The Political Web

Media, Participation and Alternative Democracy

Peter Dahlgren

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781137326362
• eBook ISBN: 9781137326386
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Entreprise Applications
• Index: Social Sciences

As democracy encounters difficulties, many citizens are turning to the domain of alternative politics and, in so doing, making considerable use of the new communication technologies. This volume analyses the various factors that shape such participation, and addresses such key topics as civic subjectivity, web intellectuals, and cosmopolitanism.

Part I

Politics and Participation on the Web

1

Democracy, Participation, and Media Connections

Democracy: Discontent and resurgence

Troubling trends

That democracy is facing an array of very serious dilemmas has become an established and engaging theme within research and public discussions in the past two decades; foundations are earmarking ever greater sums to study the issues, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are trying to tackle them in diverse ways, journalistic pundits analyse the difficulties, while political parties and governments are obviously troubled. Though the concept of ‘democracy’ is routinely invoked, at times almost as an incantation, we must keep in mind that the term itself is contested among theorists, who offer a range of ideal models (Held, 2006). Not least on the Left, there is a diversity of visions of its future (see, for example, Agamben et al., 2011).

Also, and significantly, actual manifestations of democracy in the world today vary considerably; there is no universal template, even if most would argue that there are a number of essential features to be included and criteria that must be fulfilled. Within Europe and the EU we find noteworthy differences and even tensions in regard to political traditions, notions of citizenship, assumptions about openness and access, conceptions of what constitutes civil society, and so on. At the same time, with the traditional nationalist frame for politics being problematised by globalised forces and regional structures, most notably that of the EU (with all its compounded dilemmas of distance between citizens and decision-making), this model is becoming increasingly problematic. This has been particularly evident in Greece, Spain, and Portugal, where governments carrying out EU austerity measures have evoked large-scale confrontations.

The problem was also glaringly illustrated by the elections in Italy in late February 2013, where a politically resurrected Silvio Berlusconi won approximately 30 percent of the seats in the bicameral parliament, and Beppe Grillo, the country’s most famous political comic, who had turned to electoral politics, gained 25 percent. Among the planks on Grillo’s very mixed protest platform was a call for a referendum on whether Italy should abandon the euro and default on its debts; the anti-corruption theme was also strong. Mario Monti, head of the so-called technocratic government that had recently been ruling Italy and attempting to establish an economic order along the lines set by the EU, received only 10 percent. Thus, a majority of Italian voters, of differing political persuasions, sent a strongly dissenting message to the EU (Grillo, whose electoral base is in the younger cohorts, may also signal the start of a generational change in Italian politics).

Growing strain around trust, belonging, individualism, legitimacy, and other issues makes it difficult for government to devise policies to simply promote citizenship as an all-purpose panacea for society’s ills (Hurenkamp et al., 2012) Many citizens feel an estrangement from – and often a growing cynicism towards – governments and the political process; corruption scandals tend to confirm the view many citizens have of the power elites. The current civic discontent in Slovenia can be understood as a microcosm of widespread trends.

Democracy in recent decades has taken root in a number of countries that previously had authoritarian regimes, but it often remains precar-ious; in other parts of the world struggles are raging in an effort to establish something that might be called democracy. The older, Western democracies, for their part, are evolving as the social, economic, cultural, and political factors on which their political system is predicated are undergoing transformation in various ways (I summarise some of the extensive literature on this theme in Dahlgren, 2009). Globally, democracy has had a long and uneven history, as Keane (2009) demonstrates in his epic rendering; it remains an ongoing project faced with shifting circumstances and driven by actors with varying commitments. This form of governance is a complex, multidimensional enterprise for solving conflicts of interest and for making power accountable. It comprises many elements that must function together to make the whole system work, from the various formal institutions to tacit understandings, core values, and modes of practice. Any one aspect or ‘problem’ on which we may choose to focus quickly becomes prismatic and leads our attention to a number of other, related aspects and quandaries. So it is with the theme or ‘problem’ of citizens’ participation and the factors that can promote or hinder it; this port of entry soon directs us to other related dimensions, including, as I shall shortly discuss, the character and use of media.

