International Intervention in Ethnic Conflict

A Comparison of the European Union and the United Nations

Etain Tannam

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9780230273351
• eBook ISBN: 9781137317421
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Comparative Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Tannam focuses on the role of bureaucracies when dealing with conflict in two international organisations, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN), providing a unique comparative account of their policy-making procedures.

1

International Intervention, Ethnic Conflict and Theory

Since the early 1990s, international intervention in ethnic conflict has gained increasing attention. The dramatic failures of the international community to respond effectively to genocide and violence in the Balkans, Rwanda and many other cases have led to criticisms of international actors for poor management and for failing to prevent conflict (Tonra, 2007). However, detailed accounts of international organizations’ policy-making processes in conflict resolution are relatively rare. This book focuses on the role of bureaucracies in two international organizations, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN), in dealing with conflict and compares these organizations’ policy-making processes to determine how far they differ and why they differ from each other.

This chapter explains the aims of the book and the rationale for setting out these aims. In the first section, definitions of ethnic conflict, international intervention and international organizations are provided, followed by an overview of International Relations perspectives on international intervention. In the final section, an overview of methodology is presented.

Aims and definitions

The main argument of this book is that the UN Secretariat and the European Commission have autonomy under certain conditions and that reducing explanations of EU and UN’s policy outcomes to ‘political will’, or to the preferences of member states, is inaccurate. Autonomy is defined as ‘the capacity to act independently’ (Verhoest et al., 2004, p. 9), and it refers to ‘the extent of decision-making competencies and the constraints exercised over performance of those competencies’ (Verhoest et al., 2004, p. 9). International intervention is defined in this book as comprising economic, diplomatic or military actions by the EU and UN to bring about cooperation in conflict or post-conflict zones. Conflict is defined as ‘a situation in which two or more actors pursue incompatible, yet from their individual perspectives entirely just goals’ (Cordell and Wolff, 2011, p. 4). Ethnic conflict is defined as a conflict where the goals of at least one party in the conflict are defined in (exclusively) ethnic terms and in which the primary fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions’ (Cordell and Wolff, 2011, p. 4). The EU and UN are both defined as international institutions’: ‘sets of rules meant to govern international behaviour’ (Simmons and Martin, 2001, p. 194). This approach avoids any ‘qualifying criteria about the social construction of rules, nor about whether rules are explicit, or implicit’, and informal rules may be defined as norms (Simmons and Martin, 2001, p. 194).

The definition of international intervention adopted in this book reflects the fact that whereas classical approaches to intervention viewed military intervention as inevitable and as the best way of achieving peace, contemporary definitions emphasize multifaceted approaches, including diplomacy and the engagement of grass-roots actors (Ramsbotham et al., 2009, p. 25). External intervention comprises non-coercive intervention, coercive intervention and mediation. Non-coercive intervention refers to international actors that either provide incentives for cooperation, for example, EU membership, or inflict punishments for actors who do not cooperate, for example, the use of sanctions (Lake and Rothchild, 1996, p. 65). Coercive power refers to military intervention, or humanitarian intervention. Thus a range of tools is available for the EU and UN in intervening in conflict.

EU and UN interventions are examined in three cases in this book: Northern Ireland, 1988–98; Cyprus, 2002–04; and Kosovo/Serbia (the Kosovo–Serbia relationship), 2006–08. In Northern Ireland, it is assumed that the conflict has been resolved, although tensions still exist, and in Kosovo and Cyprus the conflicts are frozen. The Council Secretariat is also examined in the Kosovo/Serbia case study, but overall, the Commission is the main focus of this study.

It must be noted that the aim of this book is not to evaluate the EU and UN’s success in resolving conflict in the three cases, but to examine and compare their policy-making processes with particular emphasis on the role of bureaucracy. The underlying assumption is that even though some policies may be unsuccessful, it is possible to discover ways of improving policy outcomes by understanding the policy-making process more deeply. The theoretical rationale for examining the role of bureaucracy is derived from comparative politics literature, where bureaucracies are shown to have significant autonomy because of their policy expertise and capacity to implement policies, especially where policies are vague (Huber and Shipan, 2002, p. 12). However, as this chapter shows, the rationale for this book is also drawn from debates in International Relations theory and from empirical gaps in that debate.

