The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy

Recycling Empire

V. Dimier

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781137318275
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

A comprehensive analysis of how European development policy was shaped, this book explores the role of former colonial officials in shaping the policy agenda and explores this example of 'recycled empire.' Dimier argues that this post-colonial agenda only changed as a result of pressure from the OECD and World Bank in the 1980s and 1990s.

1

‘Grandeurs et Servitudes Européennes en Afrique’ (European Greatness and Servitude in Africa)*

The ‘Association’ with Overseas Countries and Territories was born of a convergence of opportunities: decolonization on the one hand and the building of the EEC on the other. In 1956, France was still recovering from the war in Indochina, the Suez crisis, the independence of Tunisia and Morocco, and was more and more involved in the Algerian ‘disorder’. Eager to regain its status as a world power, it was trying to save what remained of its empire in Sub-Saharan Africa, renamed in 1946 the Union Française (French Union). Thanks to the African currency Franc CFA (Franc des colonies françaises d’Afrique) and the system of colonial preferences, this Union Française constituted a large trade and monetary zone, protected from outside competition. Trade barriers that were set around France and its empire in 1928 allowed French enterprises to have free access to the markets of the overseas territories and products from these territories to have privileged access to the French market. France even guaranteed to buy these products at a higher price than the global market value. Consequently, France’s exports to its African overseas territories continued to represent over one third (33%) of all French exports for the period of 1930–1950, exceeding France’s exports to its future European partners (25%) (Ravenhill, 1985, p. 49). These commercial links were even more vital for the colonies: in 1953, 85% of French West Africa’s imports came from France and nearly all of its exports went to France (Lister, 1988, p. 16). To maintain such colonial dependence, social and economic development plans were adopted, along with a new legitimizing discourse that emphasized the necessity to care for the welfare of overseas inhabitants (Cooper, 1996; Dimier, 2004b; Lonsdale and Low, 1976). Concretely, a specific fund, the ‘Fonds d’Investissement Economique et Social (The Economic and Social Investment Fund)’ (FIDES), consisting of multi-annual plans, was set up by the French government in 1946. Breaking with the principle of colonial financial autonomy, these investments were to be mainly financed by France. Nevertheless, at a time when the latter was weakened economically by the war and faced with the African elites’ growing demands for the same social benefits as French citizens, it did not have the means to pay for them (Chafer, 2002b; Cooper, 1996; Turpin, 2010). Nor was it able to absorb the overseas agricultural products. Consequently, sharing this ‘white man’s burden’ with other European countries became a necessity for France in order to maintain some influence in Africa. This meant that some arrangements had to be made for French overseas countries and territories in case France was integrated into a European Economic Community.

European burden in Africa

The idea to create a kind of association between Europe and the French overseas territories and a specific European investment fund for Africa was not new in 1957. It had already been proposed by Jean Monnet during the negotiations of the Schuman plan preceding the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950 and discussed again in 1952 by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Member States of the ECSC as part of their respective plans for the political future of Europe. Such proposals were presented as the realization of the old Franco–German dream of Eurafrica (Deschamps, 1999) and as an opportunity for the nascent common market to assert itself on the world stage (Guillen, 1989, p. 105). Following pressures from the French Minister of Overseas France, Gaston Defferre, similar proposals were made during the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome. The arguments put forward by Defferre were quite convincing: for him it was unthinkable that France ‘should sacrifice its African vocation for a European one’ (AMAE/719, letter from Defferre to Pineau, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 17 May 1956). Economically, France, with its overseas territories, formed a ‘common market’ much more integrated than the one envisaged in Europe and that could not be disrupted without ruining years of efforts for the development of these territories. Politically speaking, France and its overseas territories constituted a French Union fully recognized in the 1946 constitution. As they were an integral part of the Republic, leaving them out of the European Economic Community would simply be anti-constitutional and would surely lead them to what was still called ‘secession’, or in modern terms, independence. This might also have made them susceptible to the influence of the USSR, not a small argument in the context of the Cold War. Last but not least, it was hoped that with such proposals, African representatives within the French National Assembly would be less tempted to vote against the European project, as they did in 1954, during the European Defence Community debates. Indeed, by creating a citizenship common to all inhabitants of the French Union, the French constitution of 1946 allowed certain categories of former colonial subjects to vote and send a limited number of representatives to the French National Assembly in Paris. Because of ‘the pattern of shifting alliances between parties, which provided French governments with small and often fragile majorities in parliament’, these representatives could have a decisive influence (Chafer, 2002b, p. 87).

