China's Achilles' Heel
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China's Achilles' Heel

The Belt and Road Initiative and Its Indian Discontents

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eBook - ePub

China's Achilles' Heel

The Belt and Road Initiative and Its Indian Discontents

About this book

This book analyses Chinese discourse on Indian attitudes towards the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), and argues that the Indian discourse is becoming one of the biggest hurdles to China creating its own narrative about China's rise in Asia and beyond. In doing so, it spans across the themes of the power struggle between China and US, China and India, the Chinese perception of India, China-South Asia relations, the China-US- India strategic triangle and the success and failures of BRI.
The first part of the book focuses on the Chinese thinking behind the launch of the BRI and addresses questions related to the purpose of this initiative and ways in which it will facilitate China's rise as a superpower. Subsequently the book addresses how effective or ineffective India's challenge is and how it is negatively affecting China's BRI.

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Yes, you can access China's Achilles' Heel by Srikanth Thaliyakkattil in PDF and/or ePUB format, as well as other popular books in Business & International Business. We have over one million books available in our catalogue for you to explore.

Information

© The Author(s) 2019
Srikanth ThaliyakkattilChina’s Achilles’ Heelhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8425-7_1
Begin Abstract

1. Introduction: The BRI as Strategic Camouflage

Srikanth Thaliyakkattil1
(1)
Independent Scholar, Kerala, India
Srikanth Thaliyakkattil

