Policing for Peace in Northern Ireland

Change, Conflict and Community Confidence

J. Murphy

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781349332182, 9780230291997
• eBook ISBN: 9781137319456
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This is the first in-depth analysis of the transition from the RUC to the PSNI seen through the eyes of key figures, inside and outside the organization. It provides a fresh insight into the wider social and political context in which this change occurred and is a significant contribution to the story of the Northern Ireland peace process.

Part I

Context, Process and Time

1

The Conditions for Conflict and Change

Introduction

The literary critic and commentator Edna Longley has written about Northern Ireland as a ‘cultural corridor’, a space through which both Irishness and Britishness travel and intermingle (Longley 1993). Such a territory is by its nature home to colliding political identities, national aspirations and battles for power. In Northern Ireland the outcome was a long and violent political conflict, referred to colloquially as ‘the Troubles’. In such a complex, difficult and dangerous environment, policing has always been a critical (some would say, the critical) issue of engagement. For a long period of time, each community saw, reflected in their relationship with the police, their own national identity either protected, or rendered illegitimate by the state. In this way the culture, politics and organisational identity of the RUC were derived from, and intimately bound up with the structural dimensions of the conflict itself: institutions, equality, loyalty, representation, defence, justice.

Northern Ireland is a small place of 1.8 million people and sits at the centre of the historic conflict between Britain and Ireland. The political identities of those who reside within it are largely aligned with their religious identity, and more importantly their position on the continuation of the union with Britain. Members of the majority Protestant community are generally regarded as supportive and indeed defensive of the continuation of this union. Members of the minority Catholic community are generally considered nationalist or republican in their relationship to the union and support instead the reunification of Ireland. While these broad generalisations do not always hold true, an analysis of voting patterns illustrates that most of those who vote fall within these categories. Even the self-proclaimed anti-sectarian Alliance Party holds what is effectively a de facto pro-union stance, belying an underlying position on the constitutional question and an inconsistency frequently cited by nationalists. The Belfast or Good Friday Agreement of 1998 enshrined the ‘principle of consent’ within both the formal political process and the debate within the electorate. This tenet, long championed by the moderate nationalist SDLP, established that a change to the constitutional position in NI could only take place with the consent of the community in the region.

The story of policing in Northern Ireland is a story of transition going back over a hundred years. It is marked by divergence, false starts, human hurt and truncated organisational lifetimes. Change in policing did not start with the PSNI, or even the creation of the RUC itself. The story is much longer than that and much of what has been written (and there has been a great deal) betrays significant polarisation of opinion. Yet it is impossible to understand the difficulties associated with pulling an organisation so central to the institutional fabric of the region through such a contentious change process, without some understanding of the historical and social background that placed the police in the centre of debates around political progress.

This background provides a political, social and institutional skeleton upon which to hang the story of change. It is not an exhaustive account of this region’s disputed history. Others have done that with much greater skill and an historian’s eye for detail and variance (McKittrick and McVea 2001; Bardon 2005; Ferriter 2010). Nor is it strictly a history of policing, with a criminologist’s concern for the intricacies and perspectives of the criminal justice field (Brewer et al. 1996; Ellison and Smyth 2000; Mulcahy 2000). Instead it briefly lays out the historical baggage for inspection and analysis, to better understand the challenges of change and resistance that accompanied the journey. It presents the external events that are well known, but also internal responses to them that are perhaps less documented, to better understand how dominant themes emerged and change motifs developed.

The development of a modern police service: RIC to RUC

The history of policing in Ireland is a long one, and the establishment of a civilian police service there preceded the establishment of a police service anywhere else in these islands. The person responsible for this radical action was Sir Robert Peel, who became Chief Secretary of Ireland in 1812 and by 1814 had founded the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), an armed force. Peel went on to become a respected and reforming UK Prime Minister and to establish policing services in Britain and in British colonies abroad. The RIC was taken as the organisational model for these police services and the terms ‘Peelers’ and ‘Bobbies’ both refer to his legacy (Ryder 2000).

