Fantasy and Social Movements

J. Ormrod

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781349467600, 9781137348166
• eBook ISBN: 9781137348173
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: Social History
• Index: Psychology

It is sometimes assumed that fantasizing stands in contrast to activism. This book, however, argues that fantasy plays a central role in social movements. Drawing on psychoanalysis and psychosocial theories, Fantasy and Social Movements examines the relationships between fantasy, reality, action, the unconscious and the collective.

Part I

Fantasy in Constellation: Fantasy, Reality, the Unconscious, Action and the Collective

Postponing for the moment a discussion of ‘social movement theory’ as a distinctive body of work, the four chapters of this part of the book all address the relationships between ontic realms central to the constitution of social movements – fantasy, reality, the unconscious, action and the collective – as described in the psychoanalytic theory of Freud, Klein and Lacan. Most people, whether psychoanalysts or sociologists, or neither, work with some theory as to these relationships. Our understanding of the nature and significance of each realm depends to such a great extent on our understanding of its connection to each of the others that they can only be described as an ontic ‘constellation’ in the critical realist sense of the term (see Hartwig, 2007, pp. 78–9). Yet psychoanalysis itself, the discipline most concerned with such relationships, has failed to reach any kind of agreement as to its nature.

In a seminal paper on phantasy, taken as read during the Controversial Discussions, and published in 1952, Susan Isaacs returned to Freud’s development of a theory of phantasy in the hope of clarifying its meaning, and in so doing necessarily reminded psychoanalysis of the contentious nature of its place within psychoanalytic ontology. She noted that:

A survey of contributions to psycho-analytical theory would show that the term ‘phantasy’ has been used in varying senses by different authors and at different times. Its current usages have widened considerably from its earliest meanings.

(p. 67)

Isaacs’s paper established her as the voice of authority on Melanie Klein’s theory of phantasy (Leader, 1997, p. 85), but, far from uniting psychoanalysis, her paper brought to the fore the disagreements between the various traditions around the time of the Controversial Discussions, which arguably took the theory of fantasy as their main focus (Britton, 1995; also Hayman, 1989; Hinshelwood, 1989). And when Jacques Lacan later situated the term as a key element of his own ontology, it only served to obfuscate it further, to the extent that over 45 years after the Controversial Discussions, the same observations were being made (Hayman, 1989; Inderbitzen & Levy, 1990, cited in Infante, 1995).

In what follows, I have attempted to tread my own path through competing understandings of the correspondence between fantasy, reality, the unconscious, action and the collective. I begin in Chapter 1 with my account of Freud’s own writing. To begin anywhere else proves extremely problematic. Britton (1995) makes the point that during the Controversial Discussions Kleinians argued the case for their understanding of phantasy on the grounds of both orthodoxy (i.e. on the grounds that their account was true to Freud’s) and accuracy (especially in as much as they saw their ideas as extending Freud’s work). They were attacked, correspondingly, for being both heretical and wrong. What makes things more difficult is that it was rarely clear whether it was an interpretation of Freud or an advance on his work that was at stake.

Having established a base in Freud’s writing it becomes easier to follow how understandings of the constellation of interest differ amongst Freud’s followers. Due to limitations of space, I have concentrated on the two schools of psychoanalysis that have most clearly and comprehensively remodelled the Freudian version of the constellation, and which have served as the most common frameworks for social scientists grappling with issues around social movements and activism. These are the Kleinian and Lacanian traditions, addressed in chapters 2 and 3 respectively. In each of these three chapters I have explored not only Freud’s, Klein’s and Lacan’s own writing, but also how their writing has been taken up by others and brought closer to the concerns of this book. Chapter 4 aims to synthesize this discussion through a focus on what I have called ‘modes of fantasy’. Freud, Klein and Lacan are not the only psychoanalysts, of course, to have important things to say about fantasy. Some other analysts are mentioned only in passing – Winnicott and Bion, for example – when they really deserve a chapter of their own. This is most certainly also true of Jung, who had much to say on this topic, and whose work has also influenced political science (see, for example, Samuels, 1993), albeit to a lesser degree.

