State, Religion, and Revolution in Iran, 1796 to the Present

B. Moazami

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781137325860
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Two basic assumptions have shaped understanding of recent Iranian history. One is that Shi'ism is an integral part of Iran's religious and cultural landscape. The other is that the ulama (religious scholars) have always played a crucial role. This book challenges these assumptions and constructs a new synthesis of the history of state and religion in Iran from 1796 to the present while challenging existing theories of large-scale political transformation. Arguing that the 1979 revolution has not ended, Behrooz Moazami relates political and religious transformations in Iran to the larger instability of the Middle East region and concludes that turmoil will continue until a new regional configuration evolves.

I

Introduction: State, Religion, and Revolution in Iran, 1796 to the Present

Two basic assumptions shape scholarly and public understanding of recent Iranian history. One is that Shi’ism is an integral part of the Iranian religious and cultural landscape, and the other is that the ulama (elite religious scholars) have always played a crucial role in the Iranian political structure. This book challenges these often unquestioned assumptions, constructs a new synthesis of the history of state and religion in Iran, and presents the Iranian case in a way that illuminates some of the limits of present theories about large-scale political transformations. The book begins with an inquiry about the formation of the Qajar state in 1796 after seven decades of anarchy and ends with an analysis of the present situation. It argues that the 1979 revolution has not ended, and relates the transformations of the political and religious spheres in Iran to the larger political and social instability in the region. Finally, it concludes that political and social turmoil will continue in Iran until a new regional political configuration evolves.

The investigation of the evolving political and religious spheres focuses on state formation and the institutionalization of religion as two distinct but interrelated historical processes. The transformation of one informs the other. The political and religious communities have different goals, interests, and institutional forms, but they negotiate common ground and share constituencies. The state has historically been the central axis of political interaction, yet the fact that the institutions of state and religion seek to regulate a common constituency means that they develop in ways that are interconnected and relational. The state, by virtue of being the dominant form of political organization, determines the organizational character of all institutions in any given society. Yet religion’s power is constantly at work in the political history that this book traces. Historically, the state and religion converge, but depending on the sociopolitical and cultural conditions of their interaction, they also diverge.

The contemporary return of religion to the world political scene is not the return of a ghost of a seemingly distant past or the defeat of secular projects, as it is often understood, but is rather the convergence of these two master processes of history in a new configuration. The state’s national character and claims do not contradict the universal character and claims of religions and religious institutions. Instead, they reinforce each other by nationalizing religious morality to suit the state’s needs and embedding religious institutions in the national setting. The ongoing interaction between the state and institutionalized religion affects how each of them develops, both immediately and over the long term.

This book does not treat state and religion as separate locations of secular and sacred powers, as most students of sociology of religion do; nor does it dwell on their divergence as much as most scholars of the Qajar and Pahlavi periods. Rather, it examines the divergence and convergence of state and religion through two distinct but related processes: state formation and the institutionalization of religion. By the institutionalization of religion I mean the formation of a relatively homogenous religious doctrine and the coalescence of a scattered body of professional religious officials with local roots connected through a network of seminaries and mosques. For almost any phase in the history of state formation in Iran, there exists a corresponding phase in the development of the religious sphere, including changes in its institutional character, doctrine, and practice.

The formation of the ulama as a distinct hegemonic force in the religious sphere with a set of articulated goals occurred concurrently with the formation of the centralized, militarized, and bureaucratic Pahlavi state in the half-century leading up to the 1979 revolution. In this period, the structure of political power became centralized and modernized, as did the structure of institutional religion. The Shi’i ulama grew from a diffuse religious and sociopolitical force without an important institutional presence to a powerful, organized body having a formalized hierarchy, a strong educational apparatus, and a vast and influential political and religious network. This transformation was not limited to the organizational aspects of religious institutions, but also occurred through religious teachings and doctrines.

I show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the ulama’s capacity to act as a distinct and unified body is of very recent origin in Iran. The ulama expanded their network, harmonized their teachings, rationalized and nationalized their bureaucracy, and helped build a national religious morality in interaction with the Pahlavi state. It was through the convergence of state policy and the interests of the religious establishment that the Homo Islamicus of the later period of the Pahlavi regime could emerge as an actor in the 1979 revolution.

The fusion of state and religion in 1979 ended a cycle of entanglement between the state and religious institutions. The ensuing state, a coalition state since its inception, eventually evolved into what I call a “theological security state.” In this state, a group of midlevel theologians, intelligence officers, leaders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and a layer of the intermediary Islamic business class, coalesced through Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s theory of velayat faqieh (the Guardianship of Jurist), control all levels of political and military power and many of the religious institutions and economic resources of Iran, despite internal discontent, regional instability, and international pressure.

