China's Selective Identities

State, Ideology and Culture

Dominik Mierzejewski, Bartosz Kowalski

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9789811301636
• eBook ISBN: 9789811301643
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica asiatica

This book discusses the role of selective identities in shaping China's position in regional andglobal affairs. It does so by using the concept of the political transition of power, and arguesthat by taking on different types of identities—of state, ideology and culture—the Chinesegovernment has adjusted China's identity to different kinds of audiences. By adopting differentkinds of "self", China has secured its relatively peaceful transition within the existing systemand, in the meantime, strengthened its capacity to place its principles within that system. To itsimmediate neighbors, China presents itself as a state that needs clearcut borders. In relation tothe developing world (Global South), the PRC narrates "self" as an ideology with the banner ofmaterialism, equality and justice. To its third "audience", the developed world (mainly Europe), China presents itself as a peaceful, innocent cultural construct based primarily onConfucius'passive approach. By bringing these three identities into "one Chinese body" (????, sanweiyiti), China's policymakers skillfully maneuver and build the country's position in the arena ofglobal affairs.

© The Author(s) 2019

Dominik Mierzejewski and Bartosz KowalskiChina’s Selective IdentitiesGlobal Political Transitionshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0164-3_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction: Theoretical Understanding of China’s Selective Identities

Dominik Mierzejewski¹ and Bartosz Kowalski¹

(1)

Faculty of Int’l & Political Studies, University of Łódź Faculty of Int’l & Political Studies, Łódź, Poland

Dominik Mierzejewski (Corresponding author)

Bartosz Kowalski

Keywords

ChinaPower transition theoryConstructivismIdentityStateIdeologyCulture

End Abstract

Since the nineteenth century, due to the growing interaction with external others, China has been facing a problem of finding a place for itself in international society. Building an individual identity for the “state” that tends to be “all under the heaven” (tianxia) and a civilization has been perceived as a fundamental challenge. The then Sinocentric view, a model of auxiliary states (fuguo) and the Confucian vision of great unity (datong) was challenged by the Western modern state apparatus (Shang Huipeng, 2009, p. 57–58). Through interaction with external others, China had the Westphalia nation-state centric system imposed upon it by the Western powers. At this point, the collision between two different perceptions of the world in the nineteenth century played an important role in shaping China’s international behavior today. After years of being economically backward, China is rising and, like every rising power, is attempting to substantiate its legacy by building its own identity, and through these means, shape its power status. Along with China’s growing economy and greatly improved material status, Chinese authorities have raised questions of fairness, equality, and justice. On the one hand, China shows its aspirations, but on the other, it tries to meet international expectations. By building its own set of values and identity, China hopes to protect its national interests, create a peaceful environment for further modernization, as well as shape its identity at the same time. The Chinese identity is perceived as socially constructed and shaped by China’s historical experiences. For this, Chinese leaders have shaped the principles of peaceful coexistence and assisting the developing world. During Mao’s time, China developed a coherent, revolutionary identity, and tried to build a united front with the Third World. Despite being more pragmatic and non-revolutionary oriented, policymakers in the 1980s were reminded of China’s principles and the need for contributing to developing countries. During the next two decades, Beijing continuously built its economic strength and in 2005 used the moral term “harmonious world” to describe its actions in the world. Xi Jinping introduced new dynamics with his Belt and Road initiative and leveraged China to become a global actor that does business in every corner of the world.

To the surprise of Chinese policymakers, China’s macroeconomic success has elevated China to become the world’s second-largest economy. After China became involved in international affairs as a UNand WTO member state, the question “who is China?” has become more evident. The “new-old” questions raised by John K. Fairbank (1966) still remain: “Communist China? – How far Communist? How far Chinese?” A second important issue is how to build equal status among the family of nations. A third issue is how to evaluate the impact of China’s vast cultural heritage and historical experiences on China’s international behavior (Fairbank, 1966, p. 574). We also follow up on the question raised by Samuel Kim: How constant or changeable is Chinese foreign policy over time, especially in the transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, and why? (Kim, 1984, p. 25). From the perspective of this work, the core question of how far China, as a rising power, is different from the West might be considered as one of the most critical issues. Other fundamental questions are: How does China place the United States within the format of selective identities, and what are China’s primary reasons for grouping political actors with different types of identity, what for, and how was this done? And finally, how does China build its position within the power transition theory?