The growing demand for Home Rule in Ireland, the Easter Rising of 1916 and the War of Independence all culminated in the 1920 Government of Ireland Act. This act originally envisaged that the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) would simply be split into two forces to take into account the creation of the new devolved authorities. However, ongoing violence, civil disturbance and difficult negotiations made it clear that the RIC would not survive even as two separate but interlinked organisations (Brewer and Magee 1991). The signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty almost a year later on 6 December 1921 established the Irish Free State as a self-governing dominion of the British Empire, but left the northern six counties as part of the UK. Elections to the new northern Parliament took place in May 1921 and Sir James Craig became the new northern Prime Minister, presiding over a parliament dominated by a Unionist majority. The RIC was disbanded on 31 March 1922 in the Republic but while responsibility for law and order had been transferred from the British parliament to the northern one on 21 December 1921, disbandment of the RIC was delayed in the North until the end of May 1922 to encourage a smooth move to a new police force. This delay was the responsibility of the Northern Ireland government and specifically the notoriously anti-Catholic Minister for Home Affairs, Sir Dawson Bates, who in January 1922 appointed a committee to advise him on the establishment of a new northern police force (Ryder 2000). The committee reported back in March of that year. Its main recommendations were that the new force should be slightly bigger than the old RIC (in terms of how the RIC operated in the six northern counties) and that its constitution should be at least one-third Catholic. The remainder would be made up of a thousand Protestants who were members of the old RIC and the rest from the Ulster Special Constabularies (set up from the ranks of the Ulster Volunteer Force in 1920 to help combat civil unrest in the North). These constabularies were known as the A, B and C Specials and were entirely Protestant in their make-up (Farrell 1983). Legislation to this effect was rushed through the Northern Ireland Parliament at Stormont, and in June 1922 the Royal Ulster Constabulary came into existence, organised principally along the same structures as the old Royal Irish Constabulary (Brewer et al. 1996).

The composition of the new force caused the most political controversy. Forward thinking as the committee recommendations might have been in terms of Catholic make-up, such stipulations were as much the result of financial pressures on the new government as a desire for a representative police force. The disbandment of the RIC was accompanied by generous pension arrangements, the responsibility for which lay with the devolved administrations. By re-employing members of the RIC into a new police service, pension responsibilities were diminished and pressure eased on scarce resources.

Demands on the Unionist government also resulted in the lifting of the long-established ban on members of the police joining the Orange Order, and when the Sir Robert Peel Orange Lodge was established in 1923 Catholic membership was at its peak of 21.5 per cent. Catholic membership of the force stabilised at 17 per cent in the late 1920s, but by the onset of ‘the Troubles’ in the late 1960s it had dropped again to a little over 10 per cent (Brewer and Magee 1991). Brewer goes on to comment that the political pattern of ‘dominant–subordinate’ relationships developing in Northern Ireland turned the force into ‘the armed wing of unionism’. This point is vital because it illustrates the strength of the bond between the political ruling ideology (Unionism) and the police as a visible, active and engaged agent of that ideological position. In addition, legislation enacted in 1922 before the RUC’s establishment (the Civil Authorities or Special Powers Act), gave sweeping emergency powers to the Unionist Minister for Home Affairs, including those of arbitrary arrest and search. The Special Powers Act, as it became known, was renewed annually until 1928, when it became law for a five-year period. In 1933 the legislation came permanently into force, and its repeal became one of the key demands of the Northern Ireland civil rights movement in the 1960s.

