The Ethics of Creativity

S. Moran, D. Cropley, J. Kaufman, S. Moran, D. Cropley, J. Kaufman

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781137333537
• eBook ISBN: 9781137333544
• Topic: Psicología
• Subtopic: Ética empresarial

The Ethics of Creativity illuminates the thorny issues that arise when novel creative ideas collide with what we believe to be 'right' or 'good'. This book tackles questions of when creativity and ethics tend to coincide and when conflict, and how both might be harnessed to support a brighter future for all.

Part I

What Are the Moral Mental Mechanisms Involved in Creativity, and How Do They Develop?

The following five chapters examine how mental mechanisms—such as imagination, embodied knowledge, reasoning, integrity, and discernment—influence how morality and ethics play a part in creative work.

1

The Development of Moral Imagination

Darcia Narvaez and Kellen Mrkva

University of Notre Dame, USA and University of Colorado Boulder, USA

A man, to be greatly good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively; he must put himself in the place of many others … the great instrument of moral good is the imagination.

Percy Bysshe Shelley, 1821, p. 13

Creativity has been defined as the ability to generate ideas that are original and unexpected, but are considered useful or important (Sternberg, 1999). Moral imagination involves not only the ability to generate useful ideas, but also the abilities to form ideas about what is good and right, and to put the best ideas into action for the service of others. This involves sensitivity to the people and lifescapes at hand. The everyday world is populated with opportunities to steer consciously through the shoals of social relationships and decide what sort of agent to be. Research into mental preoccupations indicates that individuals ponder moral and relational issues much of the time (Klinger, 1978). Thus, on a daily basis, people employ one of humanity’s greatest gifts: moral imagination. But what fosters the development of moral imagination and determines to what extent it is used to benefit humanity? How does the morally imaginative individual utilize emotional and social experiences, reasoning, and selection to produce imaginative moral action? These are the questions that this chapter addresses.

The interest in psychological research on morality is growing rapidly (Haidt, 2007) and spreading to a large number of fields. Yet, it is rare to encounter a moral psychology study that examines creativity, or theorists who give much room for creativity in their accounts of moral functioning. Although there is at least some empirical research that will shed light on these topics, John Dewey’s philosophical accounts may provide the greatest insights.

Dewey’s conceptions of moral imagination perhaps best advanced understanding of the relationship between creativity and morality (Fesmire, 2003). He conceived of imagination as a dramatic rehearsal in which people creatively explore and rehearse alternative courses of actions such that likely outcomes and impacts on others would guide moral decisions. The moral life involves co-authoring the future with others through dialogue and feedback on imagined alternatives, but also developing keen perception and flexible responses to each situation.

The place of moral imagination

The prevailing view on the interaction between creativity, deliberation, and morality is captured by deontological philosophy. This perspective emphasizes moral deliberation as conscious reasoning, which is assumed to exist apart from emotion (Kant, 1949). Emotions are considered to be inconsistent, unreliable, and irrational, and, thus, to be avoided. A deontological approach has little room for moral imagination. Imagination was considered to be in the realm of aesthetics and outside of morality (Johnson, 1993). The situations typically discussed are those with clear rules. Kohlberg’s measures pitted values against one another and scored responses within certain established boundaries (see Gibbs, 2003). The roles of creative and practical thinking, and the influence of emotions and situational considerations, were downplayed, if not considered completely irrelevant to the goal of measuring moral reasoning capacities (Fesmire, 2003).

However, explicit reasoning is insufficient for the moral life. From a neurobiological perspective, the emphasis on conscious reasoning and selection of principles is dominated by the intellectual “left brain” (McGilchrist, 2009). The intellect typically comprises the conscious aspects of the mind, which tend to minimize the vast tacit knowledge of, and behavioral control by, the rest of the brain. Relying on intellect alone signals that the intuitive mind and emotional intelligence are underutilized or underdeveloped (Narvaez, 2014).

In contrast to a heavy emphasis on the application of reason to moral decisions and judgments, other philosophers emphasize emotion as the source of moral judgments. Moral judgments spring forth without effort or worry. Reason is used only to defend the intuitive response. Building on Hume’s (1969[1739]) view, Haidt (2001) proposes a social intuitionist theory that emphasizes instantaneous moral judgment, defined as evaluations of other people’s actions and characters. As with Kohlberg’s studies the prototypical situations and methods deployed by Haidt and others do not enlist creativity. The unusual and emotionally strident situations create a quick positive or negative response that biases the conclusions these authors make about reason, creativity, and morality (Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007).

