Charting Transformation through Security

Contemporary EU-Africa Relations

T. Haastrup

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781349349128, 9780230363908
• eBook ISBN: 9781137315496
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: African Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book analyses security cooperation in the domain of inter-regionalism, addressing the emergence of the African Union as a regional actor and its impact on EU-Africa relations. It explores the transformative potential of security cooperation for equality, partnership and local ownership in EU-Africa relations.

1

Introduction: Continuity and Change in EU–Africa Relations

The past two decades have witnessed the re-emergence of international multilateral and regional organisations as key actors on the international political scene. One of the most prominent of these institutions is the European Union (EU). One defining feature of the EU’s international outlook has been its relationship with developing countries, particularly those in Africa. Between 1957 and 1989, the bulk of the EU’s development assistance and trade favoured the African-dominated African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries. In addition, EU member states such as France, the United Kingdom and Germany maintained bilateral relations with their former colonies. Africa has therefore provided the context for many of the EU’s external relations in the past 50 years. This period maintained and entrenched the unequal relationship between European countries and the former colonies through economic aid engagement, cultivating a donor–recipient dynamic. This paradigm ensured power asymmetries that favoured European and North American countries that represented the global North, at the expense of African countries of the South.

Recent events in the global political arena, however, have reinforced the need to re-examine EU–Africa relations beyond the donor– recipient paradigm and in the context of international security relations. As French troops continue to battle against extremists in Mali, with British support, the question of Europe’s relationship with its former colonies has again come to the fore in international security discourse. Furthermore, the political upheaval that has led to the so-called Arab Spring has had an effect on peace and security in North Africa. Lives were lost as intransigent state apparatuses repressed their citizens. In Libya, the response was the ousting of Col. Muammar Ghadafi through direct support for anti-government ‘rebels’, including weapons distribution by France, and an eventual military intervention undertaken by the United States, France and the United Kingdom under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These activities were undertaken ostensibly for humanitarian reasons, to protect civilian lives.

However, these good intentions have repercussions for the organisation of security cooperation among global actors, and North–South relations in particular. These repercussions, I would argue, also apply to EU–Africa relations. It is clear that framing interaction between North and South predominantly within a development paradigm does not adequately capture the complexity of the relationship. Additionally, continental Africa’s political concerns are invariably linked to international security and thus deserve thorough evaluation. Furthermore, as we see in the role of the African Union (AU) as a mediator between Libya’s Ghadafi and anti-government ‘rebels’, regional institutions are increasingly playing a prominent, if not always an effective, role in international security. This is also evident in the EU’s embargo on Libya on behalf of its member states, while the EU and the AU met in Addis Ababa with representatives from the Arab League and the United Nations (UN).

Throughout the intervention in Libya, and indeed all the Northern engagements undertaken during the so-called Arab Spring, the AU consistently complained about being sidelined, despite previous commitments by external partners to seek local solutions to insecurity in the region. This situation, the AU believes, effectively undermines efforts to create lasting peace, while entrenching the status quo in North–South relations. This example illustrates one of the pervading tensions of 21st-century North–South relations, which, while considering security as an important element in that relationship, reinforces the asymmetries we find in development interactions.

At the minimum, then, outside engagement in Africa tells us that the context for evolving EU–Africa relations ought to lie at the intersection of development (which defines the old relationship) and new security concerns as mutual frames of understanding. Additionally, the relationship is complex and highlights a tension between the desires to discard the donor–recipient paradigm in favour of a more egalitarian one. Finally, this transformation from the existing status quo to a new relationship ought to consider how new local actors such as the AU can respond to the challenges. Given the global repercussions of localised political challenges, cooperation, especially region-to-region cooperation, must be pursued as the recipe for lasting peace.

These developments in the international system provide an overarching backdrop to understanding EU–Africa security cooperation, which is the focus of this book. A nuanced investigation of recent EU–Africa relations therefore suggests that we cannot adequately understand the historical, present and future relationship between Europe and Africa as a simple one of donor and recipient. The relationships that have evolved are complex, complicated by dynamics in the international system, but especially by dynamics within Europe and Africa respectively, and consequently between Europe and Africa. Within the policy arena, the evolution of EU–Africa relations has taken place within the discourses of reform through change.

Since the end of the Cold War, Europeans and Africans have both voiced their desire to address the inequality that characterises the majority of EU–Africa relations. This impetus for change was driven, in part, by the international community’s efforts to further enmesh Africa in the global economic and political system, which espoused further cooperation and interdependence through multilateralism. Given that the unequal relations were exacerbated by the separation of economic cooperation and political cooperation, one of the intended outcomes of reform was the integration of the political and the economic.