It should be noted at this point that disagreements as to the nature of fantasy extend as far as the spelling of the term itself. The Standard Edition of Freud’s work uses the spelling ‘phantasy’ throughout. As Isaacs (1952, pp. 80–1) notes, Freud’s English translators introduced the ‘ph’ spelling in order to make clear the distinctive psychoanalytic meaning of the term as referring to ‘predominantly or entirely unconscious phantasies’ rather than ‘the popular word “fantasy”, meaning conscious day-dreams, fictions and so on’. This distinction was important for Isaacs because it reinforced Freud’s belief that psychic reality (for Isaacs, unconscious phantasy) should be treated as just as important as material reality. The common usage of ‘fantasy’ to mean ‘ “merely” imagined’ tended to undermine this point. Having said this, Freud himself used the same term, phantasie, even when he was clearly referring to conscious fantasies (Adams, 2004). He also referred to the most common manifestation of conscious fantasy as ‘day-dreams’, and elsewhere seems to use the terms synonymously. Following Isaacs’s lead, Kleinians often distinguish between the unconscious and the conscious using the spellings ‘phantasy’ and ‘fantasy’ respectively (see the footnote in Hayman, 1989, p. 105, for an extended discussion). It should be noted, however, that despite this insistence, both Klein herself and her followers have frequently allowed their discussions to drift so as to obscure whether they are talking about conscious or unconscious phantasy.

Translations of Lacan’s work and subsequent Lacanian theory, on the other hand, use the spelling ‘fantasy’ consistently, even when theorists have used the term ‘unconscious fantasy’. In each of the three chapters I have endeavoured to remain true to the conventions of the tradition being discussed. This makes it easier to make sense of quoted material, at the expense of being inconsistent myself.

1

Fantasy in Freudian Theory

The first part of this chapter builds up a picture of Freud’s theory of phantasy, beginning in his topographic period. As this picture is developed, the other components of the ontological constellation I am addressing are brought into clearer view. The second part turns attention to the ways in which Freud’s understanding of individual phantasy has been drawn into social theory, especially as it relates to collective behaviour.

The Freudian unconscious

‘The concept of there being unconscious mental processes is of course one that is fundamental to psycho-analytic theory,’ says Strachey in his editor’s note to Freud’s essay on ‘The Unconscious’ (1915b). Freud repeatedly argued that only a small part of mental life was known to consciousness, and here that everything that comes to consciousness originates in the unconscious, which has ‘abundant points of contact with conscious mental processes’ (1915b, p. 166). Although the unconscious can never be directly observed, it has a profound effect on our thoughts and behaviour, and reveals itself to analysis in symptoms, dreams and parapraxis. Freud says we can only know unconscious ideas after ‘transformation or translation into something conscious’ (1915b, p. 166). Unless expressed in the form of anxiety, the release of affect does not arise ‘till the break-through to a new representation in the system Cs. [the conscious system] has been successfully achieved’; that is to say, a substitutive idea has been found at the conscious level (1915b, p. 180). This notion of translation or substitution is an important one.

What makes up the unconscious is, however, far from agreed. Freud suggests that its basis lies in biological instincts (for both sex and self-preservation), but that it is embellished during the developmental process:

if inherited mental formations exist in human beings – something analogous to instinct in animals – these constitute the nucleus of the Ucs. [unconscious system]. Later there is added to them what is discarded during childhood development as unserviceable.

(1915b, p. 195)

Freud makes it clear that he believes the unconscious contains the same mental processes associated with consciousness, but those which are prevented from reaching consciousness (or more correctly the, unrepressed but not conscious, pre-conscious system). The unconscious does not properly consist of instinctual impulses, but of ideas that represent instincts. Central to these are wishful impulses (1915b, p. 186). These wishful impulses are attached to objects that have been experienced as capable of satisfying instinctual impulses. Wishes do not, therefore, pre-exist their objects.

Freud argues that once satisfaction has been experienced,

the next time this need arises a psychical impulse will at once emerge which will seek to … re-evoke the perception itself, that is to say, to re-establish the situation of the original satisfaction. An impulse of this sort is what we call a wish; the reappearance of the presentation is the fulfilment of the wish.

(1900, p. 566)

By the latter, Freud is referring to phantasy. He makes a seemingly straightforward distinction between a wish and a phantasy: the negative feeling of wanting satisfaction and the positive feeling of (re-)establishing satisfaction. Such a distinction is important analytically, though not always easy to defend.

Phantasy and hallucinatory satisfaction

In his topographical model of the psyche, Freud makes clear the limitations of the unconscious system (1915b, p. 188). It knows neither reality nor time. The unconscious system is unable to distinguish between an idea or wish and a perception (Freud, 1917a). Nor is it capable of action in the real world, except through reflexes. These assertions came together in Freud’s theory of hallucinatory satisfaction in the infant, initially formulated in ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’ (1900) but expounded more clearly in the 1915 series of ‘Papers on Metapsychology’. In the absence of an environment in which reflexes are able to alleviate the discomfort, and without a conscious system capable of directing action, the very young infant creates an unconscious mental image of the object that will satisfy its need, based on past experience.

