Ethics, Moral Life and the Body

Sociological Perspectives

Rhonda M. Shaw

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781349672349, 9781137312587
• eBook ISBN: 9781137312594
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy
• Index: Social Sciences

Shaw addresses the 'ethical turn' in contemporary sociological thinking, by exploring the contribution of sociology and the social sciences to bioethical debates about morality and tissue exchange practices.

1

Defining Ethics and Morality

Sociology has been a relative newcomer with regard to the renascence of debate about ethics over the course of the last few decades. In this chapter, I examine the distinctive contribution to be made by social scientists to this interdisciplinary discussion. A sociological contribution to the topic of ethics and morality can be mapped by examining the meanings of these terms, and the ways in which they circulate in different cultural contexts and within academic and scholarly literature.

It is fair to say that the meanings of the terms ethics and morality are commonly taken for granted. They are often used interchangeably in lay discourse (as discussed further in the following chapter) as well as in academic writing (for example, Banks and Gallagher 2009; Sayer 2010, 2011). Mark Israel and Iain Hay (2006), who borrow heavily from moral philosophy, collapse ethics with morality. I suggest an alternative way of proceeding in this chapter, but note, nonetheless, that there is a lack of terminological clarity around both concepts in terms of their usage. This ambiguity arises from the many different meanings of these terms; meanings that are sometimes elusive, even within academic discourses. Despite difficulties in pinning the terms down, discussions about ethics and morality now figure prominently in debates within the social sciences. This reappearance has prompted a number of key questions: ‘what is the relationship between sociology as a social science and ethics?’, ‘what is ethics?’, and ‘what is the relation of ethics to morality?’

I will make a series of points about the terms ethics and morality and their respective meanings in this chapter. In short, I suggest that although the terms ethics and morality are often held to be synonymous, they do not necessarily refer to the same phenomenon. A second point is that there are many different meanings of ethics, and no one definition is comprehensive. In primer philosophy texts (for example, see Popkin and Stroll 1994), we note that the scope of debate around ethics is wide, and no one definition fully captures the nature of the ethical domain. Furthermore, if we trace the etymological meanings of the terms ethics and morality, we see how conceptions of ethics and of moral conduct change over time. Additionally, the terms ethics and morality vary across discourses, and even within the same time period. Finally, in related fashion, the terms ethics and morality vary within linguistic and socio-political contexts. The following sections of the chapter elaborate on these points, which are subsequently developed in chapter 2, as an empirical discussion of the ways people mobilise understandings of ethics and morality in light of their reflections on everyday life, and their involvement in tissue exchange practices. In chapter 2, I draw on the debates discussed in the final sections of the present chapter, to examine how cultural meanings and understandings influence people’s moral choices and justifications for action.

Ethics and morality: Defining our terms

It is important to be clear about terminology from the outset, as this has implications for where the sociological study of ethics and morality is located as a topic. When ethics is treated as a proper noun, it refers to a subdiscipline of philosophy, which, in Western thought, is ordinarily referred to as moral philosophy. According to the second edition of Fowler’s Dictionary of Modern English Usage (1965: 170), when English scholars knew both Greek and Latin, the terms ethics and morality were equivalent. Needless to say, they have different meanings in the context of Greek social life and that of ancient Rome.

By the twentieth century, texts introducing students to ethics and moral philosophy distinguished between the two terms and respective meanings (see Grassian 1981; Rachels 1993). The split between ethics and morality as complementary terms is not typically reproduced in ordinary use by non-academics, however. In everyday parlance, people often treat ethics and morality as synonymous. Empirical research shows that when non-experts, who are not academically versed in the subject, are asked to consider the respective meanings of ethics and morality, they use the terms interchangeably. Numerous dictionaries acknowledge this overlap. The Concise Oxford Dictionary (1987: 331), for example, defines ethics as ‘relating to morals’, before referring to ethics both as a set of principles and as the science of morals. In the Fowler’s dictionary cited above, ethics is said to encompass the field of moral science and morals refer to the practice of ethics. The Oxford Dictionary of Sociology, edited by Gordon Marshall (1998: 201), likewise defines ethics ‘as the concern with what ought to be, where science (including social science) is concerned with describing reality as it actually exists’. The bulk of this entry then goes on to discuss the ethical rules to be followed when conducting social science research, confirming the practice of some social scientists, who not only conflate ethics with morality, but collapse ethics with research ethics or professional codes (for example, Fluehr-Lobban 2012).

