It has been taken for granted that the global spread of capitalism and the Western development model will lead to a transformation of all nation-states into liberal democracies. The transformation presumably implies the emergence of an economically active, educated and wealthy middle class. On the surface, this seems to have happened all around the globe. However, we are also witnessing the persistence of socialist state structures, as in Vietnam and Laos, and opposition to democracy, especially in the upper middle classes, as in Thailand. The hypothesis of a simple Westernization of the world has neglected the relevance of local histories, regional cultures and national class structures in the formation of capitalism and democracy. We do not see the transformation of all political systems according to the Western model, but a negotiation between Western and local values within the framework of twenty-first-century globalization.
Southeast Asia may be the best case to study this process, as each nation-state has a rather unique history and culture, as well as a unique political system (Bertrand 2013). All Southeast Asian states have imported aspects of the Western model reaching back to colonial times. However, each state has established a unique configuration of Western, local and globalized elements. What is more, there are powerful trends against liberal democracy in all Southeast Asian states, ranging from Chinese socialism and Buddhism to Asian monarchy and military dictatorship (Croissant and BĂŒnte 2011). These are not manifestations of backwardness or underdevelopment, but results of negotiations between classes, political camps and layers of history. Many proponents of the opposition to liberal democracy would argue that the Western model itself is not only unfit to be applied to Asia, but also partly outdated (cf. Crouch 2004). From this perspective, Southeast Asia offers both a case study of negotiation and a laboratory for experiments with democracy (McCargo 2002).
Democracy
It is certainly true that liberal democracy is rooted in a very peculiar European social configuration. Capitalists and the bourgeoisie successfully challenged the unstable coalition of monarchy and Church on the basis of economic capital and science while democratic movements associated with the European Enlightenment proposed to construct a new social and political order according to scientific principles. These ideas dominated political discourse from the seventeenth to twentieth century. The early core of the idea has been the notion of the social contract, as developed by Thomas Hobbes (1968, p. 1651), and further elaborated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (2012, p. 1762). The notion points to a purely rational construction of society through a contract between all citizens of a political entity, which presupposes that all citizens are free and equal. Through the contract, they transfer part of their powers to the abstract political entity in exchange for the protection of their physical integrity, property and freedom.
The ideas of the social contract did not remain purely academic, but were adopted by the democratic movements in Europe and North America. The constitutions of the early democratic nation-states explicitly referred to the notion of the social contract and its theoretical foundation, which ultimately lay with the Christian God. The preamble of the American Declaration of Independence (1776) reads: âWe hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. â That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.â These ideas also entered the American Constitution.
Directly inspired by Rousseauâs philosophy and the Declaration of Independence, the revolutionary movement in France published the DĂ©claration des droits de lâhomme et du citoyen (Declaration of Human and Citizen Rights) in 1789. It proclaimed the ânatural, untransferable and holy rights of manâ. The Article two summarized the philosophical foundation in the spirit of the Enlightenment by claiming that people are born equal and enter the State as legally free and equal citizens. Article two explains the purpose of the social contract, which consists of the protection of human rights, namely the rights to freedom, property, security and resistance against oppression. Freedom is defined in article four as the possibility to do whatever one pleases if it is not detrimental to anyone else. Article six could have been copied directly from Rousseau: âThe law is the expression of the general will.â It is the same for everyone and by everyone.
Article six also adopts Rousseauâs view on social inequality, which is the core of any liberal interpretation of inequality: all citizens are equal before the law and have access to all positions, places and jobs according to their virtues and talents. The liberal interpretation of inequality is meritocratic. All citizens are supposed to be born equal and to enter society as equals. Any inequality between them is interpreted as the result of personal merit or failure on the basis of their individual âvirtuesâ and âtalentsâ. In reality, basic preconditions for social action, participation in democracy and economic success are unequally distributed right from the start (Rehbein and Souza 2014). Merit is not achieved by equal individuals, but is linked to the socially differentiated abilities and resources people have. In Western democracies, most social groups did not even initially have the possibility to acquire merit because they were denied the very human rights that the declarations quoted above professed to extend to all human beings. Slavery was abolished only in the nineteenth century, and dispossessed persons, women, (formally recognized) immigrants and many minorities received full citizenship only in the course of the twentieth century. As they were integrated, their symbolic devaluation and lack of resources persisted. They did not receive the same starting conditions as the old nobility and the bourgeoisie, who had already acquired wealth, occupied the leading positions in society and dominated the symbolic universe.