The Islamization of the revolution eventually led to sacralization of the state and its constitution, with a reciprocal statization of religion. The convergence of the state and institutionalized religion did not, however, lead to a homogenous theocratic system led by the religious establishment. Nor did it lead to the formation of a polity with a common religious disposition. As the endemic crises of the theocratic regime confirms, the moment of the Islamization of the state, the climax of this fusion, also had the seeds of its disintegration. The death of Khomeini in 1989 accelerated this process and led to the emergence of a fractured political scene with pragmatists, reformists, and militarists all claiming to follow the path of the late Imam.

If revolutions either end with the formation of a stable political regime or descend into chaos, then the Iranian Revolution is still not over. Indeed, I show that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been volatile since its inception and is inherently unstable due to the incompatibility of theocracy with a republic. I also relate Iran’s development with the larger political and social instability of the region—itself one of the byproducts of the 1979 revolution—and argue that the ongoing political turmoil will continue until a new regional political configuration evolves.

*

This book is divided into three thematic sections: the formation of the state, the institutionalization of religion, and the Islamization of the revolution and its aftermath. The concluding chapter reflects on the book’s findings and discusses their larger theoretical implications.

I. From Fragmented Political Authority to Central Bureaucratic Power, 1796–1963

This section traces the changing structure of political power from the inception of the Qajar dynasty in 1796 to Mohammad Reza Shah’s political and social reforms in 1963, known as the White Revolution. The formation of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925–1926 ended the ethno-tribal monarchy that had ruled Iran for almost five centuries.¹ I consider 1963 the turning point of this long process of transformation of the state’s power structure because the Shah’s reforms centered on the distribution of land and signaled the end of the Qajar land tenure system that had long served as the basis for governance through coalition.

Chapter 2, “The Political Authority of the Qajar State, 1796–1925,” investigates the formation and structure of the Qajar dynasty’s political authority from its origins until its demise. It reinterprets the history of Qajar rule by characterizing “the protracted Kingdoms of Iran” as a centralized rule based on the power of fragmented and autonomous political authorities. The chapter argues that the Qajar monarchy held power by forging a tumultuous alliance with other Turkish-speaking tribes, powerholders of the settled agricultural communities, and the urban elite (mostly Persian-speaking families that owned agricultural lands). It then traces the gradual dismantlement of the Qajar tribal monarchy and state and the emergence of new forces in the sociopolitical scene. Finally, it evaluates the peculiarities of centralized rule in Iran, pointing to the differences between this form of centralized rule and the classical notion of the state.

Chapter 3, “Forming a Utilitarian Buffer State: The Pahlavis, 1921–1963,” discusses how the failure of the 1906–1911 Constitutional Revolution to build a centralized state paved the way for the Pahlavi regime to emerge in 1925. I argue that Reza Khan acted as the statist champion of the Constitutional Revolution and that his state-making strategy reverberated into the Pahlavi reign. The outcome was repression and imposition of the army and the bureaucracy. The coalition of fragmented authorities under Qajar rule and informal elite bargaining was replaced by a more formal relationship between the state and its clients, in which conflicts were resolved through the bureaucracy and the use of violence. This transformation, I argue, made the political climate more volatile, more prone to mass political movements, and more likely to catalyze a radical dissident discourse.

I examine the formation of the Pahlavi state in the context of its partnership with a powerful and influential external state, in this case, Great Britain. The result was the creation of a “utilitarian buffer state.” I add “utilitarian” to the term “buffer state,” used in debates about nineteenth-century colonial rule, to emphasize the reciprocity of an arrangement serving the interests of all actors. I argue that this concept better captures Iranian political realities than terms such as “client state,” “dependent state,” “peripheral” or “semi-peripheral state,” or “post-colonial state,” which are often used to describe broadly comparable states. A utilitarian buffer state has a close political and military alliance with a global power, yet has its own military apparatus, financial resources, administrative capacities, and ideological and religious orientations, and can often act with autonomy. Nevertheless, utilitarian buffer states are weak, ideologically and culturally faceless, defensive when confronted by internal pressures, and vulnerable to international pressures. I develop this concept and test its power on the evidence of events surrounding the final days of the Pahlavi kings in 1941 and 1979.

*

II. The Institutionalization of the Shi’i Ulama, 1796–1963

In this section, I explore the political and social processes leading to the institutionalization of the Shi’i ulama. I begin with the disintegration of the Safavid ulama’s power networks, hierarchy, and orthodoxy at the end of the eighteenth century, and I end with the riots in June 1963 that marked the emergence of Khomeini’s radical leadership in both political and religious spheres. The events of 1962–1963 leading to these violent riots were the first national, sustained political agitation by the religious establishment against the Pahlavi regime.

I adopt a constructive approach to explain the institutionalization of the ulama, rejecting any sort of essentialism in Shi’ism, including its orthodoxy or ethos. In my view, the history of Shi’ism over the past three centuries is better explained as a narrative of connected cycles of change than as a narrative of continuity and change. Each cycle has its own characteristics, and I have devoted a chapter to explain each.