Empirical and theoretical rationale

The task of comparing the role of the UN Secretariat with the European Commission and Council Secretariat’s role is a complicated one that begs many questions. Firstly, many observers would comment that the EU and the UN are not comparable. For example, as the next paragraphs show, their bureaucracies have different roles and powers, and both the UN and the EU have markedly different institutional frameworks. The underlying assumption of this book is that although the two organizations have different structures, rules and membership, their status as international organizations, their post-war birth, their common aims of conflict resolution and the EU’s increased activities in conflict resolution make a comparison necessary and possible. Thus, the core rationale is that there is a need to establish ‘systematic comparisons across time, across states, or across international institutions … to explain the world around us’ (Martin and Simmons, 2013, p. 344). Moreover, the very existence of differences between the EU and the UN justifies a comparison to highlight the specific features of each organization, which may contribute to certain outcomes.

Clearly, the functions of EU and UN’s bureaucracies vary, as discussed in Chapter 2. For example, unlike a classical bureaucracy, under the Rome Treaty, the Commission has formal policy initiation and implementation powers in designated policy areas, whereas the UN Secretariat does not have initiation powers formally. The hybrid nature of the Commission may lead to the criticism that it obviously has a degree of autonomy from EU member states and that it will have more autonomy than the UN Secretariat. However, as this chapter shows, in fact there is an ongoing academic debate about the Commission’s role vis-à-vis the member states’ role’: does it simply reflect the preferences of France, Germany and the UK, or is it a supranational entrepreneur? The Commission has no formal initiating power in EU foreign policy, so it might not be expected to display autonomy in conflict resolution issues. Similarly, there is a debate about the role of the UN Secretariat: are its rules and standard operating procedures responsible for policy failures in the UN, or is the Secretariat simply beholden to the instructions of the UN Security Council (UNSC)? Thus, the different formal powers of the Commission and the UN Secretariat do not imply that they should not be compared, but rather these differences actually beg a question about whether these formal powers influence their levels of autonomy in practice. In other words, the differences between the Commission and the UN Secretariat point to the need for more systematic empirical comparison of their relationship with EU and UN member states.

Another possible criticism of the decision to compare the EU and UN’s bureaucracies is that both bureaucracies use different tools in resolving conflict. The UN Secretariat’s key role in conflict resolution is its mediation role, implying its use of diplomacy and envoys to resolve conflicts, bolstered by aid, at times. Thus the Cyprus and Kosovo/Serbia case studies focus on the role of the Secretariat’s small mediating team who were sanctioned by the UNSC to negotiate a political agreement. In contrast, the Commission’s involvement was through EU enlargement policy to entice agreement in Cyprus and in Kosovo/Serbia. In Northern Ireland the Commission aimed to bolster the peace process through economic aid packages to Northern Ireland to bolster the peace process in the 1990s. Thus, the role and functions of the bureaucracies differ.

Again, this difference between the Commission and the UN Secretariat is not problematic but actually reveals the potential for theoretical and empirical richness in comparing both institutions. Specifically, does the EU’s emphasis on enlargement policy as a tool of conflict resolution imply that the Commission has more autonomy from member states in conflict resolution by using a functional policy area, or does the Secretariat’s power to mediate in a conflict (an explicitly political role) provide equal or more autonomy to its officials? This question is at the heart of a larger and enduring debate between International Relations theorists, as this chapter will show.

Overall, the aim of this book is to determine whether EU and UN bureaucracies, dealing with similar conflict problems, but often using different tools, display autonomy from EU and UN member states, and if so, what are the underlying conditions that allow this autonomy to exist. Rather than posing a methodological and intellectual obstacle, the differences between the Commission and the UN Secretariat form a justification for this study. These differences are not obstacles to the study, but rather, they justify it. In the next section, the theoretical justification for this book is elaborated.

International Relations perspectives

A core debate in International Relations has been ‘do international institutions really matter?’, and ‘missing from this debate is sustained inquiry into how these institutions actually work’ (Koremenos et al., 2001, p. 761). In this section, key theoretical approaches to international cooperation are examined and their relevance to EU and UN intervention is explored, exposing the theoretical gap in the literature about how the EU and UN make policies with respect to ethnic conflict.