Revealing the actor’s postures and variety of foreign policy approaches might explain behaviors in international relations. For a realist, the most important issue is power when understood as a material factor that shapes a state’s position in international relations, whereas for an idealist, the dominant idea of “lasting peace” plays a more significant role. Finally, for constructivists, identity and subjective knowledge are the driving forces of state behavior (Ruggie, 1998, p. 855–860).

The above research questions and puzzles are answered and discussed from the social constructivist perspective. Constructivists of different approaches agree on the fundamental point that “humans see the world through perspectives, developed socially … [meaning] reality is social, and what we see” out there “and within ourselves is developed in interaction with others” (Palan, 2000, p. 571–580). According to Alexander Wendt , constructivism in an international relationship is characterized more specifically by its “idealism.” The structures of human behaviors are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and these shared ideas construct identities and interests of purposive actors rather than being given by nature. Hans Morgenthau who was named the father of political realism said: “we look over his [the statesman’s] shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we listen in on conversations with other statesmen; we read and anticipate his very thoughts” (Ibid.).

Social constructivism argues that the ideational structure shapes the identity of the agent, and the structure in Wendt’s constructivism is not material but cultural, defined by the distribution of ideas. Culture is shared knowledge, which includes shared beliefs, understandings, and expectations formed in the process of interaction among social beings. The essence of international politics, in the view of Wendt , is ideas rather than material capabilities. It adopts mainstream assumptions of constructivism: cooperation among states is a social process and norms have essential constitutive effects, with culture taking priority. The primary model of interest and identity is transformed via interactions with external others (Qin Yaqing, Wei Ling, 2008, p. 125). Under the constructivist approach, significant policy actions taken by the People’s Republic of China are fundamentally based on spreading efforts to promote its status via constructing and exercising different types of identities. As a consequence, the Chinese hope to have a soft-influence and be different from other global actors. Following the constructivist approach, it is not only material issues that play an essential role in international relations. Rhetoric, which is understood here as a diplomatic language and argumentation, is also of crucial importance in shaping the understanding of foreign policy motivations, especially in triangular relations conducted by China with neighbors, significant powers, and developing countries. In some respect, we follow the argument presented by Soren Clausen (1998) who places Chinese identity on the trinity approach of ancient civilization, anti-imperialist resistance, and high power status. Following this understanding, however, we argue that Chinese character should be understood as the trinity of culture and civilization, anti-imperialist resistance based on ideological assumptions of justice and equal material status, and the state identity which is recognized through shaping borders and efficient administration.

The assumptions mentioned above suggest that international relationships should not be explained from a short-term perspective, but rather from a broader perspective on the issue. This kind of attitude has been rooted in historical and social approaches to global affairs. Taking China as an example, we have attempted to explain its behavior and motivation by analyzing three necessary parts of an actor’s international performance: equality status, identity, and influence. The first concept, as discussed later, is understood as a precondition for building self in the international area. Moreover, by shaping the equal status of self, there is a possibility of making a coalition of identities based on a fair platform. An interaction with an external other builds identity, but this other is anticipated by the actor, who could shape collective identity and sameness among actors. Finally, we debate the issue of influence and relations between shaping collectiveness and a relatively peaceful power transition in global affairs. This approach illustrates the complexity of China’s foreign behavior and argues that China fails to shape its own single and coherent identity in global issues (see Fig. 1.1).

