Policy-Making in EU Security and Defense

An Institutional Perspective

H. Dijkstra

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781137357861
• eBook ISBN: 9781137357878
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

EU foreign policy has long been considered the exclusive domain of member states. This book challenges such state-centered wisdom by analyzing the influence of Brussels-based EU officials in the area of security and defence. Using case studies and unique insights from over a hundred interviews this book shows how everyday policy is made in practice

1

Introduction

In 2005 and 2006 the European Union (EU) sent a monitoring mission to the Province of Aceh in Indonesia. Its mandate was to observe the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement. This peace agreement, which had been negotiated in the wake of the devastating tsunami of 2004, brought a decades-long civil conflict to an end. For 16 months, EU monitors oversaw the disarmament of the rebels and verified the withdrawal of government troops. The former belligerents had specifically asked for the EU’s involvement as a result of its credibility and perceived neutrality. The Aceh Monitoring Mission is still considered as a major success story. While the EU monitors concluded their mission seven years ago, the Province of Aceh has remained relatively peaceful ever since. The EU was a force for good and delivered added value.

The Aceh Monitoring Mission is just one example of the 27 crisis management missions that the EU has carried out in the last 10 years. Through its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), it has sent soldiers, monitors, policemen, judges, prosecutors, penitentiary officers and customs guards to many of the world’s trouble spots. They carry out a whole range of functions from conflict prevention to peace-making and post-conflict stabilization (TEU, Article 43). Some CSDP operations are small-scale in character, but the EU often makes a considerable effort. In addition to Aceh, its contribution in places such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chad, Congo, Kosovo, Georgia, and Somalia is significant. As a result of all this activity, the CSDP has become one of the most dynamic fields of European integration. The CSDP has helped the EU develop into a more serious security actor in international relations.

Looking at the plethora of different missions across three continents, it is sometimes hard to believe that the CSDP is barely a decade old. Envisioned at a bilateral summit of France and the United Kingdom (UK) in St Malo in 1998, it is one of the most recent additions to the process of European integration. Historically, issues of security and defense were not within the realm of the EU. It was indeed only in 2003 – with the launch of the Police Mission in Bosnia – that the EU started autonomously to send uniformed personnel on missions abroad. In spite of the fact that the CSDP is such a recent phenomenon, the EU has hardly had the time to learn the ropes of effective crisis management. Shortly after some of the first operations were concluded, it launched missions of substantial size, significant intensity and with serious mandates.

The various CSDP operations have perhaps received most visibility. Yet as they increased in number, so did the supportive bureaucratic services in Brussels. Behind the scenes, a complete machinery was put in place. The Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD), for instance, carries out initial fact-finding missions and is in charge of strategic planning after a crisis situation presents itself. The Military Staff (EUMS) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) prepare detailed operational documents. The Operations Centre serves as a civil–military headquarters. The Regional Departments provide the CSDP officials with background expertise about the political processes on the ground. Finally, the Intelligence Centre (INTCEN) carries out risk assessments and collects intelligence. These bureaucracies have all been created as a result of the CSDP. They were originally part of the Council Secretariat, but have since been transferred to the European External Action Service (EEAS).

The sight of uniforms near the Schuman roundabout in Brussels came as a shock to many observers. Not only had the EU generally been regarded as a civilian organization, the involvement of EU officials in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy also marked a clear break with past practice. After all, EU foreign policy – of which the CSDP is an integral part – was traditionally known for its “intergovernmental method” of policy-making. Contrary to much of the rest of European integration, this implied that decisions were predominantly made in the national capitals and that the EU bureaucracies were kept at arm’s length. Most of the foreign policy activity in the EU was traditionally for consultation and information only. In other words, EU foreign policy was regarded as the domaine réservé of the member states. It was best seen, as Simon Nuttall (1992: 11) once noted, as a “private club operated by diplomats for diplomats.”

