Global Anti-Unionism

Nature, Dynamics, Trajectories and Outcomes

Tony Dundon, G. Gall

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780230303348
• eBook ISBN: 9781137319067
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business Ethics
• Index: Business

One of the major obstacles unions face in building influence in the workplace is the opposition and resistance from those that own those workplaces, namely, the employers. This volume examines the nature of this anti-unionism, and in doing so explains the ways and means by which employers have successfully maintained their right to manage.

1

Anti-Unionism: Contextual and Thematic Issues

Tony Dundon and Gregor Gall

Introduction

In recent years, there have been many studies of non-unionism (McLoughlin and Gourlay 1994, Dundon and Rollinson 2004, Kaufman and Taras 2010). However, very few have explicitly sought to trace the antecedents and emerging trajectories of conscious ‘anti-’ union intent among employers, employer bodies and state agencies. And there is also a wider gap when viewing anti-unionism on transnational and global scales, where few studies examine employer strategies for preferred individualistic and managerial-sponsored configurations of workplace governance. In such employer projects, ‘anti-unionism’ is not the same as ‘non-unionism’. Anti-unionism is defined in this study as a conscious, deliberate decision to undermine and erode hypothetical, potential and actual workplace collective unionisation and union organisation. It concerns issues of identity (individual and collective), power resources and power mobilisations, managerial and societal ideology, and the structure and configuration of material interests. Anti-unionism is distinct but not totally separate from non-unionism, which may emerge as a less deliberate and more organic approach to workplace regulation, including such arrangements as non-union representative forums or other individualised human resource management (HRM)-inspired techniques (Gollan 2007). Anti-unionism may be an extension of a type or brand of non-unionism, but it must be regarded as conceptually distinct owing to the self-perception of material interest formation and power resource utilisation among vested interest groups. It is quite feasible, for instance, under one scenario that a small family-run business is non-union simply because the ‘union issue’ has never raised its head. Yet it may be equally plausible that, under another scenario, a large non-union transnational corporation is anti-union but paints a picture that unions are unnecessary because management seeks to protect worker interests through the means of mutual gains and reciprocity (see, for example, Flood and Toner 1997). The two fundamental imperatives to managerial attitude and behaviour here are ideological and instrumental motivations (based on self-perceived considerations of material interest formation and power resource utilisation). In the former case, anti-unionism as a conscious strategy to remain ‘union free’ does not arise in any but a hypothetical sense, the style of familial management (with a tendency towards benign autocracy) organically predominates and the scale of material interests to be threatened in a hypothetical sense is small. By contrast, in the latter anti-unionism is more likely to occur as the prospect of labour unionism is more than just hypothetical (by dint of a larger workforce and one spread across different countries), the scale of material interests to be threatened is much greater and the nature of management more sophisticated and developed. In this sense, the situational compulsion to be anti-union as a result of ideological and instrumental imperatives is much greater than in the family firm. Consequently, the latter scenario requires greater scrutiny to delineate the presence and precise configurations of either covert or overt anti-union sentiments on the part of the employer. In doing so, it would be possible to identify whether non-unionism mutated into anti-unionism or whether anti-unionism was present from the inception of the company. In this sense, we can then not only specify the spatial and temporal aspects of anti-unionism but also theorise the dynamic relationship between non-unionism and anti-unionism, where there may be tipping points from one into the other and a degree of overlap as per the interlocking circles of a Venn diagram.

