Identity and Political Participation Among Young British Muslims

Believing and Belonging

A. Mustafa

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781137302526
• eBook ISBN: 9781137302533
• Topic: Ciencias sociales
• Subtopic: Políticas europeas

This book tackles unanswered questions on British Muslims and political participation: What makes religion a salient 'political' identity for young Muslims (over any other identity)? How do young British Muslims identify themselves and how does it relate to their political engagement? A fascinating insight into the lives of young British Muslims.

1

Setting the Scene

The years following the tragic events of the 9/11 attacks have been tremulous ones for Western Muslims. The political discourse among the political right, the frenzied tabloid media craving a new ‘threat’ and the general misunderstanding of Muslims has created a negative environment that has since escalated to permeate social opinion. Doug Saunders has succinctly described this fear and misconception as:

These Muslim immigrants, and their children and grandchildren, are not like earlier groups. They are reproducing at an unusually rapid pace, with fertility rates far higher than those of exhausted Western populations, and at some point soon – perhaps by mid-century – Muslims will become a majority in European countries and North American cities. This is a danger because, unlike other immigrants, they are loyal to Islam, not to their host society. They do not regard their religion as a private source of inspiration, but as a political ideology they intend to act upon. A line of shared belief connects the moderate Muslim believer to the radical Islamist and makes the majority of Muslims impossible to assimilate. They will permanently alter the West and promote a political agenda that will destroy our traditions and freedoms …

(Saunders, 2012: 5)

Saunders goes on to refute the above allegations, but the persistence of these attitudes towards Muslims continues nonetheless. The purpose of this book is, in essence, to explore how a second generation of British Muslims has grown up surrounded by these negative experiences, suspicions, veiled threats, while the majority of British Muslims identify with being British, both as a homeland and as an identity. The book explores the effect that their faith and identity has on their politics and the reasons behind the trend. This chapter draws on the significant events, occurrences, government policies, social surveys, and media output to illustrate the impact these have had on the outlook of young British Muslims, setting the scene for the remaining analysis.

Muslims make the second largest religious group in England and Wales, with 2.7 million members (4.8 per cent of the population) according to the latest 2011 census (ONS, 2013b). Among religious groups, Muslims continue to have the youngest age profile, with nearly half of Muslims (48 per cent) aged under 25 (1.3 million) and 88 per cent aged under 50 (2.4 million). The gender divide is very slight, with marginally more men than women (52–48 per cent) (ONS, 2013b).

Though Muslims are ethnically diverse worldwide, British Muslims are more ethnically concentrated – 68 per cent were from an Asian background, including Pakistani (38 per cent) and Bangladeshi (15 per cent). In the 2011 Census, 11 per cent of Muslims (including Arabs, Turks, Persians and other ethnic groups) identified themselves as belonging to the ‘other’ ethnic category, while Black/African/Caribbean/Black British made up 10 per cent. Nearly half of all British Muslims were born in the UK (ONS, 2013b). The concentration of Muslims living in London continues to rise (12.4 per cent), with Tower Hamlets having the highest proportion of Muslims (34.5 per cent) and Newham having 32 per cent (ONS, 2013b). Elsewhere, Blackburn has 27 per cent Muslim population, and Bradford, Luton, Slough and Birmingham have over 20 per cent each. In comparison with the 2001 census, London’s Muslim population has increased by 3.9 per cent (ONS, 2013a).

Muslims in Britain are very heterogeneous. They are diverse in ethnicity, language and class. They vary in their migratory patterns, geographical settlement and economic propensity. However, the key issues that affect young British Muslims are high unemployment and poor housing. This dangerous combination faces a large cohort of young British Muslims.

Evidence for high unemployment and lower economic activity rates for Muslims comes from several sources. The 2011 census results highlight that Muslims have the lowest levels of economic activity (55 per cent). The main reasons were because they were students (30 per cent) or because they were looking after the home or family (31 per cent), compared with 17 per cent of those with no religion and 8 per cent of Christians. This matches the younger age structure found among Muslim minorities.