Keywords

BRIIndia, Debt trapNarrativeThreat perceptionsSouth Asia
End Abstract
On April 27 and 28, 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in the Chinese province of Wuhan to reset the floundering relationship between their respective countries. The content of the two-day meeting was replete with positivity. During the summit, Modi said that “both India and China are ancient civilisations and important neighbours of each other. We [China and India] must strengthen dialogue, exchanges and cooperation, live in peace and build a friendship that lasts from generation to generation.”1
The praise and emphasis on similarities were also reciprocated by Xi Jinping, according to whom “Both China and India are countries with a splendid history and culture, and the two countries share many similarities in culture. China and India should conduct more extensive and deeper exchanges, jointly commit to the rejuvenation of Eastern civilisation, advocate respect for the diversity of civilisations and promote the harmonious coexistence of different civilisations.”2
The post-Wuhan summit statements of India and China show the divergences between the thinking of the two countries about important issues that impact the relations between them. According to India’s post-summit statement, “Prime Minister Modi and President Xi recognised the common threat posed by terrorism and reiterated their strong condemnation of and resolute opposition to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. They committed themselves to cooperate on counter-terrorism.”3 However, in China’s post-summit statement, terrorism was mentioned only as part of a general statement on global challenges: “We will work together to address global challenges such as epidemic diseases, natural disasters, climate change, and terrorism and will provide innovative and sustainable solutions.”4 This divergence can be viewed in light of China’s repeated blockage of India’s attempts at the United Nations to list Masood Azhar, the chief of Pakistan-based terror group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), as a global terrorist.5
Both statements addressed the India-China border issue. The Chinese statement was a reiteration that border issues should be solved peacefully and that it was important to maintain peace in the border areas. However, the Indian statement was more specific; it stated that “the two leaders underscored the importance of maintaining peace and tranquillity in all areas of the India-China border region in the larger interest of the overall development of bilateral relations.”6 Indian concerns that the border issue would negatively impact the overall relationship between India and China were not reflected in the Chinese statement. India views the boundary settlement between itself and China as a prerequisite for a healthy overall relationship, but China tends to separate the border dispute from other aspects of the India-China relationship.
Similarly, the Chinese emphasis on supporting “the multilateral trading system” and opposing “protectionism” is missing from the Indian statement.7 From the Chinese perspective, the main aim of the Wuhan summit was to show that India is on the side of China in resisting the imminent retaliatory trade measures of the United States (which eventually materialised) against China due to its alleged unfair trade practices. Following the meeting between Modi and Xi, the Chinese media selectively reported Indian opinions, highlighting that India opposed United States-initiated trade protectionism while ignoring the fact that India had also initiated tariffs to protect its industries from unfair trade practices by China.8 The Chinese media also tried to depict a combined Chinese-Indian front against the West, as well as blaming the Western media for exaggerating the differences between India and China.9
In another major divergence, China’s post-summit statement repeatedly emphasised the “five principles of peaceful coexistence”. This reference was missing from India’s post-summit statement.10 The reason was that since the 1962 war, Indians have never taken Chinese reiterations of the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” for granted. For Indian strategic experts, the fact that “China never took the doctrine of peaceful coexistence seriously was, however, never in doubt.”11
Ultimately, the Wuhan summit was just a showpiece event achieving nothing but a series of photo opportunities for both leaders. The core issue in the background was China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) strategy. Discussions of the BRI were conspicuously absent from the Wuhan summit. The BRI has put into motion a set of strategies and counter-strategies that have increased the threat perceptions and militarisation of the Indo-Pacific region. Summits such as that in Wuhan or any other so-called confidence building meetings are held against the backdrop of the aggravated mistrust in the region that the BRI strategy has created.
The BRI has marked a turning point in the geopolitics of Asia. As argued in the following chapters, it is an attempt by China to establish its narrative dominance over Asia, thus establishing itself as the predominant power in the Asian region and the world. Becoming the dominant power in Asia serves many purposes for the Communist Party-led system of China. It will ensure its survival as a unique political system, it will increase the internal legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and it will substantially increase the power of the CCP to shape its geopolitical environment. India’s objections and resistance to the BRI have become its most vulnerable point, and the resulting discourse has securitised the BRI. Indian resistance has helped to transform what was purported by China to be an economic and cultural initiative into a regional security threat, as reflected in the Chinese discourse on the Indian attitude towards the BRI.
Several questions raised in the Indian parliament related to the BRI reflect India’s concern over the implications of the BRI. The Indian worries are mainly concentrated on the question of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The official Indian position states that
the so-called ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’, which is being projected as a flagship project of China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR) initiative, passes through parts of the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir, which has been in illegal occupation of Pakistan since 1947. [The Indian] government has conveyed to the Chinese side, including at the highest level, its concerns about China’s activities in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and asked them to cease these activities. [The Indian] government has also strongly conveyed its position at multilateral and international fora where issues related to OBOR / CPEC have been raised, citing its concerns over the violation of India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity by this project. [The Indian] government has clearly articulated its firm belief that connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognised international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality and must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty and territorial integrity.12
The then-Minister of State In the Ministry Of External Affairs, M.J. Akbar, further states that “the inclusion of the so-called CPEC, which passes through parts of the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir under illegal occupation of Pakistan, as a flagship project of OBOR reflects a lack of appreciation of India’s concerns regarding the issue of sovereignty and territorial integrity.”13 China has ignored India’s concerns, and CPEC remains the most contentious issue in the BRI strategy.
It was not the only Indian concern that led to the Indian rejection of the BRI; there are also other factors, such as the long-running border dispute, the enormous trade deficit, the sale of Chinese weapons to India’s South Asian neighbouring countries, and, most importantly, China’s strategic partnership with Pakistan.
Indian objections and the resulting events have had an unfavourable impact on China’s BRI strategy. Given the objectives and the wide-ranging issues expected to be solved by the BRI, the impact of the Indian objections has proven detr...

Table of contents

  1. Cover
  2. Front Matter
  3. 1. Introduction: The BRI as Strategic Camouflage
  4. 2. The Road to the Belt and the Road
  5. 3. The BRI and Its Different Manifestations
  6. 4. India May Join and Benefit from the BRI: A Chinese View
  7. 5. The BRI and the Good, Not So Good and Bad Business with India
  8. 6. India as Jealous Foe and the BRI
  9. 7. Belt and Road vs the Indo-Pacific
  10. 8. Conclusion: The Way to War
  11. Back Matter