State-Society Relations and Confucian Revivalism in Contemporary China

Qin Pang

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN:
  9789811083112
• eBook ISBN:
  9789811083129
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Negocios internacionales

This book is a study of the causes of the Confucian revival and the party-state's response in China today. It concentrates on the interactions between state and society, and the implications for the Chinese state's control over society, or in other words, its survival over a rapidly modernizing society. The book explores the answers to questions such as: Why has Confucianism suddenly gathered great momentum in contemporary Chinese society? What is the role of the Chinese state in its rise? Is the state really the orchestrator of the Confucian revival as has been widely assumed? This book will be of interest to think-tank and policy researchers, sinologists, and those with an interest in Chinese society.

© The Author(s) 2019

Qin PangState-Society Relations and Confucian Revivalism in Contemporary Chinahttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8312-9_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction

Qin Pang¹

(1)

Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, Guangdong, China

End Abstract

The revival of Confucianism in contemporary China is puzzling. In the midst of the 1960s Cultural Revolution in China, Levenson (1968), after observing Communist iconoclasts’ massive depredations of Confucian legacies, lamented that Confucianism had passed forever into the museum of Chinese history. He wrote, “as the Communists claimed to stand for the whole nation, the ancient mentor of a high, once mighty part (Confucius) was quietly taken over, and given his quietus” (Levenson 1968, p. 77). However, since the beginning of the new millennium, Confucianism, in defiance of Levenson’s declaration, has been resurrected and even steadily restored as a living tradition in Chinese society. The revival of Confucianism is evident everywhere, from the unprecedented enthusiasm for Professor Yu Dan’s TV lectures on Confucianism to the springing up of Confucian academies (shuyuan) across the country. In less than a decade, Confucianism has rapidly become one of the most powerful ideological trends in contemporary China (Xiao 2008; Yang and Tamney 2011; Tu 2011; Pang 2014, 2016; Wu 2015; Xu 2017). More importantly, the Confucian revival, compared with the transient revival of Confucian scholarship in the early 1990s,¹ has gone far beyond academic circles and received extensive popular support.

Why has Confucianism suddenly gathered great momentum in contemporary Chinese society? What is the role of the Chinese state in its rise? Is the state really the orchestrator of the Confucian revival as has been widely assumed by Western media and scholars? One needs to understand that in China’s post-totalitarian political system, the domination of the official ideology is still an essential means for the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to assert its organizational control within the party and political legitimacy over society. The CCP may be interested in exploiting certain Confucian elements to supplement its official ideology. However, it would not be so shortsighted as to uphold a once antagonistic ideology to compete with its own orthodoxy, unless the CCP intends to forgo its current official ideology or its position as the sole center of power in China. Neither of the two, however, is likely.

How, then, does the Chinese state cope with the society’s interest in Confucianism? How should we evaluate the state’s coping strategies? Are these strategies helpful for perpetuating the state’s authoritarian rule? China has been experiencing rapid modernization, and modernization has brought about a pluralistic society with multiple ideologies, which have presented unprecedented challenges to the current authoritarian regime. How the state engages with society to control these competing ideologies (such as Confucianism in this study) will determine, to a significant extent, whether the state can endure the proliferation of various ideologies arising out of society amid modernization.

The previous questions are the focus of my book. This book is not about the nature of Confucianism but a study of the causes of the Confucian revival and the party-state’s response in China today. It concentrates on the interactions between state and society, and the implications for the Chinese state’s control over society, or in other words, its survival over a rapidly modernizing society. This chapter will first discuss the revival of Confucianism in contemporary China, present research puzzles, and define key terms. It will then point out the significance of the study. Next, it will provide background for the study by showing how Confucianism has changed over time, and its controversial relationship with the CCP. Finally, it will detail the research methodology and preview the content of the following chapters.

1.1 The Puzzling Confucian Revival in Contemporary Urban China

1.1.1 Background

Historian Yu Yingshi (1987) once used the term “wandering soul” (youhun) as a metaphor to describe Confucianism in China. He pointed out that Confucianism, due to the uprooting of China’s pre-modern political and social institutions to which Confucianism had been closely tied, had lost its institutional base and had therefore become a soul without a body. Indeed, after the CCP’s eradication of the rural clan structure through its “social reconstruction” movement in the 1950s, Confucianism lost all institutional strongholds and narrowly retreated to the spiritual world of ordinary Chinese people. However, half a century later, the wandering soul, surprisingly, has begun to find a body and home back in China. Since early in the twenty-first century, there has been a robust revival of Confucianism in China’s urban population. Participants of this social phenomenon are mostly highly educated, well-off urban middle-class citizens; their aim is to apply Confucianism in their daily lives or, more broadly speaking, to make Confucianism regain its relevance in Chinese society.

