Europeanization and Tolerance in Turkey

The Myth of Toleration

A. Kaya

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780230300347
• eBook ISBN: 9781137318190
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Social Sciences

The book questions the popularity of the notion of tolerance in Turkey, and argues that the regime of tolerance has been strengthened in parallel with the Europeanization process, which has boosted the rhetoric of the Alliance of Civilizations in a way that culturalized what is social and political.

1

Multiple Modernities and Turkish Modernity: A Continuous Journey of Europeanization

Traditionally, modernity is perceived to be a linear and teleological process, spreading from the West to the rest of the world. Almost all 19th- and 20th-century sociology teleologically took modernity as a one-way process, experienced by all nations being transformed from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. Auguste Comte, Georg Wilhelm Fredrich Hegel, Ferdinand Tönnies, Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, Max Weber, Bronislaw Malinowski and several other social scientists assumed and claimed that all societies undergo the same transformations, but over differing periods of time. In the final analysis, they would all be ‘modern’ in a Western sense. According to the meta-narratives of modernity such as the nation-state; the West; the proletariat; high culture; teleological thinking; and progress and totality, irrational attachments to the local, the particular, tradition, roots, national myths and superstitions would gradually be replaced by more rational, secular and universalist social identities. In this frame of reference, modernization is equated with Westernization, a process which is very visible in the narrative of Turkish modernization. This belief also resulted in a subjective evaluation of Western-type civilization as the superior model of civilization, thus promoting Euro–American hegemony in the discourse on modernity.

A recent form of literature heavily criticizes the linear perception of modernity. The Euro-American hegemony is called into question in the context of contemporary discourses on modernity generated and discussed by Schmuel N. Eisenstadt, Barrington Moore, Charles Taylor, Gerard Delanty, Johann Arnason, Bo Strath, Peter Wagner, Willfried Spohn and Atsuko Ichijo. The ways in which such scholars debate modernity constitutes a separate literature on the idea of multiple modernities. The idea of multiple modernities opposes classical views of modernization, and therefore denies the monopoly of the West on modernity. Eisenstadt admits that modernity was, in its origins, a Western project, disseminated to the rest of the world through military and economic imperialism, especially in the form of colonialism, but he concludes that the West has failed in the promotion of a homogenizing (cultural) program of modernity. Instead, Eisenstadt observes the emergence of new centers of modernity all around the world in which the originally Western model of modernity is continuously reinterpreted and reconstructed. The varying interpretations of modernity manifest themselves in different institutional and ideological patterns, and are carried forward by various factors such as the agents of new social movements. In other words, the multiple modernities theory maintains that modernity should not be understood as a linear and homogenizing process vis-à-vis secularization or rationalization, but as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of political and cultural programs (see inter alia Eisenstadt, 2000, 2001, 2005; Arnason, 2006; Delanty, 2006; Martinelli, 2007; Boldt et al., 2009). Eisenstadt summarizes the idea of multiple modernities as follows:

The idea of multiple modernities presumes that the best way to understand the contemporary world, indeed to explain the history of modernities, is to see it as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs. These ongoing reconstructions of multiple institutional and ideological patterns are carried forward by specific social actors in close connection with social, political, and intellectual activists, and also by social movements pursuing different programs of modernity, holding very different views on what makes societies modern.

(Eisenstadt, 2000: 2)

By the same token, Ibrahim Kaya (2004b: 37–39) argues that modernity is an open-ended horizon in which there are spaces for multiple interpretations. This immediately implies a critique of totalizing theories of modernity. He rightfully claims that it is modernity which makes it possible for radically plural world-interpretations to be expressed openly, and it is for this reason that the field in which human beings live necessarily becomes a field of tensions. Modernity’s openness to interpretation makes the concept of the plurality of modernities necessary. Eisenstadt also argues that self-reflexivity and protest are inherent constituents of modernity:

[Modernity] focused first on the evaluation of the major dimensions of human experience, and especially on the place of reason in the construction of nature, of human society and human history, as against the more expressivist dimension. Secondly, it focused on the tension between reflexivity and active approaches to human life. Thirdly, it focused on totalizing and pluralistic approaches to human life and the constitution of society and, finally, on control or discipline, on the one side, and autonomy or freedom, on the other.

(Cited in Delanty, 2004: 395–396)

The idea of multiple modernities is also debated in Turkey by the works of Nilüfer Göle, İbrahim Kaya, Ferhat Kentel and Ayhan Kaya. The works of Göle (2003b and 2009) and Kaya and Kentel (2005 and 2008) tend to provide some alternative interpretations for the rising visibility of Islamic symbols in the public space in Turkey as well as in the Western European countries. Their interpretation of modernity equates modernity with social (civil) and political (civic) participation. For those who have a strong faith in Islam, becoming socially and politically active makes them modern although they do not fit into the classical definition of Western modernity. What makes them modern is their act of protest, in other words their self-reflexivity, which they build up against the detrimental forces of globalization, and their participation in public life. Kaya, on the other hand, makes theoretical interventions in the idea of multiple modernities through the works of Eisenstadt, Arnason and Wagner. Scrutinizing the relationship between women and Islam in Turkey, Kaya (2004a) asserts that the current Islamism of veiled women could be understood as essentially modern, since the act of protest and self-reflexivity is embedded in the very idea of modernity. Kaya also argues that it is more plausible to talk about modernity in its plural form as it is intertwined with multiple sets of interpretations as in Kemalism, Islamism, liberalism, national socialism, Fascism and Leninism (Kaya, 2004b: 40).

