China’s economic and political ascent signals an epochal change.1 The country’s enormous growth rate has continued over almost four decades. Measured in GDP (PPP), China overtook the U.S. in 2013 as the biggest economy and now commands over 17% of the world economy. Although China is still far away from reaching the per capita GDP level of the richest group of countries,2 the center of gravity of the world economy is moving towards Asia. As China integrates itself into global markets and production networks, East Asia has become the central engine of the world economy, reinstating an earlier pattern that was broken during the nineteenth century’s “great divergence,” when the industrial revolution gave rise to a European dominated world economy.3 Chinese companies and policy makers exert a growing financial and regulatory influence at a regional and global level because of accelerating investment activities into mineral extraction, fossil fuels, and infrastructure projects around the world. Chinese leaders and diplomats, supported by an increase of wealth and military power, have in turn expanded the scope and ambitions of their foreign policy.
Beijing’s current proactive diplomatic agenda impacts far-flung places and exceeds the immediate neighborhood in the Pacific and South East Asia. China’s economic statecraft and the attractiveness of its development model are felt on every level of the global economic system.4 The leadership in Beijing emphasizes that a “peaceful international environment” remains crucial to achieve the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” said to be completed at the 100-year anniversary of the People’s Republic in 2049.5 At the same time, a new generation of leaders under President Xi Jinping has gradually abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s principle of “biding time while lying low.”6 Given its fast-growing economic and military capabilities, a new “assertiveness” seems to characterize Chinese behavior in matters of territorial claims, such as in the South China Sea, and the pursuit of national interest.7 Yet, various studies have qualified the observation as premature that China’s overall diplomatic practice became indeed more assertive.8
Notwithstanding the different assessments of China’s recent foreign policy, the central question is how China’s expanding economic influence will transform the global political landscape. What kind of great power will China become? What is the scope of Chinese ambitions to create a new order? Which institutional and normative consequences result from China’s attempts to use its growing international leverage systematically? While foreign analysts disagree about whether China is already capable of challenging the liberal order or still only a “partial global power,”9 there is also no consensus about the direction of China’s “grand strategy.”10 It remains contested to which ends China’s increased power should be employed as different and partly irreconcilable visions of international order as well as China’s role and responsibilities circulate among Chinese elites.11 In light of this chronic inconsistency, the idea of engineering a revival of the ancient Silk Road marks a turning point in the debates about China’s strategy.
Proposed in late 2013, after the leadership transition from President Hu Jintao to President Xi, the Belt and Road Initiative (henceforth BR) is without doubt the most ambitious foreign policy approach adopted by China thus far. Despite a certain inherent vagueness, the associated debates among Chinese scholars clarify the shape and direction of China’s future trajectory. The country is perceived, first and foremost, to rise as a Eurasian great power.12 The initiative’s two components—coined “Silk Road Economic Belt” and “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”—form an organic approach aimed at reaching greater economic integration between countries along the routes which connect East Asia with Western Europe .13 The ultimate goal is to integrate all countries on the Eurasian landmass, connecting the regions of Central Asia , South Asia , South East Asia, Middle East, East Africa , and Europe . The BR includes an array of concrete infrastructure projects and new funding institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund which facilitate the necessary finance for large-scale infrastructure projects and other related investments along the new Silk Road.14
Like the case of China’s ongoing integration into the international political economy, which is a highly complex and partially fractious process,15 China’s emergence as a Eurasian power has worldwide repercussions. In fact, China’s influence has already been felt from Portugal to Vladivostok and from Greenland to Pakistan . Inevitably, this massive experiment has induced a host of different reactions from abroad, from welcoming embracement to outright suspicion. Other great powers including Russia , India , and the European Union (EU) have taken notice of Beijing’s evolving vision of economic cooperation and connectivity across Eurasia . The contributions by Darshana M. Baruah and C. Raja Mohan, Enrico Fels, and Philippe Le Corre in this volume show that their responses are mixed.
The academic study of the BR, meanwhile, is mushrooming. Outside China, numerous studies and policy reports have been conducted to assess to the scope, chances, and impact of China’s new foreign policy.16 With few exceptions, the latter literature has mostly remained in the genre of policy analysis and has not systematically employed theoretical frameworks in order to make sense of the BR.17 Within China itself, the study of the BR has developed into a cottage industry as the Chinese government initiated a broad academic debate and called for input from various domestic research institutes, think tanks, and universities in order to articulate a comprehensive policy based on Xi’s earlier remarks. Over one hundred institutes have formed a special BR think tank alliance.18 The massive increase in official funding began to impact the entire research landscape of Chinese academia. But despite numerous new research centers and think tanks, and the redirection of preexisting research projects, Chinese experts still see a shortage of sound expertise and detailed knowledge about local conditions of places, regions, and countries relevant for the BR.19
Against this background, the region and area experts and IR scholars contributing to this volume offer empirically dense and theoretically refined explorations of the BR that move beyond simplifications and biased ideological narratives. By applying either comparative methods or different conceptual lenses, the authors—Chinese scholars alongside scholars from “Silk Road countries”—explore diverse political and intellectual aspects of the BR. The chapters contextualize the political, cultural, and economic ramifications of the BR in order to shed light on its transformative significance and opportunities. Contributing to the broader scholarly work on China’s foreign policy, this book pushes the boundaries of current research by theorizing the modern Silk Road thoroughly while highlighting associated problems and risks. The remainder of this introduction, then, first discusses a suite of general issues related to the BR in order to offer the reader the necessary background knowledge relevant for all individual chapters. Second, I develop three broad theoretical perspectives that link the individual contributions together conceptually and indicate how these complement and resonate with each other to make sense of the BR. The conclusion points out research desiderata and emerging puzzles for the study of China’s new foreign policy.
China’s Eurasian Pivot
At the core of this volume lies the acknowledgment that China is rising as a Eurasian power. Though this is not to deny that China’s influence is growing across the board, the epicenter of the tectonic shifts lies within Eurasia . The reason the Belt and Road is so significant is not just because of the trillions of U.S. dollars that the Chinese state, state-owned companies, and private enterprises plan to invest in BR countries. More critical is the geographic vision of trade which makes, to cite the Economist, “Asia and Europe as a single space ,” while “China, not the United States, is its focal point.”20 Though the new funding mechanisms and institutions established by China fall short of challenging the principles and practices underpinning the Bretton Woods system, China has gained more influence, especially in the Eurasian regio...