The Confucian revival has been most evident in the area of academia, business, and urban groups. Confucianist academic discourses have proliferated in scholarly conferences, journals, and books since the mid-1990s (Ai 2008; Makeham 2008). Confucian academic associations formed by intellectuals have proliferated across the country. According to one account, before 1990, there were only 14 Confucianism-related organizations established in China, and the number had soared to approximately 100 by 2000 (Zhang 2003 cited in Makeham 2008). Some intellectuals have publicly issued manifestos appealing for the adoption of Confucianism in wider society. Some have even submitted related policy proposals to the National People’s Congress or Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (Kang 2008). In business, growing numbers of enterprises began to promote the learning of Confucianism, particularly Dizigui (Standards for Students), a simple manual of Confucian morality, among their employees. Moreover, an increasing number of entrepreneurs began attending Confucian lectures, spending considerable money and time to take Confucianism-related courses at China’s most prestigious universities (Kang et al. 2010). In some urban areas, rising numbers of citizens send their children to attend after-school Confucian courses which teach basic Confucian texts (dujingban) or to full-time private Confucian academies which replace the state-run orthodoxy by instruction in the Confucian canons (shuyuan). According to one report from the International Confucius Studies Association, children learning the Confucian canons have amounted to over 10 million in 2006 (Chen 2007), and the number has been increasing steadily. Confucian associations organized by urban residents have also increased dramatically. Many have their own websites and online forums for discussing Confucianism-related topics. These associations have organized non-official “traditional Confucian rites” such as the worship ceremony of Confucius, Confucian weddings, and “pen-opening” ceremonies for those starting school for the first time (Chen 2012; Sun 2011).

Interestingly, the Confucian revival is promoted not by the relatively isolated, poor, conservative rural peasants or laborers, but rather the educated, well-off, cosmopolitan urban middle-class citizens and professionals. These people are the outgrowth of China’s modernization and a “new” social force rapidly transforming Chinese society. For instance, according to a survey of over 1200 respondents conducted by Kang Xiaoguang and his team in ten Chinese cities in 2007,² participants in the Confucian revival have the following characteristics (“participants” in Kang’s survey are defined as those who are identified with Confucianism or Confucian culture and participate in at least one Confucian social activity). In terms of occupation, 13.3% of participants are government bureaucrats; 14% are entrepreneurs or managerial staff in business enterprises; 52% are the so-called “white collar” workers such as professionals, accountants, teachers, lawyers, and clerks; 7.5% are university students who are potentially middle class. Only 1.5% of those surveyed are workers, laborers, or peasants.³ With regard to individual and family income, participants’ average income level is significantly higher than that of non-participants or the national average.⁴ A striking characteristic of the participants is their high education level: 89.6% of participants have at least associate degrees, while the rate of non-participants is only 24.3% (Kang 2008).

Some participants’ political and social attitudes also confirm that they are the informed urban social groups produced by China’s modernization, rather than those who live in areas basically untouched by modernization. For example, as far as political attitudes are concerned, most participants, according to Kang’s research, are conscious of their political freedom and willing to protect their rights through “rightful resistance” (Kang 2008). Of them, 56.2% had resorted to methods like filing complaints to various levels of government, protesting, and seeking help from the media when they believed they had been unfairly treated. The rate of non-participants who undertook these activities to protect their rights is significantly lower. Confucian participants also tend to be politically attentive, spending more time reading newspapers and magazines concerning domestic and international politic affairs than non-participants. In terms of social life, participants are likely to be cosmopolitan in outlook. 83.5% participants had traveled around China or had worked in other Chinese cities in the previous year. Around 35.1% have had overseas work or traveling experience. Kang’s survey results are largely in line with most of the academic literature and media reports in showing that the various manifestations of the Confucian resurgence mostly occur among the informed urban public rather than in the rural population (Chen 2007, 2012; Billioud 2007a, b; Billioud and Thoraval 2008).

The Confucian revival brought about by contemporary urban Chinese society is the background and starting point for this book. It needs to be made clear that the Confucian revival, strictly speaking, is not an organized social movement.⁵ This is because it does not meet some of the basic requirements for social movements. For example, participants in the Confucian revival do not make collective claims nor do they show concerted coordination in their activit...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. Introduction
• 2. China’s Mutually Empowering State and Society Relations
• 3. The Chinese State’s Decentralized Response Towards the Confucian Revival and Its Institutional Base
• 4. The Confucian Revival Among Intellectuals and the State Responses
• 5. Confucianism with Consent: The Revival of “Confucian Entrepreneur” and the Chinese State’s Responses
• 6. Attenuation, Appropriation, and Adaptation: The Confucian Revival Among the Urban Middle Class and the Chinese State’s Responses
• 7. Conclusions
• Back Matter