The Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe

A Revision

Frank Jacob, Gilmar Visoni-Alonzo

• Publisher: Palgrave Pivot
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781137539175
• eBook ISBN: 9781137539182
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

This book challenges the premise that a 'military revolution' prompted the major European powers to enter into an era of global hegemony during the early modern period, and suggests that this theory is not supported if we closely examine contemporary historical events. The conquests of Mexico and Peru, arguably the two most important colonial acquisitions by a European power during that era, were accomplished without the technology or tactics that are usually associated with the 'military revolution'. On the other hand, Japan, Korea, some Indian states and the Ottoman Empire implemented military reforms, both tactical and technological, that are commonly associated with what was considered an exclusively Western approach to warfare. By comparing case studies of the Western and the non-Western world, Frank Jacob and Gilmar Visoni-Alonzo show that the concept of such a 'military revolution' is a myth perpetuated by a Eurocentric perspective on history.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Frank Jacob and Gilmar Visoni-AlonzoThe Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe10.1057/978-1-137-53918-2_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction

Frank Jacob¹ and Gilmar Visoni-Alonzo¹

(1)

Queensborough Community College, City University of New York, Bayside, New York, USA

Abstract

The concept of the Military Revolution has dominated the historical debate since Michael Roberts presented it in 1955, and it received new impetus in 1988 with the publication of Geoffrey Parker’s work. Since then many studies have eroded the solidity of the thesis. The authors claim that there was no Military Revolution at all. They assert that the changes in the practice of war observed in Europe during the Early Modern period took place on a global scale, occurred numerous times throughout history, and are part of an endless evolutionary process of research and development prompted by immediate threats.

Keywords

Military revolutionGlobal historyEarly modern Europe

End Abstract

There never was a Military Revolution. Though this statement might lead to us being ostracized from the field of military history, the present book intends to explain and prove our claim. We are well aware that our thesis stands in contrast to everything that has been written on this subject in recent decades. Nonetheless, we believe that the concept of a Military Revolution is not helpful, nor are there any provable instances of such revolutions. Rather, it is an artificial construct that is supposed to help explain the dominance of the West in the age of colonialism; it therefore expresses Eurocentric assumptions as opposed to being based in historical proof. In recent years this point seems to have been proven by the works of scholars in African, Asian, and Latin American Studies. Drawing on this work, we call for the concept of the Military Revolution to be entirely repealed. Such revolutions are myths, as we will demonstrate in detail on the pages that follow.

For more than 50 years, the notion of the Military Revolution has been expounded and promoted by countless scholars around the world. Peter Brown, a specialist in Russian history, however, has recently remarked that there are steadily growing doubts about a concept that “unquestionably bears signs of discursive fatigue and the arcane, inasmuch as it has made the rounds for so long.” Regardless of his feelings towards the concept, Brown is not willing to abandon the terminology. He rather argues for a repositioning of the concept “with ‘early modern European military evolution’ or ‘early modern European arms race’ plausibly being better tooled appellations.”¹ We go a step further. The term Military Revolution has no fit at all. And it seems to us useless to stick with a model that is derived more from Eurocentric bias than historical fact.

We thereby echo the demands for a New Military History as expressed by John Whiteclay Chambers in 1991. As military historians we are far more “interested in social and political history, technology, culture, and the relationship of war and the military to society, the state, and international relations,”² even if that means that we have to abandon a concept which has been has become an article of faith for many decades.

