Russia's Foreign Policy

Ideas, Domestic Politics and External Relations

D. Cadier, M. Light, D. Cadier, M. Light

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN:
  9781349691609
  9781137468871
• eBook ISBN:
  9781137468888
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Diplomacy & Treaties
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This edited volume analyses the evolution and main determinants of Russia's foreign policy choices. Containing contributions by renowned specialists on the topic, the study sheds light on some of the new trends that have characterised Russia's foreign policy since the beginning of Vladimir Putin's third presidential term.

Part I

Perceptions and Ideas in Russian Foreign Policy

1

Russian Foreign Policy Themes in Official Documents and Speeches: Tracing Continuity and Change

Margot Light

Introduction

Russia has issued an unusually large number of official documents on various aspects of its foreign policy since the country became an independent state in 1991. Andrey Kozyrev, the first foreign minister, was reluctant to compose a document defining Russian foreign policy, arguing that as that policy would be based on the country’s national interest, the underlying principles would be self-evident. Those in favour of a formal document claimed that working out Russia’s foreign policy would assist in defining the country’s identity. Kozyrev relented, and the first Foreign Policy Concept was adopted in 1993, followed soon after by a Military Doctrine.¹ Both were replaced by new versions in 2000, and the Foreign Policy Concept was updated again in 2008. Russia’s most recent foreign policy statement, Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, was approved by President Vladimir Putin in 2013. The latest Russian Military Doctrine was adopted in December 2014. Since 1997 Russia has also had a series of national security concepts. A second version was adopted in 2000 and a third in 2009, this last being called the Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation until the year 2020. Russia also has an Information Security Doctrine, a Concept of Participation in International Development Assistance and, most recently, a Concept of Participation in BRICS.²

These documents provide a picture of how official Russian perceptions of the international political system, Russia’s place within that system and the main dangers threatening the country have evolved over the years. But they also reveal that there are some persistent themes which are repeated from document to document and, in addition, are frequently reiterated in official foreign policy speeches and statements. Since these recurring themes seem to form a permanent part of the perceptions of decision makers, examining them helps us to understand the Russian world view. However, in spite of the insights they offer into Russian perceptions, it is not clear what role these concepts and doctrines play in practice on the formation of foreign policy because it is difficult to relate their contents to particular aspects of Russia’s foreign policy or to see how foreign policy changed between 1998, say, and 2001 to reflect the new Foreign Policy Concept adopted in the year 2000. Nevertheless, the recurrent themes contained in these documents constitute discursive landmarks around which foreign policy choices need to be articulated to correspond with the state’s vision of itself.

Since 2011, however, a number of documents have been published which appear to relate much more closely to the foreign policy Putin has been pursuing since he began his third presidential term in 2012. Particularly important are two newspaper articles published by Putin in 2011 and 2012 and the 2013 version of the Foreign Policy Concept. This chapter examines Putin’s view of the world and of Russian foreign policy as expressed in those articles and in the latest iteration of the Foreign Policy Concept. In particular, Putin set out his plans for a Eurasian Union in the first article he published. In the second, he made his opposition to intervention under the guise of the responsibility to protect (R2P) very clear. He also warned against foreign funding of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which he depicted as a means to interfere in the domestic politics of other countries. Here and later in the new Foreign Policy Concept, Putin’s interest in ‘soft power’ is evident, though his understanding of the concept is rather distinctive.

Subsequent chapters will make clear the extent to which these publications have served as a blueprint for Russian policy since 2012. But this chapter begins by examining some of the recurring tropes which appear in the documents published before 2011 and are also reiterated by officials when they discuss foreign policy. The chapter ends by looking at the shift in the tone of Putin’s foreign policy statements since the annexation of Crimea and by suggesting that a new ‘ideological turn’ can be detected, which may mean that the principles underlying Russian foreign policy are about to change.

Recurring foreign policy themes

The successive concepts, doctrines and blueprints on various aspects of Russian foreign policy and security and major speeches made by senior leaders convey a good idea of how Russian perceptions of the outside world and of Russia’s place in that world have changed over the years. But it also becomes clear that certain themes are repeated with only very small changes year after year. In this section, I look briefly at some of these tropes.

The primacy of sovereignty, territorial integrity and international law

From the first 1993 Russian Foreign Policy Concept, statements about Russian foreign policy have almost invariably contained an assurance that it is based on the principles of international law and that its primary aim is the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. Much of the criticism of Western policy is couched as a condemnation of the way in which it undermines the sovereignty of other countries and threatens their territorial integrity by interfering in their domestic affairs. Thus, for example, in a section of the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept entitled ‘The Supremacy of International Law in International Relations’, there is a declaration that Russia ‘always acts to strengthen the legal principles of international relations’ and will ‘oppose attempts by individual states or groups of states to revise the commonly accepted norms of international law’. The 2009 National Security Concept lists ensuring the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as one of the two most important foreign policy interests.

