Beyond Religious Right and Secular Left Rhetoric

The Road to Compromise

K. Fry

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781349488513, 9781137409140
• eBook ISBN: 9781137408266
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book covers arguments made by various sides of the political-religious divide from the past 30 years, showing what the actual differences are between these groups. By stressing the typically ignored similarities, the book better informs partisans and the public to move debate forward.

1

Christian Conservatives and the War against Secular Humanism

The rise of the religious right

In 2006, Representative Katherine Harris, who lost her race for the Senate, gave an interview to a religious journal, the Florida Baptist Witness, in which she asserted that the separation of church and state is a “lie,” and that electing non-Christians to political office means legislating sin (Katherine Harris). This is a rather extreme view within literature advocating for a stronger relation between Christianity and politics, even among the Christian right. Some may agree with Katherine Harris, but perhaps surprisingly, Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson have often disagreed with this view in their public policy literature. Often, it is statements like Harris’s that are viewed as representing the entirety of the religious right, and the left accuses them of wanting some form of theocratic government. However, in order to understand the general aims of persons usually described as Christian right, and in particular, what they think the proper relationship should be between religion and government, it is first necessary to discover what their more typical arguments are like.

The term “religious right,” is often not a self- identifying label for American religious conservatives, but it has become a common marker to identify a broad range of groups, organizations, religious and political leaders, and pundits who tend to have similar traditional views on social issues and often advocate a more pronounced connection between religion and government. There are certainly large numbers of conservatives who are not religious and focus mainly on fiscal and foreign policy matters, but the socially conservative religious groups continue to have an important influence upon the Republican Party. The majority of the individuals usually labeled “Christian conservatives” or “religious right” came from protestant evangelical or fundamentalist Christian backgrounds, but many of the religiously conservative organizations include persons who are from other denominations, or even different faiths. Rather than the emergence of entirely new group, historian George Marsden has called the resurgence of the religious right in the 1970s and 1980s a “ . . . revival of one of the nation’s major political traditions,” since throughout American history, religion and politics have often been strongly connected (in Cromartie 2). Periodically, various political groups have formed in response to religious concerns throughout American history. For example, during the 1950s and 1960s, evangelicals and fundamentalist ministers, most notably, Billy Graham, opposed communism and made public statements against it. Societies like the John Birch Society formed to combat communism publicly. In contrast to the more recent religious right movement, however, the majority of evangelicals and fundamentalists seemed less visible during this time period and some avoided political action because it was thought to be more urgent to focus on saving souls. Salvation was usually understood as a religious, rather than political process.

The rise of today’s more politically oriented Christian right is usually understood as beginning during the 1970s. The loss of Roe v. Wade, the introduction of ERA legislation, debates about school prayer, pornography, drug use, and concerns about the “secularization” of America prompted many right-leaning Christian leaders to reengage in politics more publicly, by which time, the enemy of communism was substituted by the new enemy of “secular humanism” (Utter and Storey 7–9). Paul Weyrich, a conservative political strategist who helped to found the Moral Majority, and Edward G. Dobson, a former Moral Majority executive, have asserted that it was not strictly the social issues like abortion that prompted the initial political engagement of these groups, but the federal government’s perceived interference with Christian schooling by removing prayer from school, eroding the “moral” content of public schooling, and most importantly, the general threat of revoking tax exempt status from Christian universities, like Bob Jones University, that prompted a need for defense from “big” government (in Cromartie 26, 52 and Hughes, Christian America 155). Furthermore, historian Daniel K. Williams argues that there was never a conservative religious retreat from politics at all, but what made the “religious right,” more visible in the 1970s and 1980s was the fact that they were more partisan, and had a stronger influence over the Republican Party (2). Whatever the initial impulse, the early figures of what came to be known as the “religious right” from the 1970s and 1980s settled upon a social and political agenda that focused on supporting the traditional family, advocating prayer and religion in public schools, protecting religious private education, as well as opposing abortion, divorce, pornography, crime, drug use, and sex and violence in the entertainment industry. Perhaps most importantly, this agenda also involved urging traditionally minded Christians to become far more active in the political process.

According to James Davison Hunter, who is responsible for the popularization of the term “culture war,” the American culture war began to emerge when the denominational divisions that kept religious persons separate from one another began to weaken (Culture Wars 90). Hunter modeled the “culture war” language on the German notion of Kulturkampf, which describes Bismarck’s failed attempt to unify the opposed Protestant and Catholic principalities through a more secular approach (Culture Wars xii). For Hunter, the American culture war differs from the German case because it does not concern a cleavage between Catholics and Protestants, and the contested issues are significantly broader than the central issue of the German Kulturkampf, which was education (Culture Wars xii). In this case, for the first time in American history, social issues began to unite denominations and faiths that had historically been at odds like Catholics and Protestants. Persons of various denominations, or even of different faiths, found that they had similar stances on moral issues such as abortion, gay rights, women’s rights, and could work across denominational and faith lines for common goals. For example, a 1994 statement from the group Evangelicals and Catholics Together, lays out common political causes between Catholics and evangelicals who could put aside very long-standing doctrinal differences to attend to urgent political matters. Together, they could agree that “ . . . politics, law, and culture must be secured by moral truth,” and that virtue “ . . . is secured by religion” (Colson and Neuhaus xxiii).

