A Primer on Policy Communication in Kazakhstan

Basskaran Nair, Saltanat Janenova, Balzhan Serikbayeva

• Publisher: Palgrave Pivot
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN:
  9789811506093
• eBook ISBN:
  9789811506109
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Politique européenne

This book is a timely publication to address the issue of the government's policy execution capabilities. The crux of policy execution is communication to win the hearts and minds of the people, particularly with regard to complex policies. The book is written as a work manual based on international policy communication best practices and principles, interwoven with case studies from Kazakhstan, applicable in other Central Asian countries as well. The book's wide range of topics cover media management in a technologically-savvy society, marketing of complexity, planning successful campaigns, soft power management given the country's aspirations for greater international standing, and forward-looking advice on crisis management and shareholder communication. This is a highly relevant book for the civil service, civic organisations, commercial entities, policy researchers, and international organisations working in or planning to work in Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries.

Part I

© The Author(s) 2020

B. Nair et al.A Primer on Policy Communication in Kazakhstanhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0610-9_1

Begin Abstract

1. History of the Nation: State of the Industry

Basskaran Nair¹ , Saltanat Janenova¹ and Balzhan Serikbayeva²

(1)

Nazarbayev University, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan

(2)

GSPP, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan

Basskaran Nair

Email: [email protected]

Abstract

It encapsulates briefly the history of the nation, the challenges Kazakhstan faced since independence, and the sociopolitical and economic challenges ahead. It then discusses the state of the communications industry and policy communication in Kazakhstan.

Keywords

Challenging geopoliticsSocial cohesionPolicy communication

End Abstract

Kazakhstan came into independence on 16 December 1991, two decades and a half which is young for a nation state. Historical circumstances forced Kazakhstan’s founding leaders, in particular First President Nursultan Nazarbayev, to take an authoritarian stance in governance to ensure the nation survived post-independence. Kazakhstan faced critical challenges from the outset: how to create a politically loyal population as the Russian population was larger than the Kazakh population; how to move from a command economy to a market economy and manage responsibly the country’s economic resources; how to ensure the richness of the land and its resources are not subjected to extractive multinationals supported by major powers; and how to manage the major social and political rifts both domestically and internationally that could negatively impact the young nation. All these realities, and more in the present volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous world, will continue to confront Kazakhstan in the coming decades.

There are three periods in its history: The lean years between 1991 and 1998 followed by the boom years (1999 till 2011) and stable years (2012 to date) (Pomfret 2014). Despite the difficulties during the lean years, Kazakhstan’s leadership developed in 1997 the strategy 2030, which includes the creation of the Bolashak overseas scholarship programme and a market-based diversified economy, signalling to the citizens that sacrifices required during the early years of independence would be amply repaid by building shared long-term prosperity (Nazarbayev 2014). Kazakhstan stands today in the upper middle-income country and ranks among the topmost competitive economies. In 2012, the First President Nazarbayev set for the country further stretch targets including being among the top 30 advanced countries by 2050.

These strategic visions are articulated in the midst of challenging geopolitics. In the early years, besides managing social cohesion to form Kazakhstan as a nation, it had to reckon with the geopolitics especially sharing common borders with tough neighbours. Kazakhstan is bordered by mainland China to the east and Russia to the north. Separating Kazakhstan from Afghanistan and Pakistan to its south are Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, each independent republics that once were also states of the USSR. Kazakhstan and these post-Soviet nations began their existence as fragile states crippled by their history as well as by their geography. However, Kazakhstan and the Central Asian nations are trying to frame a narrative, supported by external actors, that they are at the Eurasian crossroads. It is a challenging narrative: the geographical centrality bears little resemblance to the economic and cultural realities. Central Asia continues to be a constant periphery (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2013).

While Russia and China have a natural interest in Kazakhstan as neighbouring political and economic powers, the Western world, with its businessmen supported by politicians, has been drawn to the Caspian Sea which promises billions of dollars of oil and gas reserves. Of the three states, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan’s reserves have been proven to be the most significant. In fact, a Soviet geologist noted that Kazakhstan is capable of exporting the entire periodic table of elements: Untapped fossil-fuel reserves, substantial gold deposits, and rich unmined veins of copper, chrome and aluminium.

Russia is the natural leader in this part of the world, and the initial Central Asian leaders were often Soviet-era figures. Russia cannot be ignored even when it falls into hard times as it is known to use heavy-handed tactics to reign in former Soviet nations into its geopolitical interests. It has in the past induced reluctant states to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). It favoured the Abkhaz secessionists over the Georgian government and helped the Armenians in their war against Azerbaijan. The first overseas trip that the new President of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, an experienced diplomat, made was to Russia. It was a strategic move that is line with what the First President, Nazarbayev, did with regard to being circumspectly Russia-centric, his unilateral but strategic decision to move the capital of the nation from Almaty to Akmola (renamed Astana, now Nursultan) on 10 December 1997. His strategic intent was to move the nexus of power from the south-east to the north-central part of the country and thus much closer to Russia. Nazarbayev chose a visit by then Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to declare the transfer of Kazakhstan’s seat of power. Trade agreements, supply chains and the Customs Union (with Russia and Belarus) bind the country to Russia which remains an important destination of Kazakh exports, such as metal products and machinery (Yusuf 2014).