Attempts at police reform: Cameron, Scarman and Hunt

The perceived position of the RUC as ‘defenders’ of Protestant ‘hegemony’ was regarded as an issue by both the Cameron Commission, appointed by the British government, in March 1969 (Ryder 2000) and also reflected in the Scarman Tribunal of the same year. Set up to examine the onset of what was to become known as ‘the Troubles’, the Cameron Commission described graphically in its report of September 1969 the ‘breakdown of discipline’, ‘acts of misconduct’ involving ‘assault and battery’, ‘malicious damage to property’ and ‘the use of provocative sectarian and political slogans’ by police (Brewer and Magee 1991; Punch 2012). Brewer asserts:

… the blow to the standing and status of both the RUC and the USC as the result of criticism of their handling of public disorder was enormous. Consequently, reform of policing formed one of the first objectives of intervention by the British government in the situation. (Brewer and Magee 1991: 50)

Lord Scarman, in contrast, pinpointed lack of resources and numbers as a key problem for the RUC. In 1969 the British Home Secretary, James Callaghan, sent in British army troops to restore order. He also established the Hunt Commission, under the oversight of Lord Hunt, Robert Mark and Sir James Robertson. The Hunt Commission was given the role of advising the British government on the organisation of policing in Northern Ireland.

The Hunt Report and the separation of policing and security

The Hunt Committee published its controversial report within six weeks of beginning work, against a backdrop of growing civil unrest in Northern Ireland. Its basic premise was the need to separate out the twin roles of policing and security policy. It recommended the disbanding of the B Specials (the only remaining component of the original special constabularies), the creation of a part-time reserve force, the disarming of the RUC, the establishment of a Police Authority to provide a buffer between the police and the Unionist government, the repeal of much of the Special Powers Act and the introduction of a police complaints system (Ellison and Smyth 2000). Its aim was to civilianise policing along the lines of the rest of the UK. The committee’s main proposals were accepted against strong opposition but the civilianisation strategy was continually undermined by a steady deterioration in the security situation and the RUC was re-armed in 1971 after a number of police fatalities in shooting incidents. The introduction of internment (administrative detention) in 1971 reduced still further the acceptability of the police in the eyes of the minority Catholic community, as bad intelligence resulted in the widespread round-up of suspects. A scandal implicating Special Branch and the British army in the officially authorised use of interrogation techniques (which included the physical maltreatment of internees) cemented a Catholic perspective that saw the organisation as illegitimate and partisan (Ryder 2000).

Direct rule

The imposition of direct rule in 1972 was the British government’s response to a security situation that seemed to be spiralling out of control (Bardon 2005). The power-sharing executive which had been established earlier in 1972 collapsed after five months and a further attempt in the form of the constitutional convention of 1975 also failed. The 1975–6 Bourne Ministerial Working Party on NI police and security paved the way for a new doctrine of ‘police primacy’ (Ryder 2000). This resulted in the expansion and re-equipping of the RUC, its partial remilitarisation, the end to detention without trial and the phasing out of senior category status for those convicted of terrorist offences (Brewer and Magee 1991). In addition to the basic RUC structure, additional units were put in place to combat the now serious and growing threats from republican and loyalist paramilitaries. Particularly controversial and notorious were headquarters-based ‘Mobile Support Units’ (HQMSUs). These units were established in the early 1980s alongside Special Branch’s special surveillance unit (known as E4A). Their establishment and training was facilitated by the British army’s Special Air Service (SAS). Divisional Mobile Support Units (DSUs) were also put in place to deal with riots, demonstrations and paramilitary funerals. As Mulcahy has commented:

Policing itself constituted a major axis of division, and shaped the social and political landscape within which it operated (Mulcahy 2006: 3)

