Satō, America and the Cold War

US-Japanese Relations, 1964–72

Fintan Hoey

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781137457615
• eBook ISBN: 9781137457639
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Asian History
• Index: History

Using recently released archival material from the US and Japan, this book critically re-examines US–Japanese relations during the tenure of Sat? Eisaku, Japan's longest serving prime minister. During these critical years in the Cold War in Asia, with the Vietnam War raging and the acquisition by China of a nuclear capability, Sat? closely aligned with the US. This directly contributed to his success in securing the reversion of Okinawa and other Japanese territories which had remained under US control since Japan's surrender at the end of World War II. To accomplish this he was also forced to conclude secret agreements with President Richard Nixon, including one on nuclear weapons, which are explored fully. Sat? faced the challenge of the Nixon administration's attempts to shore up the relative decline in American power with policies at odds with allied interests. Sat? successfully overcame such challenges and also laid the groundwork for Japan's anti-nuclear policy.

1

Satō’s First Year in Power, 1964–1965

A world in turmoil

Satō’s elevation to prime minister in November 1964 came at a time of great changes in international relations in Asia. A month prior to his assuming office China detonated a nuclear device. Grappling with security, particularly with the question of nuclear weapons, characterised Satō’s relations with the United States over the course of his tenure, as did the broader question of diplomatic recognition of China and its representation at the United Nations. Vietnam would become another item of pressing concern between Japan and the United States. A month after President Lyndon Baines Johnson assumed office following John F. Kennedy’s assassination, he was warned by his Defence Secretary, Robert McNamara, that ‘the situation is very disturbing. Current trends, unless reversed in the next 2–3 months, will lead to neutralisation at best and more likely to a communist-controlled state’.¹ The Johnson administration steadily escalated its commitment to South Vietnam. In August 1964 the United States used what was portrayed as an unprovoked attack by North Vietnam on its warships in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin as a casus belli. This prompted Congress to pass the South East Asia Resolution, which approved the use of force. That the attack in question may not have happened and that North Vietnamese actions in the Gulf of Tonkin were far from unprovoked only came to light years after the event.² In February the United States began bombing North Vietnam and in March US Marines were deployed to protect the B-52 bases.³ These were the first American combat troops in Vietnam (previous troops had officially been advisers), and their numbers would grow to half a million by 1968 as the United States was sucked into a destructive and unwinnable stalemate.⁴ This massive escalation lay ahead; for the moment America’s war in Vietnam was still at an early stage. Satō would support America’s efforts to keep South Vietnam out of the communist camp but advised the United States not to rely solely on military force but to draw popular support away from the communists. Unfortunately this advice was not heeded.

This chapter analyses Satō’s first year in office and explores three key events: his meeting with President Johnson, his careful and skilful handling of the use of Japanese ports by American nuclear submarines and his groundbreaking trip to Okinawa. In all cases Satō walked a delicate line between ensuring the defence of Japan through enhancing the alliance with the United States and the consequently difficult and politically dangerous decisions that this entailed.

Satō in Washington

Shortly after coming to office Satō took US Ambassador Edwin Reischauer aside at an imperial garden party for a private conversation. Satō hoped to maintain close touch with the ambassador and, in the short term, wanted to meet with US President Lyndon B. Johnson.⁵ Unfortunately for Satō there was little enthusiasm for a visit in Washington, where officials were occupied with preparations for Johnson’s inauguration. Satō persuaded Reischauer that an early meeting was mutually desirable given that major developments with regard to the Vietnam War and China’s nuclear programme were looming. Satō also wanted to establish a personal rapport with Johnson. No doubt he also wanted to enhance his credentials as a statesman at home with a high-level visit. Reischauer managed to persuade his superiors of the merits of the summit, reminding them that three and a half years had past since the last such high-level meeting. Satō, who later acknowledged the ambassador’s role in his trip’s success, journeyed to Washington for talks from 11 to 13 January 1965.⁶

