Iranian Foreign Policy during Ahmadinejad

Ideology and Actions

Maaike Warnaar

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781137337900
• eBook ISBN: 9781137337917
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Written for scholars and practitioners puzzled by Iran's foreign policy choices, this book argues that Iran's foreign policy behavior is best understood in the context of the regime's foreign policy ideology, which is rooted in a conception of Iran as a nation changed by the 1979 Revolution and an example to other nations in a changing world.

Chapter 1

Studying Iranian Foreign Policy: A Constructivist Approach

Most scholarly literature on Iranian foreign policy describes the Iranian regimes as a rational actor, constrained but not motivated by ideology.¹ This view can be contrasted with works that describe the Iranian regime as primarily guided by ideological considerations, particularly a political interpretation of Shi’a Islam.² The discussion on Iranian “realism” versus “idealism” long characterized the academic debates on Iranian foreign policy, both inside and outside of Iran. Only recently, a third view of Iranian foreign policy behavior emerged: one based within a constructivist approach to the study of foreign policy.³ Although still underrepresented in the academic debate, the contours of this approach are taking shape, and the insights yielded have proven invaluable in the understanding of the “how possible” of Iranian foreign policy. This chapter traces back the steps of the constructivist approach that forms the backbone of this book.

Academically, the study of Iranian foreign policy behavior takes place within a wider framework of studies on Middle East foreign policy and international relations (IR). This chapter starts with a discussion of the contending views⁴ on the foreign policies and international relations of Middle East regimes.⁵ This literature points at the limitations of realism in explaining the IR of the Middle East and suggests several modifications. This study takes as a starting point the epistemological issues raised by these scholars about, first, the need for inclusion of systemic, as well as domestic factors, in the analysis of foreign policy and, second, the relevance of the ideational for foreign policy. However, it argues that in both these respects, studies of IR of the Middle East have ignored the epistemological contradictions inherent to their modified forms of realism. These inconsistencies can be solved when moving the study of the IR of the Middle East into a constructivist paradigm.⁶ Constructivist studies of foreign policy and IR are epistemologically diverse, but share the ontological assumption that the world that matters most for foreign policy making, is socially constructed. Constructivism in IR takes as a starting point that ideologies (including threat perceptions, identity, and norms) are social constructs that are reproduced through human action. Foreign policy behavior is made possible in the context of this ideology, reproducing it while it is produced by it. In other words, instead of treating ideology as one factor in the process of foreign policy making constructivists study foreign policy in the context of ideology. This chapter shows that studies of Iranian foreign policy point to the need for an approach that recognizes not just the relevance of ideas for foreign policy, but also acknowledges the social construction of the world relevant to foreign policy behavior, to allow for a better understanding of how Iranian foreign policy is made possible.

Foreign Policy in the Middle East

Despite the acknowledgement that the Middle East as a region “provides an important reservoir for theorizing and for contributing to broader debates in international relations,”⁷ most studies of foreign relations of the Middle East take on rather traditional theoretical models. Seemingly without exception, they take on modified forms of realism, in which for many scholars the work of neo-realist Stephen Walt⁸ is the starting point. The reason for this is perhaps that the Middle East “appears to be the region where the anarchy and insecurity seen by the realist school of international politics as the main feature of states systems remains most in evidence and where the realist paradigm retains its greatest relevance.”⁹ At the same time, most scholars of Middle East foreign policy and IR acknowledge the limitations of neo-realism. Criticisms include “a neglect of ideology and belief systems, a minimization of factors internal to states and societies, inadequate attention to economics, and, of special importance for the misrepresentation of the Middle East, a view of inter-state relations as marked by timeless, recurrent, patterns.”¹⁰ This is why studies of foreign policy in the Middle East adopted modified forms of realism as a framework for analysis.¹¹ In these middle-ground approaches, constructivist insights complement (neo)realist theory. The resulting approaches are “holistic and inclusionary,” building on what is considered relevant in different theories.¹² The main adjustments to realism these authors offer are, first, a focus on regional and domestic determinants in addition to international, systemic determinants. Secondly, the importance of ideational factors in the shaping of foreign policy is recognized and incorporated into the framework of analysis.

The notion that the domestic “matters” for foreign policy behavior is central to the concept of omni-balancing, originally developed by Steven R. David¹³ but taken up by Raymond Hinnebusch¹⁴ to explain foreign policy behavior in the Middle East. Again, Walt’s theory—to be precise, his notion of a “balance of threat”—is the starting point. According to David, decision-makers “omni-balance” between internal and external threats:

when the primary threat is internal, a regime may align with an external power to get resources to contain it. But it could also seek to appease domestic opinion and enhance legitimacy by indulging in anti-imperialist rhetoric or irredentist campaigns. Where the primary threat is external, a regime may mobilize new domestic actors into politics to expand its power base and seek alliances with similarly threatened states.¹⁵

The concept of omni-balancing offers a significant improvement when compared to the one-dimensional neorealist view, which neglects the domestic realm. As such, the notion of the interconnectedness between the international and the domestic is maintained as one of the core premises underlying the approach of this study. Omni-balancing, however, merely points at the mechanism of interaction of the international and the domestic in the shaping of foreign policy that takes place at the level of the regime—omni-balancing’s unit of analysis; it offers no analytical tools to study this interaction. Although the model of omni-balancing is still developing,¹⁶ so far it has not brought us any closer to a theory on how the domestic and international are interrelated. When applied in case studies, the analysis of omni-balancing is convoluted, prone to bias, and suitable only for posthoc analyses.¹⁷ This is particularly so, as the domestic and international factors implied in omni-balancing are not only continuously changing and reconfiguring but also interrelated. Researching omni-balancing behavior becomes even more difficult if one accepts, as the current research does, that threats and opportunities are not just “out there” but are also equally a matter of social construction.