The inclusion of the majority of human beings into liberal democracy was the result of political struggles. The struggles aimed at participation but left the unequal structure of society untouched. The former feudal structures were only transformed and persisted under the surface, as they were never consciously abolished. The egalitarian surface of democracy, the market, legal institutions and discourse rendered the structures of inequality invisible (Crouch 2004). While inequality is supposed to be the outcome of individual merit and failure, it is actually rooted in precapitalist structures of inequality and the unequal integration of underprivileged groups. Each newly integrated group becomes the lowest stratum in the democratic state of equals. After integration, some members of the lowest stratum are able to actually acquire merit and move up the social ladder. This individual success serves to legitimize and cover the hierarchy of classes in liberal democracies.
The same process took place in Europe and all over America after the end of colonialism. In most African and Asian societies, however, the entire population was declared equal and integrated into the social organism, which often were democracies, arriving with the end of colonial rule. The old structures of inequality were directly transformed into capitalist classes. During the transformation, these societies experienced much more social mobility than Western societies after their revolutions, as independence fighters, new entrepreneurs and members of the military were able to rise into the ranks of the new elite. At the same time, the structures of inequality became invisible much faster, as the underprivileged groups were formally equal from the start, and individuals originating from them managed to be upwardly mobile.
In many African and Asian states, this process continues, but it does not alter the unequal conditions of participation in capitalism and democracy. A few revolutionaries join the elites but, otherwise, the peasants remain poor even after their transformation into commercial farmers and migrant laborers, while the nobility keeps its wealth and access to power. The capitalist transformation fundamentally changes the structure of the division of labor, but not that of society (Piketty 2013). Precapitalist ranks are transformed into invisible classes, as the meritocratic liberal discourse declares them to be nonexistent. The dynamic distribution of economic capital contributes to this. A laborerâs son may get rich as a football player or singer, but this does not make him, let alone his family, a member of the ruling class, especially since he tends to lose his wealth within his lifetime.
The capitalist transformation does not result in an egalitarian and fully democratic society, but it does imply a democratization within the elite. The dominant precapitalist groups and the capitalists share power with each other in both a cooperative and competitive manner. The king is replaced by a dominant class, while the leading functions in society are increasingly carried out by the well-educated bourgeoisie (cf. Mills 1956). This has been the structure of most democratic societies from the early USA to the contemporary Philippines. It is largely a compromise between the old ruling classes and the new functional elites, which are often referred to as the middle class. The rest of the population is unequally integrated but, as Adam Smith suggested at the time the Declaration of Independence was published, co-opted through the increased âwealth of nationsâ, a small share of which will keep them satisfied (Smith 1998, p. 7).
Southeast Asia
The Southeast Asian liberal democracies have preserved precapitalist classes and structures to a larger degree than contemporary Western democracies. The tendency to arrive at a compromise between nobility, capitalists and upper middle class is obvious but highly conflict prone at the same time. On the one hand, the majority of the population grows up with the promise of democracy and equality; on the other hand, capitalists struggle with precapitalist hierarchies and clientelism. The upper middle class has not found its place within the young democracies yet and does not even play a significant role in Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, which do not have Western-type democracies.
Against this background, the present volume seeks to inquire into the relation between democracy, middle classes and the type of domination exerted by the upper classes. The most relevant question in this regard is whether Southeast Asia can come up with an alternative interpretation of democracy that is more democratic than the Western model and possibly a way into the future. The answer given by the chapters in this volume is a clear ânoâ. They do, however, point to dynamics that could or should lead to more democracy within the hybrid configurations of the respective nation-states. To understand these dynamics improves our understanding not only of the peculiarities of each Southeast Asian society (even on the local and transnational levels), but also of democratic processes and institutions in general.