China will be the country whose fortunes will impinge most on Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan has prepared itself to benefit from a dynamic and cooperative China. Given the US–China trade dispute and global trade challenges, it has to be mindful of potential downside. China’s interest in Central Asia has been structured in phases. In the first half of the 1990s, its concern was to sign demarcation treatises, demilitarisation of the borders, and prevent the strengthening of the Uighurs’ separation. With the disintegration of USSR, its primary goal was to maintain stability by addressing the issue of territorial boundaries with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and ensuring that they respect the “One China” policy. In the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, China created Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as a platform to discuss in particular the region’s security framework. By the 2000s, it had established itself in the Central Asian markets. It is one of the main trading partners for the Central Asian states, though mainly in hydrocarbons, extractive industries and infrastructure. Since 2005, it started promoting its language and culture, and to train Central Asian elites. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the centrepiece of its foreign policy in Central Asia (the five nations have 70.5 million people).

Western in particular US policy makers have co-mingled security interest with economic interest in the region. They have a threefold interest in Kazakhstan. One, the Caspian basin reserves remain a potentially enormous windfall for Western energy companies and, with Russia, could serve as an important alternative to the Persian Gulf. Two, it was the only non-Slavic post-Soviet state to have inherited nuclear weapons and with the collapse of the USSR the region was viewed as a threat to global security. Three, consequently Western threat perceptions viewed Central Asia and the Caucasus as part of the “arc of crisis”, a phrase to describe the area from the Indian subcontinent to the Horn of Africa (Olcott 1995). This focus has led to “pipeline politics” namely ensuring the route the oil pipelines take to reach Western markets. The European Union (EU) does not position itself as a hard security actor; its hard security is in the domain of NATO. Because of Kazakhstan and Central Asia nation’s importance in terms of its strategic geographic location and its rich oil reserves, these nations are not subjected to excessive scrutiny in areas such as human rights and transparency and independent media development. Today, about 500 companies with US participation are working in Kazakhstan, and more than 140 of them are joint ventures. They are into manufacturing, exporting their products to other countries (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2018).

Domestically. Social cohesion, corruption and ineffective policy execution are serious concerns for the nation. On social cohesion, Kazakhstan is probably the most multiracial and multi-ethnic of the Soviet successor states, with over a hundred nationalities represented in the republic. In the early stages of independence, both the Kazakhs and the Russians claimed Kazakhstan as their homeland. The Russians were in the majority and at the time of independence, Kazakhstan’s economy and industrial plants were fully integrated with those of Russia; the energy grids and supply lines ran north–south not east–west. Today, Kazakhs are in the majority and the system favours them. Kazakh nationalists and the population at large view independence as the restoration of Kazakh’s statehood. However, its over four-thousand and a half mile border with Russia creates a not-so-subtle reminder of the risks associated with these potentially conflicting claims.

Corruption is the other huge bugbear in the governance of the nation. Like most developing countries within a Soviet rule, the misaligned governance system has led to a culture of corruption. In contrast when Singapore became independent in 1965, the leadership clearly eschewed corruption. Former Deputy Prime Minister, Goh Keng Swee (1979), articulated the severe downside of a corrupt society:

Often insidiously petty corruption means the spoils are shared over large number of officials which may not seem serious because the end result was that business transactions gained legitimacy. What was much worse was that monopolies or oligopolies would soon appear. When the stakes are high, the system works in the opposite direction—concentration of decision-making. The bigger the prizes and the higher the level of decision-making, the fewer are the decision-makers and the higher are their positions. For the really big prizes, it is the Big Boss who decides. The effect of such leadership on society was widespread cynicism and apathy among the people, and finally acceptance of corruption as normal conduct in public administration. In some countries, the situation could reach such a ‘kleptocratic’ stage that teachers would have to pay the headmaster to remain on his payroll, the police would levy illegal tolls, and murderers would have the police helping them erase evidence and hang innocent parties.

In Kazakhstan, there are a number of anti-corruption initiatives and strong views repeatedly expressed by the leadership to end corruption. First President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, said many times in his respective State of the Nation messages and strategic vision for the nation that corruption should be eliminated. The latest by President Tokayev is to tell all high-ranking leaders that they are accountable if their subordinates are found to be corrupt and must resign; prerogative to accept their resignation lies with him. The declared objective of civil service reforms is to shift from a corrupt and command-and-control mode of government towards merit-based, transparent, customer-oriented and participatory governance systems, from a state-dominated towards a market-based economy, attracting foreign investments and building more effective govern...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• Part I
• Part II
• Part III
• Back Matter