Rethinking Human Enhancement

Social Enhancement and Emergent Technologies

Laura Y. Cabrera

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN:
  9781349571307
  9781137402233
• eBook ISBN:
  9781137402240
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy
• Index: Social Sciences

This book discusses three possible human enhancement paradigms and explores how each involves different values, uses of technology, and different degrees and kinds of ethical concerns. A new framework is advanced that promotes technological innovation that serves the improvement of the human condition in a respectful and sustainable way.

1

Introduction to the Enhancement Debate

Background

‘Human enhancement’ has become an umbrella term to refer to a wide range of existing, emerging and visionary technological interventions that blur the boundaries between interventions aimed at therapy and those beyond therapy, as well as interventions aimed at prevention, restoration, rehabilitation and promotion of well-being. Discussion of issues related to human enhancement is nothing new. The human desire for improvement goes before we have even developed any sophisticated technology. History has shown us that the desire for more, for the unlimited, for better and for the different is not satisfied with the average, nor takes its weight from the distinction between healthy and better than healthy or the abnormal and normal. In this sense, Bertrand Russell was probably right when stating that humans differ from other animals, insofar as they have some desires that are never satisfied. We can even say that the desire to improve ourselves and to overcome our limitations is all-too-human.

Throughout history, understanding of the human condition and ways in which to improve it have changed as a result of the various interactions we, as humankind, have with technology and our environments; changing the way in which we perceive and value our world and ourselves. The dynamic process of trying to improve the human condition is shaped by social changes but also by technological and scientific developments.¹ It is through science that we get a better understanding of our environment, and with technology we develop the tools and devices that day by day help humankind to understand his condition and possible ways to improve it. Thus, even though the desire to improve ourselves has been part of humans for a long time, advances in emergent technologies will likely provide us with unprecedented ways to improve the human condition. While these technologies have the potential to change the human condition for the better, they also have the potential to change it for the worse.

Over the last three and half decades, advances in different technologies—such as pharmaceutical, genetic interventions, implant technology—have given a particular twist to the human desire for improvement (Bostrom & Savulescu, 2009; Buchanan, Brock, Daniels, & Wikler, 2001; Coenen et al., 2009; Daniels, 1992, 2000; Elliott, 2004; Juengst, 1997, 1998; Lin & Allhoff, 2006; Parens, 1998, 2006; PCB, 2003; Savulescu, Meulen, & Kahane, 2011; Williams, 2007). In the literature the tools, methods or substances used for the purposes of enhancing interventions are referred to as ‘human enhancement technologies’ (Coenen et al., 2009; Elliott, 1998, 2004).

Human enhancement interventions are not confined to medical practice. Military applications and entertainment are examples of other fields where human enhancement interventions are used. The discussions around human enhancement have not only become a fashionable topic in certain circles, but the literature on it has reached a critical mass, which makes it a major topic of ethical research (Bostrom & Savulescu, 2009; Coenen et al., 2009; Selgelid, 2009). Apart from human enhancement being an all-too-human desire, other reasons for it being such a hot topic are the current cultural, economic and political dynamics that are pushing the rapid development of human enhancement technologies—such as national security concerns, global competitiveness, brain drain and consumerist lifestyle demands. Given the pervasiveness and the impact of the topic, it is not far-fetched to say that we are indeed near the start of a human enhancement revolution (Allhoff, Lin, Moor, & Weckert, 2010; Lin & Allhoff, 2008b) or that we live in an ‘enhancement society’ (Coenen et al., 2009). That is why the debate on technology and human enhancement has been regarded as one of the most crucial debates of our time.

The human enhancement discourse touches upon a wide range of concerns, from philosophical and ethical approaches to the proper role of medicine and desirable human qualities (Wolpe, 2002). Human enhancement has been portrayed as a liberating and exciting opportunity, or as a disturbing and even frightening one, that is why it carries both the promise of ‘superhumanization’ as well as ‘dehumanization’ (PCB, 2003). The term ‘enhancement’ by itself is already problematic. Many people regard it as abstract and imprecise, as it can be understood in many ways. When we talk about enhancing a function, a capacity or a trait, are we referring to making more of it or making it better? If we are referring to the former, what standard are we supposed to take as a base? In the human case, saying that something is better can mean better than I have done before, or better than my opponent or better than the best (that is to say, than any other human being before). Enhancement can also mean bringing out a function or condition more fully rather than altering it qualitatively, or augmenting or improving a function or condition. All these differences are reflected in the various definitions found in the literature.

