There are multiple sources of instability on the worldās oceans. On a state level, geostrategic ambition and competition at sea have become almost inseparable from disputes over maritime territory and sovereignty creating littoral environments rife with geopolitical tension. At the same time, lawlessness, including illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, people smuggling and other transnational, transboundary maritime security threats, is growing in prominence and poses a significant challenge to good order at sea. The ramifications of this new reality at sea directly impinge upon security and stability on land and are driving significant changes in the operationalisation of maritime security and defence.
This evolving geostrategic environment at sea challenges traditionally held concepts of naval operations, mission delineation and the use and utility of civilian or paramilitary maritime law enforcement agencies (MLEA). For naval forces, the return of great power competition in both Asia and Europe has heralded a renewed emphasis on deterrence and warfighting. However, maritime security and good order at sea, concepts that gained substantial traction during the post-Cold War years, have simultaneously risen in prominence and are now central tenants of the national security thinking in maritime states across the world.1
National security and naval strategy are thus increasingly conceived across a continuum where warfighting and broader notions of maritime security are closely connected in both operations and strategic goals. Consequently, maritime law enforcement missions and the military and civilian agencies that carry them out have growing strategic relevance as the maintenance of maritime sovereignty, economic rights and the enforcement of good order at sea become hot-button strategic issues in capitals across the world.2 This is evident in the maritime doctrines of states and international organisations which seek to provide a ācomprehensive or holistic account of the challenges to be faced at seaā.3
Traditionally, navies and MLEA have maintained a degree of operational distance. National defence and security are the primary determinants of any navyās operations. Therefore, first and foremost navies must equip and prepare for wartime contingencies.4 However, most navies maintain a secondary emphasis on maritime security operations or what Booth describes as a policing function role.5
In contrast, MLEA, which may include but are not limited to coastguards, maritime police and maritime militia, carry out law enforcement and maritime security duties as their primary function.6 MLEA have traditionally been tasked with a wide variety of missions including protecting maritime sovereign rights, enforcing national maritime laws as well as providing other public goods such as search and rescue (SAR) and environmental protection.7 This does not mean that national defence does not fall under their operational orbit, but rather it is a lower priority when compared with their military counterparts.
The contemporary maritime environment is blurring the lines between the operations of navies and MLEA as they now frequently perform similar roles despite their different operational approaches and priorities. MLEA are now key instruments in a stateās maritime policies and by extension security strategies. States which previously have not possessed such agencies or have hitherto accorded them low priority are now developing or bolstering them to manage the multitudes of maritime challenges they face. The MLEA of some states have found themselves on the frontline of interstate tensions, not just protecting maritime sovereignty and economic rights, but also contesting rival claims. This is resulting in the proliferation of larger and more heavily armed MLEA vessels particularly, but not exclusively, in the contested waters of East Asia. For those states that solely possess a navy which simultaneously performs traditional warfighting and maritime law enforcement missions, there has been an ongoing reprioritisation of roles directed towards the capacity to address low-intensity threats at sea while also maintaining warfighting capabilities. Vitally, states with more than one actor at sea are reconceptualising the way their maritime agencies work together. For instance, states are bringing their navies and MLEA closer together, promoting synergy between them and when feasible developing joint operational concepts and encouraging joint operations.
It is important to acknowledge the geographic scope of this shift in maritime operations. The near global promulgation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has codified international laws regarding the delineation of maritime territory and economic rights. Although this has provided a degree of certainty when boundaries are agreed, the gaps within the provisions enshrined in the convention, especially with respect to the interpretations of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) regime, have, in the words of Geoffrey Till, ātriggered as many disputes as it has resolvedā.8 Essentially, UNCLOS has extended and magnified maritime sovereignty and economic disputes, turning them into issues of national pride and strategic importance.9 Equally, the unregulated nature of the ocean as a global commons allows for the exploitation of the sea both as a medium of transport and as an easy, if over-exploited, resource trove. Crucially, lawlessness and human deprivation which originates from weak or unstable forms of governance on land are often transferred across borders via the sea.10
For example, in the East Asian geostrategic maritime environment, multiple and diverse military and civilian actors now operate at sea, contesting maritime territory, exploiting weaknesses and forwarding national strategic agendas in a coordinated manner that falls considerably short of traditionally understood war at sea. In maritime flashpoints such as the East and South China Seas, MLEA vessels or āwhite hullsā are interacting with naval āgrey hullsā with significant implications for the maintenance of maritime crisis stability.11 In the Mediterranean, a humanitarian crisis with substantial political and strategic ramifications for Europe continues to unfold. Military and civilian maritime agencies have deployed to meet the challenge of refugees crossing the Mediterranean to reach the shores of Europe while also managing the consequences of a renewed Russian presence and continued instability in the Middle East.12 Meanwhile, in the Arctic, warming waters are altering the strategic picture, potentially creating a new environment for competition at sea.13 In all of these theatres, the maritime security structures of multiple nation-states are adjusting to this new set of strategic challenges.
Understanding the Navy-Coastguard Nexus
Using case studies, this volume seeks to explore these new maritime strategic dynamics. It examines how states have created or are transforming their maritime security architectures to meet the realities of todayās security challenges in the maritime domain. We call this organisational and strategic approach the navy-coastguard nexus . This term does not imply a dual agency approach to maritime security, as is seen for example in the United States; rather, it is an expression which encompasses how a nation-stateās strategic and organisational structures respond to a blurred maritime landscape. In doing so, the volume seeks to answer the following questions.
- What are the internal and external drivers of the navy-coastguard nexus?
- What are the operational, cultural and organisational barriers to altering the navy-coastguard nexus?
- What implications does a shifting navy-coastguard nexus have for stability at sea?
Navy-Coastguard Nexus Organisational Typologies
There is a wide array of national organisational structures designed to manage the navy-coastguard nexus. There is no one optimal approach as each organisational structure and consequent delineation and prioritisation of missions and areas of operation is determined by a wide array of internal and external factors. However, we have identified three broad organisational models which can help define how states approach the navy-coastguard nexus:
- The sole agency structure has one primary actor which meets most if not all a stateās maritime security requirements. That actor could be either a navy which also has total responsibility for maritime law enforcement and the provision of public goods or a MLEA that has a limited or no military function. While this sole agency approach is more commonly associated with smaller, resource-limited states such as Ireland, Iceland or New Zealand, larger states including the United Kingdom have also adopted this organisational structure. This is a commonly observed structure, with many of the worldās navies taking responsibility for the entire spectrum of peace- and/or wartime operations . In this structure, the sole maritime agency will work alongside other relevant agencies such as polic...