Paul Weyrich, cofounder of the conservative think tank The Heritage Foundation, has described the rise of the religious right in late twentieth-century America as a defensive, not an offensive, movement because many Christian fundamentalists and evangelicals would prefer not to engage in politics at all. It was the profound state of crisis in American culture and the perceived cultural threat that introduced a need for more active political engagement (in Cromartie 25). Sara Diamond, a journalist and scholar of Christian conservatives, agrees that the religious right frames its agenda as a defensive response to problems arising as threats in broader culture (Not by Politics 8). Jerry Falwell’s story of political engagement is a good example of the “defensive” motivations of the Christian right. Because of the seriousness of the threat of some of the social issues that emerged as hot button topics in the 1970s, Jerry Falwell changed his position from the belief that the religious should refrain from direct political engagement and keep the realms separate. He underwent a “ . . . political awakening” (Utter and Storey 4). His 4 July 1976, bicentennial speech reflected this new viewpoint when he claimed that the idea that religion and politics should be completely separate was invented by the devil to keep Christians out of office (Utter and Storey 4). Ultimately, some conservative lobbyists approached Jerry Falwell to form the Moral Majority in 1979, which at the time, was one of only three conservative religious political organizations in the United States (Utter and Storey 12).¹ The Moral Majority drew members across faith and denominational lines and claimed to be nonpartisan, but increasingly, became strongly connected to the Republican Party. Partly, this was because the members of the Moral Majority were disappointed that President Jimmy Carter, a Southern Baptist born-again Christian, proved to be more liberal on social issues. What the members of the Moral Majority had in common was outrage concerning social issues and membership grew rapidly, allowing them, as well as the other conservative religious groups, to help influence the 1980 presidential election that placed Ronald Reagan in office. Richard Viguerie, a Christian conservative strategist, claimed that it was the religious right that caused two-thirds of Ronald Reagan’s ten-point win, though many believe that other factors like high inflation, the gas shortage, and hostage crisis in Iran that gave President Reagan the win (Utter and Storey 13).

Pat Robertson’s group, Freedom Council, was established in 1981 and later became the Christian Coalition in 1989. It was initially a mostly Southern Baptist group that formed to educate and inform Christians about politics. Eventually, it added a law organization to respond to the liberal American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and to defend Christian claims in court. Over time, it expanded to include a political action wing and Pat Robertson, the charismatic preacher and host of The 700 Club, ran for president in 1988. Robertson’s group claimed to be a grass roots movement, as opposed to Falwell’s group, which aimed at influencing politicians from the top down. Some of the differences between the two groups are reflected in the fact that Jerry Falwell supported George H. W. Bush in the 1988 election, over Pat Robertson (Utter and Storey 17). Even though the Moral Majority no longer exists and the Christian Coalition has changed its name to Christian Coalition of America and has different leadership, they laid the groundwork for the variety of political groups that represent the contemporary Christian right movement today.

Over time, the influence of the religious wing over the Republican Party steadily increased due to their organizational talent and the strategy of encouraging their members to participate in government at local levels. According to Sara Diamond, the religious right has built a formidable political presence over the years and she states that “the Left has nothing to compete with the right’s multibillion dollar organizational infrastructure” (Facing the Wrath 17). This infrastructure includes Pat Robertson’s Christian Broadcasting Network that had 287 million dollars in revenue in 2011 (Forbes, “The 200 Largest U.S. Charities List”). Diamond has called the enormous religious broadcasting industry, stemming back to evangelical ministry, the “ . . . single most important ingredient in the rise of the Christian Right” (Not by Politics 13). Despite the success of their media presence and organization, the Christian right has had various ups and downs in terms of achieving some of their goals. There have been few legislative or practical victories, but historian George Marsden states that the three major achievements of the religious right have been the symbolic or rhetorical victories of prioritizing family and patriotism in politics, the revival of moral issues as topics that politicians must address, and some limited success in political organization and policy achievements (in Cromartie 11–12).

Currently, the public advocates for a strong conservative Christian voice in American politics fall into roughly two groups. First, there are the religiously conservative public ministry figures who are professional pastors or work for religiously motivated political organizations. These individuals typically have radio, television, Internet, and publishing presences. Though some of the most famous of these figures are aging or, like Jerry Falwell, are deceased, their published works reflect the core of what contemporary like-minded individuals still reference to justify their views. Second, there are political pundits, public intellectuals, and politicians who are not professional ministers or funded by religious interests, but make cases for conservative political positions that are often religiously motivated, like Rush Limbaugh, Bill O’Reilly, and Glenn Beck. The Internet, 24-hour news cycle, and the increased number of media outlets have produced venues for these political “entertainers,” who garner a great deal of media attention. Although there are a large group of political conservatives who rarely focus on religion at all and define themselves as “secular,” some of the most well-known of conservative pundits include the topic of religion and politics in their repertoire of issues. This chapter will examine some of the more common views of these Christian conservative advocates concerning the problems with American politics and what they believe to be the proper relationship between the church and state. Even though, as historian and evangelical Mark Noll states, there is an anti-intellectual tension that is common among some evangelical Christians as certain forms of intellectualism are perceived as interfering with Christian life, Christian conservatives still have intellectual arguments for what they are trying to achieve politically (Scandal 12). Overall, there is a large amount of consensus among public right-leaning Christians concerning the state of the country and the reasons for why religion, and Christianity specifically, needs to have a more prominent voice in America.