The state of psychical rest was originally disturbed by the peremptory demands of internal needs. When this happened, whatever was thought of (wished for) was simply presented in a hallucinatory manner, just as still happens today with our dream thoughts every night.

(Freud, 1911, p. 219)

Memories of satisfaction are experienced as perceptions (Freud, 1900). The infant cannot, initially, distinguish between its wish and the perception of the breast, and is momentarily able to experience satisfaction.

The continued experience of need in spite of the hallucination results in the breakdown of hallucination, however. Freud says:

It was only the non-occurrence of the expected satisfaction, the disappointment experienced, that led to the abandonment of this attempt at satisfaction by means of hallucination. Instead of it, the psychical apparatus had decided to form a conception of the real circumstances in the external world and to endeavour to make a real alteration in them. A new principle of mental functioning was thus introduced; what was presented in the mind was no longer what was agreeable but what was real, even if it happened to be disagreeable. This setting up of the reality principle proved to be a momentous step.

(1911, p. 219)

Freud asserted that the unconscious mental processes are ‘primary processes’ governed by ‘the pleasure principle’. They seek to maximize pleasure and minimize ‘unpleasure’. These processes are unable in themselves to postpone or forego satisfaction. Hallucinatory satisfaction is the only way the unconscious is able to relieve the tension caused by the infant’s needs intruding on its pleasurable state of psychic rest. And yet it is not able to actually fulfil these needs in the long term. The infant therefore develops the necessary ability to orient itself to the real world and act within this world in order to obtain more complete satisfaction.

‘The reality principle’ does not, however, displace the pleasure principle, but rather safeguards it by ensuring that in the long term pleasure is actually experienced. ‘A momentary pleasure, uncertain in its results, is given up, but only in order to gain along the new path an assured pleasure at a later time’ (Freud, 1911, p. 223). The ego works in close relationship with the sense organs in order to achieve this. The sense organs survey reality and create memories against which internal needs are compared when they arise (1911).

The conscious system has to decide if ideas are real or not. It does this by comparing the idea against reality. Freud puts together a theory of how this process is achieved, beginning in ‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’ (1915a), where he explains how internal needs and external stimuli are distinguished. Both are felt as stimulation, which Freud associated with ‘unpleasure’. To distinguish them, the infant learns to evaluate the effects of its actions on the stimulation. If physical flight removes the stimulus then it must be an external one, and if it persists (as instinctual needs always do until satisfied), then it is internal. It is impossible to just physically turn away from internal needs in the same way it is from sources of external irritation. Freud thus places an implicit emphasis on the materiality of pain, which cannot indefinitely be denied by any illusory means. Similarly, in giving up hallucinatory satisfaction, the ego uses this process of ‘reality-testing’ to distinguish a wish from perception, monitoring the effects of our actions on our perceptions. Freud introduces the term in scare quotes, and this can be taken as signalling an important distinction between the subjective process he is referring to and attempts by others to objectively determine their reality basis. If the perception is unaltered by action, then the perception must originate from inside the subject (1917a, p. 232). Aware of the discrepancy between our wishes and reality, the ego is capable of fulfilling these wishes through deliberate physical actions. These actions are constrained and directed by secondary process thinking. This postpones immediate motor discharge by staging conscious mental ‘experimental kinds of acting’ (1911). Much later he added that ‘judgment’ signals a choice of action based on this, and marks the transition from thinking to acting (1925b, p. 238). In short, rather than simply taking an image of the satisfaction of a wish as if it were reality, the ego plans means to achieve its true satisfaction.

From this point on, the activity of phantasying is distinguished from that which undergoes ‘reality-testing’:

With the introduction of the reality principle one species of thought-activity was split off; it was kept free from reality-testing and remained subordinated to the pleasure principle alone. This activity is phantasying, which begins already in children’s play, and later, continued as day-dreaming, abandons dependence on real objects.

(1911, p. 222)

Freud likens the space protected for phantasy to a spatial reservation such as Yellowstone Park. There is no indication here, however, that Freud equated phantasying in this sense with hallucinations in which what is imagined is experienced as perception. As Bianchedi (1995) points out, day-dreams are always thought, even when visual, and never hallucinated. Once ‘reality-testing’ apparatus have developed, phantasies or illusions appear to take a different place in the psyche. Later Freud talks about the satisfaction gained from illusions …

which one recognises as such without letting their deviation from reality interfere with one’s enjoyment. The sphere in which these illusions originate is the life of the imagination, which at one time, when the sense of reality developed, was expressly exempted from the requirements of the reality test and remained destined to fulfil desires that were hard to realize.