The political configurations and frameworks for democratic governance in Southeast Asia are very diverse. Post-colonization, the Cold War and the post-Cold War have set the countries in the region into different political systems and governments. The range includes absolute monarchy (Brunei Darussalam), constitutional monarchy (Thailand), representative democracy with a parliamentary system (Cambodia, Myanmar, Malaysia and Singapore) and presidential system (the Philippines and Indonesia), and communism (Lao PDR and Vietnam). The triumph of the market economy has led to significant adjustments in the authoritarian regimes, particularly, in Vietnam. The financial crisis in 1997 had an adverse effect on the legitimacy of the Indonesian regime. Recent developments in ASEAN regional integration, to some extent, have contributed to the beginning of an electoral polity in Myanmar.
The countries of the region, however, share one important characteristic, namely a centralized and securitizing state. Through the work of multinational corporations, the neoliberal economy has been able to intervene in the national financial markets and trading regimes with weak institutional measures (e.g., the Thai tom yum kung effect in 1997), but state sovereignty has remained intact in national politics and security (cf. Loh 2005, p. 3). Yet, around the turn of the twenty-first century, new grassroots movements and civil society organizations, in parallel with the emerging new middle classes, have become more politically visible in the region, but their relationships with the securitizing state have not been fruitful. The region is more prominent for economic growth than for democratic consolidation (cf. Schmidt et al. 1998, p. 220).
However, informal and formal aspects of politics do not coincide in Southeast Asia, which is another characteristic that all nation-states of the region seem to share. Analyzing trends in democracy or democratization therefore also means studying informal politics. All the chapters in this volume address the issue to varying degrees. The discussions reveal that Southeast Asiaâs contribution to twenty-first-century democracy will lie in the realm of informal movements and arrangements rather than in formalized institutions.
The Book Chapters
The book is divided into three unequal parts. The first part consists of one chapter, which combines a global overview of democracy in the twenty-first century with an analysis of the framework for democracy in Southeast Asia. The second part contains country studies of democracy in the region. The chapters differ greatly in their topics and entry points, but they all share the search for democratic potential in the social setup of the respective countries, while exploring the challenges and limitations. The final part of the book comprises an in-depth study of Thailand, which used to be one of the success stories of Southeast Asia but has now revived its long tradition of military dictatorship. The role of the new middle classes emerges as a topic that bridges the wide span of issues tackled in the chapters.
Jan Nederveen Pieterse provides a critical analysis of the characteristics of democracy in Southeast Asia by examining three themes: the East Asian developmental state as a model for Southeast Asia; the role of the middle class in ongoing transformations; and democracy and equality. He emphasizes that the convergence of modernity, capitalism and democracy is a myth invented in the Cold War period and that there is not just one democracy in the singular. He also points out that neoliberal democracy can go together with high degrees of inequality. He concludes that the hope for alternatives to neoliberal globalization in the twenty-first century will rest on the role of the state.
Abdul Rahman Embong raises concerns over the right-wing movement in Malaysiaâs recent popular uprising. He compares different movements, the Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections (BERSIH), Persatuan Pribumi Perkasa (Perkasa) and Malaysian Muslim Solidarity (ISMA), as well as âthe Red Shirts,â to distinguish their political propensities in the democratization process. It is important to note that it is not only progressive civil society that is using the opening political spaces, but also right-wing groups, which he calls âthe noisy rightâ. Malaysia is one of the countries in which the right wing is found to be allied with the state and the ruling political party. Of particular concern is the right wingâs use of ethno-nationalism in its politicization. The role of civil society in monitoring political performance might lead Malaysian politics toward becoming a âmature democracyâ, while the rise of the right wing and the imposition of strict laws could leave the country âstuck in transitionâ.
Andrew Yeo Zhi Jian, Yeoh Lam Keong and Au Yong Haw Yee analyze the situation of the city-state Singapore as a âsocial contract trilemmaâ. The country, according to them, needs to find a balance between the three dimensions of market competitiveness, social protection and democratic development. The main argument of the text seeks to establish that these three dimensions are not necessarily contradictory, but can actually reinforce each other. While Singaporeâs economy is highly competitive, less attention has been paid to the other two dimensions. They conclude that only if this imbalance is tackled, will Singapore be ready for the challenges of the twenty-first century.
Sok Udom Deth and Daniel Bultmann study how the challenges of the twenty-first century can be met in Cambodia. They identify the decreasing role of agriculture, ruralâurban migration and the youth bulge as r...