Europeanization of the Western Balkans

Environmental Governance in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia

Adam Fagan, Indraneel Sircar

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9780230296510
• eBook ISBN: 9781137319050
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Environment & Energy Policy
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The book analyses the changing roles of international agencies, governmental bodies, non-governmental organisations, and local communities around major road-building environmental impact assessment processes in order to examine whether the influence of the European Union has transformed environmental governance in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Serbia.

1

Europeanizing Environmental Governance

This first chapter sets out to capture the theoretical and practical challenges of Europeanizing environmental governance in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The objective is to construct a conceptual framework for examining the impact of Europeanization on environmental governance that anticipates the type of impact that the EU is likely to exert – based on the experience of the 2004, 2007, and 2013 Eastern enlargements – and to analyze the process of transformation, the agency of domestic and international actors, the role of institutions, and the various constraints that are likely to determine the pace of change.

We need to capture how the EU understands environmental governance, the combination of hierarchy and networks, what it expects applicant/candidate countries to achieve, and how it aims to do so. This involves providing the reader with a summary of the tools and mechanisms that the EU employs in the context of (potential) candidate countries, and the various strategies deployed as part of the Stabilisation and Association process (SAp), and the structured dialogue undertaken as part of bilateral negotiations.

The chapter is divided into two parts. The first offers analysis and a definition of Europeanization as it is understood and operationalized in the context of enlargement and accession. The second focuses on the concept of ‘governance’ and how the EU understands and develops it in the context of enlargement, and specifically in relation to environmental policy and protection.

Europeanization via enlargement: a definition

Europeanization and enlargement are distinct but overlapping processes. The former can and does occur without there being a prospect of EU membership, as is the case with European Neighbourhood Policy countries. Whilst enlargement is the mechanism through which Europeanization is deemed to take place for countries with a membership perspective, the two processes are still somewhat distinct: Europeanization is a longer-term social as well as political and economic transformation that will occur before and after enlargement has occurred.

Whether associated with enlargement or not, Europeanization is often defined in rather prosaic terms that conjure a diffusion of norms, changes in behaviour, and an element of practical application. It is usually understood as the impact on domestic politics and public policy of EU laws, decision-making, and process of governance (Radaelli, 2003, p. 30). However, even the most cursory knowledge of the eastern enlargements would suggest that Europeanization via enlargement is a multifaceted and extensive process, worthy of a definition that is suitably broad to enable scholars: to assess the ‘varying impact of European integration on domestic arrangements and structures’ (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999), and to convey the distinctiveness of this impact from other processes such as policy transfer (Bomberg & Peterson, 2000). Thus, we need a definition that expresses more fully the complexities of the interaction between the EU and third parties: how Europeanization both broadens and enlarges domestic processes, and leads to the transfer of new norms and procedures, but ‘can also reduce policy spaces (and) ... also open up others’ (Grabbe, 2006, p. 46). A suitable definition must also capture the asymmetric power dynamics of the relationship between the EU and those countries seeking to join. For applicant states the requirements of the enlargement process (absorption into domestic law of the acquis) means that the impact of Europeanization is somewhat paradoxical: on one hand it is synonymous with the narrowing of choices and the limiting of policy options, whilst on the other it leads to the expansion of political opportunities, particularly for non-state and civil society actors as well as for local and regional political elites. In other words, the process involves both an imposition and a curtailment of options, as well as extended opportunities for domestic actors.

With such considerations in mind the definition of Europeanization offered by Radaelli (2000) – in the context of EU eastward enlargement – seems particularly concise and encompassing:

Europeanization consists of processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.

Radaelli’s definition captures the critical notion that Europeanization involves new rule formation and enforcement based on shared values that are considered to be ‘normatively superior’ (Hughes, Sasse, & Gordon, 2004). But it also conveys changed interaction between state and non-state actors, new behaviours and means of conducting policy making and enforcement.