(1908a, p. 22, emphasis added)

Though not entirely clear, Freud appears to be pointing to the development of phantasy over time, from the hallucinatory imagination to something we distinguish from reality. Blum (1995) believes that in his essay on ‘The Two Principles’ (1911), Freud is arguing that day-dreaming actually depends on the day-dreamer having established a sense of reality. Again, this emphasizes that phantasy is not the same as the attempts at hallucinatory satisfaction that preceded it.

So Freud makes it clear that our phantastic world is distinguished from reality and yet also kept free from ‘reality-testing’ (1908a, p. 144, 1911, p. 222). The conceptual difficulty of reconciling these apparently paradoxical statements is evidenced by the multiple ways in which the contributors to Person et al’s (1995) collection On Freud’s ‘Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming’ have attempted to give expression to them. Infante (1995) says ‘reality testing is here set aside, but consciously’. Blum (1995, p. 40) puts it as follows: ‘In the daydream, the individual is relatively awake and conscious of both the daydream and reality and of the daydream as distinct from reality.’ Lemlij (1995, p. 167) sees it as ‘the ability to participate in two realities at the same time, and do it in a perfect and natural manner … It is the creation of a world supported in another, which does not imply the destruction of this other (real) world.’ Britton (1995) redraws Freud’s spatial metaphor, developing the concept of ‘the other room’ as the setting for phantasy. These are all attempts to assert that we are able to suspend ‘reality-testing’ on one plane, treating our imagination as though it were real, whilst retaining ‘reality-testing’ on another plane so that we are never really fooled into taking our imaginary creations for real. This also describes our mental state when we suspend disbelief when watching a play or film or reading a novel.

The genesis of conscious phantasy

Freud elaborates on the formation of phantasy in his ‘Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams’ (1917a). Here he argues that wish-fulfilling phantasies are first formed in the pre-conscious system. Though he does not use the term himself, the pre-conscious system is presented as a kind of limbo for phantasies. Once a phantasy is formed in the pre-conscious system, there are three possibilities for its trajectory. The first is that the wish regresses back into the unconscious where it is mistaken for a perception as it would have been in the earliest stages of life, and undergoes the primary processes of displacement and condensation. Hallucinatory satisfaction through the unconscious phantasy is witnessed in dreams and in psychosis. Freud also goes on to say that in amentia, ‘the ego breaks off its relation to reality. … With this turning away from reality, reality-testing is got rid of, the (unrepressed, completely conscious) wishful phantasies are able to press forward into the system, and they are regarded as a better reality’ (1917a, p. 232). This hallucination is not the same as phantasying, although in this case Freud considers it conscious rather than unconscious. The second possibility is that the phantasies find motor discharge. In other words they may compel action directed towards the realization of a phantasy without our being conscious of the phantasy as a source of motivation. In this case we might still access the phantasy retrospectively if we wanted to; it is not repressed. The third possibility is that wishes may find their way into consciousness where they are experienced as day-dreams and distinguished from our current perceptions through a process of ‘reality-testing’.

It was in his earlier paper ‘Creative Writers and Day-dreaming’ that Freud first discussed clearly how phantasies are ‘strung together’ (1908a). Here he suggests that our day-dreams combine three moments in time.

Mental work is linked to some current impression, some provoking occasion in the present which has been able to arouse one of the subject’s major wishes. From there it harks back to a memory of an earlier experience (usually an infantile one) in which this wish was fulfilled; and it now creates a situation relating to the future which represents a fulfilment of the wish.

(1908a, p. 145)

The phantasy is not therefore the wish in a purely regressive form, but a wish cast into the future based on the present situation. Though I prefer to stick with Freud’s notion of phantasy formed in the pre-conscious system than their notion of the ‘present unconscious’, Sandler & Sandler (1995) put it as follows: ‘The unconscious wish as it first arises in the present unconscious is modelled on the inner child’s wishes, phantasies and internal relationships, but the objects involved are objects of the present’ (p. 72). Phantasy is capable of providing a path forward for the libido, rather than a regressive path (see also Freud, 1918). Freud gives the following example to illustrate these ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: Fantasy and Social Movements in Context
• Part I: Fantasy in Constellation: Fantasy, Reality, the Unconscious, Action and the Collective
• Part II: Fantasy and Social Movement Theory
• Part III: A Case Study of the Pro-Space Movement and Fantasy
• References
• Index