Institutional and Policy Change in the European Parliament

Deciding on Freedom, Security and Justice

Kenneth A. Loparo, Ariadna Ripoll Servent

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781137410542
• eBook ISBN: 9781137410559
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Civil Rights in Law
• Index: Politics & International Relations

In an EU increasingly worried about the security of its citizens and its territory, how should the European Parliament make policy decisions in these areas? This study investigates how the empowerment of the European Parliament has led it to abandon its defence of civil liberties in order to become a full partner in inter-institutional negotiations

Part I

1

The European Parliament: From ‘Talking-Shop’ to Co-Decider

Introduction

Chapter 1 offers an overview of the EP, with the objective of understanding how its role in EU decision-making processes has evolved from the outset of the European Communities until the recent changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. The chapter looks at the growing importance of the EP in the EU institutional triangle and offers an overview of its internal workings. Opening the ‘black box’ is essential to understanding the different levels of decision-making inside the EP and their relevance for inter-institutional negotiations. Therefore, this chapter pays special attention to the EP’s committee system and its key actors (‘relais actors’) so as to help one better understand how the EP translates policy positions into specific policy outcomes.

The first section looks at the EP as part of the EU’s institutional framework and its changing place in the institutional balance. The second section focuses on how the EP functions – looking at its institutional organisation and its main actors. Finally, the last section reviews the institution’s main political dimensions. The objective is to follow the evolution of the EP from its origin as a ‘sidekick’ in the process of European integration to its transition into a full-fledged parliament that can be studied alongside its national counterparts.

1.1. The European Parliament in European integration

The EP started as a fledgling institution in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as a Common Assembly constituted of representatives of national parliaments. It was not until the 1970s that the EP (as it started to call itself in 1962) gained widespread importance, first, due to the extension of its budgetary powers and then with the direct elections introduced in 1979. After this first burst of excitement, enthusiasm for the EP declined both in the political and academic arenas. This was caused by the persistence of large areas of unanimity in the Council – either determined by the Treaties or introduced de facto by the Luxembourg compromise, which allowed member states to bypass QMV if vital national interests were at stake. In addition, the use of the consultation procedure reinforced the EP’s lack of influence in EU decision-making, since it only required the EP to provide its opinion on the Commission’s proposal but left the final decision to the Council.

Therefore, the introduction of the cooperation procedure in the Single European Act (SEA) (1986) and, especially, of the co-decision procedure in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) created a small revolution. The cooperation procedure added a second reading to the basic consultation procedure, and it was thus a first attempt to give the EP a chance to introduce amendments and have a say over policy outcomes (Moser 1997). The formal changes were deemed insufficient and, as a result, the changes in the Treaty of Maastricht made it more difficult to pass a Council common position without the EP’s agreement. To this effect, it created a ‘conciliation committee’ after the second reading, which should strive to find a compromise between the two co-legislators. The Amsterdam Treaty reinforced the veto power of the EP since it prevented the Council from voting on its common position if the conciliation committee failed to find an agreement (Tsebelis & Garrett 2000).

From that moment onwards, the EP ceased to be a ‘talking shop’ and instead became one of the main actors in EU decision-making. With its gradual formal empowerment came the realisation that the institution had actually been fighting its own battles to acquire more competences and powers for quite a long time. Specifically, the EP fought for the right to have a bigger say on budgetary matters or on the appointment of the Commission. These episodes underlined the significance of key individuals, who were successful in using either their political clairvoyance or a favourable window of opportunity to expand the influence of the EP (Corbett 2001; Priestley 2008). In fact, the distance between the EP and EU citizens helped to isolate policymaking and strengthened the EP’s quest for more powers and influence in the EU institutional framework (Rozenberg 2009).

