The Political Empowerment of the Cocaleros of Bolivia and Peru

Kenneth A. Loparo, Ursula Durand Ochoa

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781349497690, 9781137453549
• eBook ISBN: 9781137453556
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: American Government
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book offers a comparative analysis of the distinct experiences of the Peruvian and Bolivian cocaleros as political actors. In doing so, it illustrates how coca, an internationally criminalzsed good, affected the path and outcome of cocalero political empowerment in each case.

Chapter 1

Introduction

In April 2003, Peru’s cocaleros (peasant producers of coca) broke into the national spotlight by mobilizing a 6000–strong March of Sacrifice from their coca-producing valleys to the capital city of Lima. In 2006, cocalero leaders ascended to several political positions at the municipal and national levels. However, their political impact has been limited and divisions among coca-producing valleys have prevented cocaleros from articulating a unified agenda on the coca issue itself, let alone on wider issues. The experience of Bolivia’s cocaleros presents a very different picture. In 2005, cocalero leader Evo Morales was elected president with the highest margin of victory in the country’s electoral history. He was reelected in 2009 by a greater margin. Morales and his political party mobilized a broad coalition as they developed an identity of “excluded” that challenged Bolivia’s unrepresentative democracy, neoliberal economic model, and relationship with the United States.

How do we explain the political ascent of these unprecedented actors that stand on the border of illegality? Why has the empowerment and impact of these actors on their national political landscapes varied so significantly?

This book examines the different experiences of the Bolivian and Peruvian cocaleros in gaining political empowerment through contentious action that originated in defense of coca—an issue that is both delegitimizing and divisive. It presents the political ascent of these actors as cases of identity formation. It argues that their ability to construct identities that deterred disunity, legitimized their struggle, and broadened their appeal determined their degree of political empowerment. Furthermore, it reveals how contentious interactions—bound by the context in which they unfolded—distinctly shaped each case’s identity-formation processes. In Peru, the imposed identity of “illegitimate” weakened the identity of “cocalero” and generated disunity, isolation, and a limited political impact. In Bolivia, the identities of “syndicalist” and “excluded” strengthened the identity of “cocalero” and engendered unity, alliance formation, and a significant political impact.

The Cocaleros in Context

The illicit drug problem, consisting of production, trafficking, and consumption, inflicts significant costs on society. Depending on the degree and type of involvement of affected countries, it generates costs for health care, education, criminal justice, military, judicial, and legislative systems. It also fosters political instability, facilitates corruption, and weakens institutions. Governments of affected countries dedicate vast amounts of resources to containing the illicit drug problem. The struggle is so great that it has been commonly referred to as the “War on Drugs” since the 1970s.¹

In the Andean region, the War on Drugs primarily targets the production and trafficking of cocaine. Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru (the main producers of coca—the raw material for cocaine) work with the main cocaine-consuming countries to form and implement policies that seek to reduce the cultivation of coca. These policies may include forced or cooperative eradication, alternative development, and crop-substitution programs.

Since their transitions to democracy in the 1980s and more poignantly in recent years, Bolivia and Peru have witnessed a series of contentious actions by the peasant producers of coca, commonly referred to as cocaleros. These actors, illegitimated by their link to the illicit drug trade, aim to defend the production and cultural significance of coca and to have a role in the formation of national coca policies. The contentious actions they have undertaken for this purpose have had multiple and distinct effects on national coca policies and on their political empowerment. In Peru, cocaleros formed a social movement that in 2003 brought the state to the negotiating table and resulted in important policy change. However, the movement proved weak, fragmented, and limited in its popular appeal. In contrast, Bolivian cocaleros formed a decidedly unified social movement that became the stronghold of a political party whose candidate won the 2005 and 2009 presidential elections with the highest margins of victory in the country’s electoral history. They significantly altered national coca policies along the way.

What explains the differing abilities of the Bolivian and Peruvian cocaleros to gain political empowerment? This book addresses this question by analyzing the transition of cocaleros in both cases from illegitimate actors to social actors through the formation of a social movement: in the case of Peru, the radicalization, disunity, narrow appeal, and limited political impact of its cocalero social movement; in the case of Bolivia, the consolidation of its cocalero social movement into a prominent political actor through its transformation into a political party with demonstrated mass electoral appeal.

