Populist Discourse

International Perspectives

Marcia Macaulay

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN:
  9783319973876
• eBook ISBN:
  9783319973883
• Topic: Languages & Linguistics
• Subtopic: Computer Science General
• Index: Languages & Linguistics

This edited collection draws on case studies from around the world to shed light on the sometimes contentious topic of populism. Examining diverse contexts including North America, Latin America, Europe, New Zealand, and Russia, the authors employ different approaches to populist discourse to analyse key notions in populism such as 'the people' and 'the heartland' as well as the exploitation of medium and narrative. Each of the chapters in this book explores an aspect of the way in which populism constructs a political reality, with reference to such high-profile examples as Donald Trump, Bernie Sanders, the Scottish National Party, Hugo Chávez, Vladimir Putin, Barack Obama, and Winston Peters. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of both discourse analysis and political science.  

© The Author(s) 2019

Marcia Macaulay (ed.)Populist Discoursehttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97388-3_1

Begin Abstract

1. A Short Introduction to Populism

Marcia Macaulay¹

(1)

Glendon College, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada

Marcia Macaulay

Email: [email protected]

Keywords

Ionescu and GellnerCanovanTaggartTaguieffLaclauMudde and KaltwasserWodakMoffitt

End Abstract

Populism is often referred to as a political phenomenon that is difficult to define precisely. It has been argued by Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) that populism can accommodate both right-wing and left-wing ideologies. They define populism as a “thin-centered ideology” that is “malleable” and can accommodate other ideologies. I shall examine Mudde and Kaltwasser’s analysis subsequently, but even an approach that conceives of populism as flexible and accommodating begs the question of its essential “platonic” essence. What is leftover once its accessibility has been observed? However accommodating it may be to other ideologies, what remains that we can call populism? This present volume does not privilege any particular theory of populism as such, but does attempt to explore the notion of populism from the perspective of the language that expresses it. This volume provides a set of case studies of populist discourse from international perspectives including North America, Latin America, Europe, New Zealand, and Russia. Analysis of populism is through analysis of populist discourse, in three cases through analysis of leaders’ narrative style or rhetoric, in one through response to a leader’s populist rhetoric, and in another through party election manifestos. These analyses provide insight into certain key concepts in populism such as ‘the people,’ ‘heartland,’ ‘the elite,’ and ‘charismatic leader.’ The methodological approaches taken in this volume are wide-ranging, but all attempt to explore populism as a realization of political reality and conversely as a means of constructing political reality.

To address theoretical approaches to populism and in turn contextualize specific discussion within this volume, we need to begin with the first major analysis of populism by Ionescu and Gellner (1969). Ionescu and Gellner’s volume was the outcome of a conference on populism held at the London School of Economics in 1967. Their volume examines populism in five different geographies: North America, Latin America, Russia, Eastern Europe, and Africa. Their volume also addresses six principal questions outlined in their introduction: Is populism an ideology (or ideologies) or a movement (or movements) or both?; Is populism a “recurring mentality” evidenced across “historical and geographic contexts”? (p. 3); Is populism a “political psychology”?; Is populism “characterized by a peculiar negativism” realized in enmity to a range of conceptual objects or groups?; Is populism worship of the ‘people’?; and finally, Is populism porous, able to be absorbed by “stronger ideologies or movements”? (p. 4). Despite the almost 50 years between the publication of Ionescu and Gellner’s volume and now, the questions they ask about populism remain relevant. It is not surprising that Mudde and Kaltwasser’s analysis of populism (2017) takes up the sixth question posed by Ionescu and Gellner’s volume: that of the porosity of populism as an ideology. In the last chapter of this volume, Peter Worsley attempts to address the “concept of populism.” Worsley notes the high degree of variability in movements deemed populist throughout the world. Thus, populism in North America is characterized by the presence of extensive membership by farmers, the absence of leadership from an intelligentsia as well as a communitarian system of land ownership. In contrast, in Russia, there is no extensive membership by peasants, while there is leadership by an intelligentsia as well as the presence of a communitarian system of land ownership. Referencing Shils (1956), Worsley further observes that populism reveals two cardinal principles: “the will of the people ” and the “desirability of a ‘direct’ relationship between people and leadership, unmediated by institutions” (p. 244). These two characteristics are observed again and again by theorists down the years. Worsley, however, goes on to describe populism not as a clearly defined social movement or ideology, but as a “syndrome” that expresses an “emphasis” or “dimension of political culture in general.” Despite acknowledging the significance of the phenomenon of populism, and the focus of six relevant questions regarding its nature, Ionescu and Gellner’s volume leaves the question of the nature of populism open ended, even going so far as in Worsley’s analysis to reduce it metaphorically to a “syndrome” and therefore as a manifestation of something else.