As a grand theory, neo-realism has much to say about international intervention in conflict, by arguing that if intervention occurs, it does so because of state preferences. Drawing from realism, international law is argued to reflect power politics and is ‘divorced altogether from ethics … . It is an expression of the will of the state and it is used by those who control the state as an instrument of coercion against those who oppose their power’ (Carr, 1981, p. 176). Fundamental to both realism and neo-realism is an assumption that individuals and states are prey to constant and innate insecurity and fear. Five additional assumptions can be identified: (1) the international system is anarchic, comprising separate states with no government; (2) states possess offensive military capacity giving them the potential to inflict hurt and destruction; (3) states can never be certain about the intentions of others; (4) the basic motivation for state behaviour is survival; and (5) states are concerned with their relative gains, not their absolute gains as they wish to maintain the exiting balance of power (Mearsheimer, 1994, p. 10). Therefore, international institutions do not cause cooperation; they reflect state preferences and calculations (Mearsheimer, 1994, p. 13).

It is argued that these assumptions underlie both EU and UN intervention in conflict. The interests and preferences of states will determine whether both organizations intervene in ethnic conflict, as well as how they intervene. The development of EU foreign policy, involving increased intervention in conflict zones, is explained by state preferences and the demise of the Soviet Union. Post-war European cooperation is also explained by state preferences, not by the EU as an institution (Paul, 2005, p. 57). The EU’s key states seek to provide a balance to the US, in the absence the Soviet Union (Paul, 2005, p. 57). However, while applications of neo-realism to the EU exist, ‘neo-realists like Waltz have not been much interested in European integration processes’ (Stone, 1994, p. 457), and theoretical explanations for EU intervention in ethnic conflict have not been well developed by neo-realists. In contrast, many explanations for UN intervention make neo-realist assumptions, although not always in a rigorous manner.

For neo-realists, the dominant role of UNSC, the use of veto on the UNSC and the enshrinement of sovereignty as an underlying principle in the UN Charter imply that state preferences will dominate, particularly those of the permanent five (P-5) on the UNSC. According to neo-realists, there are countless examples of this domination. UN military intervention in Syria in 2012 was impeded by a Russian and Chinese veto. UN recognition of Kosovo as an independent state was impeded by Russia and China on the UNSC (Ker-Lindsay, 2009). In addition, development of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has provoked a stronger debate about whether state preferences are the sole force behind UN intervention.

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICIS) chaired by Gareth Evans, former Australian foreign minister, developed the R2P doctrine to circumvent limitations of just war theory (based on state sovereignty) by setting out conditions that justify international intervention in conflict, even though a sovereign state does not consent to intervention. Although intervention is often assumed to be defined solely in military terms, the R2P doctrine has placed great emphasis on mediation, early warning and conflict prevention (Evans, 2011). The key conditions for military intervention are whether or not there is a case of large-scale human rights violations and whether a ‘last resort’ threshold has been reached and whether multiple criteria, including moral legitimacy and international legal authority, good advocacy mechanisms, good arguments and good leadership exist (Evans, 2011).

Critics of R2P point to empirical evidence whereby humanitarian crises have not met with an effective response. For example, Western strategic interests have been blamed for the failure to implement R2P in Darfur (Bellamy, 2005, p. 52). Similarly, in explaining UK’s policies on Afghanistan and Kosovo, it has been observed that even if there are ethical dimensions to explaining international intervention, ‘ethical humanitarianism is part of, not the only justification’ (Bulley, 2010, p. 448). However, these criticisms and the neo-realist perspective do not examine international institutions in any depth. In contrast, rationalist approaches since the 1950s have examined the independent impact of institutions on international cooperation, and by implication its findings are relevant to comparing the EU and UN’s approaches to international intervention.

