Chechnya's Secret Wartime Diplomacy

Aslan Maskhadov and the Quest for a Peaceful Resolution

I. Akhmadov, N. Daniloff, Kenneth A. Loparo, Kenneth A. Loparo, Anatoly Semenov

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781137338785
• eBook ISBN: 9781137338792
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Eastern European History
• Index: History

This volume makes available transcripts and commentary from the secret correspondence between former Chechen foreign minister Ilyas Akhmatov and Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov. This correspondence provides revelatory insights into both men's attempts to secure Western support for a peaceful transition to an independent Chechnya.

1

Maskhadov’s First Briefing

Audio letter of July 21–22, 2000

Assalamu-alaikum Wa Rahmatullahi Wa barakatuh!¹

My greetings to you, Ilyas! This talk is meant for you, there is no possibility to speak about everything over the phone. It’s regarding your work, so that you know roughly what the President thinks about this or that question on the agenda today.

So, first, the cause of the war: I think that the cause of this, and the wars in the course of 400 years, is uncertainty in relations between Russia and Chechnya. Unless we establish normal civilized relations, there will be wars, there will be genocide. We will never have peace with this barbaric state. Usually, Russian leaders and politicians do not want to say anything definite because it is more advantageous for them. It is possible to use Chechnya as a bargaining chip in the fight for power.

Causes for this war: I don’t think that the causes lie in kidnapping for ransom or the invasion into Dagestan, or terrorist acts. There is a single reason: to bring the right man to power. Everything was orchestrated for Putin. In my understanding, human trafficking is a precisely used mechanism for discrediting our people, the government, and the President of Chechnya, to show the inability of our authorities to build a state of our own, to show that we are savages.

The Russians themselves brought trafficking in human beings here, during the previous war [1994–1996], and it is no secret for anyone that trafficking in people, even in corpses, the demands for ransom, started out of the check points, from the commandant’s offices, from the filtration camps. Russian officers made a big business out of it. Then, after the war, there was kidnapping of the same journalists, the same foreigners, everything was ordered from above. Where there is no ransom, there is no crime, but there was ransom and considerable—millions of dollars worth.

Even the last incident with the French press photographer Brice Fleutiaux is an illustration of how things were before the war. The journalist became a hostage, our special services got on the tracks of these criminals, found him, and apparently freed him. You do know that! In our joy we called Mr. Russell Johnston² and said: “That’s it, we give him back.” But suddenly a mediator shows up, it is [Boris] Berezovsky³ with money, offers a big ransom to these criminals. And accordingly, unwilling to refuse this big money, they hide this hostage, and then Berezovsky buys him out and takes him away from under our noses.

The same happened to Yelena Masyuk and other journalists, with all foreigners. There has always been a mediator from Dagestan: [Magomed] Tolboyev, Secretary of Security Council of Dagestan, Korigov, minister of internal affairs of Ingushetia. Berezovsky always arrived with money and bought out each one on the border of Chechnya and Dagestan, or on the border of Ingushetia and Chechnya. This is how it happened.

All these famous kidnappings of prominent high-ranking officers, politicians, or journalists were executed by two criminal gangs: the first gang headed by Adam Deniyev⁴ and the brothers Saidov. And we destroyed that criminal gang. We shot these brothers, put all their comrades-in-arms in prison. Their leader, ringleader was Adam Deniyev. They confessed to it.

When we demanded the extradition of this Adam Deniyev from the Russian leadership, they flatly refused, so we brought facts of his involvement in killing Doctors Without Borders in Nizhniye Atagi.⁵ And today, he is Moscow’s henchman, contender for leadership, Moscow’s puppet. Then a question arises, so everything that he did, everything that these brothers Saidov did, had been orchestrated by Moscow, had it not?

Just the same, Akhmad Kadyrov⁶ [onetime grand mufti of Chechnya] was the head of one of the criminal gangs, the most horrible gang—the brothers Yamadayev gang. It was Kadyrov who was literally at the head of kidnapping people from Ingushetia, from Dagestan. And just before the war, Sulim Yamadayev⁷ personally confessed, he just said that it was Kadyrov who made him kidnap people, who had made him a gunman. Kadyrov was well informed about everything that he was doing: whom he had killed, whom he had kidnapped. Again, who is Kadyrov? Moscow’s henchman. National traitor. A puppet. An agent of the FSB since 1982 under the code name Adam.