However, for those who are economically active (i.e. those in or seeking employment, excluding individuals who are retired, looking after family/home or long-term sick/disabled), Muslims have the highest levels of unemployment: 17 per cent of economically active Muslims were unemployed compared with around 6 per cent of Christians and 9 per cent of people with no religion. In a continued exploration of employment penalties (in the labour market outcome literature this is a term used to refer to the poorer labour market outcomes observed, even where factors such as educational attainment and age are taken into account), researchers have recently begun comparing religious groups. The results have shown that religion is more important than ethnicity in explaining employment penalties for British Muslims (Lindley, 2002; Simpson et al., 2006; Berthoud and Blekesaune, 2007; Heath and Martin, 2012), especially among Bangladeshi and Pakistani women. The penalty faced by Pakistani and Bangladeshi women takes into consideration their family positions, and so having children does not explain why they face such employment penalties (Berthoud and Blekesaune, 2007; Heath and Martin, 2012). In the most recent study, Heath and Martin (2012) used pooled data from the 2005 and 2006 Annual Population Surveys and found a strong ‘Muslim penalty’ in unemployment and economic activity rates for both men and women from different ethnic groups. The penalties are greatest for women’s economic activity and smallest in men’s unemployment, but still significant enough to warrant attention.

Though British Muslims are mainly of South Asian descent, South Asian culture is not representative of Islam itself. In essentialising Islam this way, or to assume ethnic culture characterises the religion, we would be ignoring the wide variety of cultural, linguistic, historical and religious variations found among Muslims worldwide. In summary, the next chapter will highlight the influence that this global world has on the identities of these young British Muslims; these move beyond the ethno-religious dichotomies and labels used for generations past – the fluidity of identification has indeed created mosaics of identities.

In 2011, the ethnic group that ranked highest (71 per cent) in terms of association with the British only identity was the Asian/Asian British: Bangladeshi group. This was followed by the Asian/Asian British: Pakistani group and Asian/Asian British: Indian, with 63 and 58 per cent of these ethnic groups associating with the British only national identity respectively, rather than the British only; English and British; Welsh only/Welsh and British; Other UK identities; Irish only and Other only categories. This could highlight the fact that many British Muslims identify English/Scottish/Welsh and so on as ‘White’ racial categories, rather than a national identification.

There are numerous pieces of research that highlight the importance that Islam plays in people’s lives, as found in the 1994 Fourth Policy Studies Institute survey, in which 74 per cent of Muslims acknowledged that Islam plays a very important role in their daily lives, whereas only 43 per cent of Hindus and 46 per cent of Sikhs said the same of their religion (Modood and Berthoud, 1997: 301):

Islam serves as a frame of reference – a pattern of thought and communication – and gives meaning to their condition and behaviour. These Muslims may also have very diverse attitudes towards Islam and its practice. But what they do have in common is knowledge of Islam, on which they draw while engaging in a discourse so that they can communicate meaningfully and with relevance.

(Ansari, 2004: 13)

It is also the case that younger people are more likely than older people to identify themselves as Muslim. It seems that the spheres of influence that used to be accepted, such as parents, elders and cultural dictates, have been swept aside by young Muslims in favour of religious decrees and spiritual guidance: ‘Indeed, in the context of Islam, it has been claimed that increasing numbers of young Muslims in Britain are using the Qur’an and hadiths directly as a resource, rather than accepting the traditional views passed on to them from their parents … ’ (Spalek, 2007: 196).

Research also underlines that, as well as religion playing a role in the behavioural decisions of young Muslims, the views of youths are becoming more conservative in comparison with the views of their parents and grandparents. In a survey of 1,000 Muslims by Populus on behalf of Policy Exchange (between July 2006 and January 2007). It was found that 86 per cent of the respondents surveyed felt that their religion was the ‘most important thing’ in their life. Populus believed that the results indicated a growing religiosity amongst the younger generation of Muslims (Mirza et al., 2007). It seems that for young British Muslims, identity and religiousness are still important markers:

