Group Responsibility

A Narrative Account

C. Striblen

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781137358653
• eBook ISBN: 9781137358660
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy

Drawing on work in social psychology, narrative ethics, and feminist philosophy, the author presents a new account which answers the standard objections while also giving practical guidance to individuals who take their group-related responsibilities seriously.

1

Locating Questions of Group Responsibility: A Troubling Case

In late March of 1996 Bridget Ward, an African American single mother, moved into her rented row house in Bridesburg, Pennsylvania. Bridesburg was known as a quiet, safe, working-class white neighborhood, and Ward was glad to have found section 8 housing there. She thought it would be a step up from the dangerous West Philadelphia neighborhood where she and her daughters had been living. But her very first night in the house she heard people walking up and down the street yelling ‘Burn, motherfucker, burn!’ When she awoke the next morning, she found ketchup and motor oil thrown on her steps and the words ‘Nigger leave now’ written on her house.¹ The local NAACP, the police, and a few community members supported Ward and decried the behavior; nonetheless, two weeks later Ward got an anonymous letter that read ‘we fire-bombed the lady on Thompson Street, and we’ll fire-bomb your house, too. We’ll get your daughters, you better keep them inside.’ In early May 1996, Ward moved out of Bridesburg.²

Hate crimes are defined as ‘violent acts against people, property, or organizations because of the group to which they belong or identify with’ (American Psychological Association 1998). Clearly Ward and her family were the victims of hate crime. It is difficult to determine just who is responsible for hate crimes. Of course the people who vandalized Ward’s house and sent her a threatening letter are responsible. However, when we look at the reasons offenders give for their acts, it seems possible that responsibility extends further. According to the American Psychological Association, when hate crimes occur, ‘offenders frequently justify the use of force to preserve what they see as their disappearing, traditional way of life.’ Additionally, ‘offenders perceive that they have societal permission to engage in violence’ (APA 1998). Thus, it appears offenders think that they are acting on behalf of group interests by preserving their group’s way of life. Furthermore, they think that they are acting according to group norms that condone violence against certain members of other groups.

When offenders refer to group interests or group norms to justify their actions, there is a sense in which the offenders see themselves as and appear to act as representatives of that group. Offenders may plausibly represent their group for two reasons: (1) they sincerely believe that they acted according to group norms and interests; (2) the historical record supports their interpretation of group norms and interests. If it can be shown that offenders do in fact represent their group, is there any reasonable sense in which other members of the ‘represented’ group are morally responsible for the harm done? This is the central question of my book.

In the Bridesburg case, the represented group might be ‘white people’ or ‘whites.’ So, to begin investigating this question, let us suppose someone made the affirmative statement that ‘white people are responsible for the hate crimes against Ward.’ I make repeated reference to this statement as ‘the Bridesburg statement.’ This statement could be interpreted three different ways. First, it could simply be a shorthand way of indicating that some particular white people are responsible. We might mean to say that the direct perpetrators are responsible. We might also mean to say that anyone who explicitly ordered or encouraged the perpetrators to act is also responsible. Such persons might be referred to as indirect perpetrators. Here responsibility would simply include the direct and indirect perpetrators; that is, individuals 1, 2, 3, and so on. Throughout the text I refer to direct and indirect perpetrators together as ‘active perpetrators.’

Alternatively, the Bridesburg statement could indicate that all, or nearly all, ‘white’ people are somehow responsible as a group, beyond or in addition to the active perpetrators. This would suggest that responsibility is not exhausted after singling out obvious perpetrators. A third, even stronger reading of the statement might indicate that the group is responsible while the obvious perpetrators may not be. If perpetrators are acting under significant pressure as ‘tools’ of their group, then perhaps their responsibility is negligible while the group’s is considerable.

Philosophers discuss the feasibility of each interpretation in debating the concept of collective responsibility. To attribute collective responsibility is to say that a group is causally implicated in and morally responsible for some significant harm (or benefit). The concept gained prominence at the close of World War II when questions arose about the responsibility of the German people for the Holocaust. Philosophers revisit the topic in writings on war, terrorism, rape, corporate scandals, and other cases where many actors and actions are involved (French 1972, 1984; Isaacs 2011; May and Strikwerda 1994; Wilkins 1992).

Collective responsibility has two principle forms. It may be nondistributive and apply only to the group considered as a single unit, or it may be distributive and potentially apply to each member of the group. The nondistributive form appears to have two senses or strengths. The strong sense holds the group qua group morally responsible and does not imply that any or all individual group members are morally responsible. This corresponds best to the third reading of the Bridesburg statement above. Strong collective responsibility indicates that the group is responsible, but it does not tell us anything definitive about individual group members, their actions and responsibilities. The weak sense holds that the group is somehow causally involved and that at least some members of the group are morally responsible for harm. This sense corresponds best to the second reading of the Bridesburg statement. Weak collective responsibility indicates that both the group itself and at least some members are causally implicated in the production of harm; however, it does not specify whether moral responsibility is distributed equally or proportionally among group members.

