The Individual Disengagement of Avengers, Nationalists, and Jihadists

Why Ex-Militants Choose to Abandon Violence in the North Caucasus

E. Souleimanov, H. Aliyev

• Publisher: Palgrave Pivot
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781137498823
• eBook ISBN: 9781137498830
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Drawing on unique first-hand data from Russia's North Caucasus, this study is the first of its kind to detail the causes and contexts of individual disengagement of various types of militants: avengers, nationalists, and jihadists. It aims to considerably enhance our theoretical understanding of individual militants' incentives to abandon violence.

1

Theorizing Militant Disengagement

Abstract: The main goal of this chapter is to present the existing theoretical framework on individual disengagement. It is demonstrated in this chapter that the current research is heavily focused on rather vague and amorphous ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors. Having reviewed a diverse body of literature in political violence studies, this chapter offers a detailed and contextualized analysis of different types of disengagement across a range of militant organizations from different parts of the world.

Souleimanov, Emil and Huseyn Aliyev. The Individual Disengagement of Avengers, Nationalists, and Jihadists: Why Ex-Militants Choose to Abandon Violence in the North Caucasus. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. DOI: 10.1057/9781137498830.0005.

This chapter provides a theoretical framework for the empirical analysis of militant disengagement conducted in this book. By exploring the current scholarship on disengagement and examining the relevance and applicability of existing theoretical approaches to the topic, this chapter delves into different strands of literature on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), illustrates the differences and similarities among the three, and analyzes the gaps and limitations in the current scholarship. To date, few studies exist that address insurgents’ incentives to abandon the pathway of violent struggle. A number of studies have, however, dealt with the causes of terrorist disengagement, which may be considered a cognate field given the somewhat blurred distinction between insurgents and terrorists in terms of their personal profiles, modus operandi, modus vivendi, and their similar group dynamics. These studies have often focused primarily on the group dynamics of individual disengagement, which reveal similar patterns across various militant groups.¹

As detailed in the introduction, extant scholarship on insurgent disengagement is replete with studies on DDR (Walter, 1999; Knight and Ozerdem, 2004; Muggah, 2005; Marriage, 2007), while research on disengagement as such is surprisingly scarce. Moreover, the conceptual difference between demobilization as a large-scale process and disengagement as either an individual or smaller group (collective) effort remains neglected and under-represented in the current literature. Studies by Horgan (2009) and Bjørgo (2011) are among the few to discuss disengagement as a complex multi-dimensional process occurring on both individual and group levels. This study understands disengagement as a broad generic concept that expands beyond the traditional in the DDR literature definition of demobilization into the realms of organizational and individual behavioral studies (Knight and Ozerdem, 2004). According to Horgan (2009: 35), disengagement: ‘... does not necessarily imply that the individual leaves terrorism – the person may disengage by simply moving (or by being moved) from one role into another’ – a process Rabasa et al. (2011: 5) have defined as role change.

In the extant scholarship, disengagement is often closely associated with research on de-radicalization (Horgan and Braddock, 2010; Rabasa et al., 2011). As argued by Horgan (2009: 27), however, these two terms refer to rather different phenomena and therefore should not be used interchangeably. Horgan (2009) suggests that, even after having disengaged, a militant ‘may not necessarily be repentant or “deradicalized” at all.’ As will be later outlined in this book, many of the disengaged militants who have physically abandoned armed struggle still believe in the righteousness of the cause that inspired them to join in the first place.²

The term ‘disengagement’ continues to be used in the literature on DDR to refer to demobilization processes (Mitton, 2008) and, due to its multi-disciplinary scope, is also employed as an umbrella term incorporating disarmament and demobilization, with the latter understood as a process by which armed combatants disband en masse (Muggah, 2005). Given that this book focuses specifically on the lesser-known individual aspects of withdrawing from armed militancy, the term disengagement employed throughout this book does not indicate large-scale institutionalized demobilization processes, and rather focuses on individual forms and aspects of withdrawal from militant organizations. The central theme of this book is therefore: How and why do militants disengage?

