Power, Politics and Confrontation in Eurasia

Foreign Policy in a Contested Region

Roger E. Kanet, Matthew Sussex, Roger E. Kanet, Matthew Sussex

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN:
  9781137523662
• eBook ISBN:
  9781137523679
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Diplomacia y tratados

The central objective of this edited volume is to help unlock a set of intriguing puzzles relating to changing power dynamics in Eurasia, a region that is critically important in the changing international security landscape.

Part I

Russian Politics and Foreign Policy

1

Whose Playground Is It, Anyway? Power Rivalries in Post-Soviet Space

Suzanne Loftus and Roger E. Kanet

Introduction

In many respects the ongoing conflicts between Russophones and the Ukrainian government in south-eastern Ukraine, between the governments in Kyiv and Moscow, and between the Russian Federation and both the United States and the European Union represent the culmination of the struggle to redefine spheres of influence in post-communist Europe. When the Soviet Union collapsed almost a quarter of a century ago US President George H.W. Bush envisaged the emergence of a ‘new world order’ in which states would resolve their differences through negotiations (Bush, 1991) and Russian President Boris Yeltsin spoke of Russia joining ‘the community of civilized nations’ (Yeltsin, 1992). The differences that had divided Russians and Americans, many expected, would be resolved, as the new Russian Federation became a full-fledged member of the Western-centred international system – the very system against which the Soviet Union had so long struggled. In the 1970s, then Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev had regularly spoken of the ‘changing international correlations of forces’ and the emergence of a new global international system that would soon bypass a declining international capitalist system (Mitchell, 1978). Less than two decades later Russia seemed to be on the verge of embracing that capitalist system.

Yet, as is now so very evident, not all of those in the political elite in either Washington or Moscow in 1992 shared President Bush’s view of that new world order. In both capitals there were those with darker, less optimistic, views about the preferred development of Russian–US and Russian–Western relations more broadly. As we shall demonstrate in the following pages, the honeymoon was soon over. Western leaders wrote off Russia as a diminished international actor and dismissed Russian policy concerns and objectives and moved to constrain any Russian efforts to re-establish its dominance across the Eurasian landmass. In Russia a growing group voiced their alarm that Gorbachev and Yeltsin had given away Russia’s empire and challenged its security without really getting anything in return. Before the end of the first decade of independence of the Russian Federation, Russia and the West were enmeshed in a series of disagreements and conflicts that are still central to their relations today (Kanet, 2001; Kanet & Ibryamova, 2001).

In some respects these disagreements led almost directly to the confrontation between the two sides in the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. Today’s Russia under President Vladimir Putin has declared itself a revisionist state, one that no longer abides by the rules of the liberal international system established by the West, a state that can establish regional dominance and be an important international actor on its own. With the use of aggressive gas policies, Russia has been able to assert dominance in the former USSR space (Nygren, 2007, 2008) despite Western attempts to counter this revival. Whether Russia’s aggressive foreign policy stance is viable in the long term, with an economy that is highly dependent on energy resources that will inevitably run out, is an issue the Russian state needs to face for the future.¹

The present chapter has a twofold purpose, to demonstrate both sides of the evolving relationship of Russia with the West over the past quarter century. On the one hand, the West largely ignored Russia and Russian interests, thereby contributing to the deterioration of relations, especially after the rise of President Vladimir Putin. On the other, and closely intertwined with the first, as Matthew Sussex, Richard Sakwa and Peter Shearman all maintain (Sussex, 2015; Sakwa, this volume; and Shearman,this volume), from the very outset Russian leaders pursued a policy of ‘revanchism’, committed to re-establishing Russia’s status as the dominant regional power and a major global actor. However, in the most recent period President Putin and his supporters have seemingly overextended their reach. Although Russia largely overcame Western efforts to contain its interests, it has pursued policies that increasingly confronted the West without calculating the relative weakness from which Moscow was operating. The current collapse in global petroleum prices and the free-fall of the value of the rouble are the result.

US–EU–Russian relations in the 21st century

During Mikhail Gorbachev’s final years in power Moscow hoped for good relations with Europe and joint global leadership with the US. When Boris Yelstin came to power as Russia’s first president, he tried to integrate Russia into the West by seeking to join various economic and political regimes that were dominated by the West. Eight years later, when Putin replaced him, security collaboration between Russia and the West still seemed feasible. In addition, during his presidency, Dmitry Medvedev suggested a European security treaty and a joint defence perimeter for Russia and NATO. As Dmitri Trenin (2014) of the Moscow Carnegie Center has stated, all these efforts have fallen short of expectations, as the leaders of the West showed little concern in integrating Russia into Western institutions.² Given the size of Russia and its economy, providing the amount of economic assistance implied in Western promises would have been quite costly for the West. Although the West did provide assistance and advice to Russia to restructure its economic institutions, the end result was a failure, as the Russian economy plummeted and Russia defaulted on its domestic debt in 1998.³ By then relations between the two sides had begun to sour, as disagreements arose.

