Theorizing Outdoor Recreation and Ecology

Sean Ryan

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781349578856, 9781137385079
• eBook ISBN: 9781137385086
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Ecology
• Index: Social Sciences

Deciding what user impacts are natural or unnatural has inspired much debate. Biophysically, moose cause similar kinds of soil and vegetation impacts as hikers. Yet moose are the sign of nature while hikers are the sign of damage. The field of outdoor recreation is beset with paradoxes, and this book presents a unique, alternative framework to address these dilemmas.Examining outdoor recreation through the lens of ecological theory, Ryan draws from theorists such as Foucault, Derrida and Latour. The book explores minimum impact strategies designed to protect and enhance ecological integrity, but that also require a disturbing amount of policing of users, which runs counter to the freedom users seek. Recent ecological theory suggests that outdoor recreation's view of nature as balanced when impacts are removed is outdated and incorrect. What is needed, and indeed Ryan presents, is a paradoxical and ecological view of humans as neither natural nor unnatural, a view that embraces some traces in nature.

1

Introduction

Let me begin with a true fictional tale: “Stay on the trail and avoid cutting switchbacks!” the sign intoned. That was not the first time I had encountered such an invective, nor, I was sure, would it be the last, but for some reason I began to wonder about this directive. I couldn’t cut off switchbacks, and indeed I had instructed hundreds of clients and campers not to do so either. I knew why. I had explained why both to eager and uneager ears. But now I was wondering. Animals of all kinds cut off switchbacks. Whenever I see game trails cutting back and forth across the landscape they are, in fact, signs not of disobedience leading to degradation but of nature itself. Why was I so damaging but a moose not? That made me mad. So I deliberately stepped off the trail and cut across the switchbacks. “Yeah! Stick it to the man,” I thought. I wasn’t going to be controlled by some arbitrary rules. I get to choose what I do. The guilt quickly followed, though. And then shame. Deep down I knew that what I was doing was wrong, no matter how much philosophizing I did. Who was “the man,” anyway? Wasn’t he me just as much as anyone? Sheepishly I got back on the trail before anyone saw.

This story contains the questions and issues that this book addresses: what is natural, how do we know that, how have we attempted to preserve or enhance this quality in protected areas and/or wilderness, what consequences arise from these attempts, and should we come to a different understanding of natural? Let’s call these and other associated questions and issues the conundrum of nature. The conundrum of nature has a large jurisdiction, but will be limited here to just the field of outdoor recreation (OR). My focus, then, concerns the quest to maintain, value, enhance, or protect ecological integrity in OR contexts, which brings two fields into contact with each other: OR and ecology.

Since the 1960s, the environmental movement has been growing both in terms of profile and seriousness (Boyd, 2003). Over the same period, OR use increased dramatically and was having significant and noticeable effects in natural areas. Given those developments, it should not be surprising to find a growing concern for the quality of the environment in the field of OR. One of the most significant manifestations of this concern appears in the form of minimum or low impact camping practices. These practices began in the early 1970s, became more standardized in the early 1980s, were formalized in the 1990s, and are now part of the basic discourse of OR in terms of articles, brochures, educational and training programs, research studies, and common or best practices for outdoor users (McGivney, 2003; Reed, 1999; Turner, 2002). These practices are designed to limit or to remove the negative effects that human users have on wilderness or natural areas. In addition, OR also manifests its concern for the environment in debates and discussions about identifying and reaching proper management goals for natural areas. For example, the field regularly debates the level and type of user restrictions that would best protect wilderness areas. In both these trends, OR discourse regularly employs the notion of ecological integrity or a variant of it to justify and to legitimate its recommendations and conclusions. Understanding this linkage between ecology and OR is an important piece in responding the conundrum of nature.

In OR, the term “environment” usually refers more specifically to wilderness or natural areas. Quintessentially, these are large and relatively undisturbed areas that contain only a certain amount and type of development. Of course, the particulars vary with location (ocean environments are quite different from arctic ones), with the level of protection (some areas forbid motorized vehicles, while others allow them), and with the agency responsible for managing and maintaining the integrity of the area. The term “wilderness” is not the best choice, though. In the USA, “wilderness” has a specific legal definition that does not correspond exactly to designations in Commonwealth countries, such as Canada, the UK, Australia, or New Zealand. Furthermore, “wilderness” is too restrictive a term to cover the range of contexts OR occurs in. For these reasons, the term “natural nature” rather than “wilderness” is preferred as it better captures the broad contexts in which OR occurs and does not denote a formal and/or legal definition. There is general agreement in the international literature over what OR in natural nature entails, even as there are some differences. The focus in the first part of this book is to map the contours of the discourse on recreation in natural nature. Comparative studies have shown many similarities in this discourse between countries and regions around the world: for example, between Australia and North America (Weber and Anderson, 2010); between Spain, Czech Republic, and Russia (Brodanský, 2013); between South Africa and USA (Greffrath et al., 2012); between Tanzania and USA (Mtahiko, 2007); between Turkey and USA (Sayan et al., 2013); between Garhwal, India, and USA (Serenari et al., 2013); and between Czech Republic and Britain (Turcová et al. 2005). Likewise, protected areas in Poland (Tomczyk, 2011), New Zealand (Wray, 2011), Kamchatka (Zavadskaya, 2011), southern Brazil (Almundi and Berker, 2010), Turkey (Ardahan and Mert, 2013; Sayan and Atik, 2011), Sweden (Borgström et al., 2013), Germany (Coppes and Braunisch, 2013), Garhwal (Farooquee et al., 2008), Thailand (Roman et al., 2007), North Wales (Varley, 2011), and Slovenia (Kozorog and Istenič, 2013) show remarkable consistency in terms of management goals, concerns over user impacts, and the benefits gained from recreation in natural nature. While many of these studies do not use the term “wilderness,” and none employ the wording “natural nature,” all of them subscribe to a large degree to the concept of natural nature as a place distinct from developed spaces.

