This chapter has three objectives. First, it will demonstrate the role intelligence can play for decision-makers, analysts, investigators and others managing bio-threats and risks. In particular, the chapter shows the importance of good intelligence support to preventing, disrupting, reducing and containing such threats. Second, it will define key terminology used throughout the book, such as âbiosecurity â, âbioterrorism â and âbio-threatsâ. Given the diverse nature of the biosecurity and bioterrorism fields, differences exist among scholars and practitioners on the meaning of various terminology: including âbiosecurity â and âbioterrorism â. Several researchers have tried to address these definitional difficulties (Koblentz 2010; Rappert and Gould 2009: 1â19; Lakoff and Collier 2008). The chapter will build on their work to provide definitions for biosecurity and other terminology. Third, it will provide an overview of the bookâs approach and an outline of the remaining eight chapters. But before addressing each of these objectives, it is important to provide a brief background of where this book fits into the broader biosecurity literature.
Since 9/11, there has been a growing concern amongst decision-makers and the public about bio-terrorism as well as other biosecurity threats. A key priority for policy makers has been to prevent what many argue to be low probability, yet high impact bio-attack scenarios by terroristsâsuch as the use of a highly pathogenic weaponised substance like anthrax in a major urban centre (Koblentz 2009: 200â227; Rosenau 2001; Tenet 2007). The 2001 Amerithrax attacks on members of the US Congress postal system and some media outlets demonstrated that policy makers had cause for concern about such bio-threat scenarios (Walsh 2011). Though in this case, the mode of delivery (via the mail) was not the highly sophisticated âWMD â platform some might have expected. Nevertheless, the attack demonstrated the critical role of technology and scientific experience in enabling bio-attacks regardless of their mode of delivery or their impact.
Both the first attack (only one week after 9/11), and the second (in October 2001), became a catalyst for recalibrating many policy maker and intelligence agencyâs understanding of the nature of bio-threats and their impacts. However, the investigation that followed Amerithrax showed that planning such attacks was complex and required a great deal of tacit and technical knowledgeâbeyond simply down loading a ârecipeâ for making a bio-bomb from the internet (Walsh 2014; Vogel 2013).
The attack revealed how difficult it was for even a microbiologist, who worked with anthrax for twenty years to make a highly weaponisable form of the bacteria (Walsh 2014). From another perspective though, the Amerithrax case provided more insights to our assessments of threat actors and their capabilities to use biological substancesâparticularly in acts of terrorism. Yet from another, it became clearer that it was beyond the capability of most terrorists groups to down load ârecipesâ from the internet for making and weaponising anthrax despite some trying in the past (Rosenau 2001; Tenet 2007; Walsh 2014).
Despite the technological and logistical difficulties of âweaponisingâ a dangerous pathogen, the Amerithrax incident was seminal in improving our post 9/11 understanding of other important facets of biosecurity and bioterrorism that remain less clear. These include: the role of intelligence, investigation challenges, multi-agency collaboration (particularly between national security and public health agencies) and the role of technology in driving emerging bio-threats.
The history of biosecurity and bioterrorism goes back centuries (Crawford 2007; McNeil 1998). The modern history of bio-weapons (both state sponsored and terrorism) begins in the twentieth century with changes in the international security environment and advancements in both technology and microbiology. However, these changes in the bio-threat landscape during both world wars and the Cold War (Koblentz 2009, 2010; Geissler and van Courtland Moon 1999; Tucker 2000) have been well surveyed from an international security and bioterrorism perspective.
The book acknowledges and reviews briefly the bio-threat landscape up to the Cold War (see Chapter 2), but its primary focus is on the analysis of the post 9/11 biosecurity environment. In particular, the book seeks to make a unique contribution to the biosecurity and bioterrorism literature by focusing exclusively from an intelligence perspective on the four key objectives listed later in this chapter.
Since 9/11, an increasing amount of literature and several government reports have focused on aspects of the role of intelligence in managing biosecurity threats (e.g. Koblentz 2009; Vogel 2008; SSCI 2004; Butler 2004; Silberman and Robb 2005; NRC 2006). However, the literature has only provided a smaller focus on intelligence issues with the broader attention placed on other aspects of biosecurity and bioterrorism , such as: international security issues, bioterrorism , post 9/11 biosecurity policy-making or intelligence failure post WMD assessments in Iraq . The literature has not examined in detail the role of intelligenceâeither as a system of processes resulting in products that support decision making in the bio-threat context; or as a set of organisational and community frameworks in which intelligence capabilities work to provide strategic, operational and tactical decision-making support.
Drawing on recent theoretical perspectives from research into intelligence reform post 9/11 (Walsh 2011), this book will provide a deeper, macro understanding of both the opportunities and limitations of intelligence processes and capabilities that has been missing in the post 9/11 biosecurity , bio-terrorism literature. The focus will be broadâspanning across the bio-threat spectrum including bio-crime and bioterrorism issues.
The Audience
This book is primarily for intelligence analystsâregardless of their professional context (national security, law enforcement, military or private sector), who are currently or shortly will work on bio-threats and risks. The second audience is for the broader and diverse array of stakeholders, who also play a role in managing bio-threats and risks. These include: policy makers, public health authorities, first responders, intelligence agencies, investigators, researchers, security managers, compliance officers, and the private sector. All of these stakeholders also need to better understand what the intelligence enterprise can and cannot deliver to support biosecurity threat decision-making. Finally, the book will be of interest to undergraduate and postgraduate students enrolled in a range of cross disciplinary courses relating to biosecurity , bioterrorism and health security .
The book does not assume any prior knowledge about intelligence or biosecurity , hence its introductory and incremental approach will be useful to tertiary and other training courses for security officers, post-graduate intelligence and security programs, public health and other regulatory/compliance training programs relating to biosecurity and bio-terrorism.
The Bookâs Points of Difference
In addition to focusing exclusively on the role of intelligence in managing bio-threats and risks, a second unique feature of the volume is how it addresses the four central objectives (detailed below) by drawing on interviews from key stakeholders (policy, intelligence, security and researchers). The book includes insights from intelligence and security practitioners and researchers across the âFive Eyesâ countries (Australia, UK, US, Canada and New Zealand), who have had an active role in the biosecurity and bio-terrorism space.
Insights from academics, intelligence and security practitioners have been gathered by adopting a flexible qualitative approach using semi-structured interviews. In total 25 interviews were conducted across the âFive Eyesâ intelligence countriesâthe bulk completed in the US and Canada. This methodology is a similar one adopted during research for my first book, Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis (2011), which involved interviewing 60 intelligence leaders, managers and analysts across the âFive Eyesâ intelligence communities. The insights and experiences of both producers and consumers of intelligence in the biosecurity and bioterrorism context is essential to include when trying to gauge the role of intelligence in a potentially rapidly evolving threat environment.
In summary, the key benefits of this book is its detailed focus on intelligence processes and capabilities and assessing their role in preventing, disrupting and containing contemporary and emerging bio-threats. A third benefit is that the book seeks to build a bridge between the intelligence and biological sciences âworldsâ. It does not pretend to be a treatise of technical and scientific knowledge on the biological sciences. The analysis presented is from an intelligence studies perspective only. Nonetheless it seeks to bring our clinical and scientist colleagues into debates of mutual concern relating to biosecurity and bio-terrorism.
Book Scope and Limitations
The small number of interviews obviously do not constitute eit...