The state of crisis and the need to recognize Christian foundations

Many Christian conservatives agree that the nation is in crisis and there is an urgent need for a stronger Christian presence in politics to help the nation as a whole. This point of view depends upon the idea that the United States used to be more traditional, conservative, and Christian, and it is only in contemporary times that these values have been threatened. In 1980, Jerry Falwell wrote that Americans “ . . . want this country come back to basics, back to values, back to biblical morality, back to sensibility, and back to patriotism,” and this kind of rejection of present-day attitudes remains quite typical today, as it has been for over the past 30 years (Listen 19). The longing for a purer past is illustrated by a number of religiously conservative figures, though they disagree about the exact time frame in which this deterioration of values occurred. James Dobson, who founded the conservative group Focus on the Family, wrote in 1990 that in the United States it was not until “ . . . approximately thirty years ago, [that] these biblically based concepts were dominant values and beliefs in Western society. Not everyone agreed, but most did” (Dobson and Bauer, Children at Risk 20). Dobson and Bauer believe that the main source of trouble occurred in the 1960s and that the United States has been deteriorating ever since. Similarly, Newt Gingrich has pinpointed the downfall to 1965, or the year that “cultural elites” began to question the greatness of the legal and moral principles the country was founded upon (7). In 1994, D. James Kennedy, founder of Coral Ridge Ministries, wrote that it was the last 50 years that has taken a serious toll on the Christian heritage of the nation, making the post–World War II era the initial source of the problem (76). Rick Scarborough, a pastor and founder of the religiously conservative organization, Vision America, puts the problem in more personal terms. He states:

I remember how America used to be. I remember when every broadcast day on television began with a devotional and ended in a prayer, as did every school day in the public schools. . . . (Defense 26)

Rick Scarborough recalls living in a time when people did not lock their doors or cars, when there was less crime and violence, and when people stood up for what was right (Defense 25). He also entitles a chapter in his book Enough Is Enough, “Life in the Fifties Was Good” (Enough 29). Sara Diamond has called this tendency within the Christian right a politics that is rooted in a longing for a nostalgic past, and she believes that this idea resonates with a large portion of the mainstream Americans who believe that the country has regressed from this purer and more innocent past (Not by Politics 8). Many leading Christian right figures seek to revive the purity of the past to improve the state of the nation today.

While the past is categorized as ideal, the present is perceived to be in a state of decline, with traditional values under attack. Jerry Falwell begins his book Listen, America! by recounting his fear that the American people have taken God’s blessings for granted and he declares that the beloved country of the United States is “ . . . indeed sick” (7). For Falwell, American society had become a community of “ . . . confused and depressed people,” who ruin their lives by violating God’s laws (Listen 64). Falwell, prompted by conservative operatives, led the way for Christian right figures to recapture the popularity of traditional values and to “ . . . rise up against the tide of permissiveness and moral decay that is crushing in on our society from every side” (Listen 7). D. James Kennedy concurs in his writing that the crisis in character of the American people is so severe that it amounts to a new Cold War with urgent implications. Kennedy states that “ . . . ethical and moral fallout threatens not only our political, economic, and intellectual well-being, but our very ‘destiny’ as a nation,” and the only thing that could save the American people is a return to Christian values (D. Kennedy 11, 37). James Dobson and Gary Bauer also argue that Christian values are under attack and that a civil war of values is underway. According to Dobson and Bauer, the church and the family are the main focus of a vicious attack and there is an urgent need to protect them (19–23). In 2008, Senator Jim DeMint and J. David Woodard argue similarly that

. . . the values that were instrumental in forming the basis of our culture have been ignored, forgotten, or, worse, forbidden in public debate. . . . We are concerned about the process that has caused this decline, and we believe that its continued operation, and ultimate replacement by a secular ethic, will prove fatal to our society. (xi)

Glenn Beck’s use of capital letters in his writing also represents the sense of rage and emotion that “SOMETHING DOESN’T FEEL RIGHT” to many in this country, and he claims that this feeling has been around for a very long time (Common 8). Differing from some of the ministry professionals, Beck blames the downfall of traditional values upon not only the irreligious and political liberals, but also the business experts on Wall Street, the political experts in Washington, and the government in general that have “ . . . gotten it wrong for a very long time,” and for becoming “ . . . out of step with the Laws of Nature” (Common 11). While there have been some moments of optimism among these pub...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• 1   Christian Conservatives and the War against Secular Humanism
• 2   The Secular Left: “Reason,” Religion, and the Threat of Theocracy
• 3   The Common Origins of the Right and the Left on Church and State
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index