Security in Shared Neighbourhoods

Foreign Policy of Russia, Turkey and the EU

Licínia Simão, Rémi Piet

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781137499097
• eBook ISBN: 9781137499103
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Comparative Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This edited volume addresses the foreign policy approaches demonstrated by the European Union (EU), Russia and Turkey towards their shared neighbourhood. These three geopolitical players promote active foreign and security policies towards the Black and Caspian Seas, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and determine stability in these regions.

Part I

Triangulating Perceptions among Regional Powers

1

Identities and Images of Competition in the Overlapping Neighbourhoods: How EU and Russian Foreign Policies Interact

Tom Casier

Introduction

When the European Union (EU) interacts with Russia, in a setting prior to the crisis over Ukraine, it does not do so in the first place on the basis of what Russia has actually done. Rather the EU acts on the basis of what it believes Russia has become. The Union and its member states redefine the identity of Russia, aggrandise differences between perceived ‘European’ and Russian identities and eventually – in a context of rather acrimonious relations – read bad intentions into Russia’s behaviour. Something similar happens the other way around. Russia is primarily led by the images it holds of the EU. It redefines the EU’s identity up to the point where any move is understood negatively as aimed against Russia. Identities of both actors are not given, but change in the process of interaction itself. Over roughly the last decade this process has resulted in a competitive logic between the two big neighbours over their respective roles and policies in the overlapping neighbourhoods.

Conventionally this competition in the neighbourhood is explained on the basis of incompatible interests or diverging normative preferences. By looking at identities rather than interests, this chapter takes a different approach. It looks at images of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ of the EU and Russia as regional actors in their overlapping neighbourhoods: how they perceive themselves, how they perceive the other and in particular how they understand their respective roles in the overlapping neighbourhoods. The chapter zooms in on the (non-) recognition of identities. It is argued that it is not so much the interests as such that are incompatible, but rather the images of identities through which these interests are understood.

This chapter starts with the presentation of a theoretical framework, based on findings from social constructivism and cognitive psychology. It leads us to the analysis of different dimensions of identities and images in EU–Russia relations. First the shared understanding of the strategic environment is explored. Next we address the mutual non-recognition of the EU’s and Russia’s regional roles. The following section suggests how hierarchies of identities are created. Finally, we link the concept of sovereignty to identities, demonstrating how the rhetoric of sovereignty is affected by identities.

The claim of this chapter is not that EU–Russia relations can be entirely explained on the basis of identities, but that identities and images are key factors for understanding these relations. To put it differently, rather than looking at competition, we focus on how the perception of competition is interwoven with constructed identities and images. The current conflict with Ukraine demonstrates vividly how the images that different parties hold of each other matter and have contributed to a logic of competition. It equally illustrates how identities are redefined and mobilised within the context of the conflict: strong dichotomous identities are promoted or radicalised (e.g. between ‘European’ and ‘Russian’ or ‘Ukrainian’ and ‘Russian’) and identity choices are imposed.

It is equally clear that a structural solution to the war in Ukraine will require a long and tedious process of trust-building. This requires moving beyond current negative images and reversing a downward spiral. This chapter, however, will not deal with the most recent developments, but rather seeks to understand how a logic of competition, driven by negative images, unfolded and contributed to the direct confrontation in which the EU and Russia find themselves today.

Understanding dynamic and relational identities

This chapter moves away from a large part of the literature on EU–Russia relations that focuses on diverging interests or a gap between an EU norm-driven agenda and a Russian interest-driven agenda. Such approaches are based on an essentialist concept of interests. Interests are seen as a priori given and exogenous. The process of interest formation itself is not addressed and rationalist approaches ‘either bracket the formation of interests, treating them as if they were exogenous, or explain interests by reference to domestic politics, on the assumption that they are exogenous’ (Wendt, 1994: 384).