Rationalists

In contrast to neo-realists, neo-functionalists, rational institutionalists and intergovernmental institutionalists have devoted more attention to the development of international cooperation and institutions and to the evolution of EU. Neo-functionalism was the first ‘school’ that provided a theoretical account of the role of international institutions, specifically the role of the European Commission (Koremenos et al., 2001). The expansion of the welfare state and severe economic problems in the post-war period meant that economic policy necessitated political coordination by a centralized institution – the European Commission. Once formed, the supranational institution would provide an underlying dynamism for the integration process by upgrading common interests. In other words, state preferences would gradually change as the Commission persuaded them of the merits of an increased number of common policies. The Commission’s status under the Rome Treaty is that of a guardian of the Treaty, its formal powers to initiate policy and its technical expertise all empowered it to ‘upgrade’ interests. This upgrading was more effective than other bargaining processes – a compromise – satisfies no state completely and lowest common denominator agreements were so diluted to be meaningless. However, upgrading interests implied that significant policy integration would occur, but with member state support – a non-zero-sum outcome. The central institution’s interaction with national agents was also to be used as a measure of integration. The neo-functionalist view assumed that Commission officials themselves would subsume the aims of the European project and adopt Europhile preferences. The EU would also be characterized by a growing number of networks of EU and national actors whose interests and activities intermeshed-engrenage.

In more recent accounts of European integration, many of the above neo-functionalist assumptions are retained (Niemann and Schmitter, 2009). However, more recent studies criticize the classical debate between intergovernmentalists and neo-functionalists for focusing solely on whether integration occurs, or whether national sovereignty dominates in a zero-sum manner, rather than examining the EU as a complex political multi-layered system (Rosamund, 2013, p. 89). Supranational governance theorists argue that the role of the autonomous supranational Commission is central to understanding the evolution of EU (Stone-Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998, p. 6). The EU moves on a continuum between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, and the presence and intensity of rules, organizations and transnational society determines how supranational is the EU in a given policy area (Stone-Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998, p. 9). The transactionalist approach explains why integration across policy sectors varies and also rectifies the myopia caused by focusing only on grand bargains in EU history, which by their nature are intergovernmental (Stone-Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, p. 14). Institutionalization is a crucial component in garnering transnational demands and creating a supranationalist dynamic:

Rules define roles and the EU’s supranational institutions gradually shape what actors define as their interest. Notably, where there is no Treaty basis for growth of supranational activity, in the midst of increased cross-border activity, the relevant actors will create one.

(Stone-Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998, p. 19)

Over time, rules evolve in unpredictable ways and national actors become locked into those rules through a process of path-dependence (Stone-Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998, p. 19). This process of path-dependence has been illustrated by the growth of specific directorate generals in the EU from 1960 to 1993. Fligstein and McNichol showed that almost all expansion of competences occurred after major treaty revisions in order to achieve the EU’s original purposes – for example, the single market. However, ‘this “frame” has been used skilfully to make agreements that have substantially expanded the policy domains of the EU’ (Fligstein and McNichol, 1998, p. 74). Path-dependence helps explain this development. As the number of decisions made by policy actors increases (issue density), supranational autonomy increases, because national actors cannot firmly control policy developments (Pierson, 1998, p. 39). Issue density creates overloaded problems and also leads to a process of spillover. The short-term horizon of politicians implies that these developments have unintended consequences to which they are locked in. These institutional dynamics empower EU supranational institutions over time.

A similar approach to examining international institutions is adopted by principal–agent theorists (Pollack, 2003). The key arguments are that states (the principals) set up institutions (the agents) to serve their aims, but agents have an independent influence on policy outcomes. The agents may have a monopoly of information and expertise that makes it difficult for the principal to regulate its behaviour (Pollack, 2003, p. 36). The principal may delegate agenda-setting to the agent (Pollack, 2003, p. 36). These functions and the influence of the agent become locked in, as the transaction costs of changing arrangements is too large (Pollack, 2003, p. 37). Comparing the EU and UN policy-making processes with respect to their rules and to the extent to which they are locked into their rules with unintended consequences is an important aspect of examining EU and UN policy-making towards conflict zones.

In contrast to the above accounts, rational institutionalists counter the supranati...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• 1. International Intervention, Ethnic Conflict and Theory
• 2. The EU and UN: Institutional Frameworks and Conflict Resolution
• 3. The EU, UN and Conflict Resolution: Overview
• 4. Northern Ireland
• 5. Cyprus
• 6. Kosovo and Serbia
• 7. Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index