There has been widespread discussion about the political and economic potential of online media and social networks, their contribution to changes in working and living practices, and growth rates, alongside their enhancement of democratic practices, public sphere and civic cultures, and citizen responsibility and participation. In particular, Web 2.0âthe second generation of the World Wide Web, focused on the public collaboration and sharing of information onlineâhas facilitated computer-mediated tools that allow for the creation and exchange of ideas across virtual communities. This emergence of so-called social media has provided the technological and ideological foundation for the production of user-generated content.
These changes have gone hand in hand with the rise of an era in modern politics which has been described as either post-democracy or late modernity. Several political sociologists have defined the period as one characterised by major transformations in democratic values (Beck 1992; Giddens 1991; Lash 1990). Henrik Bang (2004) has argued a discursive form of political activism in which solidarity exists but is not tied to any notion of the common good or of a particular ideology. Bang contends that new types of representation have emerged outside the mainstream political institutions, as citizens have only minimal interest in party politics. Rather than aspire to the duties of citizenship, these virtuous âeveryday makersâ want to feel âinvolvedâ in their communities and are taking part in small local narratives founded on a mutuality of interests. Therefore, as political activity is no longer based on ideology and membership, politicians must engage on a continuing basis with citizens to persuade them to participate, as Bang:
identifies a shift away from an inputâoutput model of politics, in which citizens via parties etc., were negotiated and aggregated into policy outputs by governments, to a recursive one, in which the demo-elite, operating through the political system acts: âin its own terms and on its own values, thereby shaping and constructing societal interests and identityâ. (Marsh et al. 2010:329)
Consequently, this reformulated view of participatory practices has witnessed a change in the relationship between the citizen and political classes. This reflexivity demands that politicians engage in a more personalised and less ideological set of political communication. Thus, Bang argues, Obamaâs 2008 Democratic presidential campaign directly interacted with everyday makers through innovative use of new information and communications technologies (ICTs). He notes that MyBarackObama.âcom (MyBo) mobilised the democratic input of over two million users, and from the 100,000 profiles available, 35,000 affinity groups were organised at a community level. This commonwealth of local associations comprised grassroots activists drawn from youth and ethnic minority delegates, working in an inclusive and relational manner (Bang 2009). Obama thus defined a political image which was founded on reciprocity and shared meaning, and which encouraged popular scrutiny of his political deliberations (Cogburn and Espinoza-Vasquez 2011:205).
Bangâs work concerning the reformulation of democratic relations between the political elites and the public ties in with John Keaneâs vision of âmonitory democracyâ (Keane 2009a). Effectively, Keane argues that since 1945, governmental or parliamentary forms of democratic practice have declined. Therefore, the central grip of elections, parties and representative assemblies has weakened, and behaviour in âall fields of social and political life [has] come to be scrutinizedâŠby a whole host of non-party, extra-parliamentary and often unelected bodies operating within and underneath and beyond the boundaries of territorial statesâ (Keane 2009b).
These alternative types of accountability are linked with monitoring mechanisms founded on consumer preference, customer voting and networks of redistributed power. The new monitoring formations have included concepts of âempowermentâ, âhigh-energy democracyâ, âstakeholdersâ, âparticipatory governanceâ and âcommunicative democracyâ. Keane contends that monitory democracy is closely associated with the rise of the new multimedia and Internet communications technologies. Late modernists suggest that the technological revolution replaces hierarchical power with a distributive form of network governance and a constantly evolving version of contemporary democracy (Marsh et al. 2010:326).
These horizontal forms of information were identified by Manual Castells, who argued that such flow of communication has led to overlapping and interlinked devices through which multiple ideas and scrutiny may occur (Castells 2012). For instance, the older mechanisms of media accountability have been replaced by myriad citizen-generated discussion groups. In turn, Castells contends, the networked society facilitates new types of political solidarity through alternative forms of social capital and the construction of grassroots engagement. Clay Shirky maintains that it has become easy to dismantle the barriers to collective action (Shirky 2009). The social media enable a self-directed open source to mobilise against repression, special interests and hermetically sealed ideologies. Such dispersal of power means that cyberspace will create a public sphere which circumvents dominant interests, enabling grassroots organisations to propagate their values (Castells 2012:11).
Moreover, Internet content has witnessed a move away from journalistic âobjectivityâ, to the âsubjectivityâ of bloggers, social networking and citizen journalism. In this context, the malleability of âhypeâ has been viewed as a profundity in which everyoneâs opinions are of equal worth. Thus, one may contend that these power-scrutinising innovations enfranchise citizens through the formation of âbully pulpitsâ in which there exists âone person, many interests, many voices, multiple votes and multiple representativesâ (Keane 2009a).
Such arguments have focused on the relative value of voice and output against the requirements of aggregated input and agency to define a normative position of post-democratic behaviour. Marsh et al. (2010:330), however, question the political validity of such activities. First, to what extent have the politics of late modernity actually witnessed a rise of network governance and a decline in hierarchical relations? Second, does such a reliance on âvoiceâ to garner support from laypersons ignore traditional sources of information? Third, and most important, to what degree do these contentions ignore the structured inequalities, as political elites market themselves through the traditional media and social media to the public?