In reality, of course, EU foreign policy had never been completely intergovernmental. Since its foundation in 1970, it had gradually become institutionalized (Smith 2004). Yet time and again, the member states preferred to rely on their own resources. Rather than delegating foreign policy tasks to the EU bureaucracies, which was the practice in other parts of European integration, the six-monthly rotating Presidency was given responsibility for convening meetings, issuing declarations and speaking on behalf of the Union. By keeping such tasks “in-house,” the member states benefited from consultation and cooperation in foreign policy, while avoiding excessive sovereignty loss. When France and the UK held their bilateral summit in St Malo, there were only two dozen EU officials working on foreign policy in Brussels. Half of them were seconded from the member states.

The rapid institutionalization and the creation of a plethora of EU bureaucracies in security policy, which took place in the period 1999–2009, therefore presents an important empirical puzzle. Whereas the member states had previously made the explicit choice not to involve EU officials in their foreign policy deliberations, they now decided otherwise and empowered the Brussels-based bureaucracies in the area of security and defense.¹ This change of heart is particularly surprising given the importance that states typically attach to sovereignty in these areas. Indeed, the CSDP is arguably a “least likely” case for the delegation of functions to EU officials. Moreover, the speed with which the member states have established the CSDP machinery in Brussels remains puzzling. After years of limited delegation in EU foreign policy, the member states created a professional CSDP machinery in less than a decade.

The involvement of Brussels bureaucracies in the CSDP also presents a theoretical puzzle. Scholars have repeatedly claimed that international cooperation between states in security issues and economic affairs takes different paths. Stanley Hoffmann (1966), for example, made a famous distinction between “high” and “low” politics. High politics, he argued, follows the logic of diversity, which makes cooperation problematic and the involvement of EU officials undesirable. As a matter of fact, the whole International Political Economy research agenda followed from the observation that international economic relations were more cooperative than international relations theory suggested. Several scholars have furthermore tried to show, by means of game theory and formal reasoning, that the nature of international security results in different degrees of institutionalization (Jervis 1982; Lipson 1984; Haftendorn, Keohane and Wallander 1999; Wagner 2003). Theoretically, the creation of EU bureaucracies in Brussels for the purpose of the CSDP was not expected.

These empirical and theoretical puzzles therefore demand a closer look at the establishment of the EU bureaucracies in Brussels. They merit an institutional perspective on policy-making in EU security and defense. Now that the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) has come into force, it is a good moment to study the rapid creation of the CSDP machinery following the turn of the twenty-first century. This book first takes a step back and asks why do the EU member states delegate functions in the area of security and defense? As noted before, delegation is by no means automatic. States tend to jealously guard their sovereignty. Delegation is therefore never the default option. This holds particularly true in the areas where sovereignty really matters, such as security and defense. Studying the very rationale of delegation and the considerations of the EU member states will thus provide important insights.

Analyzing delegation in the CSDP constitutes, however, only a first step. Institutional design is, after all, not only a dependent variable, but also affects the way policy is made. Indeed, the very reason why member states have long preferred to keep EU bureaucracies away from security and defense is that they knew that bureaucratic involvement inevitably alters policy outcomes. To put it slightly differently, the consequences of delegation are arguably the real topic of interest here. CSDP officials in the External Action Service (and previously the Council) carry out important functions such as fact finding, preparing risk assessments, and drafting military options. It is on the basis of their work that the member states make crucial decisions concerning force deployments and the conduct of the CSDP operations. Despite the fact that security and defense remains one of the least likely areas for EU officials to exert influence, it is clear that the contribution of the CSDP officials will not be completely impartial.

The role of international bureaucracies and their officials in policy-making is increasingly a topic of interest in within international relations (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Biermann and Siebenhuener 2009; Oestreich 2012). Following the delegation of certain competences, functions or resources, international civil servants are in a position to affect policy-making in international organizations. Indeed, any act of delegation implies, almost by definition, a certain loss of control over policy outcomes. The member states cannot have it all. They cannot benefit from outsourcing functions to Brussels while at the same time keeping full control. As David Lake and Matthew McCubbins (2006: 343) succinctly state “no pain, no gain.”

