In consequence of a changing climate, the Arctic has once again secured a place on the international agenda. It is in the Arctic global climate change is most conspicuous. Higher temperatures and diminishing ice cover are affecting the basic conditions for actors with interests in the region. Technological progress has also made it possible to extract resources in areas that were previously inaccessible.
Commercial activity is increasing and each of the Arctic states wants to take part in shaping the “new” Arctic. In parallel, a number of non-Arctic states also have aspirations for the region. The agenda varies from research to geopolitics, but that something is happening in the Arctic that needs careful monitoring is becoming clear to increasing numbers.
Although interest in the region is growing, it is still characterised by political stability and well-functioning governance regimes. Among the Arctic states, there is consensus on the basic rules. That is not to deny the existence of different approaches to what a future Arctic should look like, from ideas of total protection to expansive oil and gas extraction. The Arctic’s position on the political agenda also varies among the Arctic coastal states, from Norway’s High North hype to a more peripheral place in the foreign policy of the US.
It is in this political and geographical landscape the Arctic Council operates. All the Arctic states describe the Council as the most important international forum for dialogue and cooperation on Arctic challenges and opportunities, and as a significant arena for developing knowledge and learning about a changing region. Despite portrayals like these in addresses to the public and official political documents, knowledge of the forum is actually in short supply. In a survey conducted in 2015, in which residents from all the Arctic states participated, fewer than half were aware of the Arctic Council.1 The purpose of this book is therefore to introduce the reader to the Arctic Council and its role as a platform for dealing with local, national, regional and global challenges of relevance to the “new” Arctic.2
The book is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 presents the history of the Arctic Council, starting from a limited effort to promote cooperation on environmental policy to becoming the most important international forum for discussions on a wide range of Arctic issues. Chapter 2 introduces the Council’s organisation and gives a short introduction to the Arctic profile of the member states. This is necessary because the states decide the parameters for cooperation. Their ambitions and interests in the Arctic can thus tell us a lot about the Arctic Council’s room for action. In Chap. 3, the Arctic Council’s role in “Arctic governance” is discussed: Where do the political and legal constraints lie? In extension of this, the road ahead for Arctic collaboration is discussed (Chap. 4). Here, I dare to reflect more widely about what should be done to make sure the Arctic Council remains the most important international forum for Arctic-related dialogue and knowledge development. In the final chapter (Chap. 5), I recapitulate the main argument in this book and ask why we have an Arctic Council in the first place. By then, I hope the reader will have gained some understanding of the Arctic Council.
Throughout the Cold War, the characteristic feature of the Arctic was the military and strategic rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. The Cold War stifled opportunities for collaboration in the region. The Arctic was a place for security policy and strategic assessments. All aspects of politics in the north were seen in light of this tense but essentially stable situation. In the 1980s, the thaw got under way. In his celebrated Murmansk speech of 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev was eager to transform the Arctic into a “zone of peace” and the North Pole into a “pole of peace”.3 Gorbachev’s olive branch heralded new times. Canada and the US were both at the time determined to let the Arctic become a region of international cooperation.4 By the end of the 1980s, the conditions were right for the Arctic states—including Russia—to create meeting places where common challenges facing the area could be discussed. This was nothing new, however. Norway and Russia had long been working closely together on the management of fish stocks in the Barents Sea,5 for example. Now, though, all eight Arctic states could get together to discuss broader issues, not just narrowly defined fields.
In parallel with this development, environmental policy had climbed up the international agenda. The 1972 Stockholm Conference is often regarded as the start of international environmental politics. It resulted in, among other things, several international environmental agreements on, for example, conservation of endangered species. During the 1970s, several treaties aimed at combating pollution were signed. In the 1980s, fighting pollution became a global policy.6 Steps taken to reduce ozone-depleting emissions, among other things, were important here. In 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was signed. Marine pollution and management were key issues here. The 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development is considered a watershed event in international environmental politics. It was during this period the UN-appointed World Commission on Environment and Development launched the versatile concept of sustainable development,7 a term that subsequently would play an important role in the debate on developments in the Arctic.
This positive atmosphere gave Finland the impetus in January 1989 to invite the Arctic states to come together to discuss the protection of the Arctic environment, under the aegis of the so-called Rovaniemi process.8 The first meeting was held in Rovaniemi in September 1989 and the project was called the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). In the ensuing years, the eight circumpolar states—the US, Russia, Canada, Sweden, Finland, Denmark (including Greenland and Faroe Islands), Norway and Iceland—met regularly. Working groups were established and indigenous groups and non-Arctic states were invited as well. In June 1991, AEPS was officially established. An important arena for international cooperation saw the light of day.9
Alongside the rollout of the Finnish initiative, Canada was pushing an idea for an Arctic Council. The indigenous voice was particularly important.10 A new forum for the Arctic states was first aired by Canada’s then Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney, in Leningrad in November 1989. The idea was not to incorporate AEPS as part of the Arctic Council. The Canadians wanted rather to support the demilitarisation process that had taken hold since the end of the Cold War. Canada wanted this Arctic council to be a forum where states could discuss security issues, an idea welcomed by Finland. Nevertheless, there was resistance; the US in particular was sceptical. For the Americans, it was (and remains) important that such a forum should not address questions of security.11 There are several reasons for this reluctance, but America’s traditional mistrust of binding multilateral bodies addressing sensitive political questions is one.12 Another controversy regarding the establishment of the Arctic Council centred on whether the forum should be expanded into an international organisation. The Arctic states agreed to the organisation of the Council as a forum,13 and again, it was Americans who held back from committing themselves more than necessary. Such a forum has a weaker mandate than an international organisation and, among other things, has less legal clout (see Chaps. 2 and 3). In 1996, the Ottawa Declaration officially established the Arctic Council. The first sentence of the Declaration reads: “The Arctic Council is established as a high level forum to: (a) provide means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues.” At the birth of the Arctic Council, AEPS was incorporated into the new forum, and indigenous peoples, observers, member states and working groups involved in AEPS came along too. Although participants considered the Council as a breakthrough for an official and constructive form of collaboration in the north, not all were equally enthusiastic. In the Washington Post, the achievement was relegated to an inconspicuous place deep inside the ...