Fig. 1.1

Foreign relations “EII”

Finding Equality and Reciprocity in International Relations

Discussing the importance of equality in social life has a long tradition. Political scientists have presented various views of equality: for some, it means the balance of ideas, others see it as equal material status. Equality is also defined as the correspondence between a group of different objects, persons, processes, or circumstances that have the same qualities in at least one but not all respects. However, the core question remains: equal in what respect? (Rae, 1981, p. 132). Equality consists of a triangular relation between two or more objects or persons, and one or more qualities. In other words, two objects are equal in absolute respect if, in that regard, they fall under the same general terminus. In international relations, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the concept of equality among nations was rooted in the justice in international law. Lassa Oppenheim (1905) described it through the importance of the law of nations: “Since the law of nations is based on the common consent of states as sovereign communities, the member states of the family of nations are equal to each other as subjects of international law […] as members of the community of nations these are equals whatever differences between them may otherwise exist” (Hicks, 1908, p. 530–561).

The early discussion on global equality tried to shape the common points of reference for finding and exercising balance. Edwin Dickinson’s book, The Equality of States in International Law (1920), is perceived as the most influential work dedicated to justice in international relations. First, there is equality before the law which prescribes that states should be equal under the international law. From this perspective, international laws should be regarded as general rules for all subjects to whom the rules apply and that all parties remain equal before the law. The second legal idea of equality prescribes the equality of rights for all participants. According to this concept, there can be no exclusive rights for some actors or groups of actors, but equal voting power and representation are embodied into the sovereignty concept (Hjorht, 2011, p. 2585).

Equality is often treated as an element of sovereignty or as a principle that is derived from sovereignty. China always refers to sovereignty but advocates it not only for itself but also for a group of countries. In this sense China follows the understanding presented by Pieter Kooijmans (1964) Equality should not be viewed as a characteristic of a state, but rather as something that results from some property that the units that enjoy equality have in common, that is, a standard descriptive property (cited after Higgins, 2012).

Taking into consideration the theoretical assumptions of building equal status, the most crucial issue is to establish the relations based on the reciprocity principle. Gouldner emphasized that reciprocity implies conditional action: reciprocal behavior returns ill for ill as well as good for good: “people should meet smiles with smiles and lies with treachery”—as quoted by R. Keohane (1986). Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane (1986) argued that heading toward equality “seems to be the most effective strategy for maintaining cooperation among egoists.” Reciprocity is also often invoked as an appropriate standard of behavior which can produce cooperation among actors in international society. From a broader perspective, the discussion on global reciprocity encourages discussion about global values and standards. Universal norms and rights enforced through internal or external sanctions are morally justified only if they can be reciprocally justified (Keohane, 1986, p. 1–12).

In the 1980s, during the Cold War period, the question of reciprocity was raised by the advocates of liberal free trade. In the United States, the discussion was derived from the trade imbalance with Japan. As declared, reciprocity means “moving toward a balance with Japan rather than a big surplus in their account trading with us ” (Keohane, 1986, p. 14). More to the point for social scientists, reciprocal obligations hold societies together. Participants typically view diffuse reciprocity as an ongoing series of sequential actions which entail mutual concessions within the context of shared commitments and values (Ibid.).

Furthermore, the concept of reciprocity is defined as any stimulus by one actor that “may be expected to bring about a proportionate response in kind from the other” (Richardson et al., 1981, p. 130). Although the above-quoted definitions answer the core question of understanding, the problem of reciprocity’s measurement remains unanswered. Going through the literature, we acknowledge difficulties in measuring equality, and we recognize the needs to be specified in each particular case. In international relations, the reciprocal approaches have been measured with the equivalence of benefits (Temkin, 1993, p. 8). But according to Koehane, in international relations, as in the social world, precise measurement is often both impossible and inadequate: “Reciprocity refers to exchanges of roughly equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of the others in such a way that good is returned for good, and bad for bad. These exchanges are often, but not necessarily, mutually beneficial; they may be based on self-interest as well as on shared concepts of rights and obligations, and the value of what is exchanged may or may not be comparable” (Ibid.). Most authors measure it by military spending analysis. These stu...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. Introduction: Theoretical Understanding of China’s Selective Identities
• 2. Building China’s State Identity: Interests, Institutions, and Conflicts
• 3. Debating China as Ideology: Marxism, Materialism, and Own Way
• 4. Beyond the Borders: Utopia, Uniqueness, and Soft-Power
• 5. Conclusions
• Back Matter