Performing Political Theory is a book on political education, with case studies of outstanding political theorists as educational performersâwriting classic texts to stimulate readers and students to think politically. The phrase âperforming political theoryâ refers to the performative art of writing used by our sample set of political theorists: where âperformativeâ means practising the arts of âpolitical theoryâ with readers of the text. The writers of certain political theory texts do far more than âinformâ readers about the nature of politics; these very gifted writers âperformâ theories of politics to stimulate readers to think and act theoretically when they act politically. Performing Political Theory shows how academic teachers can interpret complex works of political theory written by highly regarded philosophers to help readers and students participate in this important but seriously understudied form of political education.
The Promise of Performance
The title of the book refers to performing a way of thinking called âpolitical theoryâ. Academic teaching in the field of political theory helps students understand the great effort of the most influential political theorists who have shaped the history of modern political thought: Machiavelli stands at the front of this queue, with academic teachers trying as best they can to bring students to come to grips with the thinking associated with this great writer. The book title thus refers primarily to the performance of great theorists like Machiavelli whose written works flesh out theories about the nature of politics. The title, however, also refers in less direct ways to the performance of students who can be taught to appreciate the strengths and limitations of the theories of Machiavelli and his successors; and also to the performance of academic teachers whose pedagogy (or teaching practice) builds the bridge of accessibility between the writers of the past and the students of the present. This book is written by an experienced academic teacher (still learning much about pedagogy) to help others reflect on the pedagogy of bridge-building in political science education. This chapter examines the performance of the pedagogue in helping students better understand (even if they then reject their views) the great performance of some of the greatest political theorists in the modern era.
Many political scientists know the important role of US philosopher Judith Butler in mobilising research interest in performance studies of contemporary politics. Her first book was on âHegelian reflectionsâ in French political thinking and practice, indicating Butlerâs unusual combination of abstract theory and challenging political practice. A later book closer to what we think of as performance studies was called Excitable Speech with a subtitle on âa politics of the performativeâ. Another book in 2015 examined âa performative theory of assemblyâ referring to what groups of people do when they perform together, assembled to defend or promote whatever interests they consider of social importance in their role as designated public officials or simply as activist citizens (Butler 2015). Of more immediate interest here is the background influence of British philosopher J. L. Austin (1911â1960) who is generally regarded as the founder of contemporary performance studies because of his influential, if quietly methodical, examination of speech actsâincluding âperformative utterances â (Austin 2001). Evaluations of the many schools of performance studies affecting contemporary politics would have to begin with Butlerâs considerable work compared to very many additional later schools of analysis. Here the task is more modest and retrospective; it is to look back at Austinâs original reflections on âperformance utterancesâ setting the stage for our own recovery of earlier historical examples of political theory conceived of performatively.
Much turns on differences between informing and performing. Austin was trying to identify a form of speech act which differed from those that were informative. His hope was that he could defend something important about âordinary languageâ not well understood in the specialisms of speech analysis in twentieth-century philosophy. His focus was on types of speech used ânot to report facts but to influence people in this way or thatâ. Some of his examples are from the bottom up: of people, including self-interested schemers, pleading for special treatment. Other examples are from the top down: of people exercising some kind of public authority, which might be fair and reasonable or might be unfair and false. This distinction between performances that are fair or unfair implies that not all performances are credible. On some occasions, we might be ânot entirely responsible for doing what we are doingâ; or indeed we could be âacting a play or making a jokeâ for some particular reason, so that âwe shall not be able to say that we seriously performed the act concernedâ. Of relevance here is Austinâs own rather abbreviated explanation of what distinguishes an appropriate from an inappropriate exercise of performative speech. Defending the ritual of performative speech, Austin generally relies on common sense or conventional explanation of what society might hold as appropriate or inappropriate exercises of performative speech. Hence it might be thought appropriate for judges to determine hard or soft sentences but it might be held inappropriate for police officers to deal with lawbreakers firmly or softly (Austin 2001, 1435; see also Rosen 2002, 182â193).
Austinâs claim was that what he termed âperformance utterancesâ shaped rather than reflected a state of affairs. Put otherwise, these types of performance prescribed rather than described a state of affairs. A judge who sentences a convicted person is enscribing rather than describing that sentenceâwhich comes into existence precisely because of the judgeâs performance when judging. Speech or text which functions as performance is not merely saying something but is doing something: the speech or text performs the action it addresses. Austin acknowledged that his formulation might allow sceptics to warn us of loopholes where âperjurers and welshersâ could claim to have performed or nor performed simply on the basis of cleverly persuasive rhetoric. But his larger point was that performative speech was inevitably rhetorical. Claiming that performative speech âmust be appropriate to its invocationâ, Austin allowed that performative utterances exercised an element of what he awkwardlyâor ârather hurriedlyâ as he writesâcalled âthe notion of forces of utterancesâ. Force here means persuasion where the performer speaks acceptably to audiences in ways that fall outside the categories of true or false required of nonperformative statements. Austin invites his readers to accept the implication that performative language is rhetoricalâalthough very little in Austinâs own analysis acknowledges in what ways rhetoric may be fair and reasonable or unfair and false (Austin 2001, 1442; see also Rosen 2002, 193â203).