Thus, the diffusion of norms, values, and behaviours within a candidate state, or indeed a neighbouring country, may well have occurred prior to progress with regards formal compliance. Conversely, an applicant state may have successfully adopted various tenets of the acquis and enshrined within the domestic legal system compliant laws, but the process of Europeanization, defined in terms of political process or the way politics is undertaken, may be judged to be limited. Recognizing such a distinction between legal and institutional adaptation on one hand (formal compliance), and political behaviour and process on the other, is critical. This is particularly so in studies of post-communist accession where formal change is (and has proved to be) far more readily and easily achieved than changes in the style and process of governance.

Radaelli’s conceptualization of Europeanization offers a framework for measuring both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ impacts. It provides a means of assessing change in ‘ways of doing things’ as well as in formal rules and procedures, transformation in ‘styles, and shared beliefs and norms’ (Grabbe, 2006). The two aspects are integral and indivisible in terms of evaluating progressive change, and this research sets out to measure both the importation of new laws and procedures and the degree of diffusion and transformation of political processes. The focus is thus on both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ impact, and the emergence of formal policy change as well as transformation in the behavioural interaction between formal/state and informal/non-state actors.

Europeanization via enlargement: the exceptional case of eastward enlargement

Prior to the fifth enlargement (2004, 2007), analysis or discussion of Europeanization tended to focus on the extent to which member states were responding to the growing demands of integration and the constraints on homogenization and enforcement (Radaelli, 2000). However, the process of Europeanization is now immediately associated with the eastward enlargement to include the post-communist Central and East European (2004) and the South-east European states (2007, 2013).

Despite the enormous shift in terms of what the EU has set out to achieve in terms of transforming former-communist states with little or no experience of democracy or capitalism, the actual mechanisms at the EU’s disposal have essentially remained unchanged. Whilst the EU, unlike most international organizations, has the potential capacity for hierarchical steering (Börzel, 2009c, p. 10), it nevertheless lacks coercive or enforcement powers. Thus, in order to drive substantive change, the Commission relies heavily on the predicted emergence of new modes of multi-level governance in which new forms of decision-making and new constellations of actors will ensure formal and informal compliance under the shadow of hierarchy cast by supranational institutions and by national core executives (Kohler-Koch, 1999; Börzel, 2010). Inducing candidate or potential candidate countries to comply with EU-established norms and requirements is therefore twofold: (i) it involves a behaviour modification strategy based on a process of extensive positive reinforcement, whereby compliance with preconditions is rewarded with additional resources and ultimately full membership, and (ii) the emergence and increased efficacy of new constellations of non-state actors and locations of deliberative decision-making (cf ‘network governance’ in Kohler-Koch, 1999).

In the context of the eastern enlargement, this mechanism of ‘accession conditionality’ was used extensively both for securing progress with regard to democratic as well as acquis conditionality: the former referring to the normative changes outlined in the Copenhagen criteria of 1993 (democratic governance, rule of law, and minority rights); the latter to the incorporation of acquis-compatible laws and procedures. Thus, rather than focusing on existing member states’ adaptation to EU rules and processes, or the origins of integration, studies of Europeanization via enlargement in the Western Balkans can, courtesy of the accession of the CEE and SEE states, draw on an extensive literature charting the successes and failures of conditionality and the limitations of external governance (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004).

As noted above, the fifth enlargement involved two simultaneous processes: First, the transfer to CEE states of a model of multi-level governance – a way of doing politics – that reflected a decision-making ideal that was, to a greater or lesser extent, practiced across aspects of policy making within the EU and amongst existing member states, and seen as characteristic of EU politics (Eising & Kohler-Koch, 1999). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier refer to this aspect as ‘what is exported’ (2004, p. 662). What must be emphasized, however, in examining the EU’s impact across CEE states is that these post-communist countries were very keen to join the EU, and were willing to shoulder considerable costs and enact extensive rules in order to gain entry as quickly as possible (Hyde-Price, 1996). Such was the unprecedented degree of EU influence over the restructuring of the economy, politics, and society of these new democracies that Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier viewed the eastern enlargement as a process of ‘external governance’ (2004, p. 661). Second, the CEE states were asked to absorb a huge tome of new laws and directives, to do so in a short time frame, and as part of a regime of continual reporting and extensive conditionality. In other words, the legacy of CEE and its predictive power for other countries engaged in accession negotiations with the Commission must be understood as representing a very specific set of cases, in which EU mechanisms and strategies worked extremely well in a context of a high degree of political will on both sides.

