India and Japan

Assessing the Strategic Partnership

Rajesh Basrur, Sumitha Narayanan Kutty, Rajesh Basrur, Sumitha Narayanan Kutty

• Publisher: Palgrave Pivot
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN:
  9789811083082
• eBook ISBN:
  9789811083099
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

  

© The Author(s) 2018

Rajesh Basrur and Sumitha Narayanan Kutty (eds.)India and JapanPolitics of South Asiahttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8309-9_1

Begin Abstract

1. Conceptualizing Strategic Partnerships

Rajesh Basrur¹ and Sumitha Narayanan Kutty¹

(1)

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore

Rajesh Basrur (Corresponding author)

Sumitha Narayanan Kutty

Abstract

The India–Japan “special strategic and global partnership” has been described as one that will define the Indo-Pacific and shape the Asian century. This introductory chapter introduces the reader to a brief history of the growing relationship, defines the hitherto inadequately explored concept of “strategic partnership” in a post-alliance world, explains the objectives, design and relevance of the book and outlines the distinguishing features of the chapters to follow.

Keywords

IndiaJapanStrategicPartnership

End Abstract

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe ’s visit to India in September 2017, highlighted by his country’s $17 billion commitment to build a high-speed rail line, elicited speculation about the possibility of an emerging alliance between the two countries. This is widely viewed as being in response to the rise of China and the apparent diminution of American commitment to and presence in the region.¹ How accurate are such assessments? We argue that they point correctly to the direction that the relationship between New Delhi and Tokyo is taking, but that they miss the true nature of the India–Japan “strategic partnership,” a phenomenon very different from an alliance and one that is symptomatic of interstate politics in a fast-changing world.

The India–Japan “special strategic and global partnership ”² has been described as one that will define the Indo-Pacific and shape the Asian century. Under Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Japanese counterpart, there is much expectation of change. In Modi’s view, no other strategic partnership “can exercise a more profound influence on shaping the course of Asia and our interlinked ocean regions.”³ The bilateral relationship has gathered momentum in the past decade, driven by Indian and Japanese anxieties regarding China ’s rise and the distinct challenge it presents to them. Political and defence consultations between the two countries have been institutionalized at the highest level and Japan is the first country with which India has set up a “2+2” dialogue involving their foreign and defence ministries.⁴ Defence cooperation , strategic dialogue and the strengthening of economic ties have proceeded apace. Highlights of this growing cooperation include Japan ’s joining of the annual Malabar naval exercises between India and the United States as a regular participant in 2015, its commitment to invest in building the high-speed railway mentioned above, the signing of a civilian nuclear agreement permitting Japan to export nuclear materials and technology to India in 2016, and joint initiatives on infrastructure development projects from the Asia-Pacific to Africa.

Evolution of Interests

The India–Japan relationship has been witness to many decades of divergent trajectories, particularly during the Cold War . The two countries were in separate camps and in no way strategically aligned: Japan prioritized its security alliance with the United States , while India remained non-aligned and friendly with the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War signalled the tentative beginnings of a new interest in each other. Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao launched the country’s “Look East” policy , which created a window for bilateral interactions to expand. However, the nuclear tests conducted by India in 1998 meant a decade of lost opportunities. Japan reacted harshly to the tests and imposed sanctions. Additionally, Tokyo stayed neutral on the India–Pakistan Kargil conflict the following year, refusing to condemn Pakistan ’s violation of the Line of Control in Kashmir.

In the twenty-first century, the relationship has seen rapid movement forward. With the United States pushing for close ties with New Delhi, Tokyo could not afford to be left behind. The further rise of China ’s economic and military might and its increasingly tough posture in Southeast Asia spurred mutual interest in shaping outcomes in their shared neighbourhood. India was now looking beyond its traditional preoccupation with South Asia , while Japan was doing the same with respect to its alliance with the United States .⁵ New Delhi was also determined it would no longer remain a reactive power, but one that would “influence events abroad” rather than be “pushed by them” by building political and personal relationships.⁶ India has since forged strategic partnerships with a range of countries from China and Russia to the United States and Japan , reflecting a hedging strategy . At the same time, Japan has gradually shed its post-Second World War aversion to playing the role of a significant stakeholder in regional strategic politics and is increasingly focused on being a “normal” major power.⁷

Simultaneously, the United States has sought to reduce its costs as a guarantor of regional stability in Asia by building a closer strategic relationship with India and encouraging a trilateral linkage between these two and Japan . The US “pivot” or “rebalance” towards Asia—motivated by the rise of China —is closely linked to the new US–Japan–India nexus. Cooperation between India and Japan “helps reduce gaps that would otherwise emerge” in US policy towards the Asia-Pacific at a time of “declining U.S. military resources and rising commitments in the Middle East and Europe.”⁸

While the US has a long-standing alliance with Japan , the new strategic warmth between it and India , and similarly between Japan and India , has taken the form of “strategic partnerships.” But what exactly are strategic partnerships? What do they facilitate and what are their limitations? The next section discusses their chief features.

Defining Strategic Partnerships

While much is made of “structural change” in terms of the global distribution of power—primarily, the effect of the rise of China and its challenge to the post-Cold War dominance of the United States —a deeper systemic change has been given less attention.⁹ Power itself is not what it used to be: the possession of material attributes of what we know as “power” no longer translates directly into a capacity to use it as an instrument of foreign strategic and economic policy. This is by no means a new phenomenon. At least two kinds of power were—under certain circumstances—visibly constrained in the twentieth century. Nuclear weapons reversed the relationship between war and politics. The very notion of “Cold War ” highlighted a fundamental transformation of the strategic landscape: the primary purpose of nuclear weapons became one of preventing rather than carrying out acts of war. In short, strategic interdependence ruled out traditional power politics. In the economic sphere, the change was similar: competing states—notably the United States and Japan —could no longer conceive of the kind of economic warfare that states throughout history had engaged in. Economic interdependence made this option a self-defeating one. In both types of competition, the states that were at odds with each other were compelled to try and sort out their differences in ways that would ensure their survival as viable political and economic entities.

The new realities took a while to sink in and have become clearer in the post-Cold War era. Despite much discussion about the possibility of war between the United States , the “declining hegemon,” and the “challenger,” China ,¹⁰ the fundamental truth is that the two states are profoundly interdependent in both ways: they possess nuclear weapons and their economies are intricately intertwined.¹¹ In an increasingly interdependent world, the role of alliances , central to strategic politics throughout history, has begun to fade. The bottom line in a world of alliances is the capacity to combine power to defeat an adversary in war or economic conflict. That is no longer possible for major powers since significant military or economic conflict threatens systemic collapse.

Today, the relationships among powerful states with adversarial interests are characterized by interdependence , whether military or economic or both. The US–China relationship carries both. The China–Japan relationship involves economic interdependence and something close to military interdependence since Japan enjoys the benefit of extended deterrence from the United States and also has the capacity to convert its latent nuclear weapons capability into actual weapons should the need arise. Finally, China and India are militarily interdependent as nuclear weapons powers and also have a rising (though not yet mutually interdependent) economic relat...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. Conceptualizing Strategic Partnerships
• 2. Evolution of India–Japan Ties: Prospects and Limitations
• 3. A Confluence of Two Strategies: The Japan–India Security Partnership in the Indo-Pacific
• 4. Why Japan Needs India as a Defence Partner
• 5. Integrating an Ally and an Aligner in a Principled Security Network: The United States and the India–Japan Strategic Partnership
• 6. Conclusion
• Back Matter