As stated earlier, extant scholarship on the causes of disengagement focuses on roughly two groups of factors, categorized as either internal ‘push’ or external ‘pull’ factors. Coined by Hogan (2009), both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors provide a broader analytical framework for individual and group disengagement. Rabasa et al. (2011: 13) call such factors a ‘trigger’ ‘that calls into question a person’s commitment to a radical organization.’ While ‘push’ factors encompass individuals’ internal experiences that drive them away from violent groups, ‘pull’ factors relate to external pressures that serve the same purpose. Although different examples provided by researchers in the field often combine elements of both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ (Rabasa et al., 2011; Bjørgo, 2011), analyzing these two key categories of militant disengagement in detail is essential in order to establish the theoretical background for a more contextualized analysis of different groups of militants’ specific motivations for disengagement.

The umbrella term of ‘push’ factors encompasses a variety of influences contributing to an individual’s desire to disengage. For example, disillusionment with a group’s underlying ideology plays a contributing role (Alonso, 2011; Harris, 2010; Rosenau et al., 2014), even though scholars (Horgan, 2009; Sageman, 2008; Bjørgo, 2005) generally consider it a secondary factor. Disapproval of group strategy and tactics (Bjørgo, 2011, Reinares, 2011) regarded, inter alia, as either ineffective or too lethal or indiscriminate, is another ‘push’ factor. Other main factors include personal issues impacting in-group relations, such as problems with leadership or fellow combatants (Bjørgo, 2011; Rosenau et al., 2014; Harris, 2010); or burnout as a result of severe fatigue and hardship associated with membership in a terrorist or insurgent group (Rosenau et al., 2014; Bjørgo, 2011, Reinares, 2011, Della Porta, 2009).

‘Push’ factors

The collective term, ‘push’ factors, is used in the literature on disengagement to explain a number of internal causes either resulting in individual withdrawal or leading to a collective exit of militants. The most common internal ‘push’ is one’s disillusionment with the group’s ideology, teachings, or politics. The disillusionment factor occurs because of individual or collective loss of faith in the central ideological cause of a militant organization. While disillusionment is reported to occur less frequently among religious groups (Rabasa et al., 2010), it often takes place in ethno-nationalist, political, as well as extreme right- and left-wing, extremist organizations (Bjørgo and Carlsson, 2005; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). More broadly speaking, disillusionment is a fairly common occurrence in ideologically based militant groups. For example, Alonso (2011) discusses the lack of faith in group ideology and the group’s methods of using violence among Basque separatists of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), and Moghadam (2012) identifies ideological decline as the cause of disengagement of German Red Army Faction (RAF) militants.

Ideological disillusionment is often accompanied by resentment and disagreement with group tactics and methods of resorting to violence. According to Reinares (2011), if during the 1980s the majority of ETA members who chose to leave the organization did so because of disagreements with its political ideology; most cases of disengagement in later years were due to disillusionment with the organization’s tactics. Horgan (2009: 32) describes the disillusionment of members, in particular recent recruits, of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) with the organization’s reliance on criminal methods and with the use of violence against civilians in communities the organization has struggled to represent. While separate cases of disengagement due to disillusionment with how a group uses violence or procures its funding (such as through extortion, racketeering, and robbery) are common among recent recruits in most militant organizations, a group’s transformation or change in operational tactics – often as a result of exogenous factors or risks – may also lead to the mass exodus of its members. For example, the transformation of the ideological base of the Chechen insurgency from nationalist to Islamist, as will be discussed later in this book, resulted in en masse militant disengagement, with many of them joining the ranks of counterinsurgents and many more permanently exiting the armed conflict. A similar development occurred after the Irish PIRA’s decision to enter into dialogue with the authorities, as a result of which the more radical splinter groups the Real IRA and Continuity IRA were created (Jarman, 2004; Gilmore, 2009). The creation of the Philippines’ radical Islamist group Abu-Sayyaf, as a splinter group of Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), has followed a similar path (Filler, 2002; Turner, 2003). The creation of splinter militant groups, however, often occurs not only because of the original group’s change in tactics, but also due to an ideological shift, such as either the renunciation of violence and terrorist acts, or, on the contrary, reliance on indiscriminate forms of violence to accomplish the group’s mission.

