Chinese Environmental Governance

Dynamics, Challenges, and Prospects in a Changing Society

Bingqiang Ren, H. Shou

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781349468539, 9781137350688
• eBook ISBN: 9781137343680
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Politique asiatique

In this edited volume, leading environmental policy experts from China, USA, and Europe provide a contemporary view of Chinese environmental policy, analyzing current discussions among various actors and agencies. The book covers a wide range of topics including the gap between national policy goals and their local implementation, cultural and social factors shaping political behavior, legal and political systems affecting environmental policy creation and execution, new societal forces participating in environmental policymaking and governance, and local state strategies tasked with navigating a mix of political, legal, and societal forces. Featuring in-depth, empirically-grounded analyses with interdisciplinary approaches, the book is ideal reading for scholars interested in the complex nature of balancing Chinese environmental sustainability and economic growth.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: DYNAMICS, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES IN MAKING A GREEN CHINA

Bingqiang Ren and Huisheng Shou

During the rush hour commute, a haze envelops the whole city, with no trace of the sun; tall buildings nearby are obscured by the smog, and vehicles stuck in the traffic jam snail ahead. In the dusky haze, one can easily develop feelings of depression and even despair. This has been a typical picture of haze in Beijing, the capital of China. Yet it was not until the winter of 2011 that the city began to suffer from constant smoggy and hazy weather, with the air so contaminated that the pollution levels were way off the charts (more details in the chapter by Lin and Guan in this volume). Just as the haze hangs over the city of Beijing and elsewhere in China, environmental pollution looms in the public mind across the nation.

Environmental pollution not only impairs human health but also can shake the legitimacy of a government. Since instituting economic reforms and opening to the outside world, China has greatly improved its people’s living standards, with rapid and sustained economic growth and upgrading of the scale and level of the economy. While economic growth has become an important source of government legitimacy in China, it has also led to serious environmental pollution. Air, water, and land are all severely polluted, posing a threat to public health. The public complains about the government’s economic development mode that disregards environmental protection, questions the government’s capacity to make and implement sound policies, and sometimes resorts to violent protests. Public attitudes and behaviors have exerted great pressure on the government. We predict that Chinese government will confront intense conflicts between economic development and environmental protection for a quite some time.

Yet, it is clear that China’s current environmental governance system is, as the title of this book suggests, in a critical juncture and it is dangerous to jump to any firm conclusion about what is happening now and what may happen next. The governance system is a complex, fluid, and often self-contradictory one that defies simple labeling. As readers may find out from reading the chapters in this volume, the arguments and conclusions of our contributors are not always consistent from chapter to chapter. We do not see that as the weakness of this volume. On the contrary, we recognize that as the strength of it: we would like to draw our readers’ attention to these contradictions and urge them to understand the complexity of the matter and explore possibilities for better solutions.

To help understand the complexity, this introduction provides readers with a comprehensive yet very brief sketch of China’s current environmental governance system. We hope that the information provided here can facilitate readers’ understanding of the issues in general, as well as the specific topics addressed in each chapter in this volume. Our discussion is divided into four parts, and the last section summarizes each chapter. The first part introduces the institutional, legal, and administrative framework of the governance system, as well as the regulatory regime that realizes the goals set in these frameworks. The second part discusses the problems inherent in the current system, including power distribution, decentralization, the capacity of the environmental protection agencies, and collusion between local governments and firms. The third part discusses the challenges beyond the legal and administrative mechanisms, including the contradicting goals with respect to economic growth and environmental protection inherent in China’s development strategy in the past decades, as well as domestic environmental protests and the pressures introduced by globalization and the international community.

Though some of these discussions may seem depressing, we do want to make a not-so-gloomy prediction about the prospect for China’s environmental future in the last part. We contend, as the book title suggests, that opportunities are available for China to improve its environment, now and in the future. As discussed in some of the chapters in this volume, various signs suggest that the country is now facing arguably the worst environmental crisis in its history; this crisis presents an opportunity to change course and create a truly sustainable development. For the government, public, and business alike, the opportunities are here and now; the legal and institutional tools from the government, the desire from the citizens, and the pressures from the world are all mature and ready.

1. ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM: STRUCTURES AND POLICIES

China embarked on setting up the environmental governance system in the late 1970s, when the nation was transitioning from a planned to market economy, from closure to opening to the outside world, and from centralization to decentralization of power. And this transition has profoundly affected the institutions, policies, and instruments of environmental governance in China.