Armed with these arguments, French representatives in the Venice Intergovernmental Conference (May 1956) proposed the following deal to their partners: within the framework of an association between the EEC and the overseas countries and territories, France would open its African market (i.e. its colonial preferential zone) to other Member States’ goods and enterprises in exchange for them taking part in the financing of a European Development Fund for overseas territories and opening their borders to French colonial products. Of course, the main task for the French representatives was to convince their partners that their offer was ‘extremely constructive and that the accomplishment of a common mission in Africa was probably the greatest task which could be proposed to a Common Europe’ (AMAE/719, letter from Defferre to Pineau, 17 May 1956).

This task proved to be difficult, however (Bossuat and Bitsch, 2005; Dimier, 2001; Guillen, 1989; Lister, 1988; Migani, 2008; Schreurs, 1993; Twitchett, 1978). Except for Belgium, none of the Member States were really convinced of the benefits of such arrangements, either for Africa or for themselves. The Dutch and the Germans opposed any idea of being included in a preferential zone that could be detrimental to their economic and political links with developing countries in Latin America and British Africa. The Italians, whose sole colonial territory was Somaliland, a UN mandate, feared that agricultural products of the overseas territories would compete with their own and that money spent for the development of overseas territories would be lost for the development of their ‘own south’, the Mezzogiorno. Like the Germans, they would not risk, for diplomatic reasons, associating themselves with a dying colonial power fighting nationalists in Algeria or even worse, indirectly subsidizing its actions (AMAE/720, letter from the French Ambassador to Germany to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministère Français des Affaires Etrangères, MAE), 7 January 1957).

Because of this scepticism, the Association with Overseas Countries and Territories became the last and most difficult issue to solve before the Treaty of Rome was signed (AMAE/720, telegram from Bousquet, the French Ambassador to Belgium, 28 January 1957). Franco–Belgian proposals were exchanged and faced with German–Dutch counter-proposals. ‘Rough discussions’ and ‘important bargaining’ continued with questions regarding the Member States’ contribution to the future European Development Fund, its size, the limits of its action, the mechanism for decisions and control and the right of establishment for Member States’ firms in the associated countries and territories (AMAE/720, letter from Bousquet to Pineau, 21 February 1957). In the end, the French government made the Association a pre-condition to France entering the European Economic Community (Guillen, 1989, p. 106; Schreurs, 1993). As a note for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs also emphasized, the German representatives were too concerned with the success of the negotiations to oppose the French on this issue (AMAE/720, letter from the French Ambassador to Germany to Pineau, 7 January 1957). At this time, the USA was pressing West European countries and especially Germany to have a development policy that would support the American fight against communism (Schmidt, 2003). Consequently, the French proposals were eventually accepted with only a few concessions for the German–Dutch plans. However, the proposed Association with Overseas Countries and Territories was less accepted for itself and for the sake of the African peoples than for the sake of the European Economic Community.

The Association as a pacte colonial?

The aim of the Association was ‘to further the interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of these countries and territories in order to lead them to the economic, social and cultural development to which they aspire’ (Art. 131 of the Treaty, part IV). It combined trade arrangements with financial aid and concerned 18 overseas countries and territories, those which had ‘special relationships’ with some of the Member States, that is to say mainly French and Belgian colonies (renamed overseas territories after the Second World War).¹ Within the context of decolonization, one would have expected these territories to be involved in the debate regarding their association with the EEC. As one commentator put it some years earlier: ‘to engage the overseas territories in the European Community without their consent would be a most questionable form of colonialism’ (Moreux, Marchés coloniaux du monde, 1953a, p. 2882). Eventually, it did happen: the Association was decided on unilaterally, without discussion with the emergent political elite of the territories concerned at a time when these territories were granted more political autonomy and power (Lister, 1988, p. 14).