A third perspective directly addresses creativity in moral situations. Building on social intuitionism’s view that reasoning is used for post hoc rationalization, Ariely and colleagues conclude that creativity may actually increase unethical behavior (Gino & Ariely, 2012). This is because creativity makes individuals better at inventing justifications for cheating and more skilled at defending personal moral goodness after moral violations. In one study, priming individuals with creative words led to more cheating, suggesting a causal link between creativity and cheating. Despite these concerns, like John Dewey (2009[1908]), Mark Johnson (1993), and others, we believe that moral imagination contributes positively to moral functioning in most circumstances. Moral imagination relies on different types of intelligence: cognitive, social, and emotional. Emotional intelligence may be foundational for the others.

Emotion and moral development

When emotion systems are misdeveloped, morality can go awry. Early life shapes the emotional and cognitive capabilities that underlie morality and imagination (Greenspan & Shanker, 2004). A child is born with only one quarter of his or her brain developed; caregivers co-construct 75 percent of the brain of a full-term infant in the first years after birth (Trevathan, 2011). As a dynamic system, early life experience on multiple levels sets the stage for the rest of life. Caregivers shape the thresholds for numerous brain/body circuitries, and much of this involves the neuroendocrine and emotion systems (Meaney, 2010; Schore, 2003a, b). Too much stress at the wrong times in the first years of life can foster a stress-reactive brain, setting up a self-protective personality (Narvaez, 2008, 2014). For example, when infants do not receive physical comforting in timely ways, the vagus nerve can be mistuned, leading to long-term difficulties with social relations as well as numerous health problems (Narvaez, in press; Porges, 2011). When an infant is distressed too much during gestation or postnatal life, the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis (HPA) can be tuned to be hyper- or hypo-active (Lupien et al., 2009).

Stress affects imagination and creativity. Children who suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder have difficulty with daydreaming and symbolic play, which consolidate meaning, affect, and representation (Reid, 1999; Slade, 1987, 1994). Whenever the stress response is active, it draws energy away from higher-order thinking capacities, influencing how and how well a person imagines and relates to others (Sapolsky, 2004). If stress and trauma occur early in life, neurobiological systems never reach their optimal trajectories (Shonkoff et al., 2012). Well-rehearsed stress states become traits. In this way, neurobiological systems influence morality, setting up propensities to use different social and moral mindsets (Narvaez, 2014). What the brain’s capacities look like has much to do with early life experience, when brain system connections are being established.

Many philosophical traditions and psychological theories have underestimated the role emotion plays in moral functioning, although there have been some exceptions (for example, Hume). Even among those who emphasize emotion descriptively, emotion has been viewed overwhelmingly as normatively disruptive and as impairing moral judgment (Ben Ze’ev, 2000). Philosophers have viewed emotion as passive, undependable, and even primitive and bestial. In reality, individuals use their emotional experience to think in inclusive and integrative ways (Isen & Daubman, 1984), build social relationships, and broaden creative possibilities (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005).

In recent decades, it has become clear that emotions serve as informatory guides to adaptive judgments and behavior (Panksepp, 1998; Slovic et al., 2002). They serve as cues to value, the relevance of stimuli, and whether our actions are successful (Panksepp, 1998). In the moral domain specifically, emotions reflect our goals and values and help us respond flexibly and adaptively (Pizarro, 2000). They can be used imaginatively in attending to the morally relevant aspects of a situation, selecting moral goals, integrating values, and being sensitive to other individuals (see “Everyday Moral Imagination,” later in this chapter). They form the substrate for moral motivation and action (Blasi, 1999). Triune ethics theory takes this perspective.

Extending Dewey’s moral imagination

Triune ethics theory (TET; Narvaez, 2008) asserts that humans rely on a variety of neurobiologically derived moral mindsets resulting from evolved global brain states (MacLean, 1990). Individuals habitually can favor one mindset or fluctuate among several. Before delineating the theory in detail, it is instructive to note the tremendous overlap and agreement between the conceptions of moral imagination and moral functioning of Dewey and TET.

First, both theories emphasize that moral imagination requires being sensitive to the morally relevant aspects of a situation, envisioning different alternatives for action, and thinking about the ramifications of a particular action for the people involved (Fesmire, 2003; Narvaez & Vaydich, 2008; Somerville, 2006). These capacities rely on finely tuned perception, which is strongly affected by where one habitually places one’s attention (Murdoch, 1989). If one’s attention is captivated by perceived threat cues, then moral perception will be narrowed to what is self-protective.