The Cases of Peru and Bolivia

This book examines the cases of the cocaleros of Peru and Bolivia for a paired comparative analysis due to their broad similarities and significant differences. Among the Latin American countries, Bolivia and Peru have among the highest percentage of indigenous people.² Both countries have produced coca for traditional consumption since precolonial times and for illicit purposes in modern times. This stands in contrast to Colombia, which has only produced coca in modern times and has done so exclusively for illicit purposes. The links with the illicit drug trade have inevitably made cocaleros in both countries prominent actors in the War on Drugs. Bolivian and Peruvian cocaleros have developed a stance with respect to the United States based on this circumstance, as well as the latter’s interventionist policies in other matters. The two countries have also experienced institutional failings since (and prior to) their respective democratic transitions, such as crises of representation, corruption, and weak party systems (Gamarra 2003; Ledebur 2005; Mayorga 2002; Rojas 2005).

Alongside these similarities stand marked differences. Of the two countries, Bolivia has a higher percentage of indigenous people, a higher rate of poverty,³ a higher percentage of people employed in coca production, and a higher per capita rate of traditional coca consumption.⁴ Both countries engage in traditional and illicit coca production. In Peru, coca is grown in numerous, scattered, and geographically remote valleys. In Bolivia, it is grown in two main areas (the Yungas and the Tropic of Cochabamba)—neither of which is remote or unfamiliar given their proximity to the cities of La Paz and Cochabamba, respectively.

Both countries have a history of interaction with the United States (to a large extent related to the War on Drugs). However, this has tended to be more conflictive in Bolivia than in Peru. Bolivia, for example, essentially became the testing ground in 1985 for the neoliberal shock therapy prescribed throughout the region in response to the 1980s debt crisis. It experienced one of the harshest stabilization packages in Latin America, the severe social costs of which have not been forgotten. Peru also underwent neoliberal shock therapy in the 1990s. Yet, the harsh reform package had more support (or less antagonism) than in Bolivia because Peru faced the growing threat of Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path)⁵ alongside that of economic breakdown.

Additional differences stand out. First, indigenous movements, leaders, and parties have had a far greater presence and influence in Bolivia than in Peru.⁶ Second, Bolivia did not suffer the vicious and socially debilitating effects of Peru’s war with the Shining Path. Third, Bolivia’s labor and peasant union sector—due in part to the legacy of the revolution of 1952—is more autonomous and better organized than its Peruvian counterpart. Bolivian cocalero organizations emerged within this union sector and eventually became its dominant force. The labor and peasant union sector in Peru has been historically characterized by partisanship and lack of cohesion. It has four main labor federations and two main peasant federations divided along party lines, as well as several semi-independent sectoral federations. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the presence of the Shining Path and a militarized state severely weakened labor and peasant federations. Cocalero organizations in Peru (with one exception) emerged independent of the union sector. They have since then remained autonomous and have not received significant union sector support in their mobilizations. Fourth, Bolivia was affected by US drug policies in the 1980s and 1990s to a much greater extent than Peru. This occurred in part because activities of the Shining Path made the War on Drugs in Peru a lesser priority. Fifth, Bolivia has had a far greater dependence on the coca-cocaine economy than Peru (or Colombia for that matter), especially during the economic crisis of the 1980s.

Given these differences, one could perhaps argue that the disparate political fortunes of the Bolivian and Peruvian cocaleros are hardly surprising. However, such a conclusion would be giving too much credit to structural preconditions and not enough to the fact that the Peruvian cocaleros overcame the aforesaid obstacles and gave rise to a contentious episode with considerable impact. This is remarkable because the cocaleros of Peru managed to generate a contentious episode despite a weak history of union and indigenous organization, despite their formal criminalization by the state in 1978 (ten years before Bolivia), despite their subjection to the Shining Path and state repression that followed under the Fujimori government, despite the tensions and rivalries between the interests and leaders of the numerous coca-producing valleys (which vary in terms of their degree of legality),⁷ and despite the substantial geographic and cultural distance between them and other groups in society. The Peruvian cocaleros managed to lead and highlight a struggle largely unknown or ignored by the rest of the country. At the height of their contentious episode, they mobilized two marches by thousands of cocaleros from the country’s coca-producing valleys to Lima. Their contentious actions compelled the state to conduct the first formal study of the legal demand for coca in 2004, which resulted in an update of the register of legal coca producers that had remained unchanged since 1978. They pressured the state to engage in dialogue and pass a law that made the policy of gradual and negotiated (as opposed to forced) eradication mandatory. In the end, Peru’s cocaleros brought about a renewed debate on an issue that had faded in prominence since the steep decline in the production of coca that took place in the mid-1990s. Yet, unlike the Bolivian cocaleros that managed to transition from mobilizing as a social movement to challenging entrenched authorities as a political party, the Peruvian cocaleros have only achieved limited and individual political victories since the radicalization and division of their social movement.

