Professionals Making Judgments

The Professional Skill of Valuing and Assessing

A. Styhre

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781137369567
• eBook ISBN: 9781137369574
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business Strategy
• Index: Business

Professionals Making Judgments examines the role of judgment in professional work. The book makes the argument that too many studies of professionalism put emphasis on rational decision making. The more theoretical parts of the book are complemented by empirical studies of three distinct domains of professional practice.

Part I

Theory

1

Three Perspectives on Professional Judgment

Introduction

In this chapter, three forms of professional judgment will be discussed in detail. First, what will be called perceptual-epistemological judgment is judgment that is embedded in collective and professional ways of seeing. In this form of professional judgment, there is a split between, on the one hand, the visual or audible perception of the professional and, on the other hand, the underlying explanatory epistemological and theoretical framework capable of explaining or at least providing some meaningful operative hypothesis of what is being observed. The typical illustrative case here is the physician diagnosing a patient; the doctor speaks to the patient, looks at and touches him or her, and uses a few instruments such as the stethoscope to examine the heart. These observations are related to the various medicinal explanatory frameworks the physician is trained in diagnosing, and after a few iterations between what is visually observed and such operative theories, the physician may be able to articulate the diagnose and prescribe a therapy. Foucault (1973) suggested that the physician working in the clinic must transform him or herself to a “speaking eye,” having the capacity to look and articulate as one interrelated process. Perceptual-epistemological judgment is thus on the one hand embedded in visual practices, mediated or non-mediated, while on the other hand justified on basis of scientific know-how. The physician’s diagnoses are not random acts, but rather are based on training, previous experience, justified true beliefs in the profession of physicians, and so forth, and the accuracy of the diagnoses are ultimately verified on basis of the efficacy of the therapy prescribed.

In contrast, what will be named aesthetic-emotional judgment is based on professional norms and standards separated from underlying scientific theories and explanatory frameworks and clinical effects. If one uses the American Film Academy’s Oscar Award ceremony as an example, the assessment and ranking of one year’s production of movies is not a matter of finding the “best film” on basis of some kind of prescribed scientific standards, but instead a jury decides what film they think was the best on basis of the jury member’s professional expertise but also personal preferences. The outcome from aesthetic-emotional judgment is a ranking of a set of performances or qualities, but such a ranking is not justified on basis of scientific credentials or quantitative evidence, but rather on basis of professional norms and standards. While perceptual-epistemological judgment is based on a realist epistemology – actual human bodies qua material substratum being examined by physicians are “out there” in their immediate corporeality – aesthetic-emotional judgment is constructivist: it does not attempt to conceal the fact that judgments are ultimately based on nothing else than the professional communities’ shared and collective beliefs regarding quality and performance. In comparison to perceptual-epistemological judgment, aesthetic-emotional judgment may appear fickle inasmuch as it is not rooted in scientific knowledge production, but much professional judgment is in fact of this kind. At times certain professional communities claim they draw on scientific standards, while in fact scientific standards may play only a marginal role.