Generally speaking, the term ‘human enhancement’ is used to refer to any intervention or activity by which we improve or augment in any sense (e.g. performance, appearance) our abilities, bodies, minds and well-being (Lin & Allhoff, 2008b; Miller & Wilsdon, 2006; Williams, 2007). Thus, we can think of our daily life being impregnated with enhancement practices—such as exercising, drinking coffee, having a good diet, taking vitamin supplements and education. These examples can be regarded as ‘natural’ human enhancement interventions, which tend to be seen as not morally interesting and unproblematic (Allhoff et al., 2010; Coenen et al., 2009), where the improvement attained is usually not perceived as an enhancement, even though by definition it is. For instance, people generally do not make a big deal out of someone drinking coffee in the morning in order to improve his or her performance in the office, or of someone studying in the best-ranking university rather than a small public school.

It has been argued that if we were to take such a broad view on enhancement, where nearly everything we do could be considered as an enhancement, it would make the concept impotent (Bostrom & Savulescu, 2009; Coenen et al., 2009). The challenge has been to find a more ‘reasonably intelligible’ and ‘non-arbitrary’ account for it. So even if the term ‘enhancement’ remains somehow vague we still need an account that captures ‘something that might plausibly be thought of as a kind’ (Bostrom & Savulescu, 2009, p. 3); more importantly, an account that help us track morally relevant distinctions. A first step to achieve such a view has been to keep the discourse on human enhancement focused on improvements or augmentations brought about by science-based or technology-based interventions, such as those envisioned and suggested in the emergent technologies discourse. It is primarily these kinds of interventions that have instantiated ethical debate and controversy. Take, for example, the case of brain-machine interfaces. Their use by impaired people in order to enable them to achieve certain tasks seems uncontroversial; however, the reaction is not always of acceptance when brain-machine interfaces are aimed at other purposes, such as to augment performance in healthy individuals.

The problem with such an understanding of human enhancement is that, in a way, all technology is a form of human enhancement (Harris, 2007), as it improves our native human capacities, ‘enabling us to achieve certain effects that would otherwise require more effort or be altogether beyond our power’ (Bostrom & Savulescu, 2009, p. 2). In order to avoid this problem, some scholars have emphasised that we should focus on human enhancement interventions ‘in the human body’ (Coenen et al., 2009, p. 6). However, even if we were to agree on this point, just considering interventions in the human body, ambiguity remains regarding whether by this we mean enhancement interventions that are internal (inside the body) or external to the body (such as a prosthetic hand). It might also be needed to differentiate between interventions that have long-term effects or permanent results and those that have just temporary or reversible results (Bruce, 2007). Others have suggested that we need to differentiate between enhancement interventions that involve a radical change of state regarding human capabilities compared to those that only offer a change in degree in the expansion of human capabilities or power (e.g. incremental enhancement) (Bruce, 2007; Khushf, 2005). Some others have suggested that it can be helpful to distinguish between the ends—enhancing end states—and the means used to enhance (Kamm, 2009). Finally others have argued that we need to separate enhancement interventions that offer positional or competitive advantages (such as an increase in height) from those that do not (such as a better immune system) (Bostrom, 2005a; Buchanan et al., 2001; Elliott, 1998).

There are of course many problems in trying to justify why such distinctions would be meaningful. For instance, why should having a better immune system not count as offering a positional advantage? Better health generally means better life opportunities. Thus, it can be argued that any enhancement connotes in a way a positional advantage; otherwise it would not be regarded as an enhancement in the first place. Or how is it that taking coffee to keep awake is any different from taking a medically tested and safe drug with the same effect? Moreover, we can ask, if the underlying idea of human enhancement interventions is self-improvement and well-being, why is it that some enhancement interventions should be permissible but not others? Should human enhancement be limited to eliminating suffering and sickness, or should it cover the improvement of other goods such as intelligence, memory or beauty?