A more detailed analysis of the EU’s approach identifies two different mechanisms for achieving change in policy and process: (i) a voluntaristic (or ‘social learning’) approach whereby a gradual acceptance of EU (or EU-compliant) rules by political elites in non-member states takes place, and (ii) the ‘external incentives’ model based on the notion that rapid and effective progress towards Europeanization is driven by conditionality (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005c). From the latter perspective, states are rational actors and the speed at which EU rule adoption occurs depends primarily on the rational cost-benefit calculations of the domestic political context by non-member elites (Héritier, 2005). This approach to Europeanization is referred to as rationalist institutionalism and is very much the dominant framework within the literature (Börzel & Risse, 2005). The former approach, referred to as constructivist institutionalism, understands change as occurring through the diffusion of ideas and knowledge transfer as a result of twinning processes and the development of transnational networks. Institutional and actor behaviour are modified as a consequence of new institutional arrangements, additional resources, and through tutelage and exposure to different experiences of policy making and enforcement.

Used in conjunction, both perspectives are critical in terms of understanding how and why third countries comply. According to Manners, the EU has effectively established itself as a ‘normative power’ (2002), and has done so by using financial and non-financial assistance to essentially ‘teach’ CEE states how to implement European standards and harmonize their practices to the acquis (Sissenich, 2007). However, there is much debate as to whether policy elites and civil servants in the Czech Republic or Romania actually had their belief systems and values transformed, or whether they learned how to comply to the point where it became habitual (Parau, 2010; Szulecka & Szulecki, 2013). What is certain is that the new member states are not outliers in terms of their compliance (Falkner & Treib, 2008; Sedelmeier, 2011) and that the provision of additional resources from the EU for state and non-state actors, formal compliance with the acquis, and the formation of transnational and pan-European links all played a role in generating progressive change. Whilst there were certainly ‘veto players’ and serious hurdles, the promise of membership and the effective use of conditionality worked in terms of securing compliance, if not the empowerment of NGOs (Sudbery, 2010), or the emergence of new modes of governance (Börzel, 2009c; Falkner & Treib, 2008).

If the rapid adoption of EU-compliant rules in the run-up to accession was achieved largely through conditionality and the external incentives model, the CEE states also benefited from a period of social learning that preceded the start of sustained ‘hard’ conditionality (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005a, p. 245). Indeed, prior to the start of accession negotiations and the completion of the acquis communautaire, state and non-state actors in CEE were aided by EU programmes for dialogue and technical assistance and provided with opportunities for social and policy learning (Bomberg, 2007; Grabbe, 2006).

Whilst the EU has concurrently employed a mix of strategies to drive change within applicant states, and demonstrated a degree of pragmatism in terms of its use of incentives, rewards, assistance, and tutelage, it has also modified what it expects applicant states to achieve. For example, in the run-up to Bulgaria and Romania’s accession in January 2007, far greater emphasis was placed on building administrative capacities and the ability of states to enforce and comply with the laws they had enacted. There was also a particular focus on the rule of law and judicial capacities (Phinnemore, 2013). The experience of the fifth enlargement also suggests subjective rather than rational decision-making with regard to progress towards membership and the start of formal negotiations. For example, laggard candidates (Slovakia in the late 1990s) were invited to begin acquis negotiations before democratic conditionality had been met (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005b).

