British Military Withdrawal and the Rise of Regional Cooperation in South-East Asia, 1964-73

S. Thompson

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9780230301788
• eBook ISBN: 9781137314482
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Asian History
• Index: History

This book examines the links between Britain's withdrawal from its east of Suez role and the establishment of South-East Asian regional security arrangements. The link between these two events is not direct, but a relationship existed, which is important to a wider understanding of the development of regional security arrangements.

1

Post-War Policy and Regional Cooperation, 1945–64

The general aim of the Foreign Office’s policy towards South-East Asia during the 1940s was to establish a regional organisation that would provide economic and political cooperation, leading eventually to regional security and stability.¹ After the war, the British Government formed a new South-East Asian Department of the British Foreign Office and a new position of ‘Special Commissioner in South-East Asia’. This post was given the responsibility for coordinating the economic recovery of the region.² An initial step towards some form of regional cooperation can be traced to August 1942 when the British Foreign Office and Colonial Office agreed that there should be a union of Malay states, Straits Settlements and Borneo Territories. Although, British officials wanted to avoid ‘forcing the pace’, believing ‘that it would be counter-productive to impose a scheme . . . and preferred that the impetus should come from community leaders’.³

In January 1946, British policy in Asia focused on the security of its overseas territories, good relations between both the Commonwealth and the region as well as between Asian nations generally, the extension of British economic interests and the protection of British assets and financial stability throughout the region. However, a planning paper drafted by the Far East Planning Unit of the Colonial Office acknowledged the limitations of British resources after six years of war in Europe and four in the Pacific, concluding that London could not resume all of its pre-war power and influence and responsibilities throughout all of Asia. Therefore, Britain, it maintained, had to utilise its resources in the most efficient way. On that basis, it was necessary to distinguish between north Asia, including China, Japan and Korea, where the United States would play a principal role in the immediate future, and south Asia, areas south of the Tropic of Cancer. The planning paper did not use the expression South-East Asia; however, this region included a number of British territories and therefore was of main concern to British policy-makers.⁴

The international trade of British dependencies in Asia helped to support sterling – an important element in Britain’s post-war reconstruction. Strategically, South-East Asia was important for the security of Australia, New Zealand, India and Burma, as well as the defence of the British dependencies of Hong Kong, Papua, New Guinea and Fiji. Therefore, security for these areas would be assured through the successful defence of British interest in South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific. However, there were at least two potential difficulties facing the British in South-East Asia after the Second World War. One was the anti-colonial sentiment brewing in the region and the other was the need for Britain itself to maintain close relations with neighbours France and Holland for the sake of both European and South-East Asian security. The British Government worried that one part of South-East Asia could be disadvantaged economically and politically by instability in other parts of Asia. Consequently, the welfare of British territories in the Far East at large depended on the stability of South-East Asia. London, therefore, sought to ‘play a leading part in the settlement of difficulties between the native peoples and our Allies’. It also thought that one means of arranging cooperation in this sphere might be the establishment of a Regional Commission.⁵

American policy and the Cold War

As the Cold War gathered momentum, South-East Asia was becoming a battleground for great-power rivalry and the region was increasingly important for American strategic interests. After the war, the United States was overseeing the reconstruction of the Japanese economy as a key element of its strategy aimed at stemming the spread of communism in the region. Japan’s economic progress would depend greatly on expanded exports of industrial goods and imports of regional resources. Washington had started looking at South-East Asia, and especially resource-rich Indonesia as a good market for Japanese trade. In 1947, the United States provided aid to the Netherlands East Indies to fast track economic reconstruction and the resumption of regional trade.⁶ Therefore, the threat of communist takeovers in Malaya and Indonesia could greatly threaten Japan’s political and economic reconstruction, and that the national security of the United States depended on ‘minimizing the vulnerability of strategically important industrial operations in foreign countries’.⁷ Behind America’s interest in South-East Asia lay the growing international quest for the significant natural resources in the region and the fact that Malaya and Indonesia, in 1950, produced more than half of the world’s natural rubber and tin, and that Indonesia’s exports in 1949 reached the value of US$500 million. However, the Truman administration had to tread carefully if it was to influence the region, with many commentators acknowledging that America could not ‘buy anti-communism’. Rather Washington decided it would merely assist the South-East Asian nations.⁸