Considering all this, it can be argued that finding a meaningful and politically viable way to talk about human enhancement, not only for deliberating about the acceptable and the unacceptable, but more importantly to grasp the value of it, becomes a priority. This takes us to the core issue to be tackled in this book, the role of sound ethical considerations in the decisions we make over the kind of enhancement interventions we pursue.

Statement of the problem

Science and technology have challenged our dominating views of the world. First the Copernican revolution, which displaced the belief that our home planet was the centre of the universe; then Darwin dispelled the belief that man was divine, relegating us to descendants from the animal world; and later Freud demonstrated that we are not even masters in our own house. Now adding to the cosmological, biological and psychological shocks to human pride, we face the challenge of finding a legitimate distinction between us and our technologies (Mazlish, 1967).² Vernor Vinge predicted in his paper ‘Technological Singularity’ (1993) that the human era will end once we create superhuman intelligence. More recently, Raymond Kurzweil argued in his book The Singularity Is Near that we are already reaching that point, and that it is happening at an exponential speed rate (2005). Other authors, the majority of whom support the transhumanist movement, who have also put forward reasons for thinking that this could happen within the first half of this century, include Marvin Minsky, Hans Moravec and Nick Bostrom. They named this new era, in which our biological portion will become obsolete, the posthuman era (Bostrom, 2005a). These views help explain why the prospect of using different technologies for human enhancement has been the subject of considerable scientific research, and recently also of ethical debate.

With our rapidly evolving technology, we have also accelerated the rate of change affecting the human condition. According to some futurists, such as Kurzweil (2005), our technological developments follow an exponential accelerating rate, in which the number of technological breakthroughs has increased rapidly in comparison with the technological breakthroughs we have had so far in human history. However, it is questionable that our wisdom in using these developments in pragmatic and ethical ways in the quest for improving the human condition has followed a similar path.

For instance, considering the potential impact of emergent technologies, as well as the large amount of money available for research and development of emergent technologies in recent years, it is fair to say that there is still much to be done around the ethical, legal and societal implications that these technologies can give rise to. Moreover, there has not been much done in trying to find ways to use human enhancement and new technologies in less individualistic and more community-based ways.³

Even though the importance of ethical discussion is recognised, little has been done to foster it, and more troublesome is the fact that when ethical discussion does take place it often limits itself to problematic assumptions, not only around enhancement but also about the individual and the role of ethics itself. Public fear, rejection, great expectations or even unreasonable beliefs about emergent technologies can be the result of a lack of dialogue between governments, research institutes, granting bodies, researchers and the public on the implications and directions of these technologies (Mnyusiwalla, Daar, & Singer, 2003). That is why it is of great importance to have an adequate study of the ethical and societal implications of emergent technologies; in particular those aimed at human enhancement applications.

Under the dominant view of human enhancement—the biomedical one—emergent technologies are used to augment or increase our capacities (such as increasing our mental capacity or our sensory system limits) beyond any therapeutical aim yet still within the range of possible human species features. The transhumanist movement, which is becoming popular and influencing social views, is promoting a view in which emergent technologies are envisioned as a path to achieve the posthuman; that is to say, the augmentation of our human capabilities and features beyond those known to be possible for the human species. Both the biomedical and the transhumanist views of enhancement suggest a path of action aimed at directly manipulating the individual, whether it is the brain or its senses or any other aspect of an individual’s biology. Thus, one can say that they are both focused on individual and individualistic bodily oriented enhancement interventions.

Focusing the discussion on individualistic, bodily oriented and fiction-like human enhancement interventions tells us something about the dominant values and views about what constitutes well-being. For instance, one may question why it is that most human enhancement applications that have been debated to date are those focused mainly on changing the individual’s body or mind in a direct (and sometimes permanent) way.