Second, the invasion into Dagestan: We say that it was collusion; collusion with the Kremlin, the financial oligarchy, and the military that lost the first war [1994–1996]. Either Vladimir Putin or Alexander Lebed⁸ was supposed to come to power. If it were Lebed, then it would be a blitzkrieg war because that man did not need a protracted war to raise his ratings. But to bring an unknown man to power meant to extend the war to the time of the election. They chose the second candidate, Putin. And the rest of it was a collusion, this war was inevitable.

Third, the terrorist acts. We are told that they do not have facts about the involvement of the Russian special services but not a single Chechen was caught red-handed. And everywhere, the mass media says that Maskhadov was caught red-handed, he blew up those buildings, that it is all about Chechens. We say that not a single Chechen was implicated. It is necessary to set up an independent inquiry; it is not difficult to investigate who blew up these buildings. We are reproached that we did not condemn terrorism, did not extradite criminals or punish them. But that is not true: we condemned terrorism, racketeering, the march into Dagestan. We condemned everything. They do not tell the truth. Here are the steps on My call went as far as Voloshin,⁹ and I was told: “He is sick,” “he’s not in his office,” and so on. I pleaded: “Let me talk to Yeltsin for five minutes!” It was useless!

We expressed our condolences; we condemned the bombings, and there was also my statement that we were ready to give up any of our citizens if there were facts about their involvement in these terrorist acts. To present them to any independent court hearing.

There was my appeal to the leaders of the North Caucasus. And I suggested to them: “Let’s sign a document, and agreement about collective security up to creating some peacekeeping forces to unite efforts against crime, to unite efforts against racketeering, terrorism.”

I even said to Sergei Adamovich Kovalev¹⁰ who wrote in his article in the newspaper Groznenskii Rabochii something like Chechens don’t have civil courage being afraid that they can be accused of lack of fear of God, or of patriotism, they do not want to tell the truth. I asked him, “Sergei Adamovich, what were we supposed to confess to? That we are gunmen, that we are terrorists, that we blew up those buildings, that we planned this provocation in Dagestan, that we planned this war, that we began this war? Is this what Chechen courage consists of?”

About governance with the Shariat: He [Putin] says all sorts of things that they [the Chechens] shot people, our attitude towards women, Sudan, Afghanistan, Algeria. I am saying it again, that these things are twisted on purpose: both Wahhabism and driving people into a state, so that they fly off the handle the moment they see a beard. The Kadyrovs did all this. And there would not be any tragedy if I did not have this “crusader” Kadyrov near me, I would have come to terms with the young people, and I almost did it. But I was constantly reproached that this sleazebag was near me.

We have strongly rejected any Wahhabism, fundamentalism, extremism. We have always said that traditional Islam is moderate Islam that rejects Wahhabism, fundamentalism, extremism.

And besides, Kovalev says that Maskhadov wanted to accomplish the unrealizable, that is, to prevent a civil war and brought about bigger trouble. Well, again I answer him: I really did not want it! I wanted to prevent Russia’s aggression, to stop this war at least for some time. I feared that if aggression began again, I worried whether my people would be able to face these bombs, shells, again three years later after that severe war. Without its state system, shaky power, army, and so on, and so forth.

I feared these things, and not a civil war. Because I knew perfectly well what a civil war means for Chechens, it is much worse than Afghanistan. And right after that, Russia’s invasion, we would have lost that war. And what does it mean to be defeated by Russians? We all would be throttled for sure. I did not want a civil war to be a cause for Russia to begin its aggression, knowing that it would be a 100 percent defeat for us.

Therefore, I feared this civil war, and even more, the aggression that would come after that. And, again, why didn’t I condemn, Basayev,¹¹ why didn’t I condemn Udugov, Yandarbiyev, Khattab? Because there was a split, but nevertheless, the war began. The war was inevitable, whether I condemned them or I didn’t condemn them. However, the war was planned in October and November [in Moscow, 1999]. The war was to begin six months before the election, it had been planned.

But if I started gangland-style shoot-outs among us, that would mean a split. Again a defeat for us, and victory for Russia. Again we would have been crushed. Did they expect this from me? Had we enough civil courage and smarts, just the other way around, to unite. They don’t like it, Kovalev doesn’t like it, nor do the Kadyrovs.