This slow change in the balance of power also underlines the importance of formal and informal institutional change in-between Treaty reforms,¹ what Farrell and Héritier (2007a, 2007b) named ‘interstitial’ institutional change. ‘Interstitial’ change occurred, for instance, when developments in the informal workings of the conciliation committee – the use of informal meetings in particular – resulted in increased powers for the EP and improved cooperation with the Council. Similarly, the EP also made use of inter-institutional agreements to fill in any grey zones in the treaties that could potentially result in an expansion of its functions and powers (Garman & Hilditch 1998; Maurer 2007). The EP’s creeping powers were helped by shared perceptions of the EU’s democratic deficit: increasing the role of the only directly elected institution was presented as the most legitimate instrument to fill a perceived gap in direct representation of EU citizens (Rittberger 2005, 2012). Informal developments of treaty reforms, however, have not been uniformly in favour of the EP. For instance, a recent reform of the comitology system (a network of expert committees in charge of assisting the Commission in the implementation of EU legislation) saw the Council successfully use the implementation of new treaty articles to ‘claw back’ power on delegated acts, that is, non-essential decisions that help to complement legislative acts or update their scientific or technical specifications (Christiansen & Dobbels 2012).

Debates on democracy and representation led to question the role that the EP should have in the EU’s institutional structure. For instance, Hix and Bartolini (2006) started a debate on the desirability of politicising the EU and transforming it into a parliamentary system. This debate triggered several reactions leading to broader considerations about the ideal political system for the EU, usually in the form of either a parliamentary democracy or a full separation of powers system similar to the United States (Magnette & Papadopoulos 2008; Shackleton 2005). Hix (2008) considered that politicising the EU (for example, linking the EP’s elections with the political orientation of the Commission) would be the solution to the EU’s democratic deficit (see also Hix & Hagemann 2009). However, the low levels of participation and second-order nature of EP elections question whether politicising the EU and empowering the EP might actually contribute to increasing the overall legitimacy of the system (Blondel et al. 1998).

These questions have sparked interest on the nature and functioning of EP elections. As Farrell and Scully put it, elections can be understood as ‘geographical representation’ (2010: 38), that is, as a link between the domestic electorates and their elected members. In this sense, the domestic electoral systems may have an impact on how MEPs define their role once working in the EP. The link can also work in the other direction, depending on how MEPs are selected at the national level and, especially, on how campaigns are fought; European citizens will be differently informed of and interested in EP elections (Bowler & Farrell 1993, 2011; Gherghina & Chiru 2010; Wüst 2009).

However, EP elections have been mostly seen as a source of democratic representativeness for the EU’s institutional structure, therefore raising the question of whether (or to what extent) the EP represents European citizens.² It is now generally agreed that EP elections are second-order elections (Eijk & Franklin 1996; Reif & Schmitt 1980). That is, these elections are not fought on European issues but, rather, are seen as secondary national elections focusing mostly on domestic affairs.³ Therefore, there are concerns that voters are not accurately represented in the EP, since often the positions of national parties – which are still the main actors in European elections – are not aligned with those of their respective political groups at the EU level. In addition, the problematic link between citizens and MEPs is exacerbated by the low levels of turnout and the presence of vote switching between national and European elections, caused not only by a general lack of interest in European matters but also by mistrust towards the EP and of dissatisfaction with the EU (Clark 2013; Franklin & Hobolt 2011; Hobolt & Spoon 2012; Lefkofridi & Katsanidou 2014; Mattila 2003; McEvoy 2012; Stockemer 2012).

1.2. Opening the ‘black box’: Committees and ‘relais actors’

The first section of this chapter looked at the EP as an object of the European integration process, putting particular emphasis on inter-institutional relations. From this perspective, the EP appears as a ‘black box’ – a unitary actor characterised by its sui generis nature and its continuous attempts to gain more influence inside the EU’s political system. However, the EP can also be understood as a ‘normal’ parliament – ‘part of the European political “establishment” ’ (Maurer 2007: 18) – with its own internal politics and structures that need to be understood if one wishes to understand the role and influence of the EP in the wider political system.