Considering the kind of enhancement interventions that advances in emergent technologies could potentially bring to the fore, a more pragmatic, politically feasible and more ethical way to frame human enhancement is required. With this in mind, as an alternative way in which human enhancement can be conceptualised beyond the individualistic, bodily oriented and fiction-like kinds of enhancement interventions, a third view of enhancement is suggested: the social.

Considering the three different human enhancement paradigms put forward in this book—biomedical, transhumanist and social—the general question to be explored is:

What are the ethical considerations for choosing one kind of enhancement over another?

This book’s main argument is that given the degree and kind of ethical considerations involved in each human enhancement paradigm, we have morally compelling reasons to opt to use advanced technologies in different ways from those suggested by current human enhancement understanding.

Aim and scope

The aim of this book is to analyse and put forward a position on issues that have been latent for a long time in the fields of biotechnology, pharmaceutics and genetics, and have been brought to the fore again with more novel forms of emergent technologies, namely issues related to human enhancement. In the hope of adding something valuable to the debate on human enhancement, this work discusses three possible human enhancement paradigms and explores how each paradigm involves different values and different uses of emergent technologies, as well as different degrees and in some cases different kinds of ethical issues.

In the past there have been attempts to find alternatives to the therapy-enhancement distinction, for example:

• Gregor Wolbring has suggested a distinction between therapeutic versus non-therapeutic enhancement interventions (Wolbring, 2005). A recent European report has followed a similar line suggesting a ‘non-medical’ three-level distinction of enhancement:⁴ (1) restorative or preventive non-enhancing interventions, (2) therapeutic enhancement and (3) non-therapeutic enhancement interventions (Coenen et al., 2009).

• Others have suggested distinguishing between enhancement and (1) augmentation, (2) alteration (Jotterand, 2008), (3) design evolution (Canton, 2004) or (4) human reengineering (Hook, 2007).

• Ruth Chadwick has suggested four different ways in which enhancement may be understood: (1) beyond therapy, (2) quantitative view, (3) qualitative view (enhancement different to improvement) and (4) as an umbrella term (Chadwick, 2009).

• Julian Savulescu has suggested at least two other main approaches to enhancement in addition to the ‘not medicine’ approach to enhancement (that is to say, treatment versus enhancement), the functional-augmentative approach and the welfarist approach (Savulescu, 2006). The former considers interventions as enhancements ‘insofar as they improve some capacity or function by increasing the ability of the function to do what it normally does’ (Earp, Sandberg, Kahane, & Savulescu, 2014, p. 2), whereas the latter considers changes to the biology or psychology of a person as enhancements insofar as they increase the chances of leading a good life in a given set of circumstances.

• Others have suggested dropping the term ‘enhancement’ because it is already politically charged in both its use and meaning. Zack Lynch, executive director of the Neurosociety Institute, has for instance recommended replacing it with the term ‘enablement’ (Williams, 2007).

• Finally, one more suggestion argues that instead of talking about therapy and enhancement ‘as though these were categorically different things’ and abandoning the therapy-enhancement distinction, we should focus on particular interventions, ‘and examine the ethics of these on a case by case basis’ (Selgelid, 2007, p. 1; c.f. Coenen et al., 2009), classifying them in terms of degree and prototypical cases. While such an approach might indeed be a valuable and reasonable one, it still faces the challenge of how different cases can be defined. This is often known as the problem of the relevant description (Daniels, 1992, 2008; Elliott, 1998).

Is a case defined according to the type of enhancement intervention? If yes, the problem would be that certain enhancement interventions while indeed an enhancement for certain individuals, might turn out to be quite the opposite for others. Let us consider the case of suppressing the ε4 allele of apolipoprotei...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Tables
• Foreword
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• 1. Introduction to the Enhancement Debate
• 2. The Biomedical Paradigm
• 3. The Transhumanist Paradigm
• 4. The Social Paradigm
• 5. To Enhance or Not to Enhance: Looking into Deeper Issues
• 6. A Suggested Approach
• 7. Conclusions
• Notes
• References
• Index