Assistance would be in the form of economic programmes and technical support that would strengthen the non-communist governments in South-East Asia. By October 1949 the United States National Security Council (NSC) hoped to see a ‘trade triangle’ between America, Japan and South-East Asia as a replacement for colonial empires. For the NSC, conflict in Asia was between colonialist and nationalist independence movements, which in turn threatened to encourage the spread of communism in the region.⁹ In addition, Washington would encourage South-East Asian nations to restore and build their own economies and expand both commerce and the flow of raw materials with their neighbours; in particular, Indonesia was seen as key in achieving these aims. Washington would thus seek to strengthen the non-communist elements in the government in Jakarta and promote Indonesian economic development, which in turn would encourage regional security in South-East Asia.¹⁰

In the early 1950s, Washington was not worried that there would be a communist takeover in Indonesia; however, there were concerns about increasing influence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in the government.¹¹ Throughout the 1950s, support for communism was on the rise in Indonesia. For the Americans, that nation was viewed as one of the few countries in the world where United States and Soviet officials were in direct competition for influence.¹² In Indonesia’s first national election in 1955, the PKI, which was increasingly shaped by Maoist policies, received almost 16 per cent of the vote. Furthermore, the PKI had been allowed to campaign openly. After these elections, the communists were the fourth largest party in a parliament where no party had a majority of seats.¹³ In 1957, Indonesian President Sukarno suspended parliamentary government in favour of presidential rule under the term ‘Guided Democracy’. As this new system took shape, the PKI and the army started to strengthen their positions while attempting to infiltrate each other’s organisations.¹⁴

From the mid-1950s, Jakarta moved away from Western support, reflecting not only the growing influence of the PKI in the Sukarno Government but also the Indonesian leader’s pursuit of an independent foreign policy. Sukarno emphasised that Indonesian people should see themselves as part of a global struggle against imperialism. In that context, he sought leadership in a group of non-aligned states, wanting to pursue Indonesian independence and not bind the country to external commitments. However, despite Indonesian attempts to pursue an active foreign policy, during the 1950s and 1960s, internal subversion was viewed as the primary threat to national security.¹⁵

Concern about internal unrest was one reason for Sukarno to suspend parliamentary democracy, although this did not prevent rebellions inside Indonesia. In February 1958, rebels in an insurrection in northern Sumatra received outside help in the form of weapons and equipment. Australia, Britain and the United States were involved covertly because of both the anti-communist views expressed by the rebels, and concerns over the direction in which Sukarno was taking his government. The regional uprisings were crushed quickly by the Indonesian military, but Indonesian hostility to the West remained. Sukarno then turned more to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union for military support and economic aid. The Soviet leader, Nikita Krushchev, visited Indonesia in 1960. His visit resulted in an arms deal signed in Moscow.¹⁶ Indonesian nationalism and independence had become an important factor in Cold War strategy in South-East Asia.

Washington became deeply concerned that Jakarta might slip into the communist camp and, when President John F. Kennedy took power in 1961, his new administration was eager to stop the spread of communism in Indonesia and looked to expand economic and military assistance to Jakarta. Washington, therefore, laid the groundwork for a clash between the PKI and the army, hoping that the latter would eliminate the communists, thus paving the way for a military-led regime that would then work towards economic development.¹⁷

In addition to its provision of assistance to the Indonesian army, Washington viewed regional cooperation among South-East Asian nations as a way to ward off the threat of communist influence in a region perceived as susceptible to internal insurgencies and external domination from the communist powers. As the world changed throughout the post-war period, with newly independent nations appearing on the world stage, Washington wanted to see the formation of a group of anti-communist countries in South-East Asia that would develop economically while expanding commercial ties with the West. This in turn might help prevent the spread of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) influence in the region.