The idea of natural nature, then, is an appropriate concept when speaking globally of OR. It refers to entities and/or spaces where nonhuman presence manifests. Natural nature is not nature in the sense of a manicured lawn; it is nature in the sense of a meadow. Under this conceptualization, natural nature is ‘any thing, process, or event, or any aspect of a thing, process, or event, that exists, happens, or changes not as a result of human activity; in other words, [natural] nature includes that which is not under the control of, or shaped by, human activity’ (Schatzki, 2003: 85). Wall (1989: 204) described it as referring ‘more specifically [to] aspects of nature which are natural in that they have not been modified by human beings.’ Finally, for Miller (1999: 36), it was a place where ‘nature and natural processes dominate…. Here, in the ideal case, streams flow unimpeded by waterworks. The sounds are of birds, mammals, insects, and flowing waters. There is limited development of roads, buildings, agriculture, and human settlements.’ The phrase “natural nature” captures this common theme of nonhuman presence that dominates in the OR literature.

The content of this book deals with the contact points between OR, ecology, and social theory/philosophy. Recent ecological theory (e.g., chaos and non-linear dynamics) is integrated with social theory, environmental history, and science studies to identify the consequences the conundrum of nature has for OR. There is work outside of OR that is suggestive of this approach. For example, scholars have begun to investigate the connections between ecological integrity and social equity. The ways that wilderness protection intersects with poverty are indicative of such an approach (Broch-Due and Schroeder, 2000). Closely related are cross-cultural questions about the appropriateness of a North American fortress model of protected areas for the local populations that live on or near such areas (Neumann, 2004, 2005). Both these approaches can be grouped together under the rubric of political ecology (Biersack and Greenberg, 2006; Paulson and Gezon, 2005; Peet and Watts, 2004). Another area of similar work is reflected in the overlapping fields of posthumanism (Calarco, 2007; Congdon, 2009; Morton, 2012; Peterson, 2011; Wolfe, 2011), critical human geography (Braun, 2009; Castree and Nash, 2006; Whatmore, 2009), and animal studies (Broglio, 2013a; Slater, 2012). Scholars working in these areas theorize the place non-humans have in knowledge production, the humanist bias present in contemporary thought, and alternative conceptualizations of nature through non-Cartesian frameworks.

I situate my own work in the same general arena, but with a more narrow focus on OR/ecology and a wider frame that traces the historical and social context that both ecology and OR share. This shared context influences their conceptualization of environmental problems and solutions in OR. Toward the end of the book, I incorporate the field of science studies and post-dualism to begin building an alternative response to the conundrum of nature.

A central concern in political ecology, posthumanism, critical human geography, and other fields is the (human)culture/nature split.¹ Scholars in these fields have recognized that the modernist separation of the natural world from the human cultural one is neither desirable nor feasible. This argument is not new: Cronon (1995a) made it 20 years ago. The problem, as Braun (2009) points out, is that many contemporary approaches often operate within the subject-object dichotomy, which is inappropriate and insufficient. Thus, we need to search for a non-Cartesian perspective that does not operate within the traditional subject/object binary, what Braun calls a post-dualist ontology.

As noted, the crux of the issue is the (human)culture/nature split. When it comes to OR and the natural sciences, the majority of works tacitly (or overtly) presuppose this dualist ontology. This makes incorporating social theory (especially poststructuralism), which often contests this ontology, into OR challenging. Many scholars take issue with poststructural accounts of the world as constructed or produced by discourse. However, it is not the case, as has been suggested, that poststructural theory is anathema to environmental issues, OR, or ecology.