Political participation – or often, the lack of it – as a specific theme within the broader landscape of democracy, is also framed, not surprisingly, by a number of different theoretic traditions and conceptual schemes. There is full consensus that democracy needs people’s participation, but views on what forms this should take and how much is desirable can vary significantly. As a normative ideal, for example, researchers using elite models of democracy will be less troubled by low participation than those with, say, a classic liberal or radical republican horizon. Likewise, the respective interpretations as to the origins of the problems and their possible solutions will vary – while still having to touch base with sociological realities (keeping in mind, of course, that these seldom have a permanent character). For example, devoting attention to politics requires time and energy, which are scarce resources in the context of the daily lives of many individuals. Moreover, we live in societies where many actors are competing intensely for our attention through the media. And Ben Berger (2011: 11) reminds us that just having an interest does not automatically mean we will take an interest, and more generally, that Western democracies are struggling with, among other things, what he calls attention deficit.

A further introductory point in regard to participation is that democracies today do not automatically guarantee extensive participation of citizens, either in electoral or in extra-parliamentarian contexts. Democratic systems in fact offer varying patterns of what are called structures of opportunity for participation. Within the same society there can be different obstacles for different groups; for instance, the workings of party machines, the lack of representation for some constituents, or the inaccessibility of power holders can all serve to deflect participation for certain categories of citizens. Participation of course also depends on the initiatives that citizens themselves take, but a basic point is that such agency is always contingent on circumstances. Thus, any perceived lack of participation should not be seen as simply a question of civic apathy, but must be understood in the context of the dynamics and dilemmas of late modern democracy more generally. And as we put these contours into focus, we see that there are strong patterns having to do with power, legitimacy, and meaning that impact on participation.

Neoliberal dynamics

A specific major structural problem for participation (and democracy generally) that has emerged in recent decades is the tendency for political power to drift away from the formal, accountable political system and into the private sector, in the logics of neoliberal versions of societal development (see, for example, Harvey, 2006, 2011; Fisher, 2009; Gray, 2009). This not only subverts democracy, but leaves social devastation in its wake (Bauman, 2011). Hay (2007) pinpoints a variety of neoliberal mechanisms in public life that tend to deflect participation from issues that require normative response; I quote him at length:

I have suggested that privatization, the contracting-out of public services, the marketization of public goods, the displacement of policy-making autonomy from the formal political realm to independent authorities, the rationalization and insulation from critique of neoliberalism as an economic paradigm, and the denial of policy choice (for instance in discerning the imperatives of competitiveness in an era of globalization) are all forms of depoliticization. Each serves, effectively, to diminish and denude the realm of formal public political deliberation . . . Moreover, the increasing adoption of a range of political marketing techniques has also resulted in a narrowing of the field of electoral competition.

(Hay, 2007: 159)

When market dynamics come to be seen as the most suitable path towards a better future, democracy and the opportunities for meaningful political participation become eroded. Normative frameworks that concern justice are subverted, as economistic values seep into and put price tags on just about all areas of human life, derailing the foundations for democratic political discussion (Sandel, 2012). The upshot of such currents is often a process of depoliticisation, whereby issues that are normative and political in character become rendered in terms that are technical or administrative in character, undermining the meaningfulness of participation (see Straume, 2011, on this theme). This carries with it feelings of disempowerment and ultimately disengagement. Moreover, neoliberalism has become not just a polity horizon but also a cultural motif, shaping social relationships and visions of the good society (see, for example, Couldry, 2010; Lewis, 2011; Young, 2007).

Even in the wake of the global crisis of 2008–2009, there has been no serious rethinking of this paradigm or any effort to reform the international finance system among the power elites (Crouch, 2011).

At the same time, governments at all levels have decreasing margins of manoeuvrability in the context of increasingly complex globalisation. This in turn means that within nation states and local political units the practical requirements of governance become hampered, which can set further limits to what can be accomplished within democratic systems – and thus lead to more measures to restrain effective participation.

The decline in participation in the formal political arena can be traced to erosions of engagement at the subjective level – which in turn are fed by undercurrents of distrust, powerlessness, and ultimately meaninglessness. In commenting on these developments, Hay (2007: 39) specifies three basic perceptions that undermine public trust and legitimacy:

– Political elites subvert the collective public interest for party- or self-interest, while at the same time claiming to serve the public.

– Political elites are captured by corporate interests.

– Government is inefficient in using public funds.