The loss of one’s position or status within a group is yet another internal ‘push’ factor that encourages individuals, or even groups of individuals, to exit a militant organization. As described by Dalgaard-Nielsen (2013: 104), disagreements with group leadership, bullying by superiors and other militants (Theidon, 2007; Horgan, 2009: 33), rape (Marriage, 2007; Themner, 2013), and other challenges inherent in membership in an insurgent organization exert internal pressure on individuals to exit. For example, the physical hardships of day-to-day life have been reported by ex-militants of Colombia’s Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and Ejército del Pueblo (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army) as the most prominent causes for leaving the movement (de Posada, 2009). According to Theidon (2007), many of the ex-FARC combatants she interviewed confessed that their decision to leave the organization was influenced heavily by the physical hardships and moral dilemmas they encountered on a daily basis. For instance, being a FARC guerrilla subjected individuals to ‘gnawing hunger; days and weeks without sleep; falling sick without access to medical care or medications; living in fear and clandestinity; having to kill and watch others killing incessantly, often taking the lives of people “I didn’t even know – innocent people” (2007: 77).’ Other ‘push’ factors described by Horgan (2009: 36–38) include negative social consequences, such as censure from family and the burden of psychological pressure. Importantly, both of these factors fall more on the border between internal ‘push’ and external ‘pull’ factors.

‘Pull’ factors

In contrast to internal pressures, many of which may result in the mass exit of militants, external ‘pull’ factors are more personal and more likely to encourage individual rather than mass exit. While incentives such as the desire to create a family, build a normal career, and settle down may be particularly appealing to long-time members of militant groups who have spent significant parts of their lives in an organization, motivations such as the desire to reconnect with families and friends and return to normal life are particularly appealing to recent recruits.

Although these external factors often have a significant impact on the decisions of individual militants, they can under certain circumstances also function as mass incentives. For example, several scholars have noted that the presence of effectively managed demobilization and reintegration programs or disengagement schemes has helped considerably to convince numerous militant fighters to leave their organizations (Walter, 1999; Rolston, 2007; de Vries and Wiegink, 2011). Studies such as those by Alexander (2012) on demobilization in Afghanistan, Ashe (2009) on community-based restorative justice programs in Northern Ireland, Metsola (2006) on reintegration of former fighters in Namibia, Theidon (2009) on DDR in Colombia, and others (Jarman, 2004; Hanasz, 2012) have shown that the existence of effectively managed and implemented reintegration programs has been crucial in encouraging many individual rebel fighters to lay down arms and return to normal life. Alexander (2012) explains that, due to the effectiveness of community reintegration programs in some parts of Afghanistan, hundreds of former Taliban militants were readily accepted by their communities. Hanasz (2012) has shown that, for militant organizations with stronger ideological bases, including the Taliban and many of its offshoot groups in Afghanistan, it is easier to achieve individual militant disengagement by focusing on ‘pull’ factors than to encourage collective demobilization. A study by Collier (1994) has found that if demobilized ex-militants in Uganda were offered access to land and other support in returning to civilian life, they were more likely to reintegrate into communities and less inclined to re-join their former comrades-in-arms. Horgan and Braddock (2010), as well as Boucek (2009) and Stern (2010), note that it is largely due to the focus of Saudi Arabian de-radicalization programs on the families and relatives of ex-militants that it has succeeded in disengaging numerous members of the Islamist underground.

