The European Union's Mediterranean Policy: Model or Muddle?

A New Institutionalist Perspective

K. Knio

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781403946553
• eBook ISBN: 9781137384188
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

By analysing case studies through the lens of new constructivist Institutionalist perspective, this book sheds new light on the failure of EU policies in the Mediterranean. It suggests that these failures are the result of problems at the very heart of EU policy-making which clearly privilege economic concerns over social concerns.

1

Introduction: Model or Muddle?

Owing to its proximity and the volume of trade generated, the stability and prosperity of the Mediterranean region are essential to the stability and prosperity of the [European] Community. In a wider sense, the security of the Community is at stake (local or regional conflicts, political instability, terrorism, drugs, and environment). (Commission of the ECs, 1990a)

The importance of the Mediterranean region to the European Union (EU) has been succinctly captured by the European Commission itself. In fact, the Mediterranean basin is important to the EU for a whole range of reasons, relating to not only geographical proximity but also mutual interests and colonial links. Thus, the Mediterranean is perceived as a politically and strategically important area in the Community’s own backyard where ‘the aim … is the creation of a sphere of influence’ (Corbet, in Pomfret, 1986, p. xii).

The Euro-Mediterranean region has always been considered a high priority given the explosive setting – unmet ambitions, divergent interests and cultural perceptions about governance and democracy. The trajectory of the Barcelona process – also known as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) – took a drastic turn post-9/11 when a revised concept of security, from the perspective of trans-border flows of crime, was introduced together with the concept of ‘Euro-Mediterranean space’. The attempt was to define an entity of common interests, experiences and legacies which led to the creation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and later the Union for the Mediterranean, covering 43 countries in which new meanings are given to political participation and institutional representation. Yet, in the wake of revolts in North Africa and the Arab world, the EU leadership appears ambiguous towards the demand for democracy and its specific meanings in a conflict situation. The initial response was merely reactive – throwing money at a problem – rather than understanding its sources. Only when the protest turned violent in Libya was the principle of protecting civilians adopted, despite the lack of consensus within NATO.

The crisis of governance unfolding across North Africa and the Middle East has become an important moment in the EU’s efforts to rethink its Neighbourhood Policy. Initiated in the first half of 2000s and gradually enlarged, this policy represents the EU’s external relations with its neighbouring regions, covering a complex combination of different domains (economy, environment, energy, health, migration and culture) placed under the umbrella term ‘governance’ – a fluid concept that covers many aspects of market-oriented reform. How much this rethink actually covers is the moot point. I argue that the rethink is merely cosmetic and does not question the basic assumptions that underlie existing policies. At the same time, the rethink is not entirely worthless as it does clear up some rather obvious missteps in areas such as governance, human rights and gender.

Yet beyond the more recent succession of events, or what Francois Braudel would characterize as histoire évenementielle, lie a whole series of processes and structural mechanisms which have created, enabled and constrained the EU policy vis-à-vis the Mediterranean in a variety of ways. One of the major objectives of this book is to focus on these old historical structures which were regularized and institutionalized over more than five decades of interaction between the EU and many Mediterranean Partners (MPs) through policies devised by the EU from the 1960s until the present. In other words, to understand the dynamics of the current events in the Mediterranean, a thorough understanding of the history of the EU’s external relations is important. This means that one should further study the conditions under which these policies were formed, how they were transformed, for whom they are addressed and to whom.

One should not neglect the fact that the EU has only recently established itself as the dominant ‘club’ in Europe and as a major force in international politics and economics. This, however, was not always the case and, indeed, it is only quite recently that the EU has established this dominance. Three decades ago, it was deeply divided and engaged in a bitter and damaging internal dispute over its financial affairs. It was struggling to negotiate the accession of Spain and Portugal and, with the exception of Turkey, no other country wished to join. Moreover, the much looser, intergovernmental European Free Trade Association (EFTA) still seemed a viable alternative for many countries. Today, all that is history and the EU essentially is Europe. The global consequence of this is that the Union is a major player on the world stage and is extremely powerful (with a much greater potential). In fact, it is in the unique position of being extremely important to (and a major trading partner of) virtually every country in the world. On the contrary, few countries are of much importance to or a significant trading partner of the EU, with the exception of the USA, Japan, China and the few western European countries not currently members of the EU (notably Norway and Switzerland). This is certainly true of the countries of the Mediterranean basin. The end result is that most of the bargaining power rests with the EU, which has been accused of being aggressive and ungenerous in its external relations, particularly with regard to trade policy. It is tempting to say that EU-Mediterranean relations are a good example of this.