Second, both Dewey and TET emphasize the social nature of moral imagination and the need for flexible, open thinking. Our studies examining TET orientations have found strong correlations between moral imagination and both openness to experience and agreeableness. Both theories also posit that flexible thinking and the ability to adapt in ongoing social relationships characterize imaginative behavior. Dewey asserts that individuals with flexibility and the ability to deal with ambiguity in imaginative ways are better able to perceive moral situations and act effectively. Dewey views moral behavior as co-authored with others and as occurring in uncertain or ambiguous situations.

Third, both TET and Dewey emphasize that moral imagination involves self-regulation, or an ability to put beliefs and goals into action. Dewey idealizes the person who is able to regulate behavior based on imagined effects and to inspect beliefs for their value in action. TET goes so far as to posit neurobiological roots of moral imagination in which individuals engage the prefrontal cortex to self-regulate, prevent harmful behaviors through “free won’t,” and engage in reflective abstraction.

Fourth, both TET and Dewey emphasize the importance of harmony in dealing with multiple values, such as autonomy and community. TET asserts the importance of coordinating emotion and reason, the conscious mind with the adaptive unconscious, and goals with mood and energy. Combining the insights of Dewey and TET creates a better understanding of the processes in which moral exemplars engage when facing a moral situation. Individuals can take advantage of the power and intelligence of the moral emotions while using regulation and metacognition to ensure that they guide their behavior toward fulfillment of moral goals and virtues.

Triune ethics

Thus, triune ethics theory extends Dewey’s keen insights while delineating the developmental and neurobiological substrates of moral imagination. It develops a view of various moral mindsets on which people rely, which are formed during reciprocal interactions with caregivers in early life and other sensitive periods in life. The list of types is in Table 1.1.

There are emergent rules about getting along with others that develop in supportive environments and foster right-brain development (Schore, 1994, 2003a, b). Optimal early life offers the experience of reciprocal interaction through intersubjectivity and mutual influence. Intersubjective responsivity—attending to and responding to social signaling in a collaborative manner—is a creative response. Babies are ready for playful, creative protonarrative co-construction with caregivers at birth (Trevarthen, 2005). Baby and caregiver create their own stories through reciprocal, sensitive communication. This type of “companionship care” fosters three types of attachment (Narvaez, 2014). Protective attachment is like imprinting, a desire for physical proximity, and is evident even in abused children. Warmth attachment is emotional connection to the caregiver, which facilitates capacities for compassionate relationships. Companionship attachment offers an intellectual friendship, a cognitive sharing that fosters creative imagination.

Nurturing caregiving in early life fosters optimal brain development, including of the prefrontal cortex critical for moral imagination (Schore, 2003a, b). Imaginative capacities in adults involve tacit knowledge, a trust in process, and an indwelling in the other, whether object or person (Polanyi, 1958). Living through the mind of the “other” involves an extended self. Moral imaginative capacities emerge from social creativity, based on these intensive social experiences in early life (although there are other sensitive periods in life when the brain can be reshaped to some degree). Those who have responsive caregivers, whose needs are met without distress, are more likely to develop secure attachment and the neurobiological underpinnings of a socially adaptive personality and moral intelligence (Eisenberg, 2000; Narvaez & Gleason, 2013). This personality is represented by the capacity for an engagement ethic and relational attunement with compassionate capabilities (Narvaez, 2008, 2012, 2014). When deliberative capacities are added to this base of relational attunement capacities, Communal imagination can flourish. Communal imagination uses capacities for abstraction from the present moment, addressing moral concerns beyond the immediate but grounded in a relational web, based in well-honed social skills. This broad sense of community was displayed by our hunter-gatherer cousins who were concerned with the welfare of all life forms, even into future generations (see Narvaez, 2013a).

Table 1.1 Basic mindsets in triune ethics theory

Basic mindsets	Deliberative elaboration
Socially self-protective
Safety: Bunker morality (aggression)	Vicious imagination
Safety: Wallflower morality (withdrawal,	Detached imagination
appeasement)
Socially open
Engagement ethic (relational attunement)	Communal imagination

One of the defining characteristics of the moral imagination is its ability to abstrac...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures and Tables
• Acknowledgments
• Notes on Contributors
• Introduction: The Crossroads of Creativity and Ethics
• Part I: What Are the Moral Mental Mechanisms Involved in Creativity, and How Do They Develop?
• Part II: When, How, and Why Does Creativity Lead to Positive or Negative Ethical Impacts—or Both?
• Part III: What Role Does Ethics Play in Supporting or Thwarting Creativity?
• Part IV: Horizons
• Index