Calling ethics the science of morals may raise the eyebrows of some sociologists, for whom value-free science documents the reality of social life, not an ideal. Such prescription would be regarded by these sociologists as the domain of ethics proper. For such scholars, among them Max Weber (1949: 52), an ‘ethical science’ would be a contradiction in terms. That said, Émile Durkheim famously decreed sociology as a ‘science of moral facts’, contending that even though the content of morality was historically and socially variable, the form was the same. Other early sociologists, such as Harriet Martineau, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, and Georg Simmel, likewise argued for a science of morals (Abend 2010). They, nevertheless, located what they envisaged as this descriptive science in the sociology of morality, as opposed to situating it alongside the prescriptive aims of philosophy.

In contemporary analytic philosophy, ethics ordinarily refers to the theoretical study of morals and the evaluation of forms of moral conduct to critical scrutiny. Some philosophy texts define ethics as the theory of morality, or theoretical study of morality, outlining the rules and principles upon which value judgement is to be based. According to philosophical criterion, what distinguishes ethics is its aspiration and assent to ‘reflective generality’ (Williams 1985: 2), and its systematic nature and style of argumentation, which demonstrates ‘that the ideal morality a philosopher proposes is indeed ideal’ (Grassian 1981: 3). In this categorisation, theoretical study of morality must aim at a level of reflective generality so as to encapsulate good or right action for everyone, not simply perceptions of the good as adumbrated by specific historical groups or atomised individuals. This raises the question: if ethics refers to the theoretical study of morals, is it a special kind of knowledge, and if so, who is authorised to teach or practise it? Certainly, Harriet Martineau, who was writing in 1838, believed that the social-scientific understanding of morality required special expertise (in Abend 2010: 563). Contemporary sociologists tend to be more sceptical. Martyn Hammersley (2009) takes the view that it is impossible to make claims to ethical expertise, and this is clear when we examine the role of people who sit on ethics committees or institutional review boards (IRBs), as they are called in the US, vetting research proposals. Admittedly, the crux of Hammersley’s discussion comprises a polemic against increasing ethical regulation of social research, but his view includes the proviso that where ethical regulation is warranted, then ‘ethical regulators’ ought to have requisite training in the area. To exercise authority in this role, they should have not only sufficient philosophical education in ethics (moral philosophy), but also training in social science methodologies.

In addition to defining ethics as the theoretical study of morality, the term is deployed to refer to the norms, principles, and standards upon which to evaluate morals and rules or codes of conduct, in respect of a particular class of actions or a particular group of people (Popkin and Stroll 1994: 1). When ethics is defined to refer to codes or principles, its scope is circumscribed. This definition of ethics is relatively narrow, compared to the broad brush definition of ethics as the theoretical study of morality, but is, nevertheless, a common understanding in the contemporary workplace context, especially among professional groups. In popular usage, the term ethics has become associated with expected ways of proceeding within certain professions, reflected in specialty areas of ethical expertise. As well as research ethics associated with practice-oriented disciplines in academia such as anthropology or sociology, we now have an array of subfields of ethics within professions. Within bioethics, for example, the edited textbook by Peter A. Singer and A. M. Viens (2008) lists 10 specialty bioethics fields in the final section of the book, including ‘critical and intensive care ethics’, ‘neuroethics’, ‘psychiatric ethics’, ‘pharmacy ethics’. Defined in this way, codes of ethics pertain to the conduct of professionals in specific work situations dealing with patients, clients, consumers, or research participants. Although there are reciprocal responsibilities for patients and research participants in their interactions with professionals in these contexts, their behaviours are not regulated or guided by the same principles underpinning professional codes.

In contrast to the definition of ethics as a subfield in philosophy, morals are understood as the actual collective customs and practices of a culture; hence the relevance of morality to sociology and anthropology. The distinction between ethics as the theoretical study of morality and morality as it pertains to norms and customs is in line with the division of ethics in analytic philosophy into normative and non-normative ethics. The distinction is illuminating, as it reveals that a particular version of sociology, characterised by non-sociologists, has come to stand as representative of the discipline as a whole.

Normative ethics

A detailed survey of normative ethics is beyond the scope of this book, but it is important to provide a brief overview of its main variants, given the influence of modern moral philosophy on the thinking of both early and contemporary sociologists, and their subsequent interpretation and critique of these traditions. Background information about normative ethical theory is also essential in light of its significance for contemporary bioethics, especially with respect to approaches that draw on mainstream moral philosophy.

According to the reigning view, normative ethics is the stuff of philosophy. Normative ethics deals with substantive questions of morality by investigating the content of moral principles and virtues. Because it attempts to establish which rules, norms, and principles should guide and regulate our conduct, the focus of normative ethics is evaluative rather than descriptive. As such, normative ethics sets out to determine what ethically ought to be the case by studying actual moral arguments or statements, and engages in discussion about what instances or classes of conduct are right or wrong, good or bad. In short, normative ethics is concerned with how human beings might best lead their lives, and which states of affairs ought to be furthered in society.