Third and finally, economic judgment denotes all kind of judgment involving financialization or economization, that is, the inscription of economic value into an underlying entity or resource. In some cases, such economic judgment is a run-of-the-mill activity, as for instance in the case of the Turkish cotton spot-market traders studied by Çalişkan (2007), while in other cases there is a need for a great deal of judicial and economic expertise to determine the value or price of something, for instance, the pricing of nature in the event of oil spill disasters (Fourcade, 2011). In the former case, the traders “live and breathe” the metrics being used and have little problem pricing the commodities being traded – which does not suggest that such a pricing procedure is devoid of skills or controversies – while in the latter case there are long-term investigations seeking to collect all the information that is needed to reach an agreement between the participants. Perceptual-epistemological judgment is realist in assuming that there are solid and robust standards for evaluating the outcomes from a decision, and aesthetic-emotional judgment is constructivist in terms of denying such de-contextualized means for reaching an agreement. Economic judgment is in an intermediary position between these end points inasmuch as professionals engaging in such judgment regard prices as the measure of economic value not so much as a stable signifier but as a heuristic, a tool for maintaining social relations and enabling the trade of commodities and services. The pricing of commodities and services is thus a pragmatic activity based on both legal frameworks and professional standards. In a market-based economy such as in the contemporary, late-modern capitalism, most actors “know” that “market prices” are fickle and volatile, moving up and down as a consequence of the volatility of supply and demand, and speaking of prices as if they were rooted in any kind of fixed costs (for example, production costs) is a faulty idea insofar as the cost of producing a commodity is separated from the price someone would be willing to pay for it in the market. Especially when it comes to “special goods” such as the arts markets where art objects are by definition unique, such linear relationships between commodity and its underling production cost become irrelevant. One of the challenges for economic judgment is how to commensurate heterogeneous resources on the basis of one single metric, that is, monetary units (US dollars, Japanese Yen, and so forth). As has been frequently pointed out, some commodities or services do not easily lend themselves to financialization and economization without violating social norms and beliefs (Zelizer, 2005). For instance, prostitution is a form of financialization of intimacy that for many people is deeply problematic, and in the case of reproductive medicine, the uses of gestational surrogacy is one clinical practice that is surrounded by controversy. Such controversies suggest that there are in fact certain human capacities that preferably must not become subject to economic judgment. That is why, for instance, any form of trade involving human organs is illegal under international law. There is an endemic shortage of human organs globally, and thousands of patients are on the waiting lists for transplant surgery (Sharp, 2003), and consequently the trade of human organs would certainly be a lucrative trade for anyone having access to human organs. However, open up for a trade that would make significant parts of the human population worth more dead than alive would have terrifying consequences, and therefore there are international agreement to closely regulate the circulation and use of human organs.

In a market-based economy, that of the neoliberal doctrine that has dominated since the late 1970s in the Western world, economic judgment is playing a more central role and in, for example, the national health-care services what are part of many welfare states, there is a day-to-day calculation of how public funding should be used to provide the best possible health-care for the largest possible share of the population. A common critique against neoliberal policies is that economic judgment is given a strong position in, for example, policymaking. That is, new domains of political decision-making are being subject to calculative practices that determine the economic worth of resources that traditionally have escaped such assessment. At the same time, in certain domains of politics, the capacity to calculate and determine the economic worth of, for example, investment in the culture sector, helps create a sense of transparency inasmuch as public investment in, for example, different cultural forms (say film festivals versus opera houses) are displayed and made commensurable.

The three form of professional judgment are presented in the Table 1.1.

In this chapter, the three forms of professional judgment will be examined in detail. In the second part of the book, empirical studies of such professional judgment practices will be presented, demonstrating the difficulties involved in making credible and solid judgment on the basis of incomplete but quite substantial amounts of information and in an environment where there are a variety of heterogeneous interests. As will be discussed in the final chapter of the book, it is a key professional competence to make a judgment on the basis of such far-from-perfect conditions. In addition, such professional judgment presupposes a professional community that can both justify and critically correct deviations from the instituted norms.

Table 1.1 Three forms of professional judgment

Perceptual–epistemological judgment: data and information as sources of judgment

The domain of perceptual-epistemological judgment is based on the combination of the production of scientific “facts” in the form of number series, ratios, images, and other forms of inscriptions that are analyzed, visually inspected, and interpreted by professional communities. Professional judgment is thus executed in the intersection between abstract professional know-how and expertise and the various technologies and apparatuses that produce the data and information examined. In the field of astronomy, for instance, there is a continuous and massive production of empirical data being collected by the community of astrophysicists, and the access to data vastly outnumbers the resources available for analyses. To be able to handle a larger share of the data amassed, computational and other technological analyses are used, but in some cases, the human mind is better equipped for determining the significance of astronomical data (Nielsen, 2012, chapter 8). Another field where massive amounts of data are being produced is medicine and pharmaceutical research, where new techniques such as biocomputation and what is called “systems biology” approaches are increasingly used (Styhre, 2011a; Torgersen, 2009; Fujimura, 2005; Walkenhauer, 2001). In general, the technosciences are in the position to produce large amounts of data, while analytical procedures still lag behind (Thacker, 2006).