Largely following a constructivist line of thought, this chapter contests the essentialist conception of interest. Interests are not out there, ready to be grabbed, but minimally require a degree of social interpretation. In other words, interests do not come to us as an objective a priori given ‘fact’. Rather they are understood, produced and reproduced within complex social processes. Within this process identities play a crucial role. Several authors have indicated how identity is central to understanding EU–Russia relations (for example Sakwa, 2011, 2012; DeBardeleben, 2012; Tsygankov, 2007; Splidsboel-Hansen, 2002).

We understand identities as ‘images of individuality and distinctiveness (“selfhood”) held and projected by an actor and formed (and modified over time) through relations with significant “others”. Thus the term (by convention) references mutually constructed and evolving images of self and other’ (Jepperson et al. 1996). Following Jönsson (1983), we link these images of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ to images of ‘Situation’, through which actors understand, define and transform their identity as a function of how they perceive their position in a certain context.

From this perspective, identities are not disconnected from interests or norms, but imbue them with meaning. Interests, for example, are not an objective given, emerging from the material reality of EU–Russia relations. Rather, they are understood and get meaning in a continuous process of social interaction. The evolving images that actors hold of each other, the identities they project and the degree to which they get (or do not get) recognised in this identity, impact the way they see their interests and how they understand the intentions of their counterparts and give meaning to their action in this light. Identities, given they are formed and reproduced in a process of social interaction, are not static but transform over time, albeit often changing only slowly, seemingly ‘resistant to change’ (Wendt, 1992: 418).

Many Constructivists tend to put a strong emphasis on structure and on the ‘shared understandings’ within which identities are created (Kowert, 1998: 102). Alexander Wendt famously analysed how shared understandings of anarchy produced a social reality in international relations in which all states operated as if anarchy was an objective given, rather than an intersubjective product. In other words, relations between states give rise to collective identities: states share certain meanings of the international environment in which they operate and continuously confirm these intersubjective meanings by the way they interact. If states share an understanding of living in a competitive, anarchic environment in which they have to maximise their power in order to provide for their own security, they will confirm these understandings by the way they interact on a daily basis. Hence Wendt’s conclusion that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt, 1992).

However valuable this approach is, it can be criticised for underrating the importance of agency: the degree to which politicians, diplomats, citizens, media, etc. create identities in a complex, competitive and all but one-dimensional process. Following Kowert (1998), we need to add a second dimension to identity, taken from cognitive psychology, claiming ‘that the ordinary function of human cognition cleaves the social world into “self” and “other” categories of agency’ (Kowert, 1998: 106). Simple divisions between groups are enough to create categories of in-group and out-group which are linked to diverging identities. As ‘political categories become more salient’ (Kowert, 1998: 110), the parties will exaggerate the identities both of the in-group and of the out-group.

From cognitive psychology and specifically from the ‘minimal group paradigm’, Kowert concludes that there is a tendency ‘to exaggerate differences between political groups and to underestimate differences within these groups’ (Kowert, 1998: 108–109). In other words, the coherence of the in-group is overrated, as well as the differences with the out-group. Moreover, there is a tendency ‘to attribute the behaviour of political out-groups to the intent or desire of those groups; in-group behaviour, however, will more often be attributed to the influence of environmental constraints. Perceived increases in the power of out-groups will strengthen the tendency to assume intent (attributional bias)’ (Kowert, 1998: 109).

Jepperson et al. (1996: note 85) distinguish between two basic forms of identities:

those that are intrinsic to an actor (at least relative to a given social structure) and those that are relationally defined within a social structure. ... Put in the language of game theory, intrinsic identities are constituted exogenously to a game (though they might be reproduced or transformed through play of the game), whereas relational identities (“roles”) are constituted by the game itself. In the latter case, part of what is “going on” in a game is the reproduction and/or transformation of identities.¹

While this chapter does not study the process of domestic identity formation as such, it is also seen as a social process (in this sense it is exogenous to the game of international relations only). More importantly, as Sakwa has argued in the context of Russia’s relations with the West, the domestic and the international are intertwined. Identity formation happens ‘at the interface of domestic and international processes’ (Sakwa, 2012: 972). What Jepperson et al. (1996) called intrinsic and relational identities are by no means separated: domestic and international processes of identity formation interact. For example, if a state develops a strongly nationalist identity, this will affect the images it promotes of itself on the international scene and the images other actors hold of it. The other way around, the way a state perceives itself to be treated internationally and the degree of (non-) recognition of its identity, will impact on domestic processes of identity formation.