Russia’s international status

The official view of Russia’s status was rather gloomy in the 1990s. But Putin, when still prime minister, began extolling Russia’s existing or potential great power status in his Millennium Message, published just before he became acting president, and then, as aspirant president, in his open letter to Russian voters in February 2000, (Putin, 1999, 2000a). The depiction of Russia as a great power has appeared regularly in foreign policy documents and statements ever since then. It was repeated virtually word for word in both the 2000 and the 2008 concepts, for example (Concept, 2000; Concept 2008). Interestingly, the claim to great power status did not appear in the 2013 concept, perhaps because the status already seemed so obvious as not to require noting. In Putin’s address to the Federal Assembly that year he also did not mention the term, but he insisted that while Russia does not claim to be ‘any sort of superpower ... we will strive to be leaders’ (Putin, 2013a).

Structure of the international system: unipolarity versus multipolarity

Ever since NATO launched the attack on Serbia, Russian objections to unipolarity and to unilateral actions have been a permanent theme of Russian foreign policy statements. The 2000 Foreign Policy Concept, for example, decried the tendency to establish a unipolar structure of the world, while the 2008 concept pointed out that unilateral action destabilizes international situations (Concept, 2000; Concept, 2008). Criticism of unipolarity and unilateral solutions was usually accompanied by support for multilateral cooperation while pointing to the efficacy of multilateral solutions to international problems and the superiority of a multipolar international system.

Threats to Russia

NATO enlargement.When the idea of enlarging NATO was first mooted, Russians insisted that eastward enlargement represented a threat to the country’s security. Since then this view has become a mantra of foreign policy statements and documents. The 2000 Military Doctrine, for example, called the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of Russian military security ‘a basic threat’ (Military Doctrine, 2000), while the 2000 National Security Concept claimed that ‘NATO’s eastward expansion’ and ‘the possible emergence of foreign military bases and major military presences in the immediate proximity of Russian borders’ were fundamental threats (National Security Concept, 2000). In the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept the threat is perceived not just in general terms; the objection is voiced to ‘plans of admitting Ukraine and Georgia to the membership in the alliance’ (Concept, 2008).

Deployment of ballistic missile defence (BMD). Russian leaders (and many European leaders) were worried when President George W. Bush announced that he intended to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic-Missile (ABM) treaty in order to develop and deploy ballistic missile defence systems. The ABM treaty had long been believed the pillar underlying nuclear security. When discussions began about the possibility of developing ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems during the Clinton presidency, Russia used every public opportunity to voice its concern. Russian anxiety about BMD was reflected immediately in concepts and doctrines on foreign and security policy. One of the main external threats to Russia listed in the 2000 Military Doctrine, for example, was defined as ‘actions aimed at undermining global and regional stability, not least by ... antimissile defence’ (Military Doctrine, 2000), and subsequent statements and concepts have regularly deplored the threat BMD represents to Russian security. The 2008 Foreign Policy Concept, for example, opposes ‘unilateral attempts of development and deployment of new systems as antiballistic shields’, while the 2009 National Security Strategy similarly objects to policies aimed at ‘unilaterally creating a global missile defense system and militarising space’ (Russia’s National Strategy, 2009). In Putin’s foreign policy article in 2012, he repeated the objection, and both NATO and enlargement and missile defence are listed as threats in the 2013 Foreign Policy Concept.

Priority of relations with CIS

Perhaps the most persistent theme in the various concepts and doctrines, as well as in every foreign policy statement made by the president, is the absolute priority of strengthening relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The CIS invariably appears first in the list of Russian regional priorities. In 2005 Putin called for the ‘synchronisation of the reform processes underway in Russia and the other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (Putin, 2005). In 2006, he argued that ‘a difficult but active search for optimum cooperation models was underway’ within the CIS (Putin, 2006). In 2007 he promised that ‘Russia will continue to show initiative in pursuing economic integration in the CIS area and, more broadly, throughout the Eurasian region’ (Putin, 2007a).