Chapter 4, “Religious Revivalism and the Formative Phase of Orthodoxy, 1796–1892,” highlights the importance of heterodox ideas in the fragmented Shi’i religious sphere during the formative phase of the Qajar state. It then describes the gradual formation of a religious orthodoxy in relation to the consolidation of the Qajar state. I examine the theological controversy between akhbari (inductive) and usuli (deductive) schools of thought and show how this struggle shaped the relationship between the ulama and the emerging state.² I also study how the usuli theological revolution redefined the position of the ulama and the principle of orthodoxy, paying particular attention to the resulting redefinition of Shi’i law and its impact on the state.

The usuli ulama, armed with the notion of ejtehad (the interpretation of laws or legal judgment through deduction from real-world problems and events, as opposed to induction from scriptural sources), responded to the legal vacuum in Iran by producing scholarly publications on legal issues. They increased their power, influence, and wealth, and expanded their religious networks during the long, stable, and relatively prosperous reign of Naser al-Din Shah (1848–1896). I argue that the formation of an informal hierarchy among the ulama, topped by an office later called the Source of Emulation, is a product of this period. The gradual formation of this hierarchy changed the believers’ relationship to the ulama and to religion. However, the ulama were not yet present, formally or informally, in the political elite.

Chapter 5, “The Constitutional Moment: The Ulama and the Political Sphere, 1892–1921,” discusses the historical significance of the ulama’s first direct confrontation with the state through participation in the movement against the Régie of Tobacco, a tobacco concession Naser al-Din Shah granted to Great Britain in 1890. The concession spurred massive popular resentment, whipped by the ulama, which ultimately forced it to be canceled. This chapter then considers the ulama’s role in the failed Constitutional Revolution and how this affected relations between the ulama and the state on the eve of the 1921 coup. I focus on the convergence of state formation and the institutionalization of the ulama through the constitutional process and demonstrate the ulama’s transformation from spiritual leaders of a scattered community to a distinct social and political entity in a nation-in-the-making. This chapter also establishes the impact of the constitution on the ulama’s later institutionalization.

Chapter 6, “The Nationalization of Religious Morality and the Organizational Expansion of the Ulama, 1921–1963,” assesses the relationship between the emerging Pahlavi regime and the institutionalization of the ulama from the 1921 coup to Khomeini’s arrival on the political scene as a political and religious leader in 1963. The convergence of state formation and the institutionalization of the ulama during this period eventually led to the organizational expansion and centralization of the ulama and the formation of a religious morality dictated by Shi’ism—an indispensable part of Iran’s evolving national identity. Against accepted scholarly wisdom, this chapter demonstrates that the Pahlavi regime was the vehicle for organizing and extending the religious sphere in Iran, transforming the ways religious allegiances influenced national politics. It shows that the 1979 revolution could not have been “Islamic” without these transformations.

*

III. The Making of the Islamic Revolution and Its Aftermath, 1963 to the Present

This section traces the Islamization of political and social movements and the revolution, and the subsequent fusion of state and religion.

Chapter 7, “The Islamization of the Social Movements and the Revolution, 1963–1979,” examines the conflicts between the ulama and the state, the emergence of Khomeini’s radical politics, and the Islamization of political and social movements. It shows that this Islamization, which culminated with the 1979 revolution, was politically constructed and not an outcome of the Shi’i cultural framework or the dominance of traditional forces in the Iranian public sphere. The chapter demonstrates that, contrary to popular and scholarly wisdom, Khomeini was not an embodiment of the religious establishment. He emerged as a religious leader through political means and remained marginal in the religious sphere. Even his achievement of the status of Source of Emulation in 1970 was attained by primarily political means. Before the 1979 revolution, some leading religious scholars considered him a heretic, and in many ways, they were right. By wrapping the intellectual tradition of heterodoxy in the language of orthodoxy, Khomeini mobilized the religious establishment for radical causes. Radical Islam constructed ideological and cultural values for a new regime just as an old regime disintegrated.

Chapter 8, “The Invention of a Modern Theocracy: An Unfinished Revolution,” considers the period from the beginning of the revolution to the present. The fusion of the state and a radical version of Shi’ism during this period brought the process of state formation and the institutionalization of religion to one logical end, while simultaneously opening many new possibilities. Khomeini’s exceptional status as a religious and political leader and his suppression of rivals, coupled with the multipolarity of religious leadership inherent in the Shi’i theological outlook, made existing religious institution incapable of producing his successor. His exceptionality made him irreplaceable.

The state is now much bigger and stronger than at any time in recent Iranian history, thanks to the apparatus developed during the war with Iraq, the subsequent militarization of the region, the state monopoly over oil income, and the consequences of the religious and political polarization of the Iranian public. Khomeini’s legacy is a fusion ...