The impression of a very powerful EU has been all the greater because the Union has often appeared to be more coherent externally than internally. Indeed, even when it has been almost torn apart by internal dissension, it has continued to present a unified external face to the rest of the world, albeit with extreme difficulty at times. Furthermore, the rest of the world was swift to engage the EU (initially the European Economic Community or EEC) as a unit and has been similarly quick in responding to major EU initiatives like the single market programme (Redmond, 1992). Consequently, the EU has developed a complex web of connections with other countries and now has some sort of formal relationship with virtually every part of the world.

The precise nature of these relationships is difficult to characterize as they are based on a mixture of economic and political issues and also only partial since significant elements of external relations are still undertaken by member countries acting as nation states (Smith, 2002) (although they may choose to coordinate their positions). Nevertheless, the EU (as a single entity) is a major force in the international political economy and a significant player in the external relations of every country on the globe. Moreover, there is a clear pecking order in the EU’s dealings with third countries in that there is a strong positive correlation between geographical proximity to the EU and the closeness of the agreement on offer (Mercosur¹ in relation to EMP today).

Whilst the demise of the Soviet Union temporarily reduced tensions in the region, the Gulf War, the strife in Yugoslavia, the intermittent manifestations of the Arab–Israeli conflict, post-9/11 war on terror, the war in Iraq and the recent Arab Spring have all shown the capacity of the Mediterranean region to generate security risks and consequently is of continued strategic and political interest. In addition, there are also good economic reasons for EU interest: trade, tourism and oil feature extensively in EU-Mediterranean relations. The Arab Spring has foregrounded once again that the nature and substance of the EU-Med policies are important to the relationship and to the region itself. I argue that it is time to unpack what constitutes the policy itself, and take a long hard look at the ideational and historical principles that continue to shape the policy in a world that has changed drastically.

Clearly the incentive and rationale for the EU to develop an extensive and coherent Mediterranean policy are not lacking. All this would suggest that the Union should have close and coherent relationships with its Mediterranean neighbours. In fact, arguably, the opposite is true. Whilst relations with some of the individual countries have a degree of logic, there has been little sense of a proactive, coherent approach to the Mediterranean region as a whole in practice. Whilst the EU’s Mediterranean policy may be strong in principle, in reality, it has tended to be reactive and has at times amounted merely to ‘fire-fighting’. It often seems that it is only when the fears of migration and ‘the spread of Islam’ rear their heads (or in the aftermath of some particularly brutal act of terrorism in the Mediterranean) that the consequent security concerns compel the EU to stir and look south (Youngs, 2002). In short, the reality of EU-Mediterranean policy has yet to match the rhetoric, and it is difficult to dispel the perception that the EU’s concentration on the last enlargement must inevitably be at the expense of the rest of the world (including the Mediterranean), at least to some extent.

Tovias aptly observed that, like the British Empire, the EU’s Mediterranean policy has been acquired in a fit of absent-mindedness (Pomfret, 1989). Of course, it is possible to argue that Mediterranean countries are not all the same, and so a common approach by the EU to all countries is not appropriate. However, one of the EU’s failings in its dealings with the Mediterranean has been its efforts to impose commonality and homogeneity in dealing with different countries in the region. Coherence and order, not commonality and homogeneity, are required to make sense of EU-Mediterranean relations. The Mediterranean region is made up of a complex mix of states which are, indeed, very different from each other, but they all share a common thread in that they all exist within the shadow of the EU and are, to some extent, dependent on it for their economic well-being (mainly through trade). Thus what is required are policies with individual Mediterranean states that may differ from country to country but are consistent with each other and which together make up a web of relationships between the EU and the countries in its Mediterranean hinterland. A degree of internal logic and some attempt to treat Mediterranean states equally and fairly would be critical to success; for example, all aspects of a country’s position in the pecking order of EU-Mediterranean relations should be consistent with the nature of its agreement with the EU (and those of other Mediterranean states), rather than being a result of the date the agreement was made with the EU and other chance factors. This proposal has been taken recently by the EU under the aegis of its ENP; yet again, the gulf between the rhetoric used and actual implementation remains significant (Müller-Jentsch, 2004).