In the following, a few cases of perceptual-epistemological judgment will be examined, all pointing at the caesura between the production of data and information and the analysis of it; professional judgment is based on the capacity to accomplish both things, to construct experimental systems that produce credible data and to account for what the data mean to us. The concept of perceptual-epistemological judgment is thus consonant with what Ian Hacking (1983) speaks of as “representing and intervening” in the technosciences (see also Galison, 1997, for an analysis of the case of the discipline of physics); scientists “intervene” into natural or social systems, and they “represent” them in the format of data, images, analytical models, theories, and so forth. While much of the production of facts in experimental systems is always already shaped by the underlying theorems and theories built into the experimental apparatus (Bachelard, 1984; Rheinberger, 1997), the actual assessment of the data produced is the critical moment where scientists collectively make sense of the data produced, and consequently the analytical procedures used are of key importance when understanding scientific practices. The two cases discussed below, that of meteorologists making predictions and the professional vision of professional communities, underline that even though professional judgment is supported by advanced technologies and the prestige of the institutions that professionals represent, there is always the risk of making the wrong judgment as such statements and declarations are always precarious acts. In other words, just like Downer (2011) and Smith (2009) suggested in their analyses of engineering design and software demonstrations, there is always room for the unexpected, and the professional engineer or demonstrator needs to be capable of anticipating and handling such uncertainty. Professional judgment is thus the capacity of making qualified decisions under uncertain conditions.

Cultures of prediction in meteorology

Gary Alan Fine’s (2007) ethnography of a group of Chicago-based meteorologists is one illustrative example of how professional judgment is constantly put to the test in day-to-day work activities. Meteorologists are an interesting professional community because their predictions – weather forecasts – are based on scientific procedures and know-how and because the accuracy of their predictions can easily and quite soon be verified. After all, meteorologists are making predictions that can be checked hour by hour, all through the day, week, or year: the meteorologists predicted rain in the afternoon – did it or did it not rain in the afternoon? In addition, their work and the accuracy of their predictions play a key role for many social actors and in the decision-making in different industries and settings. Will the weather conditions be good enough for launching the space shuttle? Can we have the party in the garden, or should we move indoors? Both small and quite important decisions are guided by the work of meteorologists. This locates meteorologists in the intersection between the world of science and the everyday life, and in general they are treated as spokespersons for a domain of expertise whose inner functioning barely reveals itself to the lay beneficiaries of weather forecasts. The “weatherman” or “weatherwoman” on television is commonly treated as a relay or a messenger in-between us and the underlying professional meteorological practices and technologies generating the forecasts. Since the community of meteorologists is rarely questioned or treated as if its members represented any particular perspective – it is uncommon to speak of, for example, “left-wing” or “right-wing” meteorologists, even if the issue of global warming and other environmental issues may change that in the future – people tend to get confused or even alarmed when forecasts are perceived as being wrong or unreliable. Meteorologists are expected to be neutral presenters of indisputable evidence that will prove itself to be accurate.