The influence of international bureaucrats is, however, more than a necessary by-product of delegation. It is a topic that demands academic attention in its own right. Particularly in the realm of international security, where states are regarded as the main actors and the importance of self-help and sovereignty is stressed (e.g. Waltz 1979), the study of the work of several hundred CSDP officials is potentially important. Indeed, the role of member states in the CSDP is well explored (e.g. Miskimmon 2007; Mérand 2008; Matlary 2009; Gross 2009a; Peters 2010; Cross 2011; Weiss 2011), while the EU bureaucracies remain mostly ignored. To get a clearer understanding of what instances of delegation allow the CSDP officials to affect policy, the second question of this book is under which conditions do the EU officials exercise influence (i.e. agency) in the area of security and defense? By answering this question, the book provides an institutionalist perspective of day-to-day policy-making and offers unique views from behind the scenes.

These two research questions constitute subsequent steps in the research design of this book. The book first addresses delegation and then studies agency. Both questions are nonetheless related. The rationale for delegation, as noted, affects the bureaucratic resources – and thus the agency – of EU officials (Pollack 2003; Majone 2001). Moreover, when EU officials exert excessive agency, states may take tasks back in future delegation rounds (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985; Tallberg 2002a). Keeping this interactive nature in mind, both research questions are addressed as analytically distinct loci. This is the normal practice in the study of principal–agent relations in the EU and international organizations (Pollack 2003; Hawkins et al. 2006; Tallberg 2006; Milner and Moravcsik 2009). It has considerable conceptual and empirical advantages.

The literature

EU bureaucracies and other supranational institutions have been the subject of academic debate since the beginning of European integration.² In the Uniting of Europe, Ernst Haas (1958) put them at the heart of further unification, as they could help to cultivate spillover. By delegating authority to the EU bureaucracies, Haas argued, the member states introduced new actors in their game. These actors would have an interest in further integration and the ability to exert entrepreneurship in the negotiations, trigger functional spillover across sectors, and act as focal points for like-minded societal actors. His ideas – known as neofunctionalism – were shared by contemporaries. Leon Lindberg (1963), for example, outlined several scope conditions, under which delegation to supranational bureaucracies could result in further integration. The idea that the EU bureaucracies play an important role was thus present in academia from the start.

The theory of neofunctionalism has largely been discredited in academia–not least by Haas himself (1975). Despite several qualifications, spillover and the process of European integration were described by proponents of neofunctionalism as automatic. The actions of French President Charles de Gaulle quickly proved otherwise (Hoffmann 1966). The empirical record of neofunctionalism is frequently used as a critique. At a theoretical level, however, it also has several weaknesses. First, the theory does not explain why states delegate tasks. Haas (1964) noted functional pressures to move beyond the nation-state, but the voluntary nature of delegation was not addressed. Second, it remained unclear why EU officials exclusively held the key to entrepreneurship and further integration (Moravcsik 1993, 2005). Third, neofunctionalism failed to account for control mechanisms of the member states (Taylor 1990). Neofunctionalism has nevertheless made a significant revival since the Single European Act of 1987 (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989; Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991; Burley and Mattli 1993, but also Niemann 2006).

Intergovernmentalism became, as time passed by, the main rival theory to neofunctionalism. It emphasizes the centrality of the member states in the process of European integration (Hoffmann 1966; Milward 1984, 1992; Moravcsik 1991, 1993, 1998). Intergovernmentalism has significantly contributed to our understanding of European integration, but it has preciously little to say about the role of the EU bureaucracies. According to Andrew Moravcsik (1998), they only played a marginal role in treaty negotiations, as they did not possess better negotiating means than the member states. Member states delegate functions, because the EU bureaucracies can make the agreements between the member states more credible. By delegating “the right to propose, legislate, implement, interpret, and enforce agreements,” Moravcsik notes, “governments restructure future domestic incentives, encouraging future cooperation by raising the cost of nondecision or noncompliance” (ibid.: 73). Credible commitments between the member states are necessary, as the future is inherently uncertain and complex agreements tend to be incomplete (Williamson 1985).