Notwithstanding this brief discussion, there is a gap in terms of both empirical and theoretical understanding concerning not only the antecedents of anti-unionism but also its dynamics and inter-relationship with other managerial behaviours and strategies. Moreover, there is a pressing contemporaneous need to understand how such a concept may evolve and change over space and time, given the current era of austerity and global economic crisis, the ascendancy of a unitarist managerial ideology and a globalised neo-liberal political and economic agenda. Following this, and on a global scale, union membership as measured by density of the working population has been in almost continuous decline for the past 25 years throughout most countries. Losses in the global north have not been replaced by gains in the global south, and the operation of companies from the global north in the global south has seen the practice of anti-unionism (in addition to a more homegrown form of anti-unionism in the global south). Observing this situation raises the issue of the cause-and-effect nature of anti-unionism. Most obviously has anti-unionism led to de-unionisation, but has it also been boosted and facilitated by de-unionisation so that it has become more pervasive and persuasive? But has a perceived increase in the intensity of capitalist inter- and intra-firm competition under globalised neo-liberalism led to further compulsion towards anti-unionism in order to reduce labour costs? In trying to make progress in examining such issues, this edited book is not about explaining union decline or union organisation per se. Nor is it about the prevalence of types of non-union firm that may espouse certain individualistic or HRM strategies. Of course, that is not to say such considerations are unimportant. Indeed, multiple and various managerial strategies are central to an understanding of anti-union intent and effect. Rather, this particular chapter sets the scene by reviewing ‘anti-unionism’ not only as a set of practices deployed by employers but also as a distinct ideological mindset that has deep structural and historical roots in the power relationship embedded in the wage-effort exchange in the capitalist employment relationship. Further, the argument is subsequently advanced, and evidenced through several chapters in this volume, that employer practices cannot be divorced from the motives of government and state agencies in affecting the patterns of anti-unionism. Indeed, it is evident there is no single practice or universal policy of anti-unionism that employers subscribe to even if the generic wellspring of the idea is universal (in terms of the aforementioned ideological and instrumental defence of vested material and political interests). So anti-unionism is the result of a purposeful intention that seeks to undermine independent union organisation at the points of production, distribution and exchange in favour of managerial unilateralism over decisions affecting the lives of workers and their families.

In the wider and longer historical planes, the vast majority of employers are unwilling to share power with other parties to determine the terms and conditions under which workers are employed and work. Arguably, when employers do share power it is, more often than not, premised on their preferred terms and in their preferred ways such that it becomes axiomatic to say that they do not share power or that managers tolerate a pragmatic temporary accommodation. Most prefer the ‘default’ position of no unions or other such independent collectives of workers, despite the historical moves like the post-war settlements of social and liberal democracies of the West which saw unions become more accepted partners at the macro- and micro-levels. Anti-unionism may even be inherent and, thus, widely practised in capitalist modes of production and service delivery. However, it is not fixed or static vis-à-vis pre-determined power relationships. In making this argument, this chapter is structured as follows. Next, we delineate between employer and state anti-unionism as ‘ideology’ and anti-unionism practice. Following this, the managerial actions and outcomes of anti-unionism are reviewed in relation to employer strategies to fend off hypothetical, potential and actual unionism. The penultimate section considers worker responses to anti-unionism, pointing out that it is not a conceptual dynamic that can be evaluated fully without realising the potency of collective agency of labour. The final section of the chapter introduces the remaining chapters of the edited book.

Anti-unionism as the practice of ‘ideology’

It can be difficult to separate the boundaries between management ideology – as an attitude or personal belief of managers – that is ‘anti’ of labour unionism and the deployment of actual practices that limit or by-pass union representation. Such separation is an essential task in order not to erroneously conflate intention and outcome (where moderating factors require to be recognised). Not all actions which are de facto deleterious or detrimental to the interests of labour unionism may be the direct result of conscious and deliberate anti-unionism. The reason the boundaries can easily blur is because the intention for a practice is often anchored in an ideological value, which Fox (1966) argued serves the interests of the ruling classes as a counteracting force to the potential threat posed by the collective mobilisation of workers. In employment relations parlance, management ideology tends to be defined in relation to ‘unitarist’ or ‘pluralist’ beliefs (Fox 1966). In this situation, Fox (1966: 372) outlined three related core functions of ideology: ‘a method of self-reassurance, an instrument of persuasion and a legitimization of authority’.

First, the notion of ideology enables a degree of self-confidence and self-belief among managers as the agents of owners. Managers across different levels – from the boardroom to the production line – view their position as one with a high degree of legitimate authority to control and direct resources, including that of subordinates. This may be by dint of a combination of being appointed to the role and educational qualifications and prior experience. Unions represent an agent that can potentially challenge and destabilise that assumption of power self-reassurance (Thomas 2001). Indeed, even within organisations that recognise a union, there is an argument that they only do so either because they have to, owing to collective power of workers, or because of a legal mandate for recognition (Gall 2003). The point is employers who concede union recognition may do so only ‘begrudgingly’ (Haynes 1988: 249). Among other scholars, Pateman (1970) referred to such instances as pseudo-participation in which managers consulted unions only halfheartedly, and Ramsay (1977) articulated in his cycles of control thesis that managers tolerated worker input into decision-making systems when the their position of authority was under threat from the power of organised labour.