In reality, as Fine (2007) demonstrates, things are commonly more messy, and the self-imposed “neutrality” of weather forecasts must in itself be treated as a professional accomplishment. Similar to Smith’s (2009) software demonstrators, meteorologists are skilled in leaving much that can be subject to discussion outside of their presentations, and consequently they appear as more credible and trustworthy than what can be justified in terms of the actual accuracy of the forecasts. The basis for all meteorology is complex weather models, “extensive and elaborated sets of equations, based on theoretical assumptions about the nature of weather system” (Fine, 2007: 8. See also Sundberg, 2011, 2009). These models are based on theories, and new data are brought into the models to create predictions. Even though the models are constantly upgraded and modified on basis of new data produced and reported, the underlying weather systems that these models are aimed at representing are complex, and the theories are imprecise, making the models, Fine says, “imperfect estimations.” Similar to Downer’s (2011) engineers, compiling experimental data that needs to be balanced in the actual design of the engineered artifact, so too must meteorologists construct their weather models based on clinical data and construct weather models that are at best partial or accurate under specific conditions. Meteorologists need to trust their models, but at the same time they need to be aware of their limitations. Fine (2007: 48) refers to meteorologists as a “community of judgment” since their work is always a collective accomplishment and since judgment is an integral component in any prediction.

In Fine’s (2007: 101) view, there are four elements in all prediction work: (1) the gathering of data, (2) the enactment of a “disciplinary theory,” (3) a “historicized experience,” that is, extrapolation from past experiences, and (4) institutional legitimation. “First,” Fine writes,

The predictor must acquire empirical data, using a variety of technological devices, constituting a base from which extrapolation is possible. The collection of data results from institutional policies, resource allocation, and technological choices. These data are not transparent and must be translated and managed to become useful for the forecaster. (Fine, 2007: 101)

If the weather models are what guide and structure the forecast work, it still has a recursive relationship to the data collected inasmuch as the model “explains” the data, at the same time as the accumulated data constitutes the weather model. Still, unless the data consistently undermines the predictive power of the weather model, data is treated as input variables. Second, the predictor requires a “theory,” grounded in a “knowledge discipline” that permits routine predictions and extrapolation from available data. Theories are here playing a key role inasmuch as they “bring scientific legitimacy to the task of forecasting, suggesting a tested and proven basis for prediction” (Fine, 2007: 101). In other words, if there is no proper and widely shared theory of weather in the community of meteorologists, there are no possibilities for prediction, which in turn would undermine the legitimacy of the professional community. Theory is thus what stabilizes the data and what integrates the community of meteorologists. Third, the community of meteorologists needs to conceive of specific weather conditions, no matter how unique or idiosyncratic they are, as being part of a time series of historical weather events. That is, weather conditions observed today or tomorrow are always possible to relate to and understand on basis of previous events and conditions. Fourth and finally, all predictions need to be “institutionally legitimated.” Fine says that the prediction may be correct or inaccurate, but what ultimately grants it a social value is a matter of being taken seriously as a valid prediction by the wider social community and end users of weather forecasts. Meteorologists must therefore be affiliated with prestigious meteorological institutes and stress their credentials and scientific know-how. In addition, there may be competing meteorological institutes struggling over the authority to predict weather. In the case of Sweden, people living in the southern part of the country are more likely to use the Danish meteorological institute, as they believe that the meteorologists located in nearby Copenhagen are in a better position to predict the regional weather than the Swedish meteorological institute located in Norrköping further north on the Swedish east coast. In the same manner, people living on the west coast of Sweden are more likely to rely on the Norwegian meteorological institute for the same reason, as meteorologists located in Oslo, being closer than Norrköping, are expected to provide more accurate forecasts for the region. Such distrust for the Swedish meteorological institute is not strictly based on rational thinking, but testifies to the historical skepticism towards the eastern part of Sweden and Stockholm as the capital in the southern and western parts of the country, which were part of Denmark and Norway respectively for centuries. The social worth of weather is thus based on the ability to advance such predictions as legitimate and trustworthy statements.

More specifically, Fine (2007: 102) speaks of three forms of legitimation: “One is situated within the domain of specialized knowledge (occupational legitimation), the second is tied to the institutional structure (organizational legitimation), and the third is linked to impression management (presentational legitimation).” That is, weather forecasts are no...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction: On Judgment
• Part I  Theory
• Part II  Empirical Cases
• Part III  Analysis
• Appendix: Methodology of the Studies
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index