The second form of collective responsibility, the distributive form, suggests that individual members of the group may share responsibility. Indeed, distributive collective responsibility is sometimes called shared responsibility (May 1992, 1). As I explain below, how distributive collective responsibility is related to nondistributive collective responsibility in both its senses is important but unclear. Throughout the text I refer to the nondistributive form as either weak collective responsibility or strong collective responsibility. Both of these forms indicate that the group is implicated in a way that is separate from, or in addition to, the responsibilities of members. I will refer to the distributive form as shared responsibility. Shared responsibility focuses on individuals, not the group as a unit, and implies that members are partially and jointly responsible. When all forms are at issue – that is, when something other than a single individual is thought to be responsible – I use the more general phrase group responsibility.

This book explores the continuing group responsibility debate but focuses specifically on the possibility of group responsibility for racially motivated hate crime. The reasons for this are primarily pragmatic. First, racially motivated hate crime is the most prevalent type of hate crime in the United States today. According to a 2011 report by the FBI, 46.9 per cent of hate crimes were motivated by race, 11.6 per cent by ethnicity/national origin bias, 20.8 per cent by sexual orientation bias, 19.8 by religious bias, and .9 by disability bias.³ A better understanding of who is responsible for hate crimes is a step in the direction of ending them. The Bridesburg case, while not the most recent, is particularly interesting because of the documented local response and because it took place on the outskirts of a very racially diverse city, a region where I currently reside. As I describe later, the local response revealed deep concerns about group responsibility and where it fairly applies.

A second reason to focus on hate crimes is that they typically involve conflict between groups that are not formally organized.⁴ Many philosophers have written about the moral responsibilities of organized groups (nations, corporations, professions) and unorganized groups (random pedestrians, mobs). However, comparatively little has been written about what may be called ‘loosely organized’ groups, of which racial groups are paradigmatic. Accordingly, this project begins to fill in that gap.

The rest of this chapter proceeds in the following manner. In the next section I explore some different uses of the term ‘responsibility’ and offer a general account of how we attribute moral responsibility. It is important to establish at the beginning of this inquiry what exactly we mean by moral responsibility if we are attempting to apply it to groups in relation to hate crimes. The remaining sections trace the contours of the group responsibility debate within philosophy, examining and evaluating some of the most influential arguments from both individualists and collectivists. I conclude that resolving the problem of group responsibility, particularly in relation to identity groups, requires a new approach.

Attributing moral responsibility

Our common understanding of responsibility, like our understanding of groups, is predicated upon the individual moral subject. Participants in the collective responsibility debate agree that individuals have moral powers and are proper bearers of ascriptions of moral responsibility. As a consequence, participants also agree that group responsibility must somehow correspond with, fit, or map onto conceptions of individual responsibility. At no point do I challenge this basic assumption.

In keeping with this correspondence between individuals and groups, I first look at some basic philosophical positions on individual moral responsibility before delving into issues of group responsibility. Much of the literature on moral responsibility has focused on whether individuals have free will, whether causal determinism is true, and consequently, whether the practice of holding one another morally responsible is irrational. For the most part I avoid this discussion and assume that the practice of holding one another morally responsible as individuals is rational and permissible in human relations. As I mentioned previously, other participants in the collective responsibility debate also make this assumption: although such an argument could be made, no one in this debate contends that groups can never be morally responsible because individuals can never be morally responsible. It is also important to note at the outset that moral responsibility is distinct from, although it greatly overlaps with, legal and causal responsibility. It is generally agreed that some illegal acts are not immoral (passive resistance as a form of protest) and that some things for which we can be causally responsible (true accidents) are not things for which we are necessarily morally responsible. Despite the obvious lack of a perfect fit, I bring in both legal and causal considerations at times in order to illuminate different features of moral responsibility in its philosophical sense.

With these things in mind, let us begin to outline some of the necessary conditions for attributing moral responsibility to individuals. Although the literature on this topic is voluminous, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics can provide a traditional and helpful place to start. Here Aristotle argues that individuals are responsible only for what is voluntary. He observes that feelings and actions ‘receive praise or blame if they are voluntary, but pardon, sometimes even pity, if they are involuntary. ... Now it seems that things coming about by force or because of ignorance are involuntary’ (1999, 1109b30–1110a1). For Aristotle, an action is involuntary when force is so overwhelming that the individual ‘contributes nothing’ (1110b19). If a strong wind blows you into me and I fall down, you are not responsible (unless certain other conditions hold; e.g., you promised to keep me from falling down). However, Aristotle explains that even if one is put into a situation where one is compelled to choose the lesser of evils (e.g., throwing cargo overboard to save a sinking ship), one is still contributing something. This makes many actions voluntary, even those done under extreme duress.