This book takes into account the different social and political contexts of Peru and Bolivia discussed above, which encompass both structural preconditions and political opportunity structures.

Analytical Framework

The analysis of this book is centered within the field of contentious politics. It focuses on the theoretical framework and research agenda developed by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly (2001) in Dynamics of Contention as a starting point for analyzing the emergence and political empowerment of the cocalero social movements of Bolivia and Peru. It addresses the various limitations and critiques of theories within the field of contentious politics, both in general terms and in specific terms within the Latin American region.

From “Old” to “New” Social Movements

The study of contentious politics and social movements⁸ has evolved extensively since the mid-twentieth century. As Della Porta and Diani (2006) note:

If, at the end of the 1940s, critics lamented the “crudely descriptive level of understanding and relative lack of theory” [Strauss 1947: 352], and in the 1960s complained that “in the study of social changes, social movements have received relatively little emphasis” [Killian 1964: 426], by the mid-1970s, research into collective action was considered “one of the most vigorous areas of sociology” [Marx and Wood 1975]. At the end of the 1980s commentators talked of “an explosion, in the last ten years, of theoretical and empirical writings on social movements and collective action” [Morris and Herring 1987: 138; see also Rucht 1991a] . . . Today, the study of social movements is solidly established. (1)

The most notable turning point took place in the 1960s, when a new wave of academics rejected the traditional class-based collective action theories in favor of new approaches. Prior to this new cycle, studies of collective action centered on what Offe (1985) refers to as the “old paradigm” of politics. The prominent issues of the “old paradigm” include economic growth, distribution, military security, social security, and social control. Its central actors include socioeconomic groups involved in distributive conflicts. These actors operate internally through formal organizations and externally through intermediation or political party competition (Offe 1985: 832). The 1960s—a decade witness to the US civil rights movement, international students’ movements, and the antinuclear movement among others—shifted the research agenda toward more informal forms of collective action taking place outside the system. The “new paradigm” of politics predominant in the field has since then focused on issues that transcend those of traditional class-based actors. These issues may include the environment, human rights, gender, peace, and so forth. The central actors of the “new paradigm” include socioeconomic groups that act not as socioeconomic groups per se, but on behalf of “ascriptive collectivities.” They are organized informally and openly contest the state through protest (Offe 1985: 832). In short, under the new paradigm, class background does not determine collective identities; collective action does not limit itself to formal vertical organizations; and the target of collective action can extend beyond the economy or the state.

Research seeking to overcome the “old paradigm” of politics developed along two different strands: the resource-mobilization (or strategy-oriented) approach and the new social movement (or identity-oriented) approach. The resource-mobilization approach contested the functionalist views of the “irrational and unorganized nature of collective action” (Foweraker 1995: 16). In functionalist accounts, collective action results from irrational responses to change and has volatile goals and “crude” forms of communication (Cohen 1985: 672). In the 1960s, collective action studies began to take on an alternative perspective that replaced the idea of the psychologically susceptible individual with the rational actor. Olson (1965), for example, takes a strictly utilitarian stance by arguing that collective action cannot result from the rational pursuit of common interests because the costs of engaging in such action often outweigh the benefits. Rational individuals will not necessarily devote resources to collective action given that they can benefit from the collective goods derived from such action without incurring the costs of engaging in it (a phenomenon known as the free-rider problem). Individuals choose to engage in collective action only after making a cost-benefit analysis based on the selective constraints and incentives imposed or made available to them (Olson 1965). Various resource-mobilization approaches have since then attempted to address the free-rider problem in accounting for cycles of contentious collective action. McCarthy and Zald (1977), for example, highlight the importance of available resources in explaining the disparity between the omnipresence of grievances versus the lack of corresponding omnipresence of collective action (1214–1415). Other approaches emphasize the impor...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Chapter 1  Introduction
• Chapter 2  The Criminalization of Coca and Cocaine
• Chapter 3  Peru: Formation of a Social Movement—Crisis and Repression during the Transition(s) to Democracy
• Chapter 4  Bolivia: Formation of a Social Movement—Crisis and Opportunity during the Transition to Democracy
• Chapter 5  Peru: Transformation of a Social Movement—Radicalization, Division, and Demobilization
• Chapter 6  Bolivia: Transformation of a Social Movement—Convergence and Diffusion
• Chapter 7  Conclusion: The Cocaleros of Bolivia and Peru Compared
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index