On May 12, 1997, we managed to sign a Peace Treaty and we considered it a fundamental document, that there should be no more war. And on August 30, 1997, during the second meeting with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, I did everything possible to get a comprehensive agreement signed, making major concessions to Russia, including common economic and military space. Common diplomatic obligations, and that Chechnya would build its relations with the Muslim world and in the Caucasus in Russia’s interests. We were ready to sign that document, but again those hawks that surrounded Yeltsin prevented the signing.

Now, on to the military situation and what is happening here: As a serviceman, I can say the Russian generals have lost this war. Today the generals are trapped in lies, everything that they conceived has come to naught. They just took a ride along the whole territory and can’t say officially that they control even a meter of our land, even the place where they’re stationed. Morally, physically, financially. There is depression in the army. These generals promise them that the war would end tomorrow, then you’ll go home. And again clean-up operations, again there is death behind every bush.

This Russian army is really worth seeing! It is really some gypsy encampment, like in the “Wedding in Malinovka.”¹² They did everything possible, didn’t spare anything, used all their ammunition, but with absolutely no result. So, today it is a disgrace to look at these generals, at these Troshevs, Manilovs. I just could not restrain myself and once I sent them a cassette where I said: “Shame on you, you wear the uniform! We studied at the same academies.”

And the policemen, OMON [special Russian police], contract soldiers—if any column was fired on or an armored troop carrier or an infantry fighting vehicle was blown up near some village, they break into that village, arrest those who have money, who was into drug dealing, taking them away, then making a proposition for ransom to their relatives.

And the last incident with a suicide-bomber: it utterly brought everyone to a state of shock, specially the members of special police squad. Up to 600 members of the squad police were blown sky-high, and I am not saying it for effect. That commandant’s office, those barracks in Noibery were razed to the ground, the local residents say that they [the Russians] placed those corpses on the asphalt, and it wasn’t possible to count them, hundreds, and the Russians say some three people died.

In Argun, a car with explosives drove between two barracks with 450 members of the special police squad inside. Nothing remained of these buildings after the explosion went off. The same happened in Urus-Martan. And in Gudermes.

And the fact that Putin urgently left Dushanbe and arrived in Mozdok on July 5, 2000, was haphazard. He just did not know what to do and could not think of anything else but say, “We’ll count on the local police.” This is the most stupid decision that could be made.

And what does the Russian leader do in these cases? Well, what did they do approximately when the army was in such a state, when the politicians reached a deadlock, what did they do? They urgently found Doku Zavgayev,¹³ they fixed an election, appointed him head of the government of traitors.

The same happens today. So, the stake is on Kadyrov. Why? Kadyrov will be able to split the clergy, to win some of our fighters over to his side, and split the ranks of fighters.

Even here, the work that is being carried out by us here, has become very active. In the beginning when I could not get the television going, I sent cassettes literally by the hundreds, with appeals to clergy, the fighters, to the opposition, to everybody. I showered them with cassettes in all the villages. Then leaflets, newspapers. Now television has started working stably in Achkhoy-Martanovsky, in Shalinsky, in Kurchaloyevsky districts. There is television in Gudermesky district, it completely covers Shalinsky district as well. Generally speaking, I became a propagandist, a political scientist and president. This is what I ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• 1 Maskhadov’s First Briefing
• 2 Immediate Tasks Ahead
• 3 Contact with Dr. Brzezinski
• 4 Taliban Recognition
• 5 Russian Army Disintegrating?
• 6 Election of George W. Bush
• 7 Russia Goes Authoritarian
• 8 The Mystery of Dr. Gluck
• 9 Russia Seeks to Bribe Maskhadov Out of Chechnya
• 10 Talks with Putin Suddenly Cancelled
• 11 Minister Akhmadov and the State Department
• 12 Maskhadov Hopes for CIA Support
• 13 Seeking Negotiations
• 14 The Challenge of Radical Commanders
• 15 General Gelayev in Georgia
• 16 Reaction to 9/11
• 17 Maskhadov Names a Successor
• 18 The January 27 Presidential Issue
• 19 Russia Takes Advantage of 9/11
• 20 The Problem with Lord Judd
• 21 The Russian Policy of Rape
• 22 Solving the Chechen Problem
• 23 Peace Plans Fail
• 24 Maskhadov’s Last Message
• 25 The Voice from Beyond
• Notes
• Index