The Transnational Governance of Violence and Crime

Non-State Actors in Security

A. Jakobi, K. Wolf, A. Jakobi, K. Wolf

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781137334411
• eBook ISBN: 9781137334428
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Social Sciences

Building upon a range of case studies that range from civil war to maritime security and cyber crime, the contributors analyse how non-state actors can and should be involved in contributing to state and human security.

Part I

Introduction

1

Non-State Actors and the Governance of Violence and Crime

Anja P. Jakobi and Klaus Dieter Wolf

Preventing violence and crime is a core task of the state – yet, it is also one of the most difficult. Violence in societies and the activities of criminals were the main historical reasons for the establishment of the governmental monopoly of force and have been a challenge from the very beginning of statehood. Public order and security have never been self-sustaining, and their margins remain contested. Today, violence threatens the public order in many forms, ranging from civil war to transnational organized crime and terrorism. Rebel groups undermine peace agreements, criminal groups organize themselves in ways that allow them to evade effective law enforcement, and terrorists threaten the daily life of civilians in many countries.

Politics has delivered a multitude of countermeasures to violence and crime, ranging from military force to negotiations and international cooperation (UN 2000, Cortright and Lopez 2007, Segrave et al. 2009). Their success has been limited. Figures on worldwide drug production and trafficking are published annually by the United Nations (UN) Office on Drugs and Crime (e.g. Chawla and Pietschmann 2005), and the American ‘War on Drugs’ has existed for about four decades – still, fighting drugs has not been widely successful (Friesendorf 2007). Moreover, the ever-rising capability of surveillance systems, intelligence, or advanced weapons of the military could not prevent the rise in maritime piracy in areas where it had been abolished for decades.

Given the limitations that individual governments and international organizations face, this book examines the role of non-state actors in governing violence and crime. We conceive ‘violence and crime’ as overarching terminology referring to different forms of violence and transnational organized crimes like civil war, terrorism, armed rebellions, human trafficking, and others. Bringing these forms of violence together with issues of crime also emphasizes that, in principle, alternatives exist for how states deal with actors that violate established rules: Criminalization is one option, but acknowledging the political aims behind certain criminal activities might be another. The utility of applying a broad spectrum of instruments, and the positive effects, trade-offs, or negative consequences each may have, is at the core of this book. In fact, non-state actors’ roles in governance have been analyzed in a wide variety of contexts, but only marginally in the area of security.

The contributors to this volume examine how, when, and to what effect non-state actors are included in the governance of violence and crime: Assessing when non-state actors are included refers to conditions that make security a shared public–private task. Examining how nonstate actors are included refers to the forms security governance can take. A shared responsibility of public and private actors in security is a debatable issue and is closely related to questions of the legitimate state monopoly of force. The intended effects of non-state contributions may vary greatly, depending on the participants’ goals. States may be interested in increasing the effectiveness of security governance by including other actors whose resources and readiness to comply are essential. Nonstate actors may share this interest, but their ultimate goal may also be to contest the legitimate monopoly of force claimed by the government and to establish a political order that weakens this monopoly.

Before judging the political implications of non-state involvement in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy, however, it is important to get an idea of the huge variance that current security governance shows with regard to non-state actors. The case studies in this book focus on traditional areas of security, like war and civil war, and on emergent security issues, like cybercrime and maritime security. Only some of these cases actually show what we might expect as the standard tools of facing crime and violence: state-based governance and repressive measures. From such a perspective, violent or criminal actors are only regarded as a cause of problems and are the target of public regulatory, military, or policing measures. Yet, the empirical reality is that some non-state actors may have capacities that states lack when it comes to securing order in a given territory, representing minorities, or providing resources needed by states for effective governance. From a governance perspective, this implies that some actors become governance partners for states – security actors in areas where the state is unwilling or unable to implement governance effectively. Taken together, the different chapters broaden our notion of the growing importance of non-state actors and their interplay with state actors for security governance today.