Margaret Canovan (1982) also grapples with the problem of defining populism. She argues that there are two principal types of response to the phenomenon of populism: one to theorize its existence and the second to articulate a typology of its realizations. As others have done, Canovan notes the wide range of political phenomena that have been termed ‘populist’: “Peronism in Argentina and the Mexican Institutionalized Party of the Revolution [PRI]; Social Credit in Alberta and the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan; McCarthyism, Powellism and Poujadism; ‘Progressive’ devices for direct democracy such as the popular initiative, referendum and recall …” (p. 544). She argues that those who have attempted to theorize populism “tend to be so all-embracing that they cover everything indiscriminately” (p. 547). She also observes that “different theorists are liable to make different selections from a medley of populist phenomena, and hence to propose theories that are mutually exclusive, one of them leaving out cases that are crucial to the other” (p. 548). Canovan proposes the view that because such attempts to theorize populism are almost always intrinsically flawed, another approach is needed. She argues then for what she refers to as “phenomenological typology .” Such an approach is descriptive rather than explanatory. It does, however, avoid overgeneralization and the exclusion of important data. Taggart (2002) argues that Canovan (1981) “offers the most ambitious attempts to get to grips with populism” (p. 18).

In Populism (1981), Canovan sets out a comprehensive typology of populist movements. She sets out two distinct types of populism: agrarian and political. Within these two broad groupings, she further sets out seven sub-types: Farmers’ Movements, Revolutionary Movements, Peasant Movements, Authoritarian Populism, Democratic Populism, Reactionary Populism, and what she terms “Politician’s Populism.” For the first type, Canovan’s focus is on commodity farmers’ movements that support radical change in government. These movements include the American People’s Party of the 1890s, Social Credit in Alberta and the CCF in Saskatchewan. In addressing “Revolutionary Intellectual Populism,” Canovan examines intellectual movements such as the Narodniki of nineteenth century Russia that idealized the peasantry and advocated for agrarian reform. “Peasant Populism” concerns grassroots peasant movements such as the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union that advocated for smaller shares of property and the creation of cooperatives. In examining “Populist Dictatorship,” “Populist Democracy,” and “Reactionary Populism,” Canovan distinguishes the presence of a charismatic leader from democratic methodology (e.g. the use of referenda) and in turn reactionary leadership embracing ethnic superiority over others. Lastly, Canovan identifies the rhetorical means on the part of populist politicians to appeal to ‘the people ’ in keeping with a possible anti-political stance. Canovan’s (1981) study provides us with a typological overview of populism that is useful in going beyond geographical identification of specific movements. She distinguishes a set of specific actors including farmers, peasants, intellectuals, and politicians from responses that can very loosely be defined as ‘democratic’ and ‘economic.’ In her last type, “Politician’s Populism,” she also identifies what can be termed the specific rhetoric or style of many populist politicians in their construction of themselves as non-political or anti-political in keeping with a direct appeal to ‘the people.’

Paul Taggart (2002) introduces the concept of “new populism ” as well as focussing on a distinction between ‘the people ’ and ‘the heartland .’ Taggart defines new populism as representing “a contemporary form of populism that stems from a populist rejection of the political agenda, institutions and legitimacy of the modern welfare-state model of mixed economy capitalism” (p. 75). He notes, for instance, that new populists wish to discard standard party institutional structures. What is favoured instead is direct communication with and participation by party members, along with the “personalized leadership of key individuals” (p. 75). He points out that with France’s Jean-Marie Le Pen , “the personality, leadership and style of Le Pen were key to the success of the party” (p. 78). Equally, Jörg Haider in Austria combined charismatic leadership with a strong critique of the welfare state. Haider also expressed “vehement opposition to immigration” (p. 78) as well as promoting the concept of direct democracy in proposing referenda concerning immigration and membership in the European Union.