Explaining variation in the pace of reform and compliance

It is imperative when assessing the impact of Europeanization that we should not assume that all change occurring in applicant states is a consequence of EU influence. As Grabbe notes in the context of CEE states, there was a tendency on both the part of the EU and the candidate country to exaggerate the degree of Europeanization for political purposes. The EU obviously is keen to portray itself as ‘the principal driver of most reforms’ (Grabbe, 2006); the government of the candidate state is equally concerned to demonstrate the extent of its compliance but also ‘to blame the EU for unpopular reforms’. It is important also to remember that the EU’s political legacy on the CEE states has been largely an indirect rather than direct one: the EU did not directly bring about democratization in these states, it merely responded to dynamics and processes already under way. It is also fair to say that the commitment on behalf of the CEE governments to Europeanization was unanimous and largely unwavering, expressed at the time of the democratic revolutions in terms of a ‘return to Europe’ (Hyde-Price, 1996). As will become evident from this study, the situation is somewhat different in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia.

This is indeed an important consideration for assessing the Europeanization of the post-conflict Western Balkans. Although the EU has undoubtedly become the most significant single donor and agent of external governance across the region, it is not the sole actor. The UN, OSCE, the World Bank, and various other American and European development agencies retain a significant presence in the region, working either separately or in conjunction with the Commission, often fulfilling specific peace-building and state-building roles. These agencies set and impose their own conditionality, and whilst there is invariably coalescence in terms of assistance and reform agendas, it is thus difficult to disaggregate the exact impact of the EU, and even harder to measure Europeanization. Any judgement regarding the transformative power of Europe has thus to be placed in the wider context of multiple agencies seeking to steer and engineer change within the region.

In its dealings with the CEE countries, the EU has attempted to influence the development of governance in applicant states in ways that far exceed its official competencies within existing member countries. The theoretical and comparative literature examining the impact of Europeanization and conditionality on applicant states, which is now quite developed, has focused on the transformation of domestic political opportunity structures and the transformative effect of conditionality on the legal and institutional structures of applicant states (see for example, Dimitrova, 2002; Grabbe, 1999; Vachudova, 2005). A much smaller literature exists that focuses on the empowerment of non-state actors and the impact of Europeanization on civil society (Sudbery, 2010).

From both perspectives it is acknowledged that whilst the absorption of post-authoritarian states with barely any tradition or experience of democracy or capitalism has been an overriding success, the Commission’s hierarchical intervention has not always succeeded in transforming the process of decision-making and the interaction between state and non-state actors. Indeed, despite the emphasis placed by the EU on building good governance,¹ empowering civil society networks, and the important role of non-state actors, the Commission’s enlargement strategy stands accused of having failed to stimulate change, not effectively challenging the incapacities of state as well as non-state actors, and even reinforcing hierarchical and centralized decision-making (Börzel & Buzogány, 2010; Fagan, 2008; Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2008). For some critics the EU’s intervention strategies and the mechanism of conditionality served to actually perpetuate state weakness and prevented new modes of governance occurring by encouraging a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of minimal legislative compliance and implementation (Börzel, 2008; Goetz, 2008; Vogel & Kagan, 2004). Conditionality and compliance as the drivers of EU enlargement certainly encouraged applicant CEE states to simply import regulations and processes without necessarily investing in the requisite capacities to enable effective implementation (Buzogány, 2009).

Whilst conceding that the EU has had greater impact in driving formal legal compliance (as opposed to new modes of governance), scholars have sought to highlight and examine incidents of non-compliance and identify additional variables that appear to have determined adherence or non-adherence (Falkner & Treib, 2008; Parau, 2010). Such a ‘bottom-up’ perspective focusing on domestic constraints has encouraged a multi-variable approach to understanding the impact of Europeanization and shifted the academic focus away from a pur...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• 1  Europeanizing Environmental Governance
• 2  The Curious Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina
• 3  Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina
• 4  From Pariah to Partner? The Case of Serbia
• 5  Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Processes in Serbia
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index