Violence and crime in International Relations

Studies on violence and crime can be found in various research fields. Violence is closely linked to war and traditional security concerns, while crime has only recently appeared on International Relations (IR) agendas (e.g. Andreas and Nadelmann 2006). Subjects include analyses of armed groups, the rise of warlords, or effects of international cooperation (e.g. Marten 2006–2007, Schlichte 2009). The growing significance of these themes is the outcome of multiple and changed debates about security.

Academic interest in violence and crime has particularly increased due to the idea of human security. Human security refers to a comprehensive concept of security, moving humanitarian needs center-stage instead of the traditional, mostly state-based ideas of security (Walker 1997, Clark 2003, The Commission on Human Security 2003, MacFarlane and Foong-Khong 2006, Kaldor 2007). While state-based security is a collective good, it may well be at odds with human security when governments threaten citizens. Among the many ideas that follow from human security, the Responsibility to Protect (The Independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001) has become a core principle in recent years. As a consequence, violence and crime have become important topics in discussions on extended notions of security.

The concept of ‘securitization’ has also led to increased attention to violence and crime (Buzan et al. 1998, Paris 2001). From this perspective, the classical security risk of war has been generalized to include other emerging risks like international crime (Andreas and Price 2001). Substantial resources have been dedicated to fighting crime and placing it on international agendas. Wordings like the ‘War against Drugs’ or the ‘War against Terror’ also signify this shift. All in all, the focus on human security and the growing importance of civil wars in research have led to a convergence of the formerly different research areas of violence and crime. The linkage of these two phenomena is important in several ways.

First, crime and violence are closely intertwined. Criminal groups often apply violence, while violence carried out during or beyond civil war is usually seen as being criminal. Differences, however, may exist when it comes to the underlying motivation, since crime is usually carried out with an economic motivation, while non-state violence, for instance by rebel groups, may be foremost about political aims. The linkage of violence and crime may also range wide beyond its immediately observable form. Somali piracy can easily be localized and only takes place in a few areas, but it is nonetheless complex: Ships are selected and captured, weapons are delivered, and ransom money is laundered. In much the same way, terrorist attacks may be carried out locally, but they have international sponsors.

Second, war economies provide an environment in which several forms of violence and crime are established and support each other as with the diamond trade and arms trafficking (Collier 2003, Jojarth 2009). In such cases, the supply of illicit goods or the conduct of violence is a basic condition for the functioning of many other social activities. War can fuel local criminal activities by creating a shortage of supply and black markets. Conversely, organized crime can also contribute to security and peace-keeping goals because of its organizational capacity (Andreas 2009). The licit and illicit economy might be widely congruent in war times (Andreas 2008). For example, organized crime groups provided security for the besieged city of Sarajevo, and crime, security, and business increasingly merged over the course of the war. Although these activities may primarily represent a ‘local problem’, international linkages are abundant. Civil wars are fueled by external actors that provide weapons or trade resources from conflict areas. Peacekeepers have not only brought peace but also increased the demand for brothels, forced prostitution, and a market for illicit business (Allred 2009, Andreas 2009).

Distinctions like ‘offender’ and ‘victim’ are also difficult to uphold in a social environment entrenched by contestation, violence, and crime. Child soldiers may be cruel and pirates or drug farmers may be criminals, but conceiving them foremost as offenders will not necessarily help prevent violence and crime. Governing violence and crime is thus highly complex; given that many states where violent and criminal actors have become an important problem have only ‘limited statehood’ and serious regulatory problems, monitoring and implementation of laws is even more complicated (see Schneckener 2009). The eroding monopoly of force easily results in a proportionate increase of security risks for citizens.

States have taken multiple efforts to counter violence and crime, ranging from military intervention to bilateral cooperation in law enforcement. In particular, recent decades have witnessed a proliferation of international standards that go far beyond the traditional interstate regulations of violence and the prevention of war (Jakobi 2013). Some of these standards rely on the involvement of non-state actors or have been initiated by them. For example, countries have agreed on regulations against money laundering and terrorism financing. These are implemented by banks, and banks have put forward their own standards for monitoring transactions in the context of money laundering and terrorism financing (Pieth and Aiolfi 2004, Bergström et al. 2011, Flohr 2011). In security governance, private actors have become involved with policing, surveillance, and even military tasks (Daase and Friesendorf 2010, Krahmann 2010). Governments have also attempted to ban the illicit trade of firearms that fuel violent conflict. This ban has been supported by civil society movements and relies on increased engagement of weapon manufacturers and sellers against such illicit trade (McClean 2007, Wisotzki 2009).