The separation of economic and political external relations had been born out of the reticence of EU member states to integrate politically. This, however, led to an unrealistic division between the actions of the European Community (including EU–ACP relations) and the bilateral actions of the EU’s individual member states in African countries. However, further political integration within the EU and the new quest for a more coherent and cohesive regional integration contributed to the efforts at reform.

Beginning in the mid-1990s and escalating since 2000, both the EU and its African states and regional organisations commenced the process of integrating political and economic concerns. The impetus to merge these concerns is born out of mutual EU and African interests. In addition, the European and African countries and organisations aimed to shift from the donor–recipient paradigm to one that emphasised equality, ownership and partnership.

The Cairo Declaration and Action Plan of 2000 provided the first clear platform for a new, explicit political dialogue between Europe and Africa, based on a framework of inter-regionalism. The premise of inter-regionalism in this context is a relationship based on region-to-region interaction rather than a mismatch of bilateral relations. A relationship based on inter-regionalism assumes that each region strives to promote its own interests, thereby pursuing regional actorness. The Cairo Declaration highlighted security as a prerequisite for socio-economic development. In this way, the declaration directly links areas that were previously divergent in EU–Africa relations. By explicitly addressing the political concerns linked to endemic economic concerns, such as the links between poverty, weak state institutions and protracted conflicts (insecurity) in places such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali and Somalia, to name a few, all the agreements pertaining to EU external relations with Africa issued between 2000 and 2007 introduced something new, a change, into EU–Africa relations: the inclusion and inter-regionalisation of security. In 2007, security became a definitive area of cooperation between the EU and Africa in the peace and security nexus of the Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES).

Although the volume of literature on EU–Africa relations has mushroomed to address the empirical evidence of the EU’s security engagement in Africa over the past five years, this literature does not often deal with the implications of this new dimension for existing cooperation. Rather, the focus tends to be on the shortcomings of current cooperation. This recent literature often ignores the increased engagement of African actors in determining the type and processes of EU external relations in Africa. Yet, as European and African actors begin to consider the 3rd Action Plan under the JAES, understanding the dimensions of how the EU–Africa relationship is constituted is imperative for further improvements towards transformation.

This book, then, explores the impact of new security considerations on the nature of EU–Africa relations. It argues that the organisation of security cooperation through region-to-region (inter-regional) cooperation provides the opportunity to transform EU–Africa relations by considering the history of their evolution. However, although EU–Africa relations have evolved, and continue to do so, the state of play is that the relationship has not been transformed . . . yet. The goal of the book is to show why change has happened in the five years since the JAES and to explore the conditions under which transformation can be enabled and inhibited. To do this, we must understand the broader context of EU–Africa relations. The book will also be seeking to answer questions such as ‘What conditions make security cooperation a reliable avenue to explore this transformation?’ This introductory chapter will explore what security means in the 21st century while navigating the space which EU–Africa security cooperation occupies and how it influences transformation in existing relationships.

1.1 EU–Africa relations: The security dimension

One of the aims of this book is to highlight what security means in the context of EU–Africa relations. In order to situate this new dimension of EU–Africa relations within the broader context of international security, it is just as important to understand what security means in this relationship.

Security cooperation in EU–Africa relations is linked to prior EU development commitments. New security cooperation is an expression of the linkage between security and development, or the security– development nexus. The security–development nexus is a succinct term for the links made in foreign policy practice that is holistic and seeks to address the interconnectedness of conflict management, security sector reforms, disarmament and rebuilding societal infrastructure in post-conflict settings (OECD, 2001; Hurwitz and Peake, 2004). It is a unique way of viewing security, although it necessarily involves traditional security dimensions such as militarised intervention or civilian police action. According to Kerr (2007), ‘empirical observations and several data-collections studies reveal the significance of that nexus’ (p. 92).

The security–development nexus is consistent with the EU’s continued engagement in international peace and security. This is evident from the views expressed in the 2008 Council’s Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (ESS), which states that

As the ESS and the 2005 Consensus on Development have acknowledged, there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace.

(2008b, p.12)

The security–development nexus is useful for analysing the complexities of intra-state conflicts and other antecedent insecurities. Accordingly, the increased engagement of the international community in African affairs through direct support for peace support operations, disarmament and security sector reform and the strengthening of African capabilities are seen as part of this nexus between security and development (see Mark Malloch Brown address, 2003; Raymond Johansen speech, 2007).