It is argued that, although secularisation has occurred at a societal level in Britain (as in other parts of Western Europe), it has not necessarily occurred at the level of individual consciousness, such that people continue to seek out religious and/or spiritual frameworks of understanding to help make sense of their lives. …

(Spalek, 2007: 193)

However, material and research on the influence of identity on political decisions is limited. Little is known regarding the political views and actions of young British Muslims. Considering the effects of 9/11, 7/7 bombings, conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, bans on minarets, headscarves and face veils across Europe, the recent murder of Drummer Lee Rigby and many more topical events, it is surprising that few have explored the possible influences of these occurrences on young Muslims. The Preventing Extremism Together Working Group set up by the government after the 7 July 2005 London bombings attempted to engage young British Muslims via grass-root activities.

The social context

In order to understand the identification and political participation of young British Muslims, an acknowledgement of the social context in which they live and have previously experienced is crucial. What is the social context and how is it defined? It generally refers to the social environment of wider society:

Social context refers to the patterns of human relationships and interactions that characterize social life … social organizations provide the context that largely determines what a person does in life … your behaviour is largely determined by the social context of which you are part. As your social context changes, so does your behaviour.

(Zusman et al., 2009: 5)

The range of arenas that have affected the environment in which British Muslims have lived are areas that are the focus of much sociological research – including official political discourse, and media propaganda and stereotyping, all of which have a crucial influence on the social context to which British Muslims are reacting and in which they are living. This book will at times refer to theorists, mainly from the social interactionist school of thought, because symbolic interactionists believe that as humans we react to the context around us, while also contributing to it and affecting others. Humans perceive the symbols, communication and evidence around them, then ‘interact’ or react and respond to it. Later in this book the explanations for the way in which young British Muslims act and make decisions use this theoretical framework.

One’s socialisation in this social context has a strong influence on the way in which one perceives oneself and the decisions one takes. It is imperative to appreciate these details in order to manage the forthcoming narrative about identification of nationality, ethnicity and religion. In exploring the political activities of these young British Muslims, researchers must appreciate how their decisions are made and in what context, as they do not exist in a historical vacuum: this cohort has been affected by a wider political narrative, a media mania and a wider social discourse over which it has little control.

This chapter explores the historically important events that have influenced this cohort of young British Muslims, these events mainly taking place before and even during the fieldwork phases (January 2006–October 2007; June 2009–July 2009). These occurrences are highly relevant in situating the data collection, as well as in helping to understand the respondents’ attitudes. Although historical events that occurred before the World Trade Center attacks are important, 9/11 is highly relevant to understanding the mindset and attitudes of some young Muslims – though it is difficult to pinpoint a starting point for such analysis: are historical events as far back as the Bosnia genocide (1993–1996) and the first Gulf War (1990–1991) relevant, or should we go further back into colonial and imperial history to the carving up of the Middle East after the First World War? Although elements of this history will be brought up later in the book, the emphasis on a historical background to this research is to illustrate the impact that these events have on the social context, and more specifically on the socialisation of individuals. The continued fear of terrorist threats continued with the Madrid bombings in 2004 and the London bombings in 2005. The shock that these were perpetuated by second generation British Muslims has reverberated for years afterwards.

The social climate during the last decade in Britain has seen the development of a subtle panic or hysteria that exists around Muslims. There is a ‘fear’ of Islam and Muslims are perceived as a threat; whether this is real or imagined, people react to these negative feelings. In this chapter, four main factors are discussed as influential in perpetuating this fear: ‘propaganda’ orchestrated by the media; governmental statements, political policies and legislation; counter-terrorism measures; and the creation of an ‘othering’ of Muslims, maintained by rumours, misunderstanding and misinformation. These factors have spawned a prejudicial and discriminatory environment surrounding British Muslims, channelling disparaging images and symbols, building stereotypes and attaching negative labels that reflect adversely on British Muslims, including terrorist, outsider, extremist, oppressor and violent.