As noted, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Russian foreign policy objectives under President Yelstin focused on improving its relationship with the West. Efforts were made toward Russian economic integration into the global economy and establishing democratic rule in the former USSR. However, Yelstin’s Western-oriented policies were controversial in Russia, especially as criticism broke out concerning the lack of Western development assistance in return for Russian integration efforts. Moreover, the EU and NATO began discussing eastward expansion into areas formally under Soviet control, which many in Russia viewed as a threat. Because of Russia’s perception of this one-sided relationship, enthusiasm for Westernization waned, paving the way for a nationalist and assertive foreign policy later emphasized under President Vladimir Putin. On the other hand, the West was committed to pushing the former Soviet states toward democratic governance and capitalist economic systems, in order for the region to be fully integrated into the West. This policy objective became increasingly problematic over the years, especially under Putin and his nationalist agenda to re-establish Russia as a dominant actor in the international system (Stent, 2014).

Despite the deterioration of relations between the West and Russia, there have been temporary ‘resets’ where relations momentarily improved or even became cooperative. Such a reset occurred after the 11 September terrorist attacks, as President Putin offered Russian support to the United States to retaliate against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Russia supported the US military intervention in Afghanistan by providing advice and by facilitating US access to military air bases in Central Asia. This cordial relationship came to an end as the Bush administration invaded Iraq with the intention of regime change, a concept Russia has never supported. Putin realized that, despite his efforts to become an equal in the international system, the Bush Administration was not willing to share decision making in its ‘war on terror’ with Russia – or with any other state, for that matter. Putin was disillusioned by the results of his attempted cooperation with the West on this issue. His intention was to demonstrate that Russia was an important partner in the ‘global war on terror’ and that Russia’s own struggles with terrorism in the North Caucasus paralleled those of the US against Al-Qaeda. On the other hand, Washington believed that by fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda it would be doing Russia a favour by ‘cleaning up its backyard’ (Stent, 2014, p. 71). Washington did not assume that it needed to grant Russia recognition for its support and maintained that it was in Russia’s interest to support the US campaign. In return, the US was willing to remain silent on the Chechen War and on Putin’s undemocratic internal policies. Moreover, Russia was promised accelerated WTO membership to assist with economic modernization (Stent, 2014, p. 74). Nevertheless, Putin remained disenchanted by the lack of equality Russia was given in terms of policy decisions in the ‘global war on terror’.

After the setbacks to US–Russian relations resulting from the US intervention in Iraq, the ‘colour revolutions’ in Russia’s backyard between 2003 and 2005 proved to be even more problematic, as Washington and Brussels supported the revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, which appeared to be a struggle for power and influence between the West and Russia in Russia’s desired sphere of influence. Russia continues to believe that it has a certain entitlement to hegemony over its former Soviet republics, but the United States firmly believes that these countries are now independent and have the right to choose their own policy orientations. After 74 years of Soviet communism, the Soviet successor states tended to develop a ‘post-Soviet syndrome’ after independence (Stent, 2014, p. 99). Unsure of what identity to take on after independence, they were strongly influenced by their Soviet pasts and tended to adopt authoritarian state structures with a weak rule of law and a paternalistic system of governance. However, a decade after the collapse of the USSR, some countries began to experience rebellious movements against this status quo and fought to move closer toward Europe. These became known as the ‘colour revolutions’ which set off alarm bells for Russia. These revolutions occurred in response to elections considered fraudulent in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. In these cases, the Soviet-style incumbent had limited public support, but the regime could not suppress the rebellions and was overthrown and replaced by a more Western-oriented leader. Russia feared the same could happen within its own borders. Moreover, the fact that Western NGOs were promoting and supporting these rebellions demonstrated to Russia yet another American strategy at attempting to weaken Russia’s influence in its own neighbourhood (Stent, 2014, pp. 101–106).