Unlike push factors, ‘pull’ factors involve changes in life priorities, such as the desire to settle down and establish a family, which raises the costs of individual engagement in risky activities (Alonso, 2011; Harris, 2010; Noricks, 2009). As a militant’s membership in a violent extremist group depends on a set of emotional, ideological, or social bonds, their loyalty to the group may vary considerably. Competing loyalties, such as dedication to family (Bjørgo, 2011; Reinares, 2011), seeking membership in a new group or promoting a different cause (Demant and DeGraaf, 2010), or newly acquired religious belief (Reinares, 2011; Garfinkel, 2007) may motivate an individual to escape the group. Due to their power to allure militants away from armed insurgency, ‘pull’ factors have been identified as the key determinants of exit from right- and left-wing organizations and extremist (skinhead) gangs (Horgan, 2009). Rabasa et al. (2011: 27) thus point out that disengagement from the aforementioned types of militant organizations ‘... is driven primarily by disappointment with the organization and its internal workings or by practical factors, such as the desire for a family or career.’

Mechanisms to ensure physical safety (Posada, 2009), as well as security from persecution and imprisonment (Della Porta, 2009; Mullins, 2010); educational and employment opportunities (Abuza, 2009); and financial incentives (Barrett and Bokhari, 2009; Abuza, 2009) often included in DDR-based rehabilitation programs may also serve as factors contributing to a militant’s desire to disengage. A study by de Posada (2009: 276) confirmed that the main causes for demobilization for the majority of Colombia’s militants – both the left-wing FARC and right-wing United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC) – were ‘safety and social relationships’: both of which may be described as being caused by pull factors.

External pull factors, exercised within an environment favorable for disengagement may not only result in the exit of individual militants or groups of militants, but may also culminate in the dissolution of an entire militant organization. An illustrative example presented by Mukhopadhyay (2009) of the ex-Northern Alliance warlord, Atta Mohammed Noor, demonstrates that external incentives, such as in the case of Afghanistan opportunities to engage in politics and becoming part of the government, may convince the top leadership of a militant organization to disengage. Such a decision will almost certainly be followed by the majority of their fighters, many of whom will choose to follow their leaders for personal security or the allure of economic prospects.

While push and pull factors of militant disengagement may easily be placed on the top rung of categorical ladder of causes resulting in disengagement from insurgent organizations, these two structural generic types of factors can in turn be subdivided into agent-centered forms of disengagement, consisting of group and individual forms. Hence, while acknowledging the importance of the ‘push/pull’ framework, this book extends its analysis of disengagement beyond these factors and into a more nuanced and contextualized examination of specific types of disengagement. Of these, this chapter explores collective and individual disengagement, as well as voluntary and involuntary disengagement, beyond the ‘push/pull’ frame.

Collective disengagement

This form of disengagement, otherwise referred to as organizational decline (Horgan, 2009: 20), accounts for a significant percentage of exits from militant groups. Although collective exit is most closely related to internal push factors, the stagnation and demise of insurgencies also increases the chances of successful external pull. The most obvious factor leading to the collective exit of militants is an insurgent organization’s defeat by its enemies. Although even after suffering an excruciating blow at the hands of their adversaries, most insurgencies do not immediately fall apart and rather continue their operation in one form or another, the defeat usually results in mass disengagement or desertion. In most cases, even imprisoned members of a defeated organization chose to abandon their commitment to the group and start cooperating with their captors (Hashim, 2013).

In addition to the factors identified in the section on push factors, disillusionment with a group’s ideology – often following a militant group’s physical defeat of a militant group – the collapse of morale, beliefs, and trust in a group’s organizational structure and operational effectiveness often result in an inevitable collective exodus of militants. Among the most prominent examples of such mass disengagement is the Sri Lankan government’s victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eela...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• 1  Theorizing Militant Disengagement
• 2  Conceptualizing Pathways to Individual Insurgent (Dis)Engagement
• 3  Chechnya and Dagestan: Ethnography, History, and Conflicts
• 4  Individual Disengagement in Chechnya and Dagestan
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index