1.1. Institutions for Environmental Governance

After joining the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972, China began to establish its environmental governance system. In 1973, the Environment Protection Leading Group of the State Council was established as a national coordinating body of environmental policies. In 1984, the National Environmental Protection Bureau was established, becoming the environmental policy-making and executive body responsible for environmental protection and pollution prevention. A nation-wide environmental regulation system was developed, including environmental agencies at all levels as well as national environmental policies, regulations, and laws. In 1988 the bureau was granted more power after being under the direct leadership of the State Council. In 1998, the bureau was further promoted to the ministry level and became the State Environmental Protection Agency (Mol and Carter 2006:152). In 2008, it was further promoted to be the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), showing that the Chinese government became more aware of the importance of environmental protection as it came under tremendous pressure due to environmental issues. MEP gained the power to participate in higher-level decision making, which enabled it to better coordinate different departments and sectors.

In addition to MEP at the center, environmental protection agencies were established at the provincial, municipal, and county levels. Local environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) implement national and local environmental policies, monitor environmental data, and impose punishments and fines for conducts violating environmental standards. Local EPBs are subject to dual leadership. They are responsible not only for the higher-level agencies (vertical level of authority) but also for the local governments at the same level (horizontal level of authority), that provide personnel and funds. Such an institutional design makes China’s environmental governance operate in a grid structure, often called tiao-kuai (literally “branch and lump”) system, which is characterized by decentralization, fragmentation, and plurality. Several chapters in this volume (Brettell; Eaton and Kostka; and Green and Shou) discuss the impact of this structure, and we will discuss it as well in detail later in this introduction.

As the environmental protection agencies are more institutionalized and their roles strengthened, their size grows too. In 1995, the staff employed by the environmental protection agencies totaled 88,000. This figure increased to 160,000 by 2004 and to 193, 000 at the end of 2010 (Mol and Carter 2006). As the personnel grow in number, their capacity for policy implementation grows too, though far from a satisfactory level (Mol and Carter 2006; Stalley 2010).

1.2. Legal and Policy Framework

China has developed a legal and policy system consisting of numerous laws, regulations, and polices. In 1979, China promulgated the Environmental Protection Law (trial), the first such law. After that, China has issued a series of specialized laws on water, air, solid waste, desertification, and renewable energy. Currently, the system includes 22 laws, more than 40 regulations, around 500 standards, and more than 600 legal documents (Li 2008:118).

The establishment of the environmental governance system is characterized by “vertical development”—environmental regulatory agencies and policies are created from top to bottom by the government without much input and pressure from the public and society (Sims 1999). Since the 1970s, as China underwent drastic social changes, the government has also transformed its governance perceptions and mode, laying increasing emphasis on environmental protection and the ecological system. In 1980, environmental protection was established as the basic national policy. In 1996, the government took sustainable development as a long-term strategy. In 2003, President Hu Jintao put forward his ruling concept of “scientific development,” which emphasizes comprehensive, coordinated, and sustainable development, and has since become a dominating ideology of Hu’s administration. In 2012, the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party further advocated the concepts of “ecological civilization construction” and “beautiful China.”

Sociopolitical transformation and changes in governmental rhetoric influence policymaking and development of environmental protection. Environmental protection development in China can be divided into three stages. The first stage, from 1972 to 1991, was primarily concerned with the control of end-of-pipe pollution. The second stage, from 1992 to 2001, focused on pollution prevention. In the third stage, from 2001 to the present, the government has taken into consideration both ecological and economic development (He et al. 2012). In sum, the focus of environmental governance has shifted from pollution control to ecological maintenance, from end-of-pipe treatment to source control, and from point treatment to regional treatment (Zhang 2008). Environmental policies and measures, as a result, have become more reasonable, playing an increasingly important role in environmental protection in China.

1.3. Environmental Regulation and Implementation

Government environmental policy implementation depends on a range of policy instruments. Under Mao, the government relied primarily on direct command–control mode to implement environmental policies. With the emergence of the market economy, economic instruments are drawing increasing attention. Economic incentives have become an important environmental governance tool in a so-called hybrid instrument that relies on multiple channels. Current environmental policy instruments can be divided into the following three types: (1) Direct supervision, which includes administrative regulation such as deadline governance and emission permits, and economic sanction such as fine for sewage discharge. (2) An incentive mechanism, which includes financial, informational, and political incentives. Financial incentives concern mainly emissions trading policies. Informational incentives are about disclosure of enterprise environmental messages and pollution sources. Political incentives, such as Rating of Model City for Environmental Protection and the Responsibility System of Environmental Protection, aim to attract attention from local government leaders to environment protection by setting environment protection as evaluation indicators of local government leaders’ performance. (3) Self-regulation instruments, which mainly refers to ISO14000 certification, though it has not been fully developed yet (Li 2008:119).

From the institutional design and policymaking point of view, China has made great achievements in environmental protection. With the enhanced awareness among the government and the public, environmental protection has become one of the most burning issues in the society and has obtained higher status on the political agenda. The regulatory agencies and policy system have improved. The number of government staff for environmental protection is increasing. Environmental governance tools have become diversified.

2. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM

On the other hand, as Brettell’s chapter in this volume discusses in detail, environmental regulatory system has not been adequate in addressing the environmental problems. In spite of numerous environmental protection agencies established at different levels and their growing size and influence, the overall trend of environmental degradation has not yet been curbed. Rather, many catastrophic environmental accidents still happen frequently. Effectiveness of environmental protection is questioned by the public. Policy implementation is often disappointing. The stark disparity between expectation and result calls for a deeper understanding of the problems in current environmental governance system. This partly can be attributed to China’s rapid process of economic integration into global markets, which has drastically increased the number and size of China’s manufacturing firms, the urban population, and the dependency of agriculture on pesticides and chemical fertilizers. The efforts of the government in environmental protection have thus to some extent been offset. However, the problems inherent in the environmental system itself must be taken seriously.

2.1. Power Distribution and Environmental Agencies

The power enjoyed by the environmental protection agencies is linked closely with their policymaking authority and policy-implementing capacities. As mentioned previously and also discussed in detail by Brettell and Green and Shou in this volume, environmental protection agencies are constrained by the lack of sufficient power and authority in the current environmental protection system. First, environmental agencies, in comparison with other government branches at the same level, are lower in rank and authority, which hinders their capacity in policy implementation. For a long time, environmental agencies, as a matter of fact, had no real power and authority in relation to some other powerful departments. Before the MEP was established, environmental agencies at the center did not have the ability to fight some environment-damaging decisions made by other economic sectors. Even now, MEP still has a weaker authority compared to major economic departments such as the Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Construction.

Second, legally, the governmental agencies at the same administrative level enjoy the same power and thus cannot restrain each other. This means that the MEP has no power to inhibit the administrative behaviors of each province, which is at the same administrative level; however, environmental policy implementation needs the consent and support from provinces. Similarly, it is also difficult for the ministry to restrain and control the behaviors of other ministries and state commissions, even though it often needs cooperation and support from these ministries.

Finally, local environmental agencies are subject to the leadership of the governments at the same level, and rely on the latter for fund and personnel. However, local governments pay more attention to economic growth and local officials’ performance and promotion often hinge on GDP growth. Therefore, the capacity of local environmental agencies is constrained by their local peers.

In sum, policy capacity of environmental protection agencies in China to a great extent hinges on their political, rather than legal and administrative, power—greater power means higher policy implementation capability. In other words, policy implementation in China is lacking a legal foundation. As the rule of law is weak, policies are implemented not following the law, but largely driven by political power.

2.2. Consequences of Decentralization

Decentralization is an important feature of China’s reform. The economic decision-making power of local governments has been enhanced over time, which has greatly advanced China’s economic growth. However, decentralization has brought quite different results compared to that in the Western democracies, where decentralization enables local governments to pay more attention to the views of local citizens, so that decisions can reflect more public opinions. Under the Chinese political system, local governments have obtained great decision-making power by decentralization, but a lack of citizen monitoring has led to decision making becoming totally based on the interests and needs of local governments.

Since economic development has always been the primary goal for Chinese governments, the central government sets the targets of economic growth and expects local governments to achieve their targets. This becomes the most important element in China’s cadre evaluation system and incen-tivizes local government officials to focus exclusively on GDP rather than environmental protection.

The fiscal system is another factor that drives local governments to ignore environmental protection. The 1994 taxation system reform strengthened the tax capacity of the central government but weakened the share for local governments, and forced them to find their own sources of revenues. Local firms—often the small and medium sized and not directly controlled by the center and therefore would pay more taxes to local governments—thus came to be important sources of revenues. Local governments actively promote local firms but ignore their environmental protection capacity. With limited capital and inadequate capacity for environmental protection, these firms often secretly discharge untreated waste water and gas in order to reduce the cost. These pollution behaviors are generally ignored and even permitted by local governments whose revenues depend on these firms.

Finally, regional differences and competitions result in lower environmental standards in China, providing possibilities for pollution transfer (for the discussion on this issue, see Chen; Stalley; and Green and Shou in this volume). Local governments are trying to promote regional economic development by inviting outside investments. In order to enhance the investment appeal of their region, local governments will keep reducing relative environmental protection standards, giving rise to the problem of pollution transfer within China. Highly polluting industries are being shifted from the economically developed coastal regions to the western areas, from urban to rural areas. Local governments of less developed regions even explicitly invite highly polluting industries to invest in their jurisdictions.

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Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables and Figures
• Series Editor’s Preface
• Acknowledgments
• 1. Introduction: Dynamics, Challenges, and Opportunities in Making a Green China
• Part I: Institutions and Policies in Environmental Governance
• Part II: Firms and Environmental Regulation
• Part III: Environmental Movements and Public Participation
• Part IV: Social and Cultural Foundations of Environmental Governance
• Contributors
• Index