Austinâs philosophy of ordinary language made special room for the ordinary practice of performative utterances. What is so attractive about Austinâs restoration of this form of rhetoric is that it is believed to be ordinary rather than, so to speak, extraordinary. Yet what is less attractive is the lack of close attention to those performances worth admiring and those worth condemning. Implicit in Austinâs approach is an acceptance of âappropriateâ performances and a rejection of âinappropriateâ performances. What distinguishes the appropriate from the inappropriate is, I think, underexplored. Austin refers to explanations of social convenience when audiences defer to acknowledged authorities like judges. It might well be that in these cases of worthy performance, audiences submit to the informal education as well as the formal authority of those worthy performers. Austin says little about formal or informal education as part of credible performance. Austin certainly helps us today recognise the public power of performative utterances. What we now need, however, is a more detailed examination of case studies not only of ordinary but also what we might think of as extraordinary exercises of performative utterancesâwhich generate audience acceptance for their education even in the absence of formal authority. Machiavelliâs cagy utterances in The Prince are a good example; as are Millâs wry reflections in On Liberty; and as are Nietzscheâs revolutionary ruminations in On the Genealogy of Morals.
Political Education
The topic of political education is of increasing importance to contemporary democracy. The large amount of literature on âdemocratic civicsâ, however, pays very little attention to the role of political theory in civics education. The exceptions to the rule are rare. One good exampleânow sadly datedâis Melvin Richterâs edited collection on Political Theory and Political Education (Richter 1980). Some of the chapters from the Richter collection illustrate educational strategies I have revisited in this book. For example, the chapters by Bernard Williams (âPolitical Philosophy and the Analytical Traditionâ), Allan Bloom (âThe Study of Textsâ) and J. G. A. Pocock (âPolitical Ideas as Historical Events: Political Philosophers as Historical Actorsâ) all relate to the history of political thought and to the role of classic writers of key texts as not only political theorists but also as political educators. These influential students of political interpretation debate different ways we can begin to discern and evaluate âtheoriesâ hidden in the great historical treasures of political philosophy. My aim is more modest: this book will tell a story about effective ways of teaching the history of important texts illustrating the nature of modern political thought.
Of course, the problems facing effective teaching and learning have been well known for some time. For example, Richter noted in 1980 (when commenting on Bloomâs chapter) that students tended not to read much, had little training in abstract reasoning and knew very little about âthe imaginative work of the pastâ (Richter 1980, 32; see also Bloom 1990, 295â314). Hence this pioneering editor searched for âpedagogicalâ reflections to help those academic teachers interested in cultivating an interest among students on âhow to read a great bookâ (Richter 1980, 35). I think this book addresses this topic from the perspective of the engaged teacher who stands between students and writers of great books in political theory. The political science profession has only a few resources likely to help academic teachers gather their bearings. Rare it is that the American Political Science Association breaks ranks and publishes as part of âteacher symposiumâ an article on âthe dilemmas of teaching political theoryâ (Moore 2017). More typical is the reference to old and nearly forgotten books on âthe professor and the polityâ where old gems like Bloomâs âPolitical Science and the Undergraduateâ appear (Bloom 1977, 117â127). Searching in the wrong places can occasionally reveal other gems like Martin Diamondâs various reviews of the study of politics in a liberal education (Diamond 1971, 6â10; see also Diamond 1977a, 89â115; 1977b, 3â21).
My aim is to demonstrate a new way of teaching the history of political thought. The aim is to encourage cautious or sceptical students to take a deeper interest in practices of political theory: reading, reflecting, discussing and debating core texts in the history of political thought. If cautious students want to remain negative about the value of old political theory texts, my plan is to help them do so in an informed way, after taking into account the rhetorical skill of these historical writers. I hope I can persuade students to take political theory seriously as a way of thinking throughâor at least thinking aboutâmany important political issues. As academics, we think that historical political thinkers can be seen to be performing politically, acting as advocates of certain types of political engagement which differ from thinker to thinker. Yet common to so many influential political theorists is a commitment to âthinking politicallyâ and an endeavour to present texts which can help readers and students learn to âthink politicallyâ.
Given that this type of political thinking differs from âthinking dogmaticallyâ, I have to warn students that many of these classic texts are edgy and experimental, challenging readers with roundabout ways of learning basic practices of critical thinking. This quality of âroundaboutnessâ is political: it distracts enemies while rewarding friends. Thinkers in the historical tradition of Western political theory can think grandly as abstract philosophers, and can often write grandly abstract works of philosophy; but in other works, they can also write practically as highly skilled political performers, nudging readers to...