These works tend to propose that equating modernity with Westernization in Turkey is a rather pathological inclination as it is based on the assumption that Western civilization is superior in comparison with others. On the contrary, the idea of multiple modernities does not yield to a kind of hierarchy between cultures, or civilizations, in a similar vein to what Eisenstadt (2005) calls pluralistic modernity with reference to Erasmus, Vico and Herder. This chapter aims to explore Turkish modernity, which has basically emerged in a liminal space constructed by various cultures and civilizations, namely with Turkish, Byzantium and Islamic elements. Parallel to what Eisenstadt (2005) calls totalizing modernity with reference to René Descartes, modernization has simply meant Westernization and/or Europeanization by the secular Turkish political and military elite. Hence, I will scrutinize the process of modernization in Turkey with a historicist approach to see if there is a rupture in the perception of modernization.

Although the two World Wars mark the turn of history in European states, the Turkish case is remarkably different, in the sense that the World Wars were not the main events that determined Turkey’s path to modernity. In effect, the milestones of Turkey’s modernization are the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the consequent establishment of the republic, the decision taken at the Helsinki Summit of 1999 and the rise of identity-based conflicts in Turkey. Furthermore, the process of Westernization that Turkey experienced during the transition from an empire to a republic is significantly different from the experiences of Western European states, which were perceived as the source of modernity. In terms of the Helsinki Summit, the literature has shown that Turkish modernity and Europeanization relies heavily on the strength of the EU anchor as well as the internal dynamics of Turkey with regard to the perceptions of Turkish identity.

In that regard, the most heavily debated issue is the rights of minorities, or the lack thereof, in the Turkish state as a challenge to democracy and as a counterpart to the established rights of minorities in Europe. What follows in this chapter will draw on the literature of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, and analyze the main elements of Turkish modernity with respect to center–periphery relations, state-centric policies of homogenization and the status of minorities. This chapter will delineate the process of Turkish modernization in the following order: the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th and early 20th centuries; the foundation years of the new Turkish republic preceding World War II; the period of military coups (1950–1983); the globalization and Europeanization of Turkey (1983–2005); and the period of Euroskepticism deepening with the beginning of the accession negotiations.

The Ottoman Empire: A Muslim empire or not?

It is often stereotypically cited in Western literature that the Ottoman Empire was simply a Muslim empire. The same assumption is still present in the European public debate, in a way that reduces Turkey’s candidacy to a discussion revolving around Islam. The Ottomans were rather the bearers of three different traditions: Central Asian secular Turkic culture, the Islamic culture of the Memluks, and Byzantium (Barkey, 2007). Ottoman state tradition is a syncretic one composed of various cultural traditions. The coexistence of secular laws (kanun) and religious laws (sharia) in the Ottoman Empire, and the priority of the former (the Sultan as the absolute temporal authority) over the latter (Sheikh-ul Islam as the spiritual authority) reveal that the secular character of the state tradition was always evident. The syncretic element of the Ottoman state tradition was very much visible until the late 17th century, when the Empire had the capacity to expand toward the West. Ottoman sultans were also marrying Christians to expand their hegemony in Christian lands. Sunni Islam was certainly not the driving force of the Ottoman state.

The monolithical and Sunni-Muslim element became pivotal in the Empire after the 16th century when the Ottomans started to expand eastward and transferred the Caliphate from the Egyptian Memluks to Istanbul in 1517. Opting for Sunni Islam as the official religion of the Empire was a rational decision which was made in order to be able to compete with the rival Shia-origin Persian Safavid Empire in the East (Mardin, 1981: 193). The Turks were already using the colonial dervishes and Bektashi Tariqat (religious school) as a soft power from the 11th century to control and Muslimize the West. This also created a syncretic understanding of religion comprised of different religious legacies such as Islam, Christianity, shamanism and pantheism (Ocak, 2000). In the meantime, the fight between the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church made it easier for the Ottomans to control Byzantium, and the Orthodox Church collaborated with the Turks in the 13th century when the Crusaders destroyed Constantinople and scared the Orthodox Church.