Many examples of non-state actors engaging against violence and crime exist: Geneva Call is a private initiative that promotes the acknowledgment of international humanitarian law and disarmament treaties by non-state armed groups as with the ban on land mines (Geneva Call 2009, Herr 2010). Transparency International has frequently called attention to the issue of corruption, and it has fostered worldwide awareness about corruption by establishing local offices and publishing international rankings (Wang and Rosenau 2001). There are also historical precedents for such engagement against violence and crime. For example, non-state actors worked to end slavery and they promoted principles later codified in the Geneva Conventions (Finnemore 1996, Andreas and Nadelmann 2006). Yet, non-state actors do not necessarily act out of altruism in such contexts. Business actors have actively demanded law enforcement and security measures against the threat of Somali piracy. The UN protocol and program against the illicit trafficking of firearms met large resistance from the gun lobby and weapons manufacturers (Wisotzki 2009). Governing security thus needs to consider not only a particularly difficult policy field but also the different – and often diverging – interests involved. This complexity surrounding current governance efforts against violence and crime provides the starting point for our comprehensive analysis, outlined in this Introduction and carried out in subsequent case studies.

The governance perspective on political regulation within and beyond the state has drawn attention to a new interplay between very different stakeholders, from governments to civil society and business (Väyrynen 1999, Reinicke and Deng 2000, Held and McGrew 2002, Wolf 2008). However, it is still unclear to what extent the governance of violence and crime includes these groups and whether this is effective. Applying this lens to the governance of violence and crime may even be dismissed altogether, given the questionable credentials of the private actors involved. After all, the roles of non-state actors are particularly ambivalent in this field. Including rather than criminalizing them might effectively reduce violence and crime, yet it may also have important side effects like the empowerment of violent or criminal actors. So far, however, the implications remain unclear, and the specific advantages of a governance perspective on the study of crime and violence have yet to be systematically explored.

Non-state actors in the governance of violence and crime

‘Governance’ has become one of the key concepts in political science and other disciplines. The term refers to single or collective activities with the purpose of establishing collectively binding decisions or producing public goods. Modes of governance may take various forms, ranging from hierarchical command-and-control type regulation to soft persuasion or voluntary self-commitments. They may involve states as well as non-state actors, or both in various types of interplay (e.g. The Commission on Global Governance 1995, Young 1999, Keohane 2000, Held and McGrew 2002, Kooiman 2003, Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006, Wolf 2008). Global governance then refers to ‘the entirety of regulations put forward with reference to solving specific denationalized problems or providing transnational common goods [...]’ (Zürn 2013: 408). International governance and transnational governance represent subsets of global governance, allowing observers to distinguish between regulatory efforts of an intergovernmental nature and those that also include nonstate actors. In this context, non-state actors cooperate in public–private partnerships or public policy networks, they fulfill tasks delegated by state actors, or they undertake self-regulation (Grabosky 1995, Börzel and Risse 2005, Flohr et al. 2010).

The search for new modes of governance originated in the growing inability or unwillingness of states to provide public goods in an increasingly complex and interdependent environment, while having only limited power and other resources (Beisheim et al. 2011, Risse 2011). This results in new roles for state and non-state actors and has triggered an ongoing debate about the implications of public–private co-regulation and shared political authority for the effectiveness and also the legitimacy of gov...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables and Figures
• Preface and Acknowledgments
• Notes on Contributors
• List of Abbreviations
• Part I: Introduction
• Part II: Traditional Fields of Security
• Part III: Emerging Fields of Security Governance
• Part IV: Conclusions
• Index