Resource Management and Contested Territories in East Asia

R. Emmers

• Publisher: Palgrave Pivot
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781349456543, 9781137310132
• eBook ISBN: 9781137310149
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Ralf Emmers discusses the significance of natural resources as a source of inter-state cooperation and competition in East Asia, assessing whether the joint exploration and development of resources can act as a means to reduce tensions in contested territories. Does the joint management of natural resources in the absence of a negotiated maritime delimitation constitute a feasible strategy to de-escalate maritime sovereignty disputes in East Asia? Can cooperative resource exploitation be separated from nationalist considerations and power politics calculations? Alternatively, should the prospect for joint exploration in disputed waters be expected to raise rather than defuse territorial conflicts, especially if abundant resources are eventually discovered? If this were true, should exploration schemes be postponed until sovereignty disputes have been resolved? Emmers addresses these questions by examining the overlapping sovereignty claims in the Sea of Japan and the East and South China Seas.

1

Introduction

Abstract: The introduction asks whether the joint exploration and development of resources can act as a means to reduce tensions in contested territories. It applies this discussion on resource management to the maritime domain in East Asia and raises a series of important questions. Does the joint management of natural resources in the absence of a negotiated maritime delimitation constitute a feasible strategy to de-escalate maritime sovereignty disputes in East Asia? Can cooperative resource exploitation be separated from nationalist considerations and power politics calculations? Alternatively, should exploration schemes be postponed until sovereignty disputes have been resolved?

Key words: Resource management, joint development, contested territories, natural resources, East Asia.

Emmers, Ralf. Resource Management and Contested Territories in East Asia. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2013. DOI: 10.1057/9781137310149

Natural resources and energy needs have traditionally influenced the foreign policy objectives of states. The question of natural resources has shifted from the low politics of domestic production and consumption to the high politics of national security. A secure energy supply is seen as crucial to meeting a population’s energy demands, guaranteeing a standard of living for certain countries, and aiding in the development of others. Natural resources, as an economic and strategic issue, have also been a contributing factor in alliance building, expansionist policies, and in the origins of conflict. When considering the finite nature of such resources, the implications for conflict are obvious. Competition over a ‘variety of resources and historically legitimated claims to national homelands has inspired war throughout history’.¹ An abundance of resources can contribute to the economic vitality and political leverage of a state over others. Reversely, a scarcity of resources may leave states in a vulnerable position and dependent on securing their energy supplies from others. The increased demand coupled with a decreased availability of resources has the potential to aggravate existing tensions and instigate violent conflict.²

Nevertheless, one should also discuss the significance of living and non-living natural resources as a source of interstate cooperation rather than competition. Key here is the possibility for the joint exploration and development of resources as a means to reduce tensions and perhaps even resolve boundary disputes. A joint development agreement (JDA) is defined in this monograph as ‘an agreement by two or more states whereby they pool their sovereign rights for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources and other purposes in a defined maritime area, which provides for the management of activities and the apportionment of production and/or resources.’³ Joint exploration and development schemes are not intended to be boundary agreements. Instead, they are meant to temporarily set aside boundary negotiations so that the joint development of natural resources might proceed on an agreed basis within a specific period of time. The economic benefits of concluding a joint development agreement are clear for both developed and developing economies highly dependent on energy imports from volatile parts of the world. Joint development enables claimant states to diversify their sources of energy and benefit economically from the exploitation of fisheries and hydrocarbon resources despite the existence of overlapping sovereignty claims.

Beyond the immediate economic interests involved, it is assumed that collaborative resource schemes might also act as a de-escalating force capable, to some extent, of neutralizing ongoing tensions over the overlapping sovereignty claims or perhaps even reducing power competition among the claimant states. The signing of a joint development agreement may thus be regarded as a significant means to build-up confidence as well as to promote common economic interests among disputants. By enabling the parties to benefit economically from a joint development agreement, the de-escalation of resource considerations may thus be expected to at least soften the escalating impact of the geopolitics of sovereignty, for example. Over time, the parties may adopt a formula of shelving the sovereignty question until such time that the joint development of resources can mitigate the geopolitical sources of the conflict. Successful cooperation in the joint exploration and development of natural resources may thus ultimately facilitate a sustained and long-term improvement in interstate relations.

Beyond joint surveys and exploration schemes, reaching an agreement on the joint development of hydrocarbon resources once found in sufficient quantities for commercial use is particularly complex. It is critical for the protagonists involved in the sovereignty dispute to regard the transboundary issues of resource supplies as an impetus to cooperate, and thus collaborate and coordinate their actions, rather than compete. Policy coordination is therefore largely the result of geographic determinants and the scarcity of energy supplies and other natural resources. In this light, rising economic interdependence between East Asian nations has been anticipated as a process to open up venues for greater collaboration in the exploration and development of natural resources.

It should be noted that a series of joint development agreements for hydrocarbon resources have already been successfully negotiated and implemented in East Asia. These include JDAs between Japan and South Korea concluded in 1974, Australia and Indonesia in 1989, Malaysia and Thailand in 1979 and 1990, Malaysia and Vietnam in 1992, China and Vietnam in 2000 in the Gulf of Tonkin (Beibu), Cambodia and Thailand in 2001, Australia and East Timor in 2002, and finally between Brunei and Malaysia in 2009.⁴ When it comes to cooperative fisheries management, one should note the 1997 Sino–Japanese agreement in the East China Sea, the 1998 South Korean–Japanese agreement in the Sea of Japan, the 1998 Sino–South Korean agreement in the Yellow Sea, and finally the Sino–Vietnamese fisheries agreement for the Gulf of Tonkin (Beibu) that took effect in 2004.⁵

The monograph applies this discussion on resource management to the maritime domain in East Asia and raises a series of important questions. Does the joint management of natural resources in the absence of a negotiated maritime delimitation constitute a feasible strategy to de-escalate maritime sovereignty disputes in East Asia? In other words, are joint development schemes a means for the claimant states to access natural resources while not fighting over sovereignty issues? Can cooperative resource exploitation be separated from nationalist considerations and power politics calculations? Alternatively, as the size of the available resources is generally unknown, should joint exploration in disputed waters be expected to raise rather than defuse territorial conflicts, especially if abundant resources are eventually discovered? If this were true, should exploration schemes be postponed until sovereignty disputes have been resolved?