Similarly, the desirability of consumer-led forms of scrutiny may be seen to underestimate the divisions which exist in modern democracies. In failing to address the nature of power in post-democratic societies, the focus on output does not deal with matters of inequality and may be seen to reinforce fears concerning the democratic deficit. In particular, practices of late modernity may be suggested to favour the voices of the ill-informed over the enlightened. Thus populist attitudes define a distorted version of the common good, and these reconfigured forms of behaviour may operate akin to what Alexis de Tocqueville termed âsoft tyrannyâ (de Tocqueville 1830). In effect, normative democratic ideals have been undermined by the vagaries of public opinion, conformity to material security, the absence of intellectual freedom and the prejudices of the ignorant.
Consequently, such approaches provide only a partial analysis of the true worth of Internet politics. If the normative expectations of the politics of social media are limited to the measurement of voice and output alone, we can posit that such activity has no greater merit than in relaying the values of the demo-elite to the public or allowing disaffected oppositional groups the means through which to articulate their interests to the public. And as Shirky has noted, the dangers of overabundance have led to varied and uneven levels of participation (Shirky 2011).
Therefore, for Web 2.0 politics to have appropriate value, it must enhance civic virtues through the mechanisms of input and agency as much as illustrating the openings for voice and output. For the online political classes to have democratic worth, they need to demonstrate ideological substance and provide clarity to a fixed range of meanings such that people achieve a real sense of connection with a cause. To this end, social media should provide the representational basis upon which citizens can participate in terms of their own political efficacy to define in a wider sense the common good.
In effect, the Internet holds the potential for a fuller realisation of a democratic set of public spheres in which a true level of engagement and fulfilment will occur (Habermas 1989 [1962]). Social media can facilitate citizenship through the provision of free and accurate information in three important ways. First, individuals will achieve the widest access to information and knowledge to allow them to pursue their rights. Second, citizens will enjoy the broadest range of information, interpretation and debate regarding their political choices, and thus can employ these communication facilities to register criticism and propose alternative courses of action. Finally, individuals will recognise themselves among the multitude of representations offered across a decentralised communications environment wherein they can evolve and extend their levels of representation.
Consequently, social media provide the possibility for radical change in the ways in which public communication takes place, as information diffuses in a faster and wider manner to reach a larger number of people. The interactive nature of the Internet has been a driving force in the technological revolution, allowing for personalised forms of direct communication between the parties and the public. This realisation has inspired the political classes to take to social media to develop political communications strategies in modern election campaigns. These effects have been most notable in Western democracies such as the USA and UK, but have also become apparent in southern states such as India and South Africa. In the summer of 2015, Jeremy Corbyn, the left-wing outsider vying for UK Labour Party leadership, took to Twitter (#JezWeCan) to mobilise youthful political supporters, much to the chagrin of the party grandees and managers (Heritage 2015).
The online networks in turn can empower people to compete against the traditional political classes or media establishment. Totalitarian or despotic regimes in particular have found that it has become nigh impossible to censor or control the social media platforms associated with populist movements in a variety of states, including China, Russian, Iran and Turkey. The rise of the Internet and social media offers the possibility of effective political action, though the democratising power of ICTs varies widely across countries, resulting in different degrees of political and media openness. Conventional economic and political wisdom has been challenged online in southern European countries such as Greece and Spain. Videos like Kony 2012, the short film denouncing child abuse in Uganda, garnering more than 30 million views within the first week of its release, or the wave of protests associated with the Arab Spring and the global Occupy movement (an international protest campaign against social and economic inequality), offer illustrative examples of how online communication networks facilitate rapid diffusion of information.
Yet, does this online process actually trigger or reflect a more deep-seated change in public behaviour, from policymaking to political protest and regime change? Can we assume that the online media channel social influence in much the same way as the offline networksâby creating a structure of interactions that facilitates the creation of a new online public sphere and articulates independent decision-making? Moreover, can this political discourse degenerate into personal abuse, ignorance and intolerance? Notably, the social media have been seen to provide the means for extremist and terrorist organisations to engage in the politics of fear at national, regional and global levels. In particular, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) successfully utilised computer-mediated tools to propagate its message of a worldwide caliphate and to recruit international sympathisers.
This book critically examines the relevance of the social networks as a public sphere wherein a range of political and sociocultural imperatives may be realised. The central themes of the book address the following questions: Are online and social networks an unstoppable democratising and mobilising force? Is there a need for policy and intervention to ensure the development of comprehensive and inclusive social networking frameworks? The Internet is viewed as both a tool that allows citizens to influence policymaking and an object of new policies and panoptic state regulations, such as data retention, privacy and copyright laws, around which citizens are mobilising.
This volume develops its analysis upon Daniel Hallin and Paulo Manciniâs comparative model of media systems with reference to these matters of economic, political and societal development (Hallin and Mancini 2004). A comparative approach is necessary to identify the generic principles that drive the diffusion of online information and set the specifi...