Regional cooperation in South-East Asia

Towards the end of the war, governments sought to secure international peace and cooperation through the United Nations (UN). Washington was interested in collaboration among groups in the UN where there was common interest, including regional cooperation.¹⁸ London had an idea of developing a policy for regional cooperation of colonial areas, which it hoped would be acceptable to Washington.¹⁹ Indeed, some countries in the region also supported the idea of closer cooperation, especially those that supported decolonisation, but not pro-communist independence movements.²⁰ When the Philippine Government started to explore the possibilities of a Pacific and South-East Asian ‘understanding’, a number of countries indicated that United States policy would largely influence their position. Following this, Manila pursued a commitment from Washington for the support of and participation in a meeting of South-East Asian nations to discuss cooperation. The response from the State Department was that, for any South-East Asian association to be successful, it would need to have been ‘generated spontaneously within the area’ and the United States would ‘reserve judgment as to the specific manner and form pending developments’.²¹

For the purposes of economic cooperation and development, the aim of American policies was to support and encourage closer regional integration in Asia. Of particular importance to Washington were five regional and two sub-regional organisations. These were the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Mekong Committee, the Association of South-East Asia (ASA), the Asia Pacific Council (ASPAC), the Colombo Plan and the Asian Productivity Organisation.

By the late 1950s, Washington considered ECAFE one of the most important of these five groupings as it was a major vehicle in Asia in promoting regional economic and social cooperation and development. Its membership included both Asian countries and non-regional members such as France, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States. American officials believed that Asian members regarded this organisation as of great importance because its focus was economic development rather than political problems, thus giving the Asian members a purpose by developing an ‘Asian bloc’ for economic advancement, rather than a group devoted to opposing a ‘Western bloc’. Washington believed that renewed American commitment in the 1960s to the promotion of economic cooperation and development in Asia ‘greatly enhanced the positive communication between the United States and the regional members’.²²

The idea of promoting Asian regionalism to prevent anti-Western forces developing was reflected in United States support for the development of the Mekong River Basin. Post-war interest in developing the area came out of French–Thai negotiations in 1946 to settle a territorial dispute. In 1950, former Office of Strategic Service Director, William Donovan, recommended that the United States Administration support the development of the Mekong Basin as a long-range project to secure regional cooperation between Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. This concept was presented to ECAFE, and in 1957, the Committee for the Co-ordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin was established. In 1958, Washington provided US$2 million to help finance the collection of basic data in the area. The State Department viewed the Mekong Committee as having enormous potential for the political and economic future of South-East Asia and great significance for future relations between the United States and the countries in the Mekong River area:

The establishment of such an authority in charge of an integrated program may be one of the essential long-run factors in determining whether South-East Asia remains free or comes under the control of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.²³

The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia, under which donor countries provided economic and technical aid to participating countries in the region, was a means for encouraging development as well as containing communist expansion in Asia. Launched in 1950, its focus was the British Commonwealth. It was an initiative of Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, who in April 1949, on the advice of his officials, urged more active British interest in Asia. One of Bevin’s motivations was to prevent India from taking initiatives in the region, which would cause Britain to lose the ability to influence situations there. However, the idea was also strongly connected to the aim of containing communism through some type of regional collaboration.²⁴

When Dean Rusk worked in the State Department during the Truman administration,²⁵ he believed that it would be in America’s interest if Washington supported regional groupings of Asian countries rather than dealing individually with them. On becoming Secretary of State in 1961, Rusk tried to promote regional cooperation in Asia by urging closer Japanese relations with other Asian countries, initially through the ASA, the economic and cultural organisation that included Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand, and by supporting economic development projects such as the Mekong River Development Programme.²⁶ American support for formal regional cooperation among Asian nations began as the United States was establishing military forces in Vietnam. For Washington, regional groupings would first find a solution to the Vietnam conflict, and second provide a framework for post-Vietnam policy. Regional cooperation was to strengthen the South-East Asian region and counter the threat of internal insurgency, so that America could eventually withdraw its forces from the Asian mainland to its bases in Japan and the Philippines. These new regional or...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1. Post-War Policy and Regional Cooperation, 1945–64
• 2. Long-Term Policy and Short-Term Problems, October 1964–October 1965
• 3. Confrontation Ends, July 1965–August 1966
• 4. Changing Defence Strategies for South-East Asia, October 1965–October 1966
• 5. Dissent in London, June 1966–July 1967
• 6. Regional Cooperation in South-East Asia, April 1965–August 1967
• 7. New Policy for South-East Asia, April 1967–May 1968
• 8. ‘Non-Military Means of Influence’ in South-East Asia, March 1968–October 1970
• 9. The New Strategic Environment, November 1971–September 1973
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index