There are a number of different varieties of normative ethical theories. Each has their own version of what the focus of ethics should be and what ethics should be concerned with. Historically, the main traditions have been divided into two key theoretical approaches: deontological (duty-based) and consequentialist ethics. Some scholars include a third tradition, of virtue ethics, but this approach fell largely out of favour during the modern period and has only recently been revived (for example, see MacIntyre [1981] 1984). The first two traditions provide frameworks that are action-guiding, while virtue ethics focuses on moral character. Consequentialism and deontology have been influential in mainstream bioethics, especially outside the US, while virtue ethics is still largely regarded as an alternative approach to bioethical inquiry. The following sections briefly describe these traditions.

Consequentialism and deontology

Broadly speaking, consequentialist and deontological ethical theories are concerned with how we should act. Schematically, deontologists want to know which actions are right or wrong, and consequentialists seek to assess whether the benefits of an action or decision outweigh its risks.

In short, consequentialism takes into consideration the consequences of a person’s action. It asks questions about ‘what comes after?’ Utilitarianism, the most influential type of consequentialism, attempts to maximise good consequences of utility for everyone, and is not primarily concerned with the process by which a morally desirable end is achieved. Principally following the theories of the British philosophers Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), proponents of utilitarianism argue that we ought to do whatever will promote the greatest happiness or good for the greatest number of people. Utilitarianism is further divided into Acts (from which one calculates the consequences) and Rules (that produce best consequences).

Consequentialist arguments are often used to deliberate cases involving tissue exchange; for instance, where medical professionals need to weigh up the risk to a healthy person who seeks to donate body tissue against the benefits to the recipient of the tissue, who may receive life-saving therapy or vastly improved quality of life. In the context of concerns in Western societies about the distribution of publicly funded healthcare and the advancing view that individuals are responsible for their own health status, consequentialist arguments may be applied to the allocation of scarce resources such as solid organs. In the public domain, for example, questions are often asked with regard to liver transplantation and the ‘moral deservingness’ of prospective recipients. These arguments assume a link between a person’s health and their moral behaviour, by questioning whether donated livers should go to patients with alcohol-related liver failure, or whether preference should be given to the young or to those persons whose liver failure is a consequence of an inherited condition or infection.

Deontology focuses on a person’s motives and intentions. It is concerned with the right kind of act, and is based on general rules and principles regardless of feelings, sentiment, or inclinations. According to deontologists, acts are good in themselves, irrespective of the consequences. The thinker most often associated with deontological theory is the German Philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Kantianism holds that our duty is to follow rules that we would consistently will to be universal laws. That is, we should only follow rules that, as rational beings, we would be willing to have followed by all people at all times and in all circumstances. This argument is developed in Kant’s famous Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals ([1785] 1964) and is encapsulated in the first formulation of the categorical imperative: ‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’ ([1785] 1964: 88). The second formulation of the categorical imperative is ‘Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, by always at the same time as an end’ ([1785] 1964: 96). The second formulation holds that we should never treat others as tools for our own purposes, because it is wrong to treat that which is not an object as an object. Taken together, these supreme moral principles exhort us to treat human beings with intrinsic dignity and value.

Accordingly, a deontologist will not countenance taking opportunistic advantage of another person for their own purpose, as this would be inconsistent with the duty to respect all persons as self-determining and free agents. Because human beings are said to have certain inherent rights, claims are often made, on the basis of Kant’s theory, that practices which objectify and instrumentalise the human body are wrong. This argument is often made with respect to contemporary discussions of tissue exchange practices, especially where the sale of bodily materials such as human gametes, solid organs, or sexual services is involved. Following Kantian moral theory, proponents hold that such practices should be prohibited because they degrade human beings’ special dignity and worth.

Virtue ethics

The revival of virtue ethics is frequently traced to the 1958 publication of Elizabeth Anscombe’s high-regarded essay ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, in which she critiques deontological and consequentialist theories of ethics.1 Unlike consequentialism or deontology, virtue ethics is ‘agent-centred’ not ‘act-centred’. Rather than focusing on what one does, in terms of acts or deeds, virtue ethics is interested in what kind of person one is, and is concerned to ask questions about ‘how we should live’.

Virtue ethics is associated with the writings of the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–322 BCE) and his reflections on moral life in The Nicomachean Ethics (1976). Aristotle adopted an empirical and pragmatic approach to ethics. As such, his work is potentially compatible with sociological accounts of moral life, particularly versions of practice theory that draw on his notions of habituation and practical invol...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 Defining Ethics and Morality
• 2 Moral Judgement and Embodied Ethics
• 3 Sociology and Morality
• 4 Sociology and Bioethics
• 5 Organ and Tissue Donation
• 6 Assisted Human Reproduction
• 7 Breast Milk Sharing and Exchange
• Conclusion: Ethics and Doing Sociology
• Notes
• References
• Index