Until recently, however, there was a vast mismatch between what Putin said and what Russia did. Despite all the expressed intentions, there was scant progress in integration within the CIS. In succession various vehicles for integration were created, starting with an Economic Union in 1993 (Ukraine did not join but became an associate member in 1994), a Free Trade Area in 1994 (ratified by all members except Russia), a Belarus-Kazakhstan-Russia Customs Union in 1995, renamed the Free Trade Zone in 1996. It became the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC) in 2000, with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan as full members; Moldova, Ukraine and Armenia obtained observer status in 2002/03. None of these institutions developed into a fully functioning free trade regime or customs union, however, primarily because of Russian ambivalence. Although policymakers frequently supported integration verbally, they did little to adopt the necessary laws or implement the necessary measures. As we shall see, only in Putin’s third presidential term did he seem determined to turn rhetoric into reality.

Pragmatism

Pragmatism has been a recurring theme of the foreign policy statements of Putin and his successor, and in practice, with the exception perhaps of the Georgian War in 2008, it was the hallmark of his policy before 2014. In his 2002 address to the Federal Assembly, Putin declared that ‘Russia’s foreign policy will be purely pragmatic, based on our possibilities and national interests’ (Putin, 2002). Sergei Lavrov argued in 2007 that ‘our choice made in 2000 in favor of pragmatism, multivectorness and the firm but unconfrontational upholding of national interests [sic] has fully acquitted itself (Lavrov, 2007a). The 2008 Foreign Policy Concept argues that ‘Russia pursues an open, predictable and pragmatic foreign policy determined by its national interests’ (Concept, 2008).

Pragmatism features again in the 2013 concept. The question is whether the annexation of Crimea signals the end to Russia’s pragmatism.

This is by no means an exhaustive list of the recurrent themes in Russian foreign policy statements, but it serves to convey the gist of the perceptions of Kremlin decision makers.

Putin’s foreign policy documents

Eurasian Union

In October 2011 Putin published an article in Izvestiya on integration in the CIS. On the face of it, it was rather strange that Putin, who was, at the time, prime minister of Russia, should write an article on what was very clearly a matter of foreign policy, since the Russian constitution gives the president the sole right to formulate foreign policy. According to Article 80, ‘the President of the Russian Federation shall determine the guidelines of the internal and foreign policies of the State’, while Article 85 states that the president will ‘govern the foreign policy of the Russian Federation’ (Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993). Although it was widely believed that Putin was the driver of the ‘tandem’ that had ruled Russia since 2008, in public President Dmitry Medvedev had taken the lead in foreign policy. On the other hand, a short while previously (24 September) Putin had publicly accepted Medvedev’s proposal that he should stand for election as president again in the forthcoming elections. So his Izvestiya article can be seen as the first statement of the foreign policy programme he intended to implement during his third-term presidency.

The article set out a timetable for integration within the CIS, building on the customs union between Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia that had come into effect on 1 July 2011. Putin envisaged that the customs union would develop into a Single Economic Space (SES) incorporating the three countries by 1 January 2012. This would create a unified market, built on common macroeconomic, regulatory, transport and competition policies, as well as common natural monopoly tariffs and agricultural subsidies. The SES would move towards common visa and migration policies, allowing for border controls between the states to be lifted. Unlike previous integration efforts within the CIS, the SES would have supranational institutions such as a court and the Customs Union Commission, which would have expanded decision-making powers (Putin, 2011a).

Putin envisaged that the SES would be the foundation for a Eurasian Economic Union and would expand to include countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. But it would also develop into a fully fledged Eurasian Union, which would be ‘a powerful supranational association capable of becoming one of the poles in the modern world and serving as an efficient bridge between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific region’. The Eurasian Union, Putin emphasized, would not replace the CIS but would exist alongside it. He invited other CIS members to join and insisted that joining the Eurasian Union would not ‘contradict their pro-European stance’. On the contrary, it would help them to ‘integrate into Europe sooner and from a stronger position’.

There was nothing unusual about Russian leaders expressing the intention of furthering economic integration within the CIS. As we have seen, official statements about Russian foreign policy routinely listed deepening CIS integration as a priority. But the words seemed little more than empty rhetoric, and although a series of vehicles were created to foster economic integration,³ little progress could be observed in turning the rhetoric into reality. However, Putin’s 2011 article signalled the start of a far more serious project with the ambitious aim of constructing a viable alternative to the European Union. By the time the SES came into effect in January 2012, considerable progress had already been made in negotiating a common external tariff and customs regulations, as well as establishing decision-making and regulatory institutions. By 2014 it was clear that the project had developed features that distinguish it from earlier efforts to integrate the CIS (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2014, 15). In a later chapter, Cadier analyses how much farther the p...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• Part I  Perceptions and Ideas in Russian Foreign Policy
• Part II  Domestic Politics
• Part III  External Relations
• Conclusion: Foreign Policy as the Continuation of Domestic Politics by Other Means
• References
• Index