Furthermore, the EU has a tendency to negotiate agreements which largely reflect its own priorities and give limited attention to the requirements of the other country or countries involved. In particular, where aid and agriculture are concerned, the EU tends to determine the amount on the basis of what it can afford in the case of the former; with regard to the latter, improved market access is mainly granted only for products in which the Union has deficiencies with little, if any, reference to what the partner country actually produces. Similarly, food aid is given on the basis of what the EU wants to get rid of rather than what the recipients may want. For its southern partners, this means that EU policy is largely designed to discourage northward migration and secure the EU’s southern flank. It seems by no means unreasonable to suggest that EU-Mediterranean accords should be driven, to a much more significant extent, by the needs of the Mediterranean participants (and not solely those of the EU), thereby creating a genuine (global) Mediterranean policy.

The EU has recognized the need for a Mediterranean dimension for many years, and its first direct involvement with its southern neighbours goes back to the Association Agreements with Greece and Turkey, signed in 1961 and 1963, respectively. Similar agreements with Malta and Cyprus followed in 1970, around which time the EU created the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) to give coherence to its Mediterranean relations. Whilst the EU has historically preferred to group third countries for the purpose of external relations (sometimes to their disadvantage), the heterogeneity of the Mediterranean countries makes this difficult. Indeed, while the members do share an important characteristic (their economic dependence on the EU) which defines the group, they are very different in other ways. This makes introducing and implementing an overall Mediterranean policy difficult and possibly inappropriate.

The inevitable conclusion that follows from the analysis so far is that the EU’s relationship with its southern periphery has been somewhat neglected in the past. The EU–Mediterranean relations resurgence from the early 1990s until present however is still dealing with the historical legacy of this neglect. Academics and journalists have preferred to focus on the EU’s rapidly developing relations with its eastern neighbours. A comparative bias in that direction is clearly justified but not its extent. The intention of this book is, therefore, to fill this gap and chronicle and critique the Mediterranean policy of the EU. In the context of the movements sweeping across the Mediterranean region in 2012–2013, analysing the formative and post-formative historical structures of EU Mediterranean policies can provide us with better filters and enable us to situate the current events within their political configurations. Such an analysis will also show that while the political landscape of the region has changed rapidly, the EU-Med policies continue to be framed within the context of the colonial and post-colonial structures and processes. From this perspective, the shortcoming of the EU-Med policies cannot be attributed to (i) the policy inability to produce structures of incentives that reward all involved players, or (ii) the lack of a norm-led logic of appropriateness that organizes the relationship between the two sides of the Mediterranean, or (iii) the inevitable historical legacy of path-dependent colonial processes. Instead, the shortcoming of EU-Med relations needs to be viewed in the context of ignoring the nature of ideas that underpin these EU-Med policies. Ideas that claim to equate the social with the economic merely end up privileging the economic exclusively.

In this book, I distinguish between the EU Mediterranean policies prior to the EMP and the policies that followed it (notably the ENP). Under the first categorization, I argue that the subsequent EC Mediterranean policies (Global Mediterranean Policy and Renovated Mediterranean Policy) were vague, ad hoc and lacked coherence in their overall structure (I call it the ‘Muddle’). Despite the interdependence between the two regions, the EC policies were formulated in a reactionary fashion vis-à-vis major economic and political shocks in the region, and did not exhibit any comprehensive strategy to deal with some chronic political and economic problems prevalent in the Mediterranean region (link between trade and aid, trade dependence, rentier states, illegal immigration, etc.). In short, the EC policies were reactive, not proactive.