The nature of theory: A theory of nature

While it is the case lately that the debate surrounding environmental issues takes up postmodernism and/or poststructuralism (Swinnerton, 1999)² some of this debate has been unproductively polemical. Poststructuralism is often the misunderstood object of vitriolic attacks (Fincher, 2012; McNeill, 2003; Myerson, 2001; Schatzki, 2003; Welton, 1987; Worster, 1995). I have often wondered what it is about this brand of social theory that produces such reactions. It seems there is something threatening about it. Asdal (2003: 62), in a similar vein, suggests that poststructural theory is feared by most environmental historians because of its ‘supposed potential for pushing historical analyses even further away from concerns for our physical world.’³ Worster, arguably one of the most influential environmental historians, makes this concern plain. It is an upside-down proposition, he says, to claim that the word comes before the thing itself. Words come (a distant) second to reality. Any attempt to reduce reality to text robs reality of its power as arbiter of truth—in fact, it removes all arbiters of truth and we end up with a relativistic morass where everyone is entitled to his or her own truth (Worster, 1994). For this reason, Worster (1995: ix) claims that ‘many contemporary postmodern historians … [subscribe to an] excessive relativism [that] may distort reality’ (see also Morton, 2010). When we lose sight of what is actually there, when we confuse reality with text, the danger is that we will begin to see that a ‘landscape riddled with open cast mines, bleeding acid into streams, is as “natural” as any other’ (Worster, 1993: 176). In addition to environmental historians like Worster, these same concerns over poststructural theory are echoed by some historians of science (see for example Bowler and Morus, 2005 and Russell, 2005) and certain environmental philosophers (for instance, Shepard, 1995).

If we adopt a poststructural perspective, these authors argue, everything dissolves into random, changing, relative subjectivities with little meaning for each other. Nothing is real and true. How, then, can we determine true from false, or real from textual?⁴ The fear is that we might not know what is actually going on in nature. These questions drive many reactions to poststructural social theory and are couched in a dualistic ontology. As Ermath (2001: 52) has noted, these ‘questions are entirely understandable, but they are questions formulated by modernity, for modernity.’

My position vis-à-vis poststructuralism is similar to what Shatz (2004: 6) meant when he said that Derrida’s concern over Enlightenment metaphysics ‘was that of a lover, not a prosecutor.’ Poststructural social theory has given us some important insights, yet like all things it has its limits. I would like to challenge it to grow and change precisely because of my indebtedness to it. This work, then, theorizes OR by drawing on poststructural social theory in some instances, yet it also challenges and changes some of its tenets. My desires are to help OR think differently about some of the very foundations of the field and to further the development of social theory in such a way that calling it social theory will be somewhat of a misnomer.

Archaeology and genealogy

Archaeology and genealogy form key elements in this work. Both of these are types of historical analyses that differ from chronologies that outline major themes and events. Archaeology analyses the structure of discourse and practices of knowledge production. For Foucault (2005: xxiii),

such an analysis does not belong to the history of ideas or of science: it is rather an inquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis knowledge and theory became possible; within what space of order knowledge was constituted; on the basis of what historical a priori, and in the element of what positivity, ideas could appear, sciences be established…

Archaeology explores how this historical a priori, or archive, sets the conditions of possibility for knowledge (Foucault, 1972a: 126–131). Archives are characterized by epistemological structurings that create space for knowledge to appear. These structurings define grids of intelligibility, and various archives contain different grids of intelligibility that produce unique conditions of possibility for knowledge.

Although archives can change across cultures and/or over time, Foucault focused mostly on three archives in Western Euro-North American civilization: the Renaissance archive, which ended circa 1650; the Classical archive, which ended circa 1800; and the Modern archive, which characterizes today.⁵ Archaeology identifies the forces that create regularities in the production of knowledge and the effects these regularities have on the shape and content of that knowledge. Foucault saw the Classical archive as being concerned with ordering. Consequently, natural history was devoted to organizing living entities into relationships with each other. During this time, great tables of taxonomy were developed that showed the “correct” position of each life form and thus the relations of similarity/difference between and among them (see Szerszynski, 2012). Toward the end of the seventeenth century, the Classical archive changed in a way that ‘might be characterized as the addition of a new depth or dimension to the world of knowledge’ (May, 2006: 51). Natural history becomes biology and the concern with ordering life forms is dropped in favour of an analysis of the underlying organic structure of life. Classical ordering was based upon the visible, whereas the underlying organic structure is invisible to sight. To add this new depth and dimension to the conditions of knowledge is to change the system for producing scientific knowledge. Thus the Classical archive is ruptured and the Modern archive ushered in. The discourses characteristic of each archive change: natural history gives way to biology and then ecology. The discourses to be examined archaeologically here are that of OR and to a lesser extent ecology, both of which are modern discourses.

According to Foucault, genealogy focuses on power relations and behaviour rather than mainly on discourse, which is more the domain of archaeology. ‘From this’, Foucault (1980: 114) said,

follows a refusal of analyses couched in terms of the symbolic field or the domain of signifying structures, and a recourse to analyses in terms of the genealogy of relations of force, strategic developments, and tactics. Here I believe one’s point of reference should not be to the great models of language (langue) and signs, but to that of war and battle. … History … is intelligible and should be susceptible of analysis down to the smallest detail—but this is in accordance with the intelligibility of struggles, of strategies and tactics.

The genealogical analysis of OR, then, focuses on how (that is, the tactics and strategies by which) power is exercised in the field to produce certain types of subjects who are compliant with minimum impact standards and protocols. Genealogical power relations, Foucault noted (in Harla...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Discourse and Power in Outdoor Recreation
• 3 Humans and Nature
• 4 Tracing and Haunting Humans and/in Nature
• 5 The Nature of Paradoxes/the Natural Paradox
• 6 Paradoxical Outdoor Recreation
• 7 Conclusion
• Notes
• References
• Index