Some commentators dispute the link between security and development in policy practice, especially in the context of the War on Terror (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 133). The argument is that international partners such as the EU are securitising development issues based on the perception that Africa is a source of the risks and threats associated with terrorism (Bachmann and Hönke, 2008, p. 6; Sörensen and Söderbaum, 2012). The perception is that security resources for development assistance are being diverted for use in ‘security’ initiatives, or that traditional development issues are being linked to hard security concerns (see Duffield, 2005; Bachmann and Hönke, 2008; Brown, 2008; Bagayoko and Gibert, 2009). This securitisation¹ of development interprets the linkage of security and development as having a negative effect on donor–recipient relationships, including on civil society (see IPA, 2006; Howell and Lind, 2009). Specifically, policy links between development and security are often framed through the lenses of post-colonial discourses; consequently, increased external intervention in Africa is identified as an example of the disadvantages of linking security and development.

Despite these concerns about the securitisation of development, policy practitioners in both Europe and Africa believe that there is an overlap between development and security, and that this overlap should be harnessed to ensure peace and security for Africa’s citizens. While the marginalisation of civil society actors within African security institutions remains a substantive shortcoming, there is little evidence that security concerns have overridden tangible development needs. Moreover, the emphasis placed by institutional actors in Africa on ‘the natural link’ between security and development has served to underline the priority of development concerns to international donors. While challenges of policy implementation exist in merging these seemingly divergent fields, for the necessary changes to have any impact on security and development in Africa this merger may prove useful.

The security–development nexus is a further result of a normative approach to security known as human security. At least three other approaches in the discipline of International Relations (IR) – particularly International Security (IS), including liberalist traditions, critical security studies approaches and constructivism – have influenced the development of human security as an approach within security studies. Indeed scholars such as Dannreuther (2007) place the human security approach within a liberal/‘conventional’ constructivism/historical sociology continuum, which indicates its robust lineage. This approach was first defined in the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report. This approach pursues a people-centric notion of security. Importantly, it appeals to both EU and AU policy-makers.

Regional declaratory statements by both the EU and the AU, such as those of the ESS, the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) and the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council (of the AU), have all expressed the new concept of human security. African institutions and governments purport to embrace the concept of human security. In Africa, where the majority of threats to security come from within a country’s own borders, human security helps to analyse the normative dimensions of security by raising ethical issues (Kerr, 2007, p. 93). Human security stretches the concept of security from the horizontal, beyond military objectives alone, to the vertical, to incorporate the participation of individual, local, regional and international structures and actors (Hutchful, 2008). Situating the new EU–Africa relations within a human security paradigm is important: it illustrates the potential for change by highlighting the paradigm shift from traditional approaches to security, which also effectively separates politics from economics and security from development.

Nevertheless, while Africans and Europeans espouse human security in its broadest sense, the bulk of African security challenges are linked to active, dormant and potentially violent conflict situations, which sometimes require traditional security responses. These insecurities are deeply rooted in the social, political and economic situation on the continent. Thus human security practice in Africa means that the military (with the holistic cooperation of civilian and police actors) remains a key element in the peace and security of communities and institutions. According to the Ghanaian scholar Eboe Hutchful, the human security concept divested of a military aspect is one that is pushed by international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), who miss the point about the continued usefulness of some aspects of ‘hard security’ (Hutchful, 2008, p. 79), which could potentially hinder Africa’s quest for peace. Here, then, security relies on Hutchful’s functional approach.

The evolving approaches to security have resulted in different approaches to the issue over the past two decades. Table 1.1 below outlines the differences between the traditional models of implementing security and the ‘new’, or non-traditional, model.

From the foregoing, the evolution of security and its new inclusion in EU–Africa relations suggest that security potentially contributes to changes in the overall EU–Africa relationship.

Table 1.1 Key differences between ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ models of security engagement

	‘Traditional’ model of security engagements	‘New’ model of security engagements
Responses to threats	Military	Military and non-military.
Source of threats	External	External (border disputes) and internal.
Actors (belligerents and non-belligerents)	States	States and non-states (sub-nationalist groups, civil society organisations, international organisations and regional orga...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Illustrations
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• 1. Introduction: Continuity and Change in EU–Africa Relations
• 2. Evaluating a Contemporary Institution: EU–Africa Relations
• 3. Regionalising Security: The APSA and External Partners
• 4. EU Support for the ASF: AMANI AFRICA Cycles
• 5. Scapegoats and Heroes: Establishing a Small Arms Regime?
• 6. Change in Motion: Evolution between Layering and Conversion
• Conclusion: Transformation Deferred?
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index