While neofunctionalism was thus expecting too much from the EU bureaucracies, the theory of intergovernmentalism neglected their role. Intergovernmentalism could be conveniently used, for decades, in the area of foreign and security policy to explain non-delegation and non-cooperation. Moravcsik, in particular, has made a powerful argument that due to a lack of domestic pressures for cooperating in the area of high policies (cf. economic lobby groups), the member states never had an incentive to pool and delegate sovereignty. The trouble is, of course, that the sovereign member states eventually decided to create the above-mentioned EU bureaucracies. This significant change cannot be explained convincingly by developments in domestic preference formation. As a result, the explanatory and predictive power of (liberal) intergovernmentalism is limited in the case of EU foreign and security policy.

This black-and-white debate over the role of the EU bureaucracies between the theories of neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism reached a stalemate by the mid-1990s. To “move on,” a number of “middle-range” theories were developed. These do not aim to explain the whole process of European integration, but focus on specific instances. With a view to the role of the EU bureaucracies, rational choice institutionalism – and the use of the principal–agent model – stands out (e.g. Pollack 1997, 2003; Meunier and Nicolaïdes 1999; Majone 2001; Tallberg 2000, 2002a, 2006; Keleman 2002; Elgie 2002; Beach 2005; Franchino 2007; Alter 2009). By analyzing under which conditions the EU bureaucracies matter rather than whether they matter, this approach tries to come to “a series of hypotheses about supranational autonomy… more precise than those generated by either neofunctionalist or intergovernmentalist theory” (Pollack 1997: 101). The great merit of rational choice institutionalism is that it takes the preferences of the member states and their sovereignty concerns as the starting point, but it also accepts that delegation inevitably involves a loss of agency.

Rational choice institutionalism argues that delegation results from intentional cost–benefit analyzes by the member states. Member states have a demand for certain functions, which can be met by the EU bureaucracies. Jonas Tallberg (2002a: 25) notes that member states “face the choice of whether to perform the desired functions ‘in-house’, or to ‘out-source’ them.” In line with the theory of intergovernmentalism, credible commitments are a prominent explanation for delegation. By monitoring and enforcing agreements, the Commission and the Court of Justice can improve domestic compliance (Pollack 2003). EU agents can also provide a (partial) solution to the problem of incomplete contracting: one of the main functions of the Court is to interpret agreements in case of a lack of clarity among the member states. Rational choice institutionalism, however, goes beyond intergovernmentalism in that it also studies many other reasons for delegation (Pollack 2003; Tallberg 2002a; Kassim and Menon 2003). In particular, the efficiency of policy-making is important (Majone 2001; Beach 2005; Tallberg 2006). EU bureaucracies can facilitate the process between the member states.

Rational choice institutionalism stresses that delegation leads, almost by definition, to a loss of agency on the side of the member states (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). The member states take these sovereignty costs into account when making their initial delegation decisions. Uncertainty may result in non-delegation or less delegation than is functionally optimal (Stone 2009; Miller 2005). The member states are also likely to establish control mechanisms to avoid excessive influence by the EU officials. These range from strict mandates to agent selection, institutional checks and balances, re-contracting, appointment procedures, limited budgets, regular reporting requirements, and sending seconded national experts (e.g. Hawkins et al. 2006). Such mechanisms, however, are costly and inhibit the EU bureaucracies from effectively carrying out their work. Apart from formal competences, EU officials have other resources that they can use to exert agency. They may ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables and Figures
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Delegation and Agency in International Relations
• 3 Institutional Development in EU Security and Defense
• 4 Policy-Making in EU Security and Defense
• 5 Military Operation in Bosnia
• 6 Monitoring Mission in Aceh
• 7 Military Operation in Chad
• 8 Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
• 9 Conclusion
• Notes
• References
• Index