Under the second categorization, I study the new transformation evident in the new EU policies that sought to encompass a higher degree of comprehensiveness in the overall architecture of their Mediterranean policies (I call it the ‘Model’). Indeed, the new approaches highlight the complementary nature of the political, economic and social dimensions of development in the region. For the first time, the EU was keen to draw a link between the concretization of a peace process and the consolidation of viable socioeconomic infrastructure that can stipulate growth and stability in the Mediterranean. This became embodied in the so-called EMP or the Barcelona process and was further consolidated in a series of policies ranging from the ENP launched in 2003/2004. It was strengthened by the Barcelona 2005 framework celebrating the 10th anniversary of the EMP and reinforced by the most recent policy framework – the Union for the Mediterranean inaugurated in 2008. After the Arab Spring, the same policies were further reinforced, albeit in the language of social development.

Yet, despite this evident comprehensiveness of the ‘Model’ and its multifaceted policy variations, I argue in this book that a deeper analysis of the nature of this policy over time underplays the context in which this Model has been designed. Both the EU’s understanding and fashioning of its policy and the scholarly work which analysed it try to explain the shortcomings of the EU Mediterranean policies in three narrow terms: (a) a lack of specification of carrots and sticks, (b) lack of EU-led norm appropriation or (c) a lack of understanding of the historical conditions that construct the contours of these policies. Nonetheless, all of these scholarly approaches do not seriously question the liberal philosophy of these economic reforms and governance which claim to adjudicate the imperative goals of economic efficiency and social cohesion. Not only does the EU not acknowledge that the nature of its policies in the Mediterranean is neoliberal (in spite of all the academic writing on this topic), it is also not sensitive to the fact that the term neoliberalism is a chaotic concept which entails a variety of understandings and meanings.

Gamble (2006) distinguishes, for example, between two faces of neoliberalism. The first face is minimalist and classically associated with laisser faire, laisser passer policies where the economic realm is strictly detached and privileged over the social realm. The second face is maximalist and is associated with redistributive and developmental policies but still underpinned by market-based orientations. The maximalist brand of neoliberalism superficially claims a juxtaposition between the economic and social realm while in fact it is still underpinned by an economic logic that seeks to be legitimized via social intervention. By ignoring all such research and analysis, the EU continues to ignore the fact that its Mediterranean policies are closely associated with the maximalist face of neoliberalism. In other words, by not taking the role of ideas seriously here, the EU does not see that its claims of juxtaposing the economic with the social is actually masking the fact that the economic is primary in these policies, followed far behind by social considerations. This argument will be fleshed out through two case studies embedded within these Euro-Med policies to show that the EU’s approach inherently favours economic efficiency over social cohesion despite the comprehensive rhetoric it employs to the contrary. In so doing, I argue that the Model inherently becomes the Muddle.

In this book, I review the history and present of EC/EU policies in the Mediterranean and distinguish between Muddle and Model policies. I argue that despite the comprehensiveness and improvement shown by the EU after the launch of the EMP (model) and all the policies that followed thereafter, the Model has become a Muddle in its own right given the lack of advancements in political and social chapter and the delay in the implementation of the free trade area (from 2010 until at least 2015). In order to account and analyse the governance nature of these EU Mediterranean policies, this book draws on the literature on new institutionalisms. This theoretical literature focuses on (i) nature and definition of institutions, (ii) relation between the individual and institution, and (iii) relation between the institution and the individual. Today, there are a variety of new institutionalist approaches that are used in governance and policy studies (Peters, 1999, 2011; Peters and Pierre, 2006; Schmidt, 2010; and others) ranging from Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI), Normative Institutionalism (NI), Historical Institutionalism (HI) and more recently Constructivist Institutionalism (CI). Contrary to existing academic and scholarly literature which attribute the failure of EU policies to (i) a lack of structural incentives and enforcement mechanisms for reform (RCI), (ii) or the lack of norm appropriateness that govern the Euro-Med area (Normative or Sociological Institutionalism – NI/SI), or (iii) the negligence of previous historical structures or legacies that weaken the implementation of a healthy Euro-Med zone (HI), I draw on a CI argument to show that the Model is a Muddle because the policy practice of this Model builds on a rigid and instrumental system ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• 1. Introduction: Model or Muddle?
• 2. Institutionalisms – An Overview
• 3. Delineating the Muddle: From ‘Patchy’ Frameworks to the European–Mediterranean Partnership
• 4. Emergence and Consolidation of a ‘Model’: The European–Mediterranean Partnership and Beyond
• 5. The Role of Ideas and Interests in the EU–Mediterranean Policy
• Notes
• References
• Index