Hay further argues that we should incorporate an historical perspective about civic disengagement, disaffection, and cynicism, with reference to earlier periods. Civic dissatisfaction is nothing new, nor is even the threat of delegitimation of democratic governments. In fact, one can argue that democracy historically has always been potentially vulnerable. Hay cites the British political philosopher John Dunn, who noted that politics has proved to be ‘consistently disappointing’. What is surprising, according to Dunn, is not that democracy often disappoints its citizens, but rather that, given its track record of failures, thus far it has still managed to nourish reasonably high expectations. Indications are that these are in the process of being further reduced to troublingly low levels by an array of stresses and strains on democratic systems. Yet, if these trends contribute to a generalised sense of disempowerment and political disenchantment in a significant number of citizens, for others they become a signal to mobilise and to engage politically – to participate.

The explanations for political disaffection in formal electoral politics often turn to models of civic apathy, with their finger-pointing condemnation. While apathy is certainly an element (and can be found in most human endeavours to some degree), if we see politics in a broader sense, as extending far beyond the party domain, then such disengagement itself can at times be potentially understood as a political act, a considered and rational response under prevailing circumstances. Further, if we then look at the field of alternative political participation, the argument concerning apathy becomes more problematic, as we see many citizens engaging politically, but outside the electoral system. Often propelled by frustrations that the established parties are insufficiently responsive or even by a sense that the mainstream political system marginalises or excludes, many citizens are finding new routes to engagement and participation. Some forms of engagement are leading to new kinds of political practices, new ways of being citizens, effectively altering the character of politics in some contexts. Democracy needs both a functioning party system and a viable domain of extra-parliamentary politics; at present both are in transition.

Alternative democratic paths

Thus, parallel with the developments of declining involvement with electoral politics and an erosion of certain aspects of democracy, we also note a contrary narrative: a renewed engagement on both the Left and the Right – as well as within political shades that do not fit neatly into these classic categories – an array of groups, mostly operating outside the confines of party politics. They struggle hard to impact on legislation, entering the public sphere to pursue their own interests or their visions of a better world. On the political stage we can observe many established single issue organisations and loose collectivities, temporary issue publics, lobbying outfits, NGOs, social movements, protest activists, citizen networks, and other formations, active at local, regional, national, and global levels. The global crises are generating a good deal of critical analysis from a variety of perspectives, addressing the theme of existing, manifest political responses, as well as exploring, theoretically, the potential for further political confrontation with the neoliberal power arrangements behind the deteriorating situation (see, among such literature, for example, Badiou, 2012a, 2102b; Castells, 2012; Dean, 2012; Harvey, 2012; Mason, 2012; Žižek, 2012).

Engaged – and enraged – citizens in democracies from Slovenia to the UK, from Portugal to Australia, from Greece to the US are finding alternative paths to political involvement – though not always with great effect. One might look with dismay, for example, at how Occupy gained much attention when it was first launched, but failed to revive in a robust way the following year. On other, less crisis-ridden fronts, many citizens are also exploring ‘life-’, ‘identity-’, and ‘cultural’ politics, along with – or instead of – traditional politics. Indeed, the realm of politics is transmuting, as citizens broaden the notion of what constitutes political issues. In explicitly authoritarian contexts, the efforts to move society towards democracy have also met with varying success; in Burma there is a guarded optimism, while the protests in Iran after the 2009 election, Ukraine after the Orange Revolution, and Belarus after the regime aborted the elections of 2010 have not been able to claim significant and lasting gains. In Egypt after the Arab Spring, the situation remains ambivalent – and volatile at the time of writing.

Alternative politics operating outside party structures is hardly a new phenomenon within democracies, though its character evolves over time. A century ago, for example, much extra-parliamentarian politics in Western Europe and North America was embodied by unions and other mass movements striving for social transformations (for example, women’s suffrage or temperance issues). Alternative politics of recent decades is shaped by many of the social and cultural currents of late modernity, not least the evolving character of democratic systems themselves. It is worthwhile to try to bring this into some historical relief, in order to understand the political context of alternative politics a bit more. These political manifestations can in fact be analytically linked to other developments in the evolution of contemporary democracy.

Such an effort can be found in the work of the French scholar Pierre Rosanvallon (2008, 2011). Looking at the US and France, he sketches a longer evolution of changes in the dynamics of democratic systems; indeed, he tends to underscore transformation rather than decline. While I sense he may end up with more optimism than is justified, his historical narrative is illuminating. Basically, he argues that the original design of electoral democracy saw political parties as important features for shaping collective identities and political will. They were promoting specific visions of societal development, with oppositional parties critically scrutinising those in government. Gradually the inadequacies of the model were becoming evident, in terms of insufficient response, catering to special interests, abuse of power, and so forth.