On the basis of the above, this chapter focuses on the following aspects of EU–Russia relations. First, the chapter examines the images the EU and Russia hold of the broader strategic context in which they operate and the way shared understandings of a competitive context have come to dominate. Secondly, the chapter analyses the exaggeration and non-recognition of identities of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ as regional actors and how they lead both actors to read bad intent into the behaviour of the ‘Other’. Thirdly, the chapter discusses why the creation of hierarchies of identities matter. Finally, we link relational identities to the concept of sovereignty, indicating how the latter is imbued by the interpretations given to one’s identity in connection to others.

From cooperative to competitive strategic environment

‘[M]uch of the post-Cold War malaise is derived from identity factors’ (Sakwa, 2011: 957). The story of post-1991 identity developments can be read as one of redefining the international situation, changing identities and seeking recognition of identities. This section analyses how the shared understanding of the post-Cold War strategic context in which the EU and Russia operated developed from cooperative, but asymmetrically EU-centred, to competitive.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the young post-communist Russia took on a new identity. It adopted a liberal-democratic constitution and sought recognition in the community of Western states. In an era which has been labelled by some as the ‘honeymoon’ of relations between Russia and the West, Moscow displayed a strong willingness to cooperate with the West. Originally it followed an America-first policy, later on the emphasis would shift to the EU as key strategic partner. During most of the 1990s the EU and Russia had a collective understanding of their strategic environment as predominantly cooperative. This resulted in the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT).² By the end of the decade relations between Brussels and Moscow were increasingly framed in terms of a Strategic Partnership. While being cooperative, relations were asymmetrical. The newly established EU was the stronger partner and relations were largely based on the transfer of EU rules, norms and institutional practices to Russia. The EU and its member states very much appeared in the role of the stronger partner, assisting Russia on the path of transition. The EU promoted democracy and liberal economic principles in ways similar to the other East–European countries. Russia was extremely weak, suffering from economic decline and political chaos, culminating in the 1998 financial crisis. If it was seen as a potential threat in those days, it was not because of its strength, but because of risks of instability or lack of control over nuclear material.

The shared understanding of the strategic context of EU–Russia relations in the first half of the 1990s was thus one of cooperation, with the EU acting as teacher and Russia accepting its role as pupil. This shared understanding came under increasing strain towards the end of the decade. Several structural reasons can explain how it came to an end. On the Russian side, there was increasing frustration over not being recognised in the identity it pursued as a post-communist country and a member of the (western) international community of states: it was often involved, but not fully accepted as a member. When it came down to important decisions, with a potentially important geostrategic impact, the Russian government often felt left out. In particular, the decision to extend NATO eastwards – and to a lesser extent EU enlargement – was not received well in Moscow. The map of Europe was redrawn and former Soviet allies became members of the western alliance, without ‘partner’ Russia having a say in this process. Some authors have regarded 1999 as a watershed year (Light et al., 2000). This was the year of the Kosovo crisis, when the US and the UK bombed Serbia without a United Nations (UN) mandate or prior consultation with Russia. It was also the year when the first wave of the Eastern NATO enlargement took place and when the Alliance adopted its new Washington Strategic Concept. Light et al. (2000) state that, as a result, a new nationalist consensus emerged around the idea that Russia needed to defend its interests more consistently. In the following years, several developments would further change the mutual images of Russia and the EU (Simão, 2011). The 2004 EU enlargement de facto changed the geostrategic context. Moreover, the colour revolutions of 2003 and 2004, in particular the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, were seen by Russian leaders as masterminded by the West. Fears over similar scenarios replaying in Ru...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• Part I  Triangulating Perceptions among Regional Powers
• Part II  Security in the Shared Neighbourhood
• Part III  Competing Political and Economic Models in the Shared Neighbourhood
• Index