The term ‘revolution’ usually implies political changes that are achieved in a short period of time, and in the majority of cases by the use of violence.³ Following the definition of Forrest D. Colburn, a “revolution is the sudden, violent, and drastic substitution of one group governing a territorial political entity for another group formerly excluded from the government, and an ensuing assault on state and society for the purpose of radically transforming society.”⁴ Political scientists have recently discussed whether there is any possibility at all for future revolutions to take place,⁵ but given that they have been an essential part of our history, it seems likely that in one form or another they will occur in the centuries to come as well. Revolutions are as important for international relations as they are for the study of history. To quote political scientist Stephen M. Walt, they “cause abrupt shifts in the balance of power, place alliance commitments and other international agreements in jeopardy, and provide inviting opportunities for other states to improve their positions.” However, “true revolutions are a relatively rare occurrence.”⁶ From a political perspective revolutions are “violent political struggles over the basic principles by which society is organized.”⁷ Clifton B. Kroeber also made clear that a “revolution is successful only where a movement overturns a regime.”⁸ A revolution has therefore to cause not only a change of rule, but also a change of the ruling system. The revolution continues, or seeks to continue, until this change is achieved. As has been argued, revolutions happen in a revolutionary circle that is brought to an end only by a change that is accepted by a majority of the population.⁹ To define the term “revolution” we may again quote Kroeber:

…it seems well to avoid adjectives such as social, cultural, economic, and political—words that from the outset seem to confine one’s view within one or another academic discipline. What these adjectives bring into the picture is the parochial view of the writer’s own field of study, so that social, cultural, economic, or political turn out to be meaningless qualifications that once again start us toward smaller, more limited views.¹⁰

The term “Military Revolution”—created by scholars who try to tie the revolutionary impact of military developments to a particular period of human history and circumscribe them geographically—engenders exactly such a limitation of view. William E. Lipsky warned us of the danger that “different scholars, working within different frames of reference, have simply selected those aspects which seem most important to them,”¹¹ while losing the ability to differentiate between their own wishes and the historical facts.

In the case of the theory of Military Revolutions, technology plays an important role. Economist and LSE professor Francesco Caselli provides a detailed description of the interrelationship between technology and skill as is required to create progress (something that is true for military progress as well):

A technology is a combination of machines of a certain type and workers who have the skills necessary to use them. A technological revolution is the introduction of a new type of machines. Machines of the new type are more productive than machines of preexisting types, but they can only be operated by workers who have developed a set of machine-specific skills. The acquisition of such skills is costly, and the labor force is heterogeneous in the cost of acquisition. The revolution is skill biased if the new skills are more costly to acquire than the skills required by preexisting types of equipment. The revolution is de-skilling if the new skills can be acquired at a lower cost than the skills associated with preexisting technologies.¹²

This long quotation is intended to give the reader an idea of the ways the term “revolution” is misused. The combination of a new technology with a new set of skills, something that is a natural form of research and development, is sufficient for some scholars to frame it as a revolution. However, the development of new (military) technology does not necessarily have to change society as a whole. Nor must it lead to a change of rule. We therefore have to be very careful when we determine something as revolutionary, even if the use of this emblematic terminology is an means to sell a new theory to an interested readership—think of the many ‘revolutions’ in pop music with which we are confronted every year.

Regardless of the warnings, “many analysts now believe that profound changes in the technology of war may be causing a revolutionary transformation in the conduct of war in general and in the character of conventional military operations in particular.”¹³ But at this point we have to ask a very important question: Do new weapons revolutionize war? The way it is fought might be different, but reasons and aims have remained similar throughout history. Martin van Creveld observed that a history of war is impossible if one does not take political, economic, social, and technological aspects into consideration.¹⁴ War is determined by all of these, and a history of warfare cannot be just a history of events. He was not the first who recognized this fact. Werner Sombart (1863–1941) wrote about the interrelationship of war and capitalism in 1913,¹⁵ and many other scholars have discussed individual factors and their influence on warfare per se. The interrelationship between technology and warfare (as well as science and warfare) is as old as war itself; human beings have always tried to kill each other. However, with regard to the method of killing as changed by the introduction of new military technology, too close a focus on early modern times or the age of high industrialization can no longer be accepted,¹⁶ since we can trace a more visible interconnection among science, technology, and war in the decades between 1914 and 1945.

The concept of war itself has never changed with regard to its aims. If a war is a form of collective violence—performed by one collective against another one, usually in an ordered form by professional personnel, to achieve economic, political, religious, or so...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Frontmatter
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Global Military Revolutions?
• 3. Numerous Military Revolutions?
• 4. Conclusion: An Endless Evolution
• Backmatter