Two weeks before his departure Satō had another private meeting with Reischauer and alarmed the ambassador by voicing his support for an independent Japanese nuclear deterrent, given China’s recent development in this regard. As he stated frankly, ‘if the other fellow had nuclears it was only common sense to have them oneself’. Reischauer reported to Washington that Satō ‘more than lives up to [his] reputation of being less judiciously cautious’ than his predecessor and needed ‘more guidance and education by us ... to keep him out of dangerous courses’.⁷ An independent Japanese nuclear deterrent would wreak havoc on the administration’s global non-proliferation efforts. More nuclear weapons and more states armed with them would, it was felt, result in a more dangerous world. With China and France having already developed independent deterrents the focus shifted to preventing the countries thought to be next in line. Japan and India, judged to be both capable and sufficiently threatened by China’s development, became the focus of America’s non-proliferation efforts. Opinion was split over the best way to accomplish this. Among the options explored was extended nuclear deterrence, or the ‘nuclear umbrella’. If that proved insufficient or unworkable then the United States should enter into a nuclear sharing arrangement involving deploying weapons on the country’s territory, training local personnel in their use and placing them under joint control. In this way proliferation would occur under America’s ‘guidance and influence’.⁸ With regard to this sharing approach Vice President Hubert Humphrey told Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Chairman Miki Takeo in January 1965 that, ‘it would have a good effect in Communist China if you had a hand on the umbrella to be sure the rain doesn’t come down on you.’⁹ These plans were akin to the proposal for a Multilateral Force (MLF) for NATO countries in an attempt to satisfy West German nuclear ambitions without alarming the USSR. However Soviet and Warsaw Pact objections as well as French opposition later buried the proposal. Instead Washington and Moscow worked towards an international treaty forbidding further proliferation while locking in their privileged status as nuclear weapons states.¹⁰ Royama Michio and Miki Kase question Satō’s motives by suggesting that he was purposefully putting forth the outrageous and unrealistic notion that Japan would develop nuclear weapons purely as a gambit to induce further security guarantees from the United States.¹¹ However the development of nuclear weapons was a realistic choice which Satō and Japan seriously considered though ultimately rejected.¹² What is more likely is that Satō wished to keep his options open and manoeuvred to induce the United States to provide a nuclear umbrella while keeping the alternative of developing an independent deterrent further down the road.

Despite Satō’s preoccupation with security matters he was initially unenthusiastic about conducting substantive meetings with McNamara or with Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon. He felt that two ten-minute conversations with these two cabinet secretaries before and after a meal was adequate and did not think it necessary to schedule anything longer.¹³ Secretary of State Dean Rusk had stressed to Japan’s Ambassador Takeuchi Ryuji the importance of Satō meeting with other cabinet secretaries during his time in Washington.¹⁴ Since such a ten-minute meeting would amount to little more than an introduction, the US side pushed for more substantive talks. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Marshall Green, who was in charge of organising the summit at the American end, pressed the Japanese embassy in Washington to persuade Satō to agree to more concrete talks. Green made the point that defence relations with Japan were of sufficient importance to warrant Satō spending more time with McNamara. Takeuchi conveyed these concerns to Tokyo along with his own recommendation that Satō agree to the American suggestion, noting the importance of defence-related issues such as Vietnam and Okinawa.¹⁵ Satō followed this advice.¹⁶ Green also made a push for Satō to meet with Dillon, and the two men met for 25 minutes prior to Satō’s lunch with Rusk on 13 January 1965.¹⁷

This episode is far from a mundane matter of scheduling and tells us much about Satō’s thinking with regard to the summit. He did not want to get into substantive talks with cabinet secretaries other than Rusk. This undermines Michael Schaller’s conclusion that Satō was in some ways snubbed as LBJ did not want to talk about economic issues (Satō was happy to have these matters dealt with by his finance minister).¹⁸ Why then did Satō want to avoid detailed discussions with McNamara? This is puzzling given that his conversation with Reischauer on the eve of the summit clearly shows that security concerns were paramount in his mind. An answer lies in Satō’s diary, where he noted how he was impressed and pleasantly surprised with McNamara, who sought to engage with him as an equal rather than lecture him on the question of Japan’s future military role.¹⁹ Perhaps, then, a lecture from McNamara is precisely what he feared.