The monograph addresses these questions empirically by examining the overlapping sovereignty claims between Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands in the Sea of Japan or the East Sea as it is called in Korea; between Japan, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC), otherwise known as Taiwan, over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea; and the Paracel Islands claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam, and the Spratly Islands involving China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam in the South China Sea. Without knowing the eventual fate of the islands’ sovereignty, border demarcation in these three semi-enclosed seas is left open to dispute. This monograph examines whether collaborative arrangements for the management of natural resources provide a way ahead for defusing maritime boundary disputes in the major seas of East Asia. Rather than speculating on what the claimant states should do, the monograph discusses in detail attempts at establishing joint development agreements in the disputed areas under consideration and assesses their viability at defusing conflict.

Numerous analysts have envisioned the joint exploration and development of natural resources as the most feasible way forward in managing peacefully maritime territorial disputes in East Asia.⁶ Some analysts have argued, however, that joint development might only be possible in disputed areas after an agreement has been concluded on the delimitation of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and continental shelves. For example, Yu has noted in the context of the East China Sea that joint development could only come about after border determination has been reached, which would include demarcation of the equidistant median line, EEZs, and the continental shelf.⁷ Yet, theoretically, if the EEZ and continental shelf boundaries were agreed upon, there would be no need for a joint development agreement. Indeed, the sovereign rights of the respective littoral states would then be established by the boundary agreement.

It is precisely because it is unclear how the overlapping territorial claims in the Sea of Japan and East and South China Seas might be resolved that the joint development scenario has remained so appealing and topical. The purpose of a joint development arrangement is precisely to set aside the sovereignty dispute for a specific period of time. The challenge is therefore to dissociate the prospect of resource exploration and exploitation from the overlapping territorial claims through the temporary shelving of the sovereignty dispute. Unsurprisingly, given its potential economic and political benefits, the joint development scenario has been discussed as one of the most plausible approaches, if not the only one, to conflict management and resolution in the Sea of Japan as well as the East and South China Seas. The monograph tests this hypothesis by discussing in detail what has so far been achieved on the ground. It covers both the prospect for joint hydrocarbon development as well as common fisheries management.

Notes

1C. Flint (2005) ‘Introduction: Geography of War and Peace’ in C. Flint (ed.) The Geography of War and Peace (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 6.

2See P. Le Billon (2005) ‘The Geography of “Resource Wars” ’ in C. Flint (ed.) The Geography of War and Peace (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 219.

3T. Davenport, I. Townsend-Gault, R. Beckman, C. Schofield, D. Ong, V. Becker-Weinberg, and L. Bernard (June 2011) Conference Report (Conference on Joint Development and the South China Sea, Organized by the Centre for International Law), p. 14.

4See Davenport Townsend-Gault, Beckman, Schofield, Ong, Becker-Weinberg, and Bernard (June 2011) Conference Report, Annex A.

5See D. Rosenberg (19 August 2005) ‘China, Neighbors Progress in Fishery Agreements’, Asia Times Online (available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GH19Ad02.html).

6See for example J.D. Dai Tan (2006) ‘The Diaoyu/Senkaku Dispute: Bridging the Cold Divide’, Santa Clara Journal of International Law, vol. 1, pp. 167–168; M. J. Valencia (22 September 2006) ‘Ways forward East China Sea Dispute’, PacNet no. 47A (Honolulu, Hawaii: Pacific Forum CSIS); K. Zou (2006) ‘Joint Development in the South China Sea: A New Approach’, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, vol. 21 (1), pp. 83–109; L.T. Lee and S. Chen (2009) ‘China and Joint Development in the South China Sea: An Energy Security Perspective’ in S. Bateman and R. Emmers (eds) Security and International Politics in the South China Sea: Towards a Cooperative Management Regime (London: Routledge), pp. 155–171.

7P.K.H. Yu (2005) ‘Solving and Resolving the East China Sea Dispute: Beijing’s Options’, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 17 (3), pp. 122–126.

2

Natural Resources and International Law

Abstract: The chapter assesses the resource needs of the East Asian claimant states and discusses how their quest for and acquisition of natural resources has been influenced by international law. The East Asian states have increasingly turned to the sea in the hope of securing access to their living and non-living resources. For example, China is currently the world’s largest consumer of marine resources and its economic growth is dependent on maintaining a secure supply of hydrocarbon resources. Significantly, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has allowed coastal states to claim sovereignty rights to living and non-living natural resources in their exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and to the sedentary and non-living resources in their continental shelves.

Key words: Fisheries, hydrocarbons, international law, UNCLOS, EEZ, continental shelf.

Emmers, Ralf. Resource Management and Contested Territories in East Asia...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• 1  Introduction
• 2  Natural Resources and International Law
• 3  The Sea of Japan
• 4  The East China Sea
• 5  The South China Sea
• 6  Conclusion
• Appendix: Maps of the Sea of Japan and the East and South China Seas
• Index