The second function conceptualises ideology as a ‘persuasive’ force which can further underpin anti-union values and beliefs, not only at the enterprise but also at a broader societal level too. Ideology can conjure up an image that management actions are essentially ‘good for the firm’ and as such must also be assumed to be ‘good for workers’ and wider society (Goodman et al. 1998). The persuasive element casts unions as a force whose actions are, therefore, contrary to the objectives of the firm and its shareholders and, by implication, society and the national interest. In this way, anti-unionism becomes a self-perpetuating ideological value depicting unions as an ‘enemy within’ that must be kept out, with wider social and political ramifications. To this end, deep-seated unitarist values seek to present a more upbeat image of persuasion, showing the firm as a harmonious enterprise often characterised as the ‘happy family’ (Barley and Kunda 1992). Management ideology in this way becomes a potent force of persuasion that is then visible at a wider social and economic level, evidenced to some extent in the global neo-liberal project that has weakened organised labour by extending unregulated forms of financial capitalism under an illusion of participative democracy (Dundon et al. 2010). Arguably, short-term financial gain is deemed to be a key performance indicator (KPI) of capital. These sorts of ideological turns and twists reinforce a reward system that values, among leaders of commerce and industry, rapid mobility from one boardroom position to another in search of the next big bonus and pension scheme payout. The result is an ideological ethic that seeks to legitimise short-term financialisation (McDonough and Dundon 2010). At times, however, political expediency may lead a nation state or government agency to intervene. For example, the state may support and validate employer anti-unionism because that is the ‘price’ for maintaining economic growth. Alternatively, it may seek to rein in and criticise employer anti-unionism if wider social or political stability is endangered by such managerial actions. Indeed, it may see that both social and political stability are essential conditions for economic growth where limited pro-labour conditions are imposed upon capital (as was the case in the post-war settlement in many countries of Western Europe). But, depending on the time and place, the state may also engage in its own anti-unionism to reconfigure the balance of power between capital and organised labour, as evidenced by the likes of the Howard and Thatcher governments in Australia and Britain, respectively, as well as other country examples in this volume. In many ways, the end result is a ‘self-serving political ideology’ that protects vested interest groups and supports social structures of capitalist accumulation (McDonough and Dundon 2010).

Explicitly connected and part of both the first and second ideological functions considered by Fox (1966) is that of the third, namely, the legitimisation of authority (Geare et al. 2006). Over time the force of legitimacy has often been reinforced through legal mandates designed to protect the ruling classes faced with challenging workforce collectivisation. The anchor of mercantile capitalism rested on the idea of property rights, a factor that remains central to contemporary managerial thought (Dundon et al. 2010). Importantly, ideological legitimisation of managerial authority involves the mobilisation of power resources to a ‘potential’ or ‘perceived’ threat to ownership and profit maximisation (Hurvitz 1977: 510). In summary, the argument posed here is that anti-unionism has a very deep-seated ideological antecedent. Therefore, management practices and actions, coupled with workforce counter-responses to such actions, cannot be divorced from the ideological heritage from which they are drawn and shaped. Thus, we argue here that any ideological legacy has at least three related functional aspects underpinning anti-unionism: managerial self-confidence, social and political persuasion, and legitimisation of power and authority.

Managerial actions and outcomes of anti-unionism

With substantial managerial processual and structural-cum-physical changes occurring in almost all workplaces around the globe, labour process regimes have altered (Thompson and Van den Broek 2010). New technologies, flexible specialisation and neo-liberal de-industrialisation have paved the way for more penetrative forms of managerial practices that endear a de-collectivized labour process. HRM as the application of neo-liberalism to the workplace has witnessed the ideological colonisation of workers’ psychological thought processes and social values. And while employer actions are far from uniform, notwithstanding oversimplification, three classifications can be discerned that help understand anti-unionism in a broader, more conceptual way.

1. Preventative anti-union employer actions may emerge in response to hypothetical or perceived challenges to authority and legitimacy, taking the shape of actions to reinforce the strength of the managerial prerogative by acting against forms of independent collective worker consciousness, organisation and action or seeking to impose upon workers a managerially informed collective worker conscious ness or identity...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Figures and Tables
• Notes on Contributors
• 1 Anti-Unionism: Contextual and Thematic Issues
• Part I Historical Approaches
• Part II Contemporary Studies
• Index