In addition, Russia’s relationship with the European Union was deteriorating as well, as the EU was critical of Russia’s actions in Chechnya and its overall human rights record. Moreover, the ‘colour revolutions’ caused additional problems between the EU and Russia, as controversy arose over the question of establishing Western-democratic values in Russia’s sphere of influence. These revolutions symbolized the shift of the East toward the development of democratic political institutions away from traditional Soviet-style governance and a desire to integrate into European institutions such as the EU and even NATO. Clearly, these initiatives were strongly supported by the West, but to Russia they appeared as a threat to its regional interests and to its objective of re-establishing itself as a great power.

Moreover, the European Union implemented the EU Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), a foreign policy instrument that has sought closer ties with countries to the east and south of the EU. Former USSR states participate in hopes to further integrate with Europe and eventually become a member of the EU.⁴ The EU has offered financial assistance to countries in its ‘neighbourhood’ as long as the participating members meet certain political and economic reforms. Russia has understood this initiative as part of a plan to expand Western values into Russia’s desired sphere of influence (Casier, 2012). After the Cold War the West was committed to ensuring that Russia could not reassert its dominance across the former Soviet space. Such objectives were also made clear through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, which encouraged cooperation between former Soviet states and NATO and Euro–Atlantic partners. Moreover, the US attempted to push for the development of energy pipelines from Central Asia to Europe that would bypass Russia, limiting Russia’s ability to control the independent states and limiting Europe’s dependence on Russia for gas transit (Kanet, 2015, in press).

Fortunately for Russia, by the time Putin became president in 2001, the Russian economy was starting to recover from its difficult transition from the USSR throughout the 1990s, thanks to the increasing global demand for oil and gas. Putin used this increase in demand to his advantage and was able to re-impose central political control over the Russian state using increasingly coercive means. Russia’s stronger economic position has allowed it to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy with a nationalist rhetoric, a strategy that has gained Putin support at home (Kanet, 2010). Moreover, Russia was able to help to reverse the impact of the ‘colour revolutions’ by using its aggressive foreign policy strategies. Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 after relations between Putin and Saakashvili deteriorated as a result of the Rose Revolution in Georgia. Georgian President Saakashvili made it clear that he wanted to reintegrate South Ossetia and Abkhazia, two secessionist areas backed by Russia, by force if necessary, as well as join NATO and the EU. When a ‘massive Georgian artillery attack’ (Stent, 2014, p. 171) was launched in South Ossetia, killing both Ossetians and Russian peace-keeping troops, Russian forces marched into Georgia and five days later the overwhelmingly more powerful Russian forces defeated the Georgian military. Russia then officially recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Moscow frequently compared the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to that of Kosovo, which was generally supported by the West, and claimed that there should be no argument against Moscow’s support of these secessionist states. Russia’s actions in Georgia displayed its attitude and response toward the question of the Euro–Atlantic integration of its neighbours. Plans for NATO membership in Georgia were then put on hold.

In addition, the reform movement was undermined in Ukraine, which facilitated the election of Pro-Russian president Yanukovych in Ukraine’s next elections in 2010. President Viktor Yushchenko and Putin were involved in several gas disputes between 2005 and 2009. After the Orange Revolution, Russia used its soft power strategies with Ukraine and raised the prices of its gas deliveries. Ukraine then threatened to intercept gas in transit to Europe, leading to Russia’s cutting off of all deliveries (Nygren, 2008). The election of Russian-backed president Yanukovych in the next Ukrainian elections normalized the relationship between Ukraine and Russia and led to an agreement whereby Russia could keep its naval base in Crimea until 2042 in return for stable gas deliveries at a discounted price. Throughout post-Soviet space in the attempt to stave off Western influence in its region, Russia employed strategies such as economic blackmail, military intervention, economic assistance, and the support of the coup that brought down the president of Kyrgyzstan in 2010.

Russia had other problems besides countering the effects of the ‘colour revolutions’. After George W. Bush became president in 2001, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were on the list for NATO expansion. There was opposition from abroad to this decision, but in 2002 NATO offered them full membership. Moreover, the US had decided to deploy portions of an anti-ballistic missile system, which further exacerbated tensions with Moscow. President Bush withdrew from the 1972 ABM treaty and eliminated other barriers to the deployment of an anti-missile defence system in the Czech Republic and Poland, in order to defend against missiles that might possibly be launched from Iran or North Korea in the future (Shanker & Coulish, 2008). After Russia’s military intervention in Georgia, the Czech Republic and Poland were eager to ratify the agreement with the United States, dis...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction: Power, Politics and Confrontation in Eurasia
• Part I  Russian Politics and Foreign Policy
• Part II  Institutions and Architecture in Eurasia
• Part III  Confrontation in Ukraine
• Conclusion
• Index