Indeed, thanks to the provisions of the 1946 constitution, African representatives within the French National Assembly were allowed to take part in special commissions and could be appointed ministers in the French government, with specific attributes. They could play a significant role in the consultative institutions set up by the constitution, such as the Assembly or the Council of the French Union. They could also be elected in the assemblies created at the head of each overseas territory and take important decisions, especially after the Defferre law. Finalized by the French Parliament in June 1956, one month after the Venice Intergovernmental Conference, this law granted the overseas territorial assemblies more budgetary power, most notably in the field of social and economic development. It also introduced universal suffrage and established government councils accountable to the territorial assemblies (Chafer, 2002b, p. 167; Migani, 2008, p. 25). In sum, it constituted a significant step towards the short-lived confederation of autonomous states called Communauté Française (French Community) initiated by President Charles de Gaulle in the 1958 constitution (Migani, 2008, pp. 67–113; Turpin, 2010, pp. 37–58).

Notwithstanding this evolution, no African representatives were present at the 1957 debate of the Assembly of the French Union on the common market, a situation largely deplored by some French MPs (Antonini, Official Journal (OJ) of the Assembly of the Union Française, debates, 25 January 1957, pp. 91, 104). Despite several claims and amendments in this direction, overseas territorial assemblies were not consulted on, or even informed of, such an important matter (Cros, OJ of the Assembly of the Union Française, debates, 24 January 1957, p. 69). Some African representatives, such as Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the representative of the Ivory Coast and then Minister in the Mollet government, were sent to Brussels to help Maurice Faure, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who conducted the French delegation to the EEC negotiations. However, their presence was more of a strategy to convince the other Member States of the interests of the French proposals than a means to involve the African territories (Guillen, 1989, p. 109). Consequently, during the 1957 debates on the European Economic Community, many African representatives within the French National Assembly remained quite sceptical about the proposed Association. The fact that the latter did not envisage any representation for overseas territories in the future EEC institutions, or any participation in the running of the future European Development Fund, was a great disappointment for African deputies such as Léopold Senghor, representative of Senegal, who continued to ask for the full political integration of these territories into the EEC (Official Journal (OJ) of the Assemblée Nationale de la République Française, debates, 4 July 1957, p. 3264).

Like the proposals included in the recommendations of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in September 1952, the Association was seen by many Africans and their allies as a new Pacte colonial, which would allow former colonial powers frustrated by years of absence in Africa (namely Germany) to come back and exploit it economically under the flag of the EEC (Moreux, Marchés coloniaux du monde, 1952b, p. 2785). Could Africa accept to be offered as a ‘dowry to the French European partners’? (Coste Floret, Marchés coloniaux du monde, 1952c, p. 2965) Certainly not: ‘those [the African populations] are aware that the time for exploitation is now over ( ... ). They cannot accept anymore to be subjected to the servitudes of the European Community’ (Savi de Tové, deputy of Togo, OJ of the Assembly of the Union Française, debates, 13 January 1953, p. 13). As Senghor, who, from 1952 on, took part in the works of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, concluded: ‘we may agree in this marriage of convenience to be the servants who carried the veil of the bride, but we do not want to be the wedding gift ( ... ). We are not things ( ... ), we are human beings; we are ends not means’ (Senghor, Marchés coloniaux du monde, 1953c, p. 124). In this context, the most fervent opponents of the European Defence Community (such as Sourou Migan Apithy, the deputy of Dahomey and author of a parliamentary report on the project) voted against it. However, they did so not because overseas territories were kept out of it, as suggested by Defferre’s argument, but because they considered the arrangements proposed for these territories to be the perpetuation of the colonial division of labour (Apithy, Marchés coloniaux du monde, 1955c, pp. 177–178; OJ of the Assembly of the Union Française, debates, 26 August 1954, pp. 916–979).

