus on theoretical questions arising from a close reading of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, will tend to be circumscribed rather than open-ended, and will not seek to extend the discussion to the broader debate between the Enlightenment thinkers and their critics, which is in essence a historico-political debate. Or we might prefer a description in which a few of the same thinkers figure, for instance Jacobi and Fichte, but this time as cultural critics rather than theoreticians. On this scenario, they will be part of a major movement that will include such central personalities as Herder, Hamann, and Schiller, as well as many lesser figures. Their shared focus will mainly be the image of man (Bild von Menschheit)⁸ ensuing from both Kant’s theoretical philosophy and his practical philosophy.⁹ If we endorse this description, the thrust of our discussion will shift from philosophy to the ideological struggle between the Enlightenment and Romanticism.¹⁰

I do not wish to minimize the importance of taking these diverse descriptions into account if we are to arrive at a full and comprehensive understanding of the emergence of Hegel’s philosophy, but my own description of this process here will emphasize the ongoing connection between theoretical reason and practical reason. By the term “practical reason,” I am not referring to concrete political praxis, but rather, to ongoing scrutiny of the implications of a given thinker’s theoretical views on the question of man, to the extent that this question is conceptually dependent on the philosophical theories out of which it emerged. To this end, I will restrict myself to exploring the relationship between Hegel and Hölderlin, and will not endeavor to construct an exhaustive list of ideas put forward by the German Idealists and invoked by Hegel in developing his own philosophy.¹¹

I have chosen Hölderlin because Hölderlin’s intellectual biography vividly exemplifies the melding of the two possible paths to a definitive answer to the continuity question – the conceptual-philosophical and the cultural-historical – without making an unequivocal distinction between theoretical and practical reason. But the choice was not motivated solely by the desire for narrative economy, and was made primarily for a substantive reason, namely, the fact that Hölderlin was not only the pre-eminent exponent of the themes that would be the cornerstone of the Hegelian project, on my reading of it, but also because Hölderlin was the one who first sketched out the solution that Hegel would ultimately embrace. In analyzing Hölderlin’s position, I will show how he articulates, for the first time, the fundamental problem that defines Hegel’s philosophical project as a project that is both a theoretical-philosophical reflection mediated by diagnosis of the epoch, and at the same time, an effort to offer a normative justification for a society-based philosophy rather than an approach anchored in the individual.

2 Hölderlin and Hegel: on the break with Kant and critique of the concept of reflection

There were two separate phases in the relationship between Hegel and Hölderlin: the first, at the Tübingen theological seminary, from 1788 to 1790, the second in Frankfurt from 1797 to 1800.¹² They met in 1788 in Tübingen, where Schelling later joined them. They shared the same radical views, views that were actualized in the French Revolution, and expounded philosophically in the writings of Rousseau and Kant. By the time they met again in Frankfurt in 1797, both Hegel and Hölderlin had adopted more refined and critical versions of the ideas they espoused in their seminary days. As we will see in the next chapter, Hegel’s adoption of these ideas is manifest in his various theological-political writings from the Bern period, his first stop after leaving the Tübingen seminary.

Hölderlin had gone to Waltershausen, where – like Hegel in Bern – he had taken a post as a private tutor; it was there that he encountered Friedrich Schiller and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and their respective philosophies. Both Hölderlin and Hegel underwent a gradual process of rejecting the ideas they had upheld while studying in Tübingen. This rejection, which seems to have initially reflected acceptance of Schiller’s critique of the Kantian position and his aesthetic solution to the problems it raised,¹³ is evident in the first version of Hölderlin...