Similarly, one could also argue that Turkish Islam is different from Arabic and Persian Islam for various reasons. First, Islam was never a political tool in Anatolia to liberate the country against colonial powers; rather, it has been coded in the parliamentary democratic regime; conversely, Islam in the Arab world has been an ideological tool in fighting against colonial powers. Second, Islam in Turkey has always been an Islam of Tariqats (small networks) and now of cemaats (wider community networks through media). Third, Turkish Islam can be perceived as a sort of Volkislam, because Turks adopted Islam from shamanist heterodox colonial dervishes, not from orthodox ulema. Fourth, the Alevi minority settled in Turkey is more secular and republican, reproducing the heterodox Turkish faith. It has also recently become more politically engaged, and it was promoted by the state to display an anti-fundamentalist form of Turkish Islam as opposed to the rising political Islam (Herman, 2003). Finally, Turks had opted for secularism since the early 19th century following the conscious act of the Ottoman intelligentsia to become a part of Western civilization, which they believed to be the only civilization based on material development (Gökalp, 1976; Hanioglu, 2008). In the words of Gökalp, a Kurdish-origin leading figure of Turkish nationalism, ‘There is only one road to salvation … to adapt ourselves to western civilization completely’ (Gökalp, 1959). Following Ferdinand Tönnies’ approach, Gökalp claimed that civilization is not culture, but a supercultural development. Nations can share the same civilization, but by doing so they may be deprived of their cultural integrity. Hence, Turks must retain their culture, but at the same time acquire the benefits of Western civilization (Spencer, 1958: 651). Hence, Turkish modernization is an attempt to be incorporated into the European civilization (Berkes, 1978). In his review of the Europeanization of Turkey, Erozan asserts that the West was perceived by the Ottoman elite as an expanse from which solutions to the ills of Ottoman rule could be derived (Erozan, 2009: 6).

Management of ethnocultural and religious diversity in the Ottoman Empire was mostly accomplished on the basis of the ideology of multiculturalism, which was literally called the millet system. Millet is an Ottoman Turkish term, which refers to confessional community in the Ottoman Empire. The word millet comes from the Arabic word millah (nation). Subject populations such as the Christians were classified by their religious affiliation. Their civil concerns were settled by their own ecclesiastical authorities, who were delegated by the Sultan. This was the way the government secured access to the non-Muslim populations (Mardin, 1981: 192). In the 19th century, with the Tanzimat reforms replacing religious law with statute law, the term ‘millet’ started to refer to legally protected religious minority groups, other than the ruling Sunni Muslims (Mardin, 1981: 196; Zürcher, 2003: 66). Besides the Muslim millet, the main millets in the Ottoman Empire were the Greek, Orthodox, Jewish, Armenian and Syrian Orthodox (Barkey, 2007). Muslims encountered non-Muslims in the marketplace in everyday life; there was not a deep-rooted kind of interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims due to ethnocultural and religious boundaries essentialized by the millet system.

Although the millets were permitted to govern themselves with regard to internal affairs, their relations with the ruling Muslims were tightly regulated. For instance, the non-Muslims, though they were allowed to maintain their own religious and cultural heritage, were subject to certain rules, such that ‘non-Muslims could not proselytize, they could only build new churches under license and they were required to wear distinctive dress so they could be recognized. There were limits on intermarriage, and they had to pay special taxes in lieu of military service’ (Kymlicka, 1992: 36). Therefore, the system relied on tolerance of the millets provided that they were willing to abide by the regulations of the Empire, which encouraged conformity. Consequently, the system did not perceive the members of the millets as individuals but rather as a part of the collective non-Muslim identity. Tunaya illustrates the principle of equality during the Tanzimat era as follows:

The most emphasized issue during Tanzimat had been equality. Certainly, equality was not recognized in terms of the legal doctrine but rather in terms of being Ottoman. The second and reconciliatory method of the Tanzimat had doubled the State’s objectives. The principle of equality amongst Ottomans from multiple religions was established. According to a popular saying of the time, the principle of fellowship of the land was anticipated to become the main policy principle. Everyone was ‘the child of one father’: that father was the Sultan. Accordingly, the Islamist Empire formula was accompanied by the perception of a cosmopolitan community. The consolidative component of this plural community was being Ottoman. As a result, Islamism was accompanied by Ottomanism.

(Tunaya, 1960: 34, translation mine)

The benevolent reforms of Abdulmecid II (1839–1861) introduced laws providing some egalitarian guarantees for Muslims and non-Muslims, prohibition of bribery and uniform taxation (Spencer, 1958: 643). However, the Tanzimat laws and the attempts to introduce a European-type constitution were more or less shelved during the conservative sultanate of Abdulhamid II (1976–1909).

The Ottoman Empire was a multinational state with a sharp division between the ruling elite and the mass of the population, which played almost no part in the government of the Empire. According to Eisenstad...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures and Tables
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1. Multiple Modernities and Turkish Modernity: A Continuous Journey of Europeanization
• 2. Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Turkey
• 3. The Kurdish Question: 100 Years of Solitude
• 4. AKP’s Alevi Initiative: Limits of Tolerance
• 5. The Headscarf Issue
• 6. Nation, Europe and Modernity: Social Critique of the ‘Holy Trinity’ (Sunni-Muslim-Turk)
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index