As for ignorance, Aristotle notes that one may be vicious and therefore ignorant of what is beneficial. This generalized sort of ignorance does not make one’s actions involuntary. Rather, it is only ignorance in relation to the ‘particulars which the action consists in and is concerned with’ that makes action involuntary (1111a1). For example, if a doctor administers a drug that is incorrectly labeled (unbeknownst to her) and accidentally kills a patient, her action is involuntary in Aristotle’s view. The underlying idea here is that while causal involvement may be a necessary condition for moral responsibility, it is not a sufficient condition. There are cases where an individual is causally involved in harm production (as with the doctor) but where we would not say that the individual is morally responsible for the harm. The force condition on responsibility is meant to ensure that an individual is not merely causally involved in harm production. The ignorance condition addresses the question of whether the actor intended to do harm.

Intention appears to be a central feature of moral responsibility. What is done by force or through ignorance of particulars is not done intentionally by the individual. This leads us to what J.L. Mackie (1977) has called ‘the straight rule of responsibility,’ whereby an individual ‘is responsible for all and only his intentional actions’ (Mackie 1991, 123). Mackie notes that in practice we blame some people for their unintentional actions (e.g., involvement in car accidents) but do not blame others (e.g., small children) for their intentional actions. By and large, however, the straight rule holds. The intuition the straight rule expresses is that the individual actor must have intended or at least ‘obliquely intended’ that harm occur (125). One intends when one acts with a particular end in mind: one pulls the trigger in order to kill X. One ‘obliquely’ intends when one is reckless or negligent or can otherwise foresee that harm may result from one’s actions (126). Actions may also be ‘partly intentional’; for example, when they are performed under the influence of drugs or when one is terrified or in an uncharacteristic rage (127–128). For actions that are obliquely or partly intentional, as opposed to what we may call fully intentional, we are inclined to assign their perpetrators ‘a somewhat lower degree of responsibility’ (127). On Mackie’s view we assign less moral responsibility to an individual when that individual somehow did not fully intend the harm. But we do still assign some moral responsibility.

Another influential view of moral responsibility is offered by Peter Strawson in ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (1962). He sees attributing moral responsibility as a kind of human practice, not as a product of theoretical judgments about free will. He argues that as social creatures we naturally react to the good or ill will exhibited in people’s actions. We demand that others with whom we interact show a minimum level of good will toward us. Our emotional reactions to the behavior of others, which he calls participant reactive attitudes, are such things as resentment, forgiveness, and gratitude. There are three levels of attitudes: personal, vicarious, and self-reactive. When we are injured, we likely feel personal resentment. When others are injured, we may feel indignation, a vicarious reactive attitude. When we recognize that we have somehow injured ourselves or others, we tend to feel ashamed or guilty. These are self-reactive attitudes (Strawson 1993, 57). By feeling shame or guilt, we acknowledge that others may rightly feel reactive attitudes toward us. Overall, the participant reactive attitudes show

how much we actually mind, how much it matters to us, whether the actions of other people – and particularly of some other people – reflect attitudes towards us of good will, affection, or esteem on the one hand or contempt, indifference, or malevolence on the other. (49)⁵

These attitudes ground our practices of attributing moral responsibility and are self-justifying. According to Strawson, the theoretical truth of free will is irrelevant. To be morally responsible is simply to be subject to the participant reactive attitudes.

Although Strawson insists that the practice is self-justifying, he points out that the practice does have internal criteria for determining when the attitudes apply. We must ask whether a particular behavior exhibits insufficient good will and whether the actor is a full participant in the moral community. When the answer to either question is no, we mute or alter our reactive attitudes. We adjust our reactions when there are ‘excuses’ or ‘exemptions.’ If a friend does not return a phone call, I may feel resentment. However, if I later find that her phone was not working that day, I may excuse her behavior and adjust my reaction accordingly; that is, stop feeling resentment. While excuses are often particular to the action in question, exemptions relate to the actor in question. If a two-year-old child knocks over and breaks your favorite vase, you should not feel resentment toward the child because the child is not yet considered a full participant in the moral community and is not the proper target of the reactive attitudes. The same may be said of other persons and things (e.g., animals) cognitively incapable of assuming responsibility. The typical participant reactive attitudes are hindered when we see someone as ‘warped or deranged or compulsive in behavior or peculiarly unfortunate in his formative circumstances’ (52). In such cases, instead of taking the ‘participant reactive stance’ toward another, we take the ‘objective’ stance. Here we see the person as an object to be controlled, manipulated, or otherwise dealt with but not as a person to be reasoned with. Thus, the only conditions Strawson places on the application of moral responsibility have to do with excuses and exemptions. Attributing moral responsibility is simply the practice of employing the participant reactive attitudes. This is a practice that Strawson believes would continue regardless of the truth of determinism. Of course, Str...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction: The Problem of Collective or Group Responsibility
• 1  Locating Questions of Group Responsibility: A Troubling Case
• 2  Developing an Alternative Approach: A Lesson from Social Psychology
• 3  Defining Identity Groups: The Importance of Narrative
• 4  Broadening Participation: Arendt and May on Shared Responsibility
• 5  A Narrative Account of Shared Responsibility
• Conclusion: Extending the Narrative Account
• Notes
• Works Cited
• Index