The escalation of violence

The early 1970s are regarded as the bloodiest period in the history of the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’. The split in Sinn Féin and the IRA in January 1970, which resulted in the establishment of the Provisional movement, also heralded a new era in violence, disorder and the further politicisation of people and policing. April of that year saw the first major clashes between nationalists and the British army in Ballymurphy, a republican community in west Belfast. This was followed by the first sustained engagement of the Provisional IRA itself in the nationalist enclave community of the Short Stand.¹ Elsewhere on the island, conflict fermented with the trial and acquittal in the Republic of Ireland of TDs Neil Blaney and Charles Haughey on gun-smuggling charges. The IRA bombing campaign which continued throughout that summer coincided with the withdrawal of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)² from the Stormont Assembly and the introduction of internment without trial in August. It also saw the establishment of the loyalist Ulster Defence Association (UDA).³ The deaths of 14 marchers at a civil rights rally in Derry on 30 January 1972, shot by the British Parachute Regiment, cemented both the resolve in the nationalist community and also the perception of the RUC as defenders of the Unionist establishment and partners with the army. The event, known as Bloody Sunday, became a leitmotif for British brutality and oppression within the nationalist community. Over the next few years, intense political activity was interspersed with violence and confrontation. As the death toll mounted, political initiatives such as a short IRA ceasefire and the power-sharing Sunningdale Agreement faltered in the increasingly fragmented and bitter discord (Bardon 2005). The degree of social dissonance, violence and bitterness which typifies this period in Northern Ireland’s history is difficult to underestimate. The almost daily atrocities that piled up upon each other over years are now reduced to a semantic shorthand. Phrases like Bloody Sunday, Bloody Friday, Kingsmill, Enniskillen, Loughinisland describe not just places and events but also enormous trauma, pain and suffering which is still cascading down the generations. The Cost of the Troubles Survey (COTT) calculated that by 3 December 1997, 3585 people had been killed in the Northern Ireland conflict since 1969 (Fay and INCORE 2001). Within the RUC, 302 officers were murdered up to 1999 and over 8500 injured as a result of terrorist activity. Often quoted Interpol figures, published in the International Criminal Police Review in 1983, show that Northern Ireland was the most dangerous place in the world to be a policeman at that time. It was twice as dangerous as in El Salvador, where the risk factor was next highest (Ryder 2000).

The ongoing ‘war’ had an effect on the behaviour, structure and organisational approach of the RUC, just as it did on the IRA and the more diffuse loyalist paramilitary groupings. The traditional military structure adopted by the IRA was a prime target for the RUC and the introduction of non-jury ‘Diplock’ courts meant that the counter-insurgency operations put in place by the RUC, in conjunction with the army, hamstrung the IRA’s organisational structure (English 2004). In 1976 for example, 2000 suspects, the majority charged with IRA-related incidents were convicted through the non-jury courts (Ellison and Smith 2000). The shift in IRA tactics away from a traditional and visible ‘military’ structure, towards a terrorist ‘cell’ structure and the introduction of training in anti-interrogation techniques stifled the success of the RUC to some extent. At this point, political questions, rather than military ones came to the fore, in particular about the direction and execution of security policy and the role of the RUC in that process (English 2004). Ellison and Smyth argue;

It is quite clear, both from the public statements of senior RUC officers, and the findings of any number of commentators, that the RUC enthusiastically embraced its counter-insurgency role, and indeed fought numerous ‘turf battles’ with the British army to achieve primacy in counter-insurgency operations. (Ellison and Smyth 2000: 98)

However, interrogation ‘tactics’ and allegations arising from mistreatment of suspects began to surface and be taken seriously outside the narrow confines of republican communities and Sinn Féin. Indeed, the use of emergency anti-terrorist legislation as a routine means of policing nationalist areas led to increasing polarisation, which even the leadership of Sinn Féin and the IRA underestimated. The febrile atmosphere of the first set of hunger strikes in 1979–80 brought this resentment and ill feeling to the fore. The deaths of 10 IRA men on hunger strike in 1981 created massive unrest in nationalist areas and tested the RUC and the doctrine of ‘police primacy’ to its limit (O’Malley 1990; Ellison and Smyth 2000). Something like 30,000 plastic bullets were fired during this period, leading to the death of eight people, three of them children. It was a critical juncture and the RUC were at the centre of the storm. As Ellison and Smyth maintain:

The role of the RUC during the hunger strikes convinced many Catholics that the force could never change or be trusted. (Ellison and Smyth 2000: 95)

Such policing during the ‘Troubles’ was characterised by a high measure of secrecy, security and a blatant military approach (Mulcahy 2006). Members of...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Timeline
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• Part I Context, Process and Time
• Part II Change Within: Four Phases of Transition
• Part III Managing Change: New Challenges, Old Problems
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index