Crucially, by investigating the internal workings of the EP, it becomes apparent that its key organs and actors need to be better understood. Crucially, parliamentary committees are essential for the current study. Committees have existed since the creation of the Common Assembly in 1953, but they have experienced a gradual reinforcement. They are organised around policy areas or specific thematic fields, such as human or women’s rights, and therefore they have become the EP’s ‘legislative backbone’ (Westlake 1994: 191). In general, it has been recognised that committees fulfil an informational role, allowing members to specialise and become experts in a specific policy field (Bowler & Farrell 1995; Neuhold 2001; Yordanova 2009a). EP committees are also characterised by their high levels of internal consensus and autonomy; nevertheless, they are highly representative of the political composition of the EP as a whole (McElroy 2006; Neuhold 2007).

The representativeness of committees is crucial, since most political debates take place at that level. The leading committee is largely responsible for examining the details of the Commission’s proposal and starting negotiations with the Council. Plenary debates rarely go into details and new amendments are seldom introduced at that level. Therefore, committee reports are treated as ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ options (Hix 2005: 93; Neuhold 2001). Given the increased workload of the EP and the technical nature of the dossiers, committees generally dictate the direction of votes (Ringe 2009). Speeches and oral questions in plenary are used mostly for political purposes, for instance, to send signals to their national political party, rather than to discuss specific policy alternatives (Proksch & Slapin 2010, 2011). Concerns have been voiced about the power of committees and how they affect the EP’s capacity to act as an arena for debate and conflict; more workload and specialisation does not usually come hand in hand with improved legitimacy and accountability (Kohler 2014).

The influence of EP committees is most noticeable when they work under co-decision. For instance, the environment committee (ENVI) became one of the most powerful committees inside the EP as a result of its active involvement in decision-making; since the late 1980s, it shouldered the largest legislative workload, both under the cooperation and the co-decision procedures (Burns & Carter 2010; Judge & Earnshaw 1994). In comparison, those committees, like Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI),⁴ that lacked formal decision-making powers had to make use of informal measures – such as amplifying and politicising European debates – to expand their influence. Interestingly, committees, such as Foreign Affairs (AFET) or Committee of Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) , characterised by their non- (or very limited) legislative nature, managed to build a reputation that attracted prominent members of the EP, such as former prime ministers or other members of government (Beauvallet et al. 2009; Diedrichs 2004; Roederer-Rynning 2003).

Political groups are the other main organisational structure inside the EP. These groups gather national delegations with similar ideological positions; in plenary, MEPs sit with their political group, not with other members of their country. Therefore, the presence of political groups is central to the workings of the EP and enhances the supranational character of the institution (Kreppel 2001; Maurer et al. 2007). The composition of EP groups has remained relatively stable in the last decades, with two large groups dominating the EP’s political life. The conservative Christian democrats – now called European People’s Party (EPP) – are the largest group in the EP and are flanked on the right by the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and radical right and Eurosceptic groupings, such as the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD). Parties on the right of the EPP have shown difficulties in maintaining a stable membership and a coherent profile (Abedi & Lundberg 2009; Startin 2010). On the left side of the political spectrum, the socialists – now Socialists and Democrats (S&D) – regroup the biggest number of left-wing MEPs. They are joined at the sides by the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) and the radical left, European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), comprised mostly of reformed communist parties. Finally, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) occupies the middle ground and has often been essential to build winning majorities (Smith 2014, see also Chapter 9).

Despite the diversity of national parties represented in each of these groups and the absence of instruments to control their members – such as the capacity to name candidates for the next elections – EP political parties have been characterised by their capacity to behave cohesively and coherently. National delegations tend to join those EP political groups that present the highest political congruence, which enhances competition between the various EP groups. Cohesion is, therefore, the product of both policy specialisation across committees and internal organisation (Hix et al. 2009; McElroy 2001; McElroy & Benoit 2012). Indeed, expert MEPs inside each committee serve as focal points for the other members of their national delegation or political group; nonexperts generally rely on the judgement of expert colleagues to cast their final vote (Ringe 2009).

Therefor...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables and Figures
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• Part I
• Part II
• Annex: Interviews List
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index