Assessing Dynamics of Democratisation

Transformative Politics, New Institutions, and the Case of Indonesia

O. Törnquist

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781137369345
• eBook ISBN: 9781137381293
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The book summarises the critique of these approaches, suggests a comprehensive alternative framework, and shows how the alternative works in reality through a case study of the largest of the new democracies, Indonesia.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Why Alternative Assessments?

Democracy, Democratisation and Assessments

What is the best way to assess democratisation? Why is an alternative approach needed? To answer these questions, it is fruitful to begin with concepts that most readers can agree on. Pioneers Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter define democratisation as

the process whereby the rules and procedures of citisenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles (e.g. coercive control, social tradition, expert judgement or administrative practice), or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations (e.g. nontaxpayers, illiterates, women, youth, ethnic minorities, foreign residents) or extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subject to citizen participation (e.g. state agencies, military establishments, partisan organizations, interests associations, productive enterprises, educational institutions, etc.). (1986, p. 8)

This is both a specific and an inclusive description that neatly captures what we wish to assess. In other words, this book is not concerned with the various meanings of democracy – for which the reader may refer to the seminal work of Robert Dahl (1989) – or the various models of democracy, as discussed in the influential work of David Held (2006). Rather, it focuses on the roads and the roadmaps to democracy and how to assess their characteristics and their potential for democratisation.

We thus also need to define, however, what we mean by democracy. David Beetham (1999) argues convincingly that most scholars think about democracy in terms of popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality. Thus, democratisation is also dependent on how people and public affairs are defined as well as what is meant by control and political equality.

Furthermore, there is widespread agreement that however democracy is defined, it does call for a number of institutions (by which we mean rules and regulations) and certain social and economic conditions (it is difficult, for instance, to think of democracy in a society that is socially and economically dominated by feudal landlords or dominant castes).

However, while the aforementioned definitions of democracy and democratisation provide a good point of departure, two major disputes remain: Should the definitions be minimal or maximalist, and should they be procedural or substantive?

The first dispute about democracy concerns its extension. Extension involves three dimensions. First, what institutions and conditions are necessary for democracy to emerge? Second, what people (demos) shall control public affairs? Third, what constitute these public affairs?

These dimensions of extension are typically distinguished between minimalist and maximalist perspectives. An example of a minimal definition would be where a restricted number of people have the freedom to elect political elites to govern a limited number of public affairs (cf. Schumpeter 1943). A maximalist liberal-socialist definition would be where almost all the people are socially and economically equal with full freedoms and rights to both elect representatives and also participate in the governing of widely defined public affairs. These are extreme examples and there are certainly positions in between. The currently dominant liberal democratic model of democracy is closer to the first extreme than the participatory and the social democratic models, which in turn are closer to the second extreme. We will return more extensively to the issue of the extension of democracy when discussing what institutions and other conditions are necessary for fostering democracy. Key questions that will be addressed include whether it is sufficient for a democracy with only a few institutions (such as constitutions, freedoms and elections) or if there is a need for additional rules and regulations (such as interest-based representation) as well as for significant political capacity of ordinary people to act on their own.

Furthermore, what individuals and groups shall have the right to decide – and thus constitute the demos – and what historical circumstances and power relations does this constitution of the demos rest upon? For example, are women, migrant labourers and people that belong to specific clans or faith groups part of the demos? Moreover, what is the importance to democracy of citizenship rights other than the right to decide, such as rights to social and economic entitlement? And how does a democracy that is by definition based on the right of a limited demos to control public affairs (and the right of a limited number of citizens to additional civil and social privileges) relate to the concept of human rights for all?

Equally fundamental, the extension of democracy is affected by what issues are deemed public affairs and what issues are deemed to belong to the sphere of the family, religious associations or private life and business. This concerns not only neoliberal versus socialist positions but also, for example, the importance of libertarian and communal views.

Finally, how is the extension of democracy affected by the fact that governance is increasingly multi-layered and polycentric: what aspects of public affairs are controlled by what people (demos) and at what level? Are the various issues and the demos located at the international level or at the central national or local level? Are they within certain sectors and policy areas (such as gender relations, education, environment, health or business) and are they also in the sphere of co-operation with civil society and business?

In brief, the point of departure of this book with regard to the extension of democracy is that even if the predominant definitions are minimalistic, assessments need to acknowledge that many people may believe that they have more then the minimal issues in common. If the book did not do this, it would be biased in favour of the minimalist view.