Insights of this kind paved the way for the rise of a whole constellation of state, public, and civic agencies, bodies, and actors that are geared to scrutinising government and to monitoring its actions, partly to prevent abuses of power, but also to pursue their own interests. If oppositional parties serve a certain monitorial function on government, and the courts become the first buffer to protect citizens against legislative and executive excesses and inadequacies, from there the playing field opens up to journalism, ombudsmen, commissioned inquiries, think tanks, lobby groups, NGOs, civil society associations, self-appointed civic watchdogs, and more.

The upshot of these developments leads to three key dynamics within contemporary democracy, which Rosanvallon identifies as

Oversight or surveillance – I would term it monitoring: the capacity for representatives of citizens and citizen groups to monitor and publi-cise the activities of elected and appointed officials. It involves three dimensions, which he calls vigilance, denunciation, and political evaluation. He perceives growth in ‘social attentiveness’ as having fostered demands for transparency; he accentuates the role of the internet in this regard.

Prevention or intervention – the capacity to mobilise civic resistance to specific policies.

Judgement – comprises what he sees as the ‘jurification’ of politics, that is, the increasing use of the courts (especially in the US) as a vehicle for civic redress against officials.

Counter-democracy

These dynamics are the core of what Rosanvallon calls counter-democracy. He sees it as

a form of democracy that reinforces the usual electoral democracy as a kind of buttress, a democracy of indirect powers disseminated throughout society – in other words, a durable democracy of distrust, which complements the episodic democracy of the usual electoral-representative system. Thus, counter-democracy is part of a larger system that also includes legal democratic institutions. It seeks to complement those institutions and extend their influence, to shore them up.

(Rosanvallon, 2008: 8)

Within the established democracies where there is the frustration of feeling marginalised or excluded, and the sense that the established parties are insufficiently responsive, the strategic perception that pressure can be brought upon decision-makers becomes an empowering motif. Alternative politics can now be understood as the mechanisms of monitoring and in particular intervention, within the broader horizon of counter-democracy. The dynamics of counter-democracy involve bypassing electoral mechanisms to incorporate other actors who serve as watchdogs that speak and act on behalf of citizens, what he calls ‘functional representation’, thereby enhancing the responsiveness of democratic systems to citizens.

This can of course result in delays and gridlocks in the political process, as Rosanvallon acknowledges. Moreover, democracy requires what can be termed an optimal level of distrust, and he suggests that distrust can and does at times become excessive and dysfunctional. Yet, I take him to mean that this is part of the intrinsic character of the contemporary party system, which he sees as on its way out. He claims that elections really do not serve as a useful method of sanctions any more, since most citizens are no longer ideologically committed to particular parties and tend to mistrust most politicians. Also, punishing incumbents by voting them out takes place with increasing frequency, which, together with the lack of party loyalty, introduces a problematic dimension of instability. He surmises that the party system is historically on its way to being eclipsed by the emergence of what he calls moni-torial democracy, which derives from the functional representation he describes.

Clearly there are a number of issues here. He is a bit quick to dismiss the party system; history may prove him right in the long run, but from present horizons this seems empirically remote and functionally problematic. There is a risk of elitism in the model of counter-democracy and its functional representation; already we have questions as to whom some of the various bodies actually represent and with what legitimacy. Moreover, citizens’ access to these mechanisms is already quite uneven, which raises the issue of equality. Further, he does not say much about interest politics and the power of special interest groups. Politics for Rosanvallon is by definition a very public activity; thus he does not address the discreet exercise of power behind the scenes.

Yet, despite these and other questionable aspects of Rosanvallon’s perspective – such as a view that treats politics as a rather rational communicative activity – his framework is helpful in contextualising alternative politics, highlighting the dilemmas facing democracy, as well as suggestive in proposing in which directions this political system may be evolving. Thus, alternative politics can be understood as a necessary extension of a long tradition of ‘add-ons’ to compensate for the inadequacies of the electoral model. The value and democratic character of any given alternative political intervention will have to be judged on its own merits, but the general enterprise of alternative politics, comprising new forms of political practice, is afforded a sound legitimacy in Rosanvallon’s framework. Such political activity is seen as essential to trying to maintain democracy as a responsive and vibrant system.

The vision of post-party democracy is audacious and may or may not come to pass, but in contemporary contexts it does not seem to be on the immediate horizon....

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgement
• Introduction
• Part I: Politics and Participation on the Web
• Part II: Evolving Forms and Practices
• Part III: Critical Approaches
• References
• Index