Other elements of the visit did not go as well for Satō. Dean Rusk emphasised the increased importance of America’s military bases on Okinawa in light of China’s nuclear development. Satō readily agreed but suggested that some of the sparsely inhabited and less strategically important islands of the Ryukyus be reverted to Japan. This, however, was met with stony silence.²⁰ Relations with China presented other troubles for Satō beyond these security concerns. He was faced with a strong domestic constituency – the business community, the powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and elements of the LDP – who favoured expansion of trade with the mainland. On this, as on many issues Satō would face, he was required to walk a delicate line. In this case he had to manoeuvre between continued support for Taiwan and close coordination with the United States on keeping the Republic of China regime in the United Nations on the one hand and the demands of the domestic business lobby on the other. By the start of Satō’s tenure it had become more and more difficult to maintain that economic ties were ‘private’ given government export credits and the expenditure of public funds on a Japanese trade office in Beijing.²¹ Despite US apprehensions regarding China, many policymakers in Washington generally recognised that Japan needed to trade with mainland China. Vice President Hubert Humphrey told Miki Takeo in January 1965 that, ‘Japan had an economic interest in Communist China and ... he imagined that Japan would develop this trade even if we didn’t like it.’ Humphrey was more concerned that Japan not grant China better terms than it gave to the United States.²² President Johnson for his part signalled no objection to the Japanese policy of separating politics and economics.²³

One area where agreement was not forthcoming was in relation to Japanese cotton textile exports to the United States. This particular difficulty over textiles was dwarfed in importance and rancour by the later textile dispute during the Nixon administration. Johnson was unfazed by Satō’s point that Japan was a major trading partner of the United States and bought plenty of American goods; he was surprised when Satō hoped that since Johnson’s native Texas was not a major textile state, the issue would not be given too much importance. In the end Satō acknowledged Japan’s interest in continued American prosperity, and the issue was put aside. It did make one more light-hearted reappearance: In a show of friendliness and southern hospitality, Johnson had Stetsons ordered for the members of Satō’s entourage. Satō joked that the gifts increased American textile exports to Japan.²⁴

In most areas Satō’s first summit in the United States was a success for the prime minister. He managed to enhance his standing with high-level meetings and establish a rapport with Johnson and members of the US administration. He had little trouble in endorsing America’s containment policies in Asia, particularly with regard to China and Vietnam, though the question of Okinawa would continue to present difficulties. Most importantly of all he secured a commitment from Johnson and McNamara to defend Japan against nuclear attack, thus initiating the US nuclear umbrella. This was a signal achievement.

US nuclear submarines

On coming to office Satō inherited an agreement with the United States allowing for nuclear-powered US submarines to enter Japanese ports. The United States sought such access to allow these vessels to operate normally throughout the Pacific and also sought to push back against Japan’s nuclear taboo.²⁵ Japan’s conservative leadership accepted that the port calls were a necessary feature of the alliance. They were also alert to their potential as an issue that the left-wing opposition (composed of the Japanese Socialist Party, the Japanese Communist Party and Sōhyō, the General Council of Trade Unions) could exploit to rally support.²⁶ Popular revulsion with nuclear weapons and concern regarding the dangers of fallout ran deep in Japan given the experience of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the Daigo Fukuryū Maru (Lucky Dragon) incident. The contamination of this fishing vessel in 1954 from a US nuclear test alerted the Japanese people to the danger of nuclear contamination, particularly of the fish stocks which constituted their primary source of food.²⁷ The conflation of the nuclear allergy with the security treaty, whose passage through the Diet had been met with ferocious protest, concentrated the minds of US and Japanese officials. The agreement and the management of the issue by Washington and Tokyo provide an interesting insight into the conduct of US-Japanese relations...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• 1  Sats First Year in Power, 19641965
• 2  Maturity, Reversion and a Year of Crises: 19661968
• 3  The Reversion of Okinawa, 1969, Part1
• 4  The Reversion of Okinawa, 1969, Part2
• 5  The Reversion of Okinawa, 1969, Part3
• 6  The Nixon Doctrine and Japans Defence Policy, 19691971
• 7  The Nixon China Shock, 1971
• 8  Economic Woes, 19711972
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index