Taggart observes further that “The agenda of new populism has not been confined to Western Europe” (p. 83). This same agenda was advocated by Pauline Hanson in Australia during the 1990s, the Reform Party (which went on to integrate itself with the formally Progressive Conservative Party) during the same period in Canada, and Ross Perot in his 1992 American presidential bid. Perot attacked both the Democratic and Republican parties for their commitment to special financial interests.

In examining the notion of ‘populism,’ Taggart looks carefully at what is meant by ‘the people .’ He asks, “Why are ‘the people’ such apparently essential ingredients in the populist equation?” (p. 92). The ‘people’ can be defined as a largely amorphous ‘silent majority,’ but they can also be defined both negatively and positively. In negative definition, the ‘people’ are not “pointy-headed intellectuals, bureaucrats, hacks, fat cats, robber barons, beatniks and plutocrats” (p. 94). More positively, ‘the people’ can be defined as the virtuous majority holding on to established traditions. Taggart also maintains that what is crucial to the populist concept of ‘the people’ is the accompanying concept of a ‘heartland’ which is “the territory of the imagination” (p. 95). The notion of a ‘heartland’ evokes a societal ideal of the past rather than the future. Heartlands also possess boundaries or frontiers. According to Taggart, new populism is inward-looking, realizing itself in both ethnic nationalism and isolationism. In terms of theoretical modelling, it is the neo-populist focus on the heartland that allows theorists to identify communality amongst different national expressions.

Pierre-André Taguieff (1997) like previous theorists equally addresses what he terms ‘the conceptual mirage’ of populism. Picking up from Canovan’s (1981) notion of politician’s populism in what he terms ‘neo-populism,’ Taguieff concentrates on the presence of a new type of leader: “Ce type de nouveau démogogue se distingue d’abord par l’insistance qu’il met à célébrer sa ‘différence’ et par ses promesses” (p. 22). Taguieff identifies five traits of ‘ideal’ national populism best represented by The National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen . Taguieff’s first trait is the appeal to the people . This appeal is hyperbolically personalized by and effected through the charismatic leadership of a given leader who embodies the political movement. Taguieff references the leader’s use of the media and in the case of Le Pen specifically television. He further gives this a generic title: ‘telepopulism .’ In the more recent case of Donald Trump , we could construct ‘twitterpopulism.’

Taguieff’s second trait is the notion of the ‘people’ as an undivided whole without class distinction, cultural classification, or any specific ideological tendency. Thirdly, the ‘people’ as an undivided whole are characterized as simple, honest, healthy, and possessing good common sense. While the ‘people’ are constructed as a ‘whole,’ they are nonetheless also a ‘part,’ since they are those within the overall social body who are healthy: “Tout demagogue joue sur ces deux sens du mot ‘peuple,’ le demagogue nationalist tout particulièment” (p. 24). Taguieff’s fourth trait is the call for a purifying rupture with the established order. Given the health and common sense of the ‘people,’ there is a need to abolish or remove corrupt elites who have betrayed them. Traditional values such as order, authority, hierarchy, work, family, the fatherland, and religious morality constructed as being ‘natural’ serve to bring about this essential rupture. Above all the value of national preference serves to legitimize discrimination of outsiders now conceived of as ‘undesirables.’ This in turn leads to Taguieff’s fifth trait which is the explicit call to discriminate against individuals according to their cultural and ethnic origins: “Le national-populisme lepéniste se caractérise au contraire par une xénophobie sélective” (p. 27).

In examining the leadership style of this new populism , Taguieff argues that populist leaders who show the greatest degree of sincerity and ability to improve current conditions will be effective. Further, the use of authentic language realized by the use of ‘I am,’ ‘what I say,’ ‘I believe it,’ along with the use of ambiguity rather than precision enhances the popularity of the leader. Clear explicit ideological positioning has no such force. Like others, Taguieff (2005) identifies populism as “a political style based upon an appeal to the people , likewis...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. A Short Introduction to Populism
• 2. Representing the People: Claiming the Heartland in Scottish Election Manifestos
• 3. Hugo Chávez’s Contemporary Latin American Populist Discourse
• 4. Self and Other Metaphors as Facilitating Features of Populist Style in Diplomatic Discourse: A Case Study of Obama and Putin’s Speeches
• 5. An Untrustworthy Entertainer: Populist Identities in the Voices of New Zealand Voters
• 6. Bernie and the Donald: A Comparison of Left- and Right-Wing Populist Discourse
• 7. Conclusion
• Back Matter