Many high-profile events occurred before and during the two fieldwork stages that affected access to respondents. These events included the July 2005 London bombings; the printing of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in September 2005 by the Danish Jyllands-Posten newspaper, which caused controversy; the June 2006 Forest Gate raid scandal; the government’s attempted blacklisting of the group Hizb ut Tahrir in 2007; several negative newspaper reports and documentaries about Muslim groups and organisations, including Tablighi Jamaat in 2006, and a Dispatches programme about ‘undercover mosques’ in 2007; and the public courtroom murder of Marwa Ali El-Sherbini by a xenophobic man in 2009, which created shockwaves across Europe. The list could go on and on.

Media

The negative typecasting of Muslims in various forms of media, including popular fiction, tabloid press, documentaries and film, is fairly well documented (Poole, 2002; Shaheen, 2003; Ameli and Merali, 2004; Richardson, 2004; Poole and Richardson, 2006; Moore et al., 2008; Morey and Yaqin, 2011). There are several fearmongering publications that follow the ‘Eurabia’ thesis, arguing that Muslims intend to and will take over the West, imposing their law, values and lifestyles on their host nations (Phillips, 2006; Bawer, 2007; Caldwell, 2010).

Christopher Caldwell’s (2010) Reflections on the revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam, and the West also illustrates the deeply held fear of European Islamification. His book warns European politicians from being lax, and ultimately states that the European public is well aware of the cultural threat that Islam poses and is willing to fight against it. Popular writers and bloggers clamour to outshine each other in their abusive comments about Islam and Muslims. This negative representation is joined by popular fiction and novelists who demonise Muslims. The maligning of Islam and Muslims is no longer a private matter, and famous people with mass followings feel at liberty to express their distaste of Muslims without question:

Here is Martin Amis, one of Britain best-known novelists, on Muslims. What he has to say is extraordinarily shocking. His words, if used about any other minority, might have been seen as inciting hatred, if not violence. ‘There is a definite urge – don’t you have it?’, Amis told Ginny Dougary of The Times: ‘The Muslim community will have to suffer until it gets his house in order. Not letting them travel. Deportation – further down the road. Curtailing of freedoms. Strip-searching people who look like they’re from the Middle East or from Pakistan. Discriminatory stuff, until it hurts the whole community and they start getting tough with their children.’ Amis has since defended his remarks by asserting that he was engaged in a ‘thought experiment’. Here Martin Amis is doing much more than insulting Muslims. He is using the foul and barbarous language of fascism.

(Oborne and Jones, 2008: 15)

The globalisation of news also has an impact on the familiarity of localised or national issues, which become sensationalised through international media. The uproar in New York over the ‘Mosque at Ground Zero’ is a case in point. American incidents tend to take precedence owing to the volume and popularity of anti-Muslim incidents, including ‘Burn a Koran day’ in Florida initiated by Pastor Terry Jones of Gainesville and more recently the anti-Islam video ‘The innocence of Muslims’ in 2012.

Several publications catalogue the fabrication, falsification and exaggeration of news stories by both the mainstream and tabloid press in the UK (Poole, 2002; Poole and Richardson, 2006; Moore et al., 2008; Oborne and Jones, 2008). Evidence of negative headlines and stories focused on Muslims is plentiful: some of these stories have no evidence (such as Muslims demanding Christmas be banned – Osborne and Jones, 2008: 20), and some are stories that occurred, though not necessarily with any Muslim involvement (such as the banning of piggy banks – Osborne and Jones, 2008: 20). The common feature is the desire to sell newspapers, based on a negative image and portrayal of the Muslim ‘other’. Any subsequent ‘corrections’ that are made by these papers fall short of the apology that any other maligned person would expect for defamation of character.

There is also evidence that the public opinion polls designed, commissioned and analysed by media outlets reflect their own agenda ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Illustrations
• Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
• Glossary
• Introduction
• 1. Setting the Scene
• 2. Theorising Identity
• 3. Identity Typology
• 4. Impetus for Engagement
• 5. Political Participation
• 6. Politically Engaged and Ready for Action
• 7. Borderline/Contextual Political Activities
• 8. Out of Favour and Other Avoided Activities
• 9. Concluding Words
• Appendix
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index