In 1957, the very name of the Association, a term used by Albert Sarraut, Colonial Minister in the 1930s, to describe France’s relations with its empire, was unlikely to calm down the fears of these African elites. The fact that the Association did not allow the territories concerned to withdraw from the agreed arrangements and did not envisage any provision in case the associates would reach independence fuelled these negative opinions (Lister, 1988, p. 12).

France’s successful bargain

Meanwhile, France struck a good bargain, maintaining most of its colonial benefits while transferring most of their costs to its European partners. Regarding the commercial side of the Association, the Treaty of Rome specified that goods produced by the associates would have preferential access to the EEC markets, around which a common external tariff was established in order to discriminate against imports from third countries. Likewise, goods produced by the EEC Member States would have equal access to the associates’ markets, with custom duties on EEC exports abolished progressively. If the ultimate aim of these arrangements was to create a free trade area between Europe and these territories, in the short term they could be considered to be the mere extension to the Six of the French system of colonial preferences.² The implementation of this system, later called ‘reverse preference’, did not occur before 1964 and was gradual, which meant that the Six were not accorded equal treatment until 1969 and that French enterprises kept for some time their traditional trade patterns and privileges in Africa. Because this system challenged the norm of non-discrimination of the GATT, it remained the favourite target of attacks launched by the USA, the UK, the Netherlands and Germany. The latter kept insisting that community markets should also be open to non-associated developing countries and continued to disagree with the idea of securing prices similar to those formerly guaranteed by France to the associated producers.

Regarding financial assistance, the main instrument for public investments was the European Development Fund for overseas territories (EDF), a grant in aid of 581 million units of account (ECU, equivalent in dollars) paid over a period of five years (1958–1962). The EDF was a small fund compared to the bilateral aid of Member States such as France. It was not a substitute for this bilateral aid, but would be complementary (Grilli, 1993, p. 51).³ It was financed through direct contributions by the Member States and remained so despite the establishment of an EEC budget (with its own resources) in the 1970s. The Treaty of Rome specified that France would contribute up to 200 million units of account, on an equal footing with Germany, which meant that half of the EDF resources would be provided by Member States that no longer had any link with Africa. The amount given by each Member State was to be discussed every five years within the framework of a specific negotiation (later linked to the renewal of the conventions). Aside from this fund, financing for development projects could be sought from the European Investment Bank (EIB), whose aim was to grant loans, but whose role remained limited as far as the overseas territories were concerned.

The EDF mechanisms were lifted from the French FIDES⁴ with procedures designed to work in the context of colonial administration: the implementing convention attached to the treaty established that it was the responsibility of the associated countries’ and territories’ authorities (later on to be metamorphosed from colonial into African governments) to put forward economic and social projects for European Economic Community financing, in agreement with local authorities or popular representatives. It was also their task to implement them. The Commission would have control over the Fund, but (following German demands) a distinction between social and economic projects was inserted. The implementing convention stipulates that ‘at the beginning of each financial year the Council shall, acting by qualified majority after consulting the Commission, determine what fund will be devoted to social or economic investments’ and see to it that ‘a rational geographical distribution of the funds be made available’ (Art. 4). The social projects (hospitals, teaching institutions, etc.) would be entirely run by the European Commission. For economic projects (public investments with a productive aspect), the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community (representing the Member States) would have to give its favourable opinion (by a qualified majority vote) for a project to be adopted. For its part, the Commission was to assess the economic development projects proposed by the associated countries and territories (with the power to accept or reject projects), then to make financing proposals to be forwarded to the Council of Ministers for approval. The Commission’s right of initiative was here translated into the role of mediator and negotiator between the associates and the Member States. Its role in implementation became rather that of monitoring projects implemented by the associates and of supervising calls for tender. Indeed, as guardian of the treaties, it also became guardian of an equal share of tenders and contracts among companies from both the Member States and the associates, as specified by the treaty (Art. 132).

Practically speaking, the Fund did not become operational before March 1959 and the adoption by the EEC Council of Ministers of several regulations that were related to its implementation (Twitchett, pp. 1978, 36). These sought to establish a systematic framework within which the feasibility and eligibility of the projects could be judged. They provided outlines for the project proposals and preparatory/preliminary studies to be included in the...