Second, studies of foreign policy behavior in the Middle East acknowledge the importance of ideational factors such as norms, identities, and ideology in the shaping of foreign policy. Hinnebusch and Ehteshami¹⁸ point to the importance of super- and suprastate identities, which are also central in the volume edited by Telhami and Barnett,¹⁹ and they also point to the importance of foreign policy role,²⁰ which is again the main concept in Dessouki and Korany,²¹ whereas Halliday²² prefers the term “ideology.” These studies view ideational factors as the “missing link” where rationalist explanations fail to adequately explain foreign policy behavior. Telhami and Barnett, for example, who have devoted an entire volume to identity and foreign policy in the Middle East, inquire into the relevance of identity by asking the question: “Does the introduction of identity inform us about the foreign policies of Middle Eastern states in ways that we otherwise would not understand them?”²³ While this is a perfectly valid question from a rationalist point of view, adding the ideational variable to already existing variables of threats, opportunities, geopolitics, and the like implies a clear distinction between what is ideational and what is real. Threats, however, do not appear out of nothing: they usually result from perceived animosity, perhaps related to a perceived claim to a certain territory, progressively intensified by the action and reaction that accompanies mutual suspicion. Therefore, in studying foreign policy behavior in response to threats, the ideological context within which the threat is identified and responded to needs to be taken into account. This ideological context could be very different from the epistemological perspective of the researcher, further obscuring analysis. In other words, merely adding “the ideational” as one factor among many ignores the social construction of what rationalist consider “objectively material.”

The main objection to constructivist approaches by conventional scholars on the Middle East is that by focusing on the ideational, constructivists have lost the material out of sight.²⁴ “If realism ignores values and ideas, constructivism and its outriders run the risk of ignoring interests and material factors, let alone old-fashioned deception and self-delusion.”²⁵ These are again valid objections from a rationalist point of view, where the ideational is separated from the material. Constructivist approaches, however, do not make a distinction between the material and the ideational: after all, what rationalists treat as objective and material becomes relevant for foreign policy within a social context. Constructivism does not ignore material interests, but sees these not as objectively given but as socially constructed. As is discussed in the case studies that follow below, treating threat and material interest as objective, natural and pregiven, takes for granted their social construction. “They generally take as unproblematic the possibility that a particular decision or course of action could happen. They presuppose a particular subjectivity (i.e., a mode of being), a background of social/discursive practices and meanings which make possible the practices as well as the social actors themselves,” in the words of Roxanne Doty.²⁶ This means that constructivists, in their efforts to yield insights into foreign policy behavior, ask a fundamentally different question. In the absence of an objectively defined threat or material interest, the why-question becomes irrelevant and is replaced with the questions of “how possible?”

In other words, while the above-mentioned volumes accept some of the premises of constructivism, such as its focus on the ideational, they fail to address the ontological inconsistency that rises from merely adopting these concepts: How can one reconcile the recognition of the relevance subjective understanding of the world with the objective definition of material interest? Moreover, how can one retain a positivist research agenda based on causal relations when one adopts a social ontology?²⁷ Last, the analytical separation between the domestic and international leaves little room for the notion that these two realms are mutually constituted. A constructivist approach, which conceptually separates the national and international but recognizes their mutual constitution, provides a more suitable approach, consistent with the ontological premises of social constructivism.

By mapping out the domestic ideological context in which foreign policy gets shape, constructivist approaches have theoretical leverage over the questions of threat perception, the identification of friends and foes, the choice of one foreign policy option over other options, as well as the timing of certain foreign policy behavior. These are all elements that rationalist studies have difficulty explaining. They take for granted the ideological context in which foreign policy is made, and which makes possible, to use Doty²⁸ again, certain foreign policy options, and precludes others. To be sure, the relevance of this analysis depends on the research question that is asked. If one wants to inquire, for example, into why Saudi Arabia has good relations with the United States, it would suffice to give a detailed analysis of Saudi Arabia’s security interests.²⁹ This does not explain, however, why Saudi Arabia sees the United States as a potential ally in their security endeavors and not a foe (as Syria and Iran do), despite what at first sight seems an ideological clash. Nor does it explain why Saudi Arabia chose to balance with this great power against regional threats, instead of coming to regional cooperation with middle powers such as Syria, Egypt, and Iran....

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• Chapter 1 Studying Iranian Foreign Policy: A Constructivist Approach
• Chapter 2 Ideology and Legitimacy during Ahmadinejad’s Presidency
• Chapter 3 International Legitimacy: Constraints and Opportunities
• Chapter 4 A Foreign Policy Ideology of Change
• Chapter 5 Iranian Foreign Policy Behavior 2005–2013
• Chapter 6 “Nuclear Power Is Our Right!”: The 2010 Tehran Declaration
• Chapter 7 Foreign Threat and Political Repression
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index