Another similar reason for focusing on more comprehensively defined democracy is that minimal definitions tend to pave the way for non-democratic politics. For example, a common argument is that democracy does not help to fight corruption. On the contrary, the argument goes, democracy in itself may be fine but in order to fight corruption (and thus foster economic growth and more), it is necessary to focus on better rule of law and stronger state institutions. In this argument, however, the definition of democracy has been limited to elections and certain freedoms, while sometimes the rule of law and almost always state institutions required to implement democratic decisions are deemed external prerequisites, not to talk about interest-based representation and several other components in building democracy. Thus, it is only a narrowly defined democracy that is deemed unable to fight corruption, not a democracy that includes the relationship between elections, the rule of law, strong state institutions and more. So when democracy is defined narrowly and does not include the relations between elections, interest group representation, the rule of law and public administration, then, by definition, corruption can only be fought in ways that the advocates of the minimalist definition would say have nothing to do with democracy, such as in the case of Singapore (Khan 2005, Winters 2012, cf. Törnquist 2012).

For these reasons, the book focuses on how to assess the development of substantial democracy – a democracy that is normatively neither minimal nor maximal, but significant (as opposed to a formality) by being inclusive of (1) the issues that most people deem to be of common concern, (2) the persons that are subject to the government of these issues and (3) the institutional and other prerequisites that most scholars deem to be necessary for a democracy to work and make a difference.

The second dispute about democracy is between procedural and substantive definitions. On the one hand, the adherents of procedural definitions prefer to identify democracy with the institutions that they deem to be intrinsic, such as the rule of law and free and fair elections. As a consequence, such institutions are called democratic; given that they are operational, they are, by definition, bound to foster democracy. For example, if elections are free and fair, the assumption is that they foster democracy.

The supporters of substantive definitions, on the other hand, typically specify what values and principles are needed for democracy to become real, after which they list a number of institutional means to foster the values and thus also the aim of democracy. Beetham and his colleagues (2002, p. 14, 64–66), for example, argue that the values of participation, authorisation, representation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness and solidarity are necessary to foster the aim of democracy in terms of popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality. Thereafter, they construct a list of 23 general institutional means to realise these values, and these means, in turn, are expanded into some 85 more specific institutional arrangements. Finally, they assess whether and how these means actually promote the aim of democracy.

It is certainly necessary to discuss what institutions and other conditions are intrinsic to the development of democracy and how many indicators need to be considered. These are important themes in the following chapters. However, the main point here is to underline the premise that a substantive definition of democracy is analytically more fruitful than a procedural one in the assessment of democratisation. The main reason is simple. By identifying the aims of democracy before analysing the extent to which the institutions really foster these aims and people can use and improve them, one does not take for granted that various institutions are democratic. On the contrary, this is an empirical issue – something that remains to be found out in reality.

Substantive democracy is thus the conditions and the efficiency of the institutions, as well as people’s capacity to use them, that respected scholars deem to be intrinsic in building popular control on the basis of political equality of the issues that people (who are affected by the government or lack of government of these issues) deem to be public affairs. Logically, then, substantive democratisation is the process to achieve this.

In short, it has been argued that even if there is a broad agreement that democracy means popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality, this may be more or less narrowly defined. Good assessments of democratisation presuppose, however, that (1) the definitions of democracy are extensive enough to include the issues that most people hold to be of public concern as well as the building stones that various scholars deem to be necessary and (2) no conditions and institutions are classified as democratic per se but are subject to empirical analyses of the extent to which they promote the aim of democracy as well as the extent to which people can foster and use them. Hence, one should assess whether and how as well as why democratisation and democracy are more or less substantial and substantive.

The Origins of Assessments

Democracy assessments developed when existing often structural oriented theories proved insufficient in explaining the actual development of democracy and in recommending ways forward. By the 1970s, the focus of most schools of thought was on explaining why the democratisation that had been introduced after the Second World War had generally deteriorated and even proved impossible to sustain, with a few exceptions such as India. This applied to almost all theories, from liberal to Marxist modernisation perspectives as well as dependency theories. However, following the dismantling of the dictatorships in Spain and Portugal in the mid-1970s, more attention was drawn to the possibility that the authoritarian regimes in Latin America might also be undermined. Most importantly, pioneering scholars (including a team led by O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead) showed that the emerging transitions toward ‘uncertain democracies’ were related more to the politics of alliances and international support than to the kind of structural changes that had been emphasised in the predominant theories. Since it was possible to foster some democratisation by political design, there was an obvious need to assess the outcome and challenges.

Insufficient Structural Analyses

To understand the pros and cons of the assessments that evolved, it is necessary to discuss how democracy and democratisation were analysed at the time. A major argument in the following account is that initially dynamic analyses (such as by O’Donnell and Schmitter) of the contextual primacy of politics (which supplemented the insufficient structural approaches) were followed quite soon by studies of the crafting of supposedly universally valid and depoliticised institutions.

Until the mid-1970s, the predominant view was that capitalist modernisation and expansion – usually of an idealised Western sort – was a fundamental pre-condition for the development of democracy in the Global South. Both Marxists and non-Marxists carried out broad society-oriented studies. The tendency was, according to Martin Lipset (1959) and others, that economic development generated complicated social and economic structures that could not be managed by authoritarian regimes. In addition, modern as opposed to traditional values spread, particularly among the market-driven business people and the middle classes who were interested in standing up to autocratic rulers and the state apparatus whilst being independent enough to do so. The foremost dictum of this structurally based argument was Barrington Moore’s (1965) ‘no bourgeois, no democracy’.

There were three main concerns, however, with the modernisation arguments. The first was articulated by Samuel Huntington (1965) who contended that the rise of liberal democracies not only presupposed capitalist modernisation and middle classes, but also solid state institutions, particularly the rule of law. Without these, the discontented masses, no longer controlled by traditional institutions, would cause disruption and might even be attracted to radical ideas. As a consequence, the powerful would be unlikely to agree to even modest reforms. Thus, according to Huntington, there was a need for a ‘politics of order’ established ahead of political liberties and elections. In the event that the middle classes were not capable of building these institutions, Huntington added, the military might have to step in, being in many cases the only reasonably solid organisation. This argument provided the main rationale for the many ‘middle class coups’ in Latin America at the time, and even for the support of the military takeover in Indonesia and the subsequent mass killings of leftists in 1965–1966.

Another but non-conservative concern was promoted by comparative historical and political sociologists such as Charles Tilly (1975), Göran Therborn (1977), Dietrich Rueschemeyer, E. H. and J. D. Stephens (1992) and Collier (1999). They argued more broadly that the development of democracy rested with the general dynamics of capitalism and the role of both class and state. Capitalist development in Europe and North America had generated a large working class with both organisational capacity and an interest in democracy. Where capitalism was successful, moreover, the dominant businesspeople were strong enough to abstain from direct government control and were willing to accept some democratisation as a means to contain protest and gain public acceptance. Thus, actual democracy resulted from both demands and needs. The demands for democracy were voiced not so much by the bourgeoisie as by the working class and sections of the middle classes. The need for democracy boiled down to the elite’s requirement for the widest popular support as they engaged in state building, international state-led competition and military campaigns.

A third concern was espoused by nationalist- and Marxist-oriented comparativists with a closer focus on the Global South. These had long maintained that the European processes of democratisation were not likely to be replicated in the post-colonial world. On the one hand, scholars of imperialism and international dependency concluded that the local elite would either have to use authoritarian methods to stay in power (because of their tendency to collaborate with foreign capitalists, thus losing legitimacy), or they would have to repress labour in order to develop the economy beyond the substitution of imports by making the economy internationally attractive and competitive (Frank 1967, O’Donnell 1973, Amin 1974). On the other hand, students of class and local politics argued that popular rather than elitist-oriented democracies could only be built on the basis of structural changes such as control of foreign capital and land reform (Baran 1957, Alavi 1972, Martinussen 1980). It is true that activists who subscribed to the dependency analyses suggested more anti-capitalist reform than did the nationalist and communist leaders who referred to the studies of class-based politics and argued for broad alliances towards state-led national development. However, all agreed on the need for structural change ahead of democracy.

Actual developments in the Global South rarely bore out any of these positions. Modernisation alone was no midwife of democracy, not even when the supposedly pro-democratic middle and working classes expanded. Authoritarianism spread in countries with both market- and state-led strategies of modernisation. Even the most successful design of strong political and judicial institutions in Singapore did not generate much democracy. The exceptions include India, where basic institutional elements of democracy survived, and Taiwan and South Korea, where they developed. However, even these limited advances were difficult to explain by the application of the mainstream theories. The most successful is a combination of elements of the comparative sociological perspectives and the analyses of class and local politics. Leading examples include Mouzelis’s (1986) study of the early history of democracy in Latin America and the Balkans and Migdal’s (1988) analysis of weak states in comparison with the dominant web-like societies with complicated social structures and local strongmen.

Moreover, the only viable mass data-based universal conclusion about the nature of the correlation between development and democracy was that development, in terms of per capita income, tended to sustain already established democracies (Przeworski et al. 2000). At times, economic development had favoured certain classes or actors that had f...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The Institutions of Democracy
• 3 Actors and Institutions
• 4 Actors and Power
• 5 Actors and Democratisation
• 6 From Results to Recommendations
• 7 Theory in Practice
• Appendix 1 Implementation against Odds: the Indonesian Story
• Appendix 2 The Questionnaires for the 2013 Third Indonesian Democracy Assessment
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index