Hobbes on Legal Authority and Political Obligation

Luciano Venezia

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781137490254
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Hobbes on Legal Authority and Political Obligation develops a new interpretation of Hobbes's theory of political obligation. According to the account developed in the book, the directives issued by the sovereign as introducing authoritative requirements, so that subjects are morally obligated to obey them.

1

Introduction

According to the standard philosophical interpretation, Hobbes’ legal theory introduces the idea that coercion is the main feature of law. This reading then establishes that subjects have binding political obligations because complying with the law is the best way to promote their interests. Despite its prominence and intuitive character, I do not think that this account properly describes these central ideas of Hobbes’ legal and political theory. As I will show in the following pages, for Hobbes coercion is not the characteristic feature of law, nor does rational self-interest play a key role in establishing subjects’ political obligations.

In the book, I will develop a completely different interpretation of Hobbes’ political theory, one which stresses the sovereign’s authority over his subjects. According to this view, the directives issued by the sovereign introduce reasons which replace other considerations for the subjects to act in one way or another. The subjects are then bound to obey the law because the sovereign commands them to do so, rather than because obeying the law constitutes an efficient means of promoting their rational self-interest. In this sense, I will argue that subjects are morally obligated to obey the law, rather than merely compelled to comply with the law by the sovereign’s use of physical force or the threat to use physical force, as is assumed by the standard interpretation.

As I will show below, Hobbes argues that subjects are morally obligated to obey the law in most cases. However, he also grants that they may legitimately disobey the law, though only in very exceptional circumstances. The standard interpretation of Hobbes’ theory of political obligation is not really able to properly account for this characteristic feature of his political philosophy; in fact, this reading introduces a theory that is not Hobbes’. In contrast, I will show that the interpretation that stresses the sovereign’s authority smoothly accommodates the key idea that subjects have binding political obligations even in cases in which to obey the law does not promote their rational self-interest, and it also establishes that they may legitimately disobey the law in the cases granted by Hobbes.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I will briefly describe the central elements of the interpretation of Hobbes’ theory of legal authority and political obligation that I will develop in the book (1.1). Next, I will discuss some methodological issues (1.2). Then, I will comment on my argumentative strategy (1.3). Finally, I will indicate how I will use the textual evidence (1.4).

1.1 The project

The description and justification of the obligation to obey the law of one’s state occupies a central place in Hobbes’ political theory.¹ Moreover, Hobbes writes that in Leviathan he pretends to ‘nothing but what is necessary to the doctrine of Government and Obedience’.² He also argues that the obligation to obey the law exhausts all political obligations:

The Vertue of a Subiect is comprehended wholly in obedience to the Laws of the Commonwealth. To obey the Laws is Justice and Equity, which is the Law of Nature, and consequently is Ciuill Law in all Nations of the world. And nothing is Iniustice or Iniquity otherwise then it is against the Law. Likewise to obey the Laws is the Prudence of a Subiect. For without such obedience the Common wealth which is euery subiects safety and protection, cannot subsist.³

The standard reading in the modern philosophical literature assumes that Hobbes’ political philosophy introduces a theory according to which subjects have binding political obligations because the sanctions for non-compliance provided by the law give them sufficient reason to obey.⁴ In fact, this view comprises two distinct albeit related theses: an account of law – the vehicle through which the sovereign⁵ exercises power over the subjects⁶ – and a theory of political obligation. The standard interpretation states that, for Hobbes, the characteristic feature of law lies in its causal capacity to compel the subjects to obey by the use of physical force or the threat to use physical force. Moreover, this reading states that the subjects are bound to obey the law because so acting best promotes their rational self-interest.⁷

The above passage seems to introduce the second thesis: subjects have binding political obligations because so acting promotes their rational self-interest. And indeed, the two theses find strong textual support in several passages of the corpus. Despite its prominence and intuitive character, however, in my view this account does not correctly portray these key features of Hobbes’ political and legal theory. Certainly, the sanctions for non-compliance provided by the law give strong incentives for obedience, so that in many cases subjects have prudential reasons to comply with the law. Now, there also exist cases in which legal commands require that subjects act in one way while rational self-interest recommends acting in a different way. As I will argue in the following pages, Hobbes’ account actually involves the idea that the subjects are morally obligated to obey the directives issued by the sovereign even when complying with the law is not recommended by their rational self-interest.

In this book, I will put forward a new interpretation of Hobbes’ theory of political obligation that accounts for this point, something which cannot be established in the context of a reading which states that subjects have binding political obligations because the sanctions for non-compliance provided by the law give them sufficient reason to obey. In a nutshell, my reading highlights the authority of law: ‘Authoritas non Veritas facit Legem.’⁸ In particular, I will construe the directives issued by the sovereign as introducing authoritative requirements, so that the subjects are morally obligated to obey them.⁹

In order to obtain a rough idea of the way I will account for the sovereign’s authority over his subjects, it may be useful to consider an example. Joseph Raz portrays in a particularly vivid fashion the way governments – which characteristically claim legitimate authority for themselves¹⁰ – intend to impose their orders over the citizenry:

Governments decide what is best for their subjects and present them with the results as binding conclusions that they are bound to follow. A government does not merely say to its subjects: ‘Here are our laws. Give them some weight in your considerations. But of course you may well be justified in deciding that on balance they should be disobeyed.’ It says: ‘We are better able to decide how you should act. Our decision is in these laws. You are bound by them and should follow them whether or not you agree with them.’¹¹

Raz illustrates the way governments intend their directives to be assessed by their citizens as follows:

Take taxation, for example. Let us assume that its justification is in the moral reasons individuals have to contribute to the provision of certain communal services. The government assesses the just rate of contributions and demands that each of us should pay as assessed. It does not say: ‘We think that that is the just rate, but we will understand if you refuse to pay, provided you did so after giving careful consideration to the balance of reasons, our demand included.’ They say: ‘It is for us to decide what is the just rate to pay. You must pay the sum we prescribed unless you fall into one of the exceptions we allowed for.’¹²

In this book, I will argue that Hobbes’ analysis of law shares the essential features of the view developed by Raz. In particular, I will show that the directives issued by the sovereign are intended to affect practical reasoning by means of introducing authoritative requirements, which as such have the purpose of interrupting practical deliberation as well as providing the relevant reason for compliance.

The idea that the sovereign’s commands authoritatively regulate the subjects’ actions has some antecedents in the scholarly literature, including points and remarks in articles and monographs in the history of political thought as well as in modern political and legal philosophy.¹³ However, these interpretations are few and far between and none of them introduces a political and legal theory similar to the one I will develop in the following pages. Moreover, these readings do not analyze all the different features actually involved in Hobbes’ account. For my part, I aim to provide a comprehensive interpretation of Hobbes’ theory of legal authority and political obligation. In particular, my reading involves both conceptual as well as normative elements, which I will articulate around three theses (or, rather, sets of theses). Let us briefly look at the characteristic features of this view.

First, I will establish that authority, rather than coercion, is the key feature of law. In particular, I will argue that, in Hobbes’ view, legal directives introduce authoritative reasons which replace other considerations to act one way or another and which, as such, are not intended to promote the subjects’ rational self-interest. Moreover, there are cases in which the sovereign issues directives which require that the subjects act in ways contrary to the balance of reasons (including their rational self-interest). Hobbes’ legal theory assumes that there is nothing irrational in complying with these requirements. The account that stresses the authority of law smoothly accommodates this point. This is because the commands issued by the sovereign introduce genuine reasons, even if authoritative reasons are of a different kind from normal reasons for action, such as desires, interests or preferences.

Next, I will analyze the normative content of Hobbes’ theory of political obligation. I will show that Hobbes’ account introduces the idea that subjects are obligated to obey the law in almost all circumstances, so that they have binding political obligations even when obeying the law does not promote their rational self-interest. To account for this theory, I will first argue that Hobbes’ moral philosophy has the conceptual space required to accommodate the standard notion of moral duty or obligation,¹⁴ which, among other things, states that moral considerations possess a distinctive normativity of their own. Next, I will investigate the relationship between natural and civil law in the commonwealth.

Then, I